CRANFIELD UNIVERSITY

NAILA SALIHU

TRANSFORMING DEFENCE IN GHANA'S FOURTH REPUBLIC

CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND RESILIENCE

PhD THESIS

ACADEMIC YEAR: 2017/2018

SUPERVISOR: PROFESSOR LAURA CLEARY

MARCH 2018

CRANFIELD UNIVERSITY

CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND RESILIENCE

PhD THESIS

ACADEMIC YEAR: 2017/2018

NAILA SALIHU

TRANSFORMING DEFENCE IN GHANA'S FOURTH REPUBLIC

SUPERVISOR: PROFESSOR LAURA CLEARY

This thesis is submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in International Security and Defence

Abstract

Armed forces play an instrumental role in maintaining stability in West Africa, yet they have also been a major destabilizing actor due to their role in frequent coup d'états and human rights abuses. Ghana's armed forces in particular, has a colonial and authoritarian history. It therefore requires change to align with the political transition of the country. The thesis seeks to answers to the question; has Ghana's processes of defence transformation contributed to healthier civil-military relations and consolidation of democracy in the Fourth Republic? David Chuter's Guide to Defence Transformation and Rebecca Schiff's Concordance Theory of civil-military relations provide a dual framework of analyses of developments in Ghana's defence sector since 1992. A qualitative approach to research design, data gathering and analysis was used to establish that Ghana's defence sector has undergone transformational change which has been organically driven by the political, socio-economic and security conditions of the country.

Ghana Armed Forces in particular, has gradually undergone cultural, human, organizational and political transformation. These relative changes have contributed to a politico-military concordance that has helped sustain the Fourth Republic. Successes or otherwise of the reforms are very much dependent on commitment to change by both political authorities and the military hierarchy. There is agreement between military and political elites on key variables: social composition of the officer corps, recruitment, political decision- making process and military style. There have been some changes where the state and its security and defence institutions are no longer seen as agents of fear and repression. Nonetheless, the citizenry are not factored into the defence decision making process. The opening up of the political space has provided opportunities for civil society actors and media to begin to show interest in engaging the military. Ghana has made satisfactory progress in bringing the defence sector in time with the current democratic dispensation. Yet, there is the need for the Ghana to do more by initiating a more holistic defence transformation process to effectively transform the armed forces and other defence management and oversight institutions.

Acknowledgements

My deepest gratitude goes to Allah for his mercy, guidance and blessings throughout my life. I wish to express my profound appreciation to my supervisor, Professor Laura Cleary, for the kindness and patience with which she guided me to complete this work. Laura, I am sorry for the long and winding draft chapters. Your comments and advice actually helped put them in focus. I am most grateful for the constructive comments from members of the Thesis Committee (TC) which helped me shape my thoughts. Since the start of my study in October 2012, membership of the TC changed as faculty members moved on. I have been privileged to work with Dr Matt Quatrop, Dr Sukanya Podder and Dr Teri McConville. I am also very grateful to Faculty and Staff of the Centre for International Security and Resilience, especially Anne Harbour, and staff of the Barrington Library for their enormous assistance.

My deepest gratitude goes to Executive Management of Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre, KAPTIC, especially, former Commandant, Air Vice Marshal, CEK Dovlo, (Retired), the Director of Faculty of Academic Affairs and Research, (FAAR), Dr Kwesi Aning, who saw the potential in me and recommended me for further studies. I really appreciate the comments from Dr Aning and Dr Thomas Jaye, during the writing stages. They have been supportive and always pressed me to work hard to complete my studies on schedule. Special thanks goes to Brigadier-General (Dr), Emmanuel Kotia, who took keen interest in my research and helped in diverse ways including scheduling appointments for my interviews with key informants from the Ghana Armed Forces, both serving and retired. I am highly indebted to my other colleagues at FAAR, especially Dr Emma Birikorang, who introduced me to this area of research when I was asked to submit a research proposal for consideration for sponsorship. Emma, your suggestion has been worthwhile and I actually enjoyed the research.

I am also grateful to my husband, Awudu and daughter, Hajara Khadeeja, for their support and understanding during the long years of my studies. Awudu has always encouraged me to pursue higher studies, and provided enormous moral support and practical help throughout the study. He was always ready to read and comment on drafts and help with drawing of diagrams, despite his busy personal schedule. Thanks go to my family members, especially my dad, Alhaji Salihu Rasheed and my sisters: Fatima Batul, Fulera, and Mina, for their immense support and encouragements.

I wish to state that even though I have received support in various ways from the above mentioned persons, I am solely responsible for the content of this thesis

Table of Contents

Glossary of Acronyms

ACDR	Association of Committees for the Defence of the Revolution
ACOTA	African Contingency Operation Training and Assistance
ACRI	African Crisis Response Initiative
AFC	Armed Forces Council
AFRC	Armed Forces Revolutionary Council
ASDR	Africa Security Dialogue and Research
ASSN	African Security Sector Network
AU	African Union
BECE	Basic Education Certificate Examination
BMATT	British Military Assistant Technical Team
BNI	Bureau of National Investigations
CAS	Chief of Air Staff
CDR	Committees for the Defence of the Revolution
CDD-Ghana	Ghana Centre for Democratic Development
CDS	Chief of Defence Staff
CEF	Civic Education Forum
CHRAJ	Commission of Human Rights and Administrative Justice
CIMCSED	Civil–Military Collaboration for Socio-Economic Development in Ghana Programme
C-IN-C	Commander-In-Chief
CNS	Chief of Naval Staff
COAS	Chief of Army Staff
CPP	Convention People's Party

CSOs	Civil Society Organizations
CVCs	Citizens Vetting Committees
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DCAF	Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces
DIHOC	Defence Industries Holding Company
DISEC	District Security Councils
ECOMOG	Economic Community of West Africa Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EPA	Environmental Protection Authority
ERP	Economic Recovery Programme
FAAR	Faculty of Academic Affairs and Research
FMF	Foreign Military Financing
GAF	Ghana Armed Forces
GAFCSC	Ghana Armed Forces Command and Staff College
GCC	Gold Coast Constabulary
GCR	Gold Coast Regiment
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GIS	Ghana Immigration Service
GMA	Ghana Military Academy
GNFS	Ghana National Fire Service
GPS	Ghana Prisons Service
IMF	International Monetary Fund
JAG	Judge Advocate-General
JFM	June Fourth Movement
KAIPTC	Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre
KNRG	Kwame Nkrumah Revolutionary Guards

MDAs	Ministries, Departments and Agencies
MOD	Ministry of Defence
MoGCSP	Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Protection
MTAP	Military Training Assistance Programme
MTEF	Medium to long term expenditure framework
NADMO	National Disaster Management Organization
NAP	National Action Plans
NCCE	National Commission for Civic Education
NCD	National Commission on Democracy
NCO	Non-Commissioned Officer
NDC	National Democratic Congress
NDM	National Democratic Movement
NESTF	National Election Security Taskforce
NIRP	National Institutional Renewal Programme
NLC	National Liberation Council
NPP	New Patriotic Party
NRC	National Redemption Council
NSC	National Security Council
NSS	National Security Strategy
OECD	Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development
ONUC	United Nations Operation in the Congo
OpTraLog	Operational, Training and Logistic
ORBAT	Order of Battle
P/WDC	Peoples' and Workers' Defence Committees
PAC	Public Accounts Committee
PDA	Preventive Detention Act

PGSO	Principal General Staff Officer
PIP	Performance Improvement Plan
PNDC	Provisional National Defence Council
PNP	People's National Party
PP	Progress Party
PSCC	Petroleum Security Coordinating Committee
PSCD&I	Parliamentary Select Committee on Defence and Interior
PSO	Peace Support Operation
PT	Public Tribunal
RACCI	Royal African Colonial Corps of Light Infantry
RECAMP	Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capabilities Programme
REGSEC	Regional Security Council
RMA	Revolution in Military Affairs
RTS	Recruits Training School
SADC	Southern African Development Commission
SAP	Structural Adjustment Programme
SMC	Supreme Military Council
SSDAT	Security Sector Development Advisory Team
SSR	Security Sector Reform
TC	Thesis Committee
TCC	Troop Contributing Countries
UNIGOV	Union Government
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNSC	UN Security Council
WAFF	West African Frontier Force

List of Figures

List of Tables

CHAPTER ONE

1. 1 Background to the study

West Africa comprises fifteen countries with varying levels of political and socio-economic developments.[1] Economic mismanagement and political authoritarianism sowed the seeds for the devastating problems in the region.[2] Since the 1990s, there have been some positive developments in promoting democracy in Africa generally. This is in response to the post-Cold War international and domestic clamour for democratization. The region's politico-security environment seems to be in constant flux with political systems ranging from entrenched authoritarianism to democracy.

The transition processes have varied across the region, taking place in each state within its own unique context and at its own pace.[3] Countries such as Ghana, Benin, Senegal, Cape Verde and Nigeria have made significant progress. Despite these developments, the dividends of democratic peace and socio-economic development are mixed and yet to be fully realized in West Africa. Specifically, the democratic deficit, referring to lack of good governance has resulted in political violence often ending in military interventions and violent intra-state conflicts.[4]

The literature on African civil military relations, especially those dating from the 1960s and 1970s, has focused primarily on motivations of military intervention in politics and how to keep the military out of politics. A variety of reasons for the frequency of military interventions into African politics have been cited: ethnicity, weak state institutions, abuse of power, dictatorship, economic mismanagement, human rights abuse, and politicization of national armies, military centrality, and external aid.[5] Claude Welch categorized these reasons into three broad factors namely: 1) intra-military factors, 2) domestic factors, and 3) external factors.[6]

Table 1-1: Causes of Military Interventions in Politics

Intra-Military Factors	Domestic Factors	External Factors
Military corporate grievances Cohesion Recruitment and promotion practices Salaries, deployment	Ethnic and Class cleavages Internal violence Economic distribution Fragmentation of institutional boundaries	External aid Reference group ideas Contagious effects of adjacent countries

Source: Welsh, (1986)

This is partly attributed to the high incidence of coups in West Africa. From 1963 to 2015, the region recorded about 46 successful coups d'état accounting for half the number of coups in the entire African continent. The majority of the coups d'état occurred in 7 countries: Nigeria (6), Ghana (5), Burkina Faso (6), Niger (4) Guinea Bissau (4), Benin (5), and Sierra Leone (5). Other countries with fewer instances of coups were: Mali (3), Togo (3), Guinea (2), Liberia (1), Gambia (1) and Cote d'Ivoire (1).[7] Cape Verde and Senegal have remained coup free. The most recent coups in the region occurred in Guinea (2008), Niger (2010), Mali and Guinea Bissau (2012), Burkina Faso (2014) and (2015).

Jimmy Kandeh rightly notes two waves of military interventions in West Africa. The first wave occurred in the first two decades of independence; from the 1960s to 1970s, when mostly senior officers masterminded coups d'état. In contrast, during the second wave from the 1980s to 1990s were mainly orchestrated by junior officers or rank and file of militaries.[8] However, this distinction between the first and second waves is not precise, as in both periods coups d'états were conducted by both junior ranks and senior officers. For example, the first coup d'état in Africa occurred in the West African country of Togo in 1963, when non-commissioned officers returning from the French army after service in Vietnam and Algeria seized power from first President, Sylvanus Olympio. The coup was led by a former Master-Sergeant in the French army, Emmanuel Bodjolle.[9] Moreover, the recent cases of coups d'état in the 2000s appeared to be a mixture of both. For instance, the putsches in Niger (2010) and Guinea Bissau (2012) were led by senior officers while a recent coup in Mali 2012 was led by junior officers.

Before the advent of coups d'états in West Africa, militarism, defined as the pervasive influence of military principles and ideas in society[10] played a significant role in African affairs. This was prevalent in the historical and political evolutionary processes before the encounter with the Europeans.[11] Several examples point to the existence of indigenous armies in kingdoms such as the Zulu of South Africa, Dahomey (Benin), and Ashanti of Gold Coast (Ghana).[12] For example, there were wars involving these armies and the British in the then Gold Coast. Nonetheless, the patterns of civil-military relations of contemporary West African countries are influenced by their historical, colonial and post-independence experiences. Historically rooted pathologies about the role of the security and defence forces in society have resulted in deep cleavages between state, security sector, particularly the military, and citizens in many contemporary African settings.[13] These can be traced back to the inception of colonial security institutions and their relations to political authority on the one hand, and the society on the other.[14] Colonial rule made little distinction between civilian and military administrations.[15] African troops were mainly recruited and trained to serve the political interest of the colonial powers to quell indigenous resistance and maintain a local version of pax Britannica or pax Gallica.[16]

Besides dealing with internal security problems, there were other principal motives behind the building of large armies by colonial powers. They provided colonial masters with greater strategic mobility, and facilitated the safeguarding of capital investments of the colonial powers and their nationals and provided a useful manpower reserve of mobilization in times of war.[17] Militaries were structured to suit these external requirements rather than the interests of the indigenous people.[18] Therefore, armies were seen as 'armies of Africa, rather than African armies' as they existed to serve colonial objectives, usually outside the societies they were drawn from.[19] The use of the colonial armies as agents of suppression caused fear and even dislike for the colonial military, and this colonial legacy has indeed influenced civil-military relations in the post-independence era. [20] It is argued that the use of African armies for political purposes during the colonial era is an important factor in determining the behaviour of African armies after independence and the extent to which they acquired legitimacy and prestige among the population. In most African societies, the army was regarded with fear and hostility and often linked with low societal status. [21] This is partly attributed to the calibre of people recruited into the colonial armies.

Transformation of colonial regiments into national armies of newly independent states posed challenges in terms of establishing legitimacy and effectiveness. As noted by William Gutteridge, "substantial number of senior soldiers in African armies were recruited to meet the needs of imperial powers and, therefore, on assumptions that were not ideally suited to the needs of a new nationalist state."[22] However, the status quo was maintained by most post-independence African leaders who appeared more interested in building large armies for the purposes of regime stability. Most African leaders in the immediate post-independence era adopted one-party political systems, often built around strong charismatic rulers. The prevailing trend in the region especially in the immediate post-independence era has been the tendency of successive political leaders to resort to deleterious devices such as patron-client systems, ethnic manipulation, and politicization of the military. [23] These created divided militaries and undermined professionalism of the security apparatus. In most cases, there was little or no attempt to articulate and codify defence policies in West African states.[24] In this milieu, coups d'états started as newly trained African officers became very politically conscious. [25] These military interventions often came with destabilizing consequences such as devastating military rules, intra-military conflicts, insurgencies and even civil wars. Even in those African states where civil wars did not occur, the security sector, especially the military, are influential in the political landscape, where autocratic regimes ruled with iron hands, often using the military to inflict severe hardships on the citizens. Such acts included extra-judicial arrests, assassinations, false imprisonment, brutality against opponents, and exhibited a culture of impunity. The military remains an important force in the very existence of the state as well as political governance processes.

The post-Cold War era of democratization has witnessed a relative decline in coups in West Africa. Although no country in West Africa is currently under military rule, lingering effects from the past continue to exert a negative influence on civil management, control and oversight of the military and security sector in the region's current democratizing dispensation.[26] Recent events in West Africa have demonstrated both negative and positive signs. Even during the periods of civilian rule, there have been allegations and reports of plots and failed attempts at coups d'états across the region. The coups in Niger (February 2010), Mali (March 2012), Guinea-Bissau (April 2012), Burkina Faso (2014) could be described as a return to the days of coups. The events in these countries highlight the impact of external forces on fragile and weak African political systems with poorly trained and equipped militaries.[27] West African states, due to their mixed history of civil-military relations have benefited from the international development agenda of security and defence sector reform which started in the late 1990s, to promote sustainable peace and development in societies in transition from conflict or long-term authoritarian rule.[28] The drive for security and defence sector reforms in major national and international policy agenda is informed by the general understanding that an unreformed security sector presents major obstacles to the promotion of sustainable development, democracy and peace.[29] Such reform agenda was borne out of several reasons including the recognition that the majority of the countries that have undergone civil war in the past 30 years are in Africa and about half of them relapsed into political violence within a few years of peace.[30] The security and defence sectors, particularly the military have been a double-edged sword in the governance processes of most West African countries. On the one hand, the security sector has helped maintain both regime and state stability. On the other hand, the propensity to intervene in politics and the attendant misrule and human rights abuses have been a major cause of political instability and human insecurity in most parts of the continent. A primary aim of security and defence sector reforms has been to ensure that the military observes the supremacy of democratic institutions and respect civilians and their human rights.[31]

In this regard, defence and security sector reform initiatives have been undertaken in almost all democratizing West African countries as part of public sector reform processes though with mixed outcomes.[32] Some analysts have observed that countries such as Liberia and Sierra Leone which have witnessed the complete collapse of security due to conflicts provide a more permissive and enabling environment for SSR than non-conflict contexts like Ghana.[33] The African civil-military relations context differs significantly from that of advanced western democracies. Rocky Williams for instance, argues that despite formal mechanisms and institutions of civil control which are largely influenced by Anglo-Saxon or Western ideas, the reality underpinning African civil-military relations is the fact that the

subordination of the armed forces to civil control in most countries, when this occurs, has been as a result of complex systems of processes and interfaces of a non-institutional nature.[34] Hence, in most cases, real control of the armed forces by civil authorities whether they are democratically elected or not, is exercised by a range of subjective interfaces and partnerships which may include informal mechanisms or merely the formal expression of power relations.[35] Thus civilian control of the armed forces is often achieved based on some established principles of civil and democratic controls, as well as existing societal relationships.

In Ghana, which is the case study for the thesis, several years of militarization of politics and society engendered a volatile political environment.[36] By way of history, Ghana gained independence in 1957 amidst high hopes of socio-economic and political developments. However, the realization of these aspirations was soon truncated as the country suffered a succession of military coups and periods of military rule, interspersed with short-lived returns to civilian rule.[37]The country has been ruled by four different military governments. This began with the 1966 coup d'état when the National Liberation Council (NLC) overthrew the first post-independence government of Kwame Nkrumah. Since then, there have been three successful coups orchestrated by the military in 1972, 1979 and 1981.[38] Denis Austin posits that "if the first coup was an optimistic attempt by the army to break the enforced monopoly of single party government and to restore competitive politics to a disenfranchised electorate, the second coup marked the arrival of the army as one of the permanent contenders for power."[39]After the February coup of 1966,

> "there began the search for a very different arrangement of power at the national level – very different from the world of the dominant party or the single party – a world in which Ghana was now one of a number of states in which the army had taken its place either in the council chamber or sufficiently close to its doors to be able to impose its will from time to time on whoever rules by its favour."[40]

Military intervention in Ghanaian politics has been described as "the armed forces constrained substitution of their own policies and/or their persons, for those of the recognized civilian authority." [41] The frequent military interventions in politics resulted in what Eboe Hutchful referred to as the "decomposition of the security sector." [42] For instance, coups d'états led to a rapid turnover in top command positions and thus decimated the officer corps. This led to the deterioration of professionalism in the armed forces. In addition, coups provided avenues for corruption by the armed forces. Other factors such as increased polarization, class contradictions in the forces, erosions of internal cohesion and

decline in the legitimacy of the entire hierarchy of the armed forces.[43] But since the return to constitutional rule in 1992, Ghana has been generally perceived as a stable and peaceful nation with relatively professionalized armed forces in a sub-region plagued by protracted conflicts and political instability. The fundamental issue is the role of the defence sector in ensuring the continuity of the democratic process. Writing in 1975, Austin correctly predicted the pattern of governance mechanisms in Ghana for decades to come, the pattern of frequent military incursion into politics. Yet, while this pattern continued for more than three decades after independence military intrusion into Ghanaian politics has significantly reduced since 1992. As in many states, the military has indeed reached a watershed and have actually metamorphosed into a credible national force.[44] Indeed, Ghana's military has evolved to such an extent that from the 1960s it has been at the forefront in efforts to restore peace and security to several countries in Africa and abroad,[45] while Ghana has become signatory to several protocols and agreements barring the military from political power. These include the ECOWAS Supplementary Protocol on Good Governance and Democracy (2001), the African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance in Africa (2007). The 1992 Fourth Republic constitution of Ghana, Under Article 3(3), specifically states that any unlawful overthrow of the Constitution constitutes high treason, which is punishable by death.[46]

1.2 Statement of the Problem

The defence sector has been a primary source of insecurity and political instability in Ghana. Therefore reforms aimed at restoring its professionalism and efficiency to ensure the credibility of the state as the primary source of security for its citizenry has been a major desire in the country.[47] Reform of the defence sector has been at the centre of Ghana's remarkable democratic transformation, especially for ensuring regime survival and providing the stable environment necessary for policy reform.[48] The emphasis on the political roles of militaries in the dominant literature has led to a lack of detailed analysis on how African militaries are being transformed to carry out their defence and security functions efficiently and effectively, rather than viewed solely as internal political actors.[49] Even though Ghana's defence sector has an authoritarian past, and thus requires some level of change to ensure that it conforms to the democratic principles that Ghana has acceded to, it has not undergone any coordinated transformation of the type alluded to by Chuter.[50] According to Chuter, defence transformation encompasses four major clusters, which are cultural transformation, entailing the transformation of the culture of the institution; human transformation, entailing the transformation of the composition of the institution with regard to its racial, ethnic, regional and gender composition; political transformation, which strives to ensure the conduct and character of the institution conforms to the political features of the democracy within which it is located; and organizational transformation,

constitutes a more technocratic process within which relevant organizations are right-sized.[51]

Indeed, there have been some changes within Ghana's defence sector, but these changes have happened in piecemeal fashion. However, some aspects of the changes which have, or seem to have taken place in Ghana do fall within the four broad clusters mentioned above. These changes have taken place in the absence of a well-articulated national security strategy and a defence policy. Thus, reforms have been ad hoc and incoherent and therefore very difficult to identify or measure. In addition, reform of the defence sector in Ghana has focused on developing institutional frameworks to promote increased democratic governance of the security sector. However, there are certain constraints such as the politicization of institutions of formal oversight functions like parliaments, and their lack of technical expertise to perform their functions.[52] Besides, the excessive influence of the military in both politics and society are barriers to enhancing democratic oversight.[53]

Several analyses have been done of security sector reform in post-conflict countries such as Sierra Leone, South Africa, and Liberia. However, there are gaps in the analysis of defence sector governance in non-post-conflict contexts like Ghana. It is argued that policy choices about management and control of the military and the security sector during the times of crises, transition or in peace times, and the "democratic strategies" toward them, are indeed decisive for consolidation of democracy, conflict prevention and building of sustainable peace.[54] Nonetheless, most of the existing literature on civil-military relations in emerging democracies is preoccupied with issues of preventing coups: civil or democratic control of armed forces. Therefore, there are no exhaustive analyses of the role of armed forces in the consolidation of democracy, especially in relations to the efficiency and effectiveness of the security sector, and the implications of their roles and missions for democracy.[55] For example, one analyst argues that "for democracy to sink deep roots on the continent, the security sector needs to be a willing partner in the process of democratic consolidation."[56] While Ghana's military has not officially intruded into politics since the last coup of December 1981, the armed forces need transformation. This is because countries that were hitherto on a similar course of democratic consolidation, have seen a democratic reversal because the armed forces have not been entirely transformed.

One of the great historical obstacles to the stability of democracy in developing countries has been subordinating the military to civilian rule or control. [57]This has arguably led to the stagnation and regression in democratic consolidation and sometimes, complete breakdown of democratic processes.[58] The cases of recent military interventions in West African politics make it clear that the military coup is not just a problem of the political past, but a continuing danger, even for electoral democracies that have persisted for over a decade.[59]

Eboe Hutchful noted that civil control of the military in the independent state has historically been a myth.[60] Particularly, the existence of a civilian regime does not necessarily suggest civil control of the military. The above observation is particularly true during a certain period of Ghana's political history. There have been some changes in this regard. The study therefore examines the change in Ghana's defence sector since the return to constitutional democracy in 1992. Specifically, it investigates how the transformation process has contributed to improving civil-military relations and consolidation of democracy in Ghana.

.

1.3 Research Question

Has Ghana's processes of defence transformation contributed to healthier civil-military relations and consolidation of democracy in the Fourth Republic?

1.4 Goal and Objectives of the study

The overall aim of the study is to undertake an enquiry into the processes of defence transformation in Ghana. Specifically, the study seeks to achieve the following objectives:

a) Investigate Ghana's processes at transforming her defence sector in line with democratic principles;
b) Relate the theories and concepts of civil-military relations and defence transformation to the Ghanaian case;
c) Examine the contribution of Ghana's defence sector towards the consolidation of democracy; and;
d) Identify the lessons other countries in the sub-region and the continent could draw from Ghana.

1.5 Methodology

The study is based on a qualitative approach to design, data gathering and analyses. Qualitative method is best suited for addressing research questions that require explanation of social phenomena and their contexts. This approach is preferred for the purpose of this study due to the emphasis it places on social and political processes and institutions. The key issues of this study-civil-military relations and defence transformation can be best studied qualitatively to illuminate how patterns of events unfold over time. Although other qualitative and even quantitative research designs such as surveys, experiments and historical analysis could be employed, the epistemological position of the researcher and the aims and needs of the research rule them out. The qualitative research design selected for this study is a single-case study. The study aims at deeper understanding of a complex social phenomenon of defence transformation processes in Ghana, rather than measurements, this therefore rules out the use of other strategies like experiments or

surveys. Therefore, the research design for the study is a single-case on Ghana's defence sector.

A single-case study design is most preferred as it allows a "thick description" and deeper understanding of processes.[61] Thick description is an interpretative practice which traces how meanings are made by focusing on the accounts of local informants on the flow of social discourses at the microscopic level.[62] The case study on Ghana explores deeply how defence transformation process could contribute to improved civil-military relations needed for the consolidation of democracy. The case selection is informed by several factors and primary among them is that most analysis on defence and security sector reform in West Africa has focused extensively on post-conflict environments which are deemed permissive of reforms. While Ghana is not a post-conflict country, the military has a mixed history. Interestingly, the country has remained relatively stable since the return to constitutional democracy in 1992 in the absence of a well-articulated defence transformation process. This requires a systematic investigation to actually establish the real changes or non-changes in the defence sector. By focusing on Ghana, the findings and policy recommendations that arise from the case study could have relevance for other West African countries in need of holistic transformation of their defence sector.

Furthermore, a single-case study is compelling because there is no exhaustive study on Ghana or any other West African country through the dual lenses of Schiff's Concordance theory of civil-military relations and Chuter's framework for defence transformation. In this regard, a single-case study represents the critical case for testing the theoretical and conceptual frameworks upon which the study is hinged. Rebecca Schiff considers the unique historical and cultural experiences of nations and moves beyond institutional analysis of civil military relations by arguing that in order to prevent the military from interfering in domestic politics, three societal institutions: the military, political elites and citizenry must work and maintain cooperation or partnership agreement in four areas; the social composition of the officer corps; political decision-making process; method of recruitment of personnel and style of the military.[63] In addition, analyzing Ghana's contemporary civil-military relations from Schiff's theoretical proposition, there is a general view that since the advent of the Fourth Republic in 1992 something has changed within the Ghana Armed Forces and Ghanaian society that needs to be studied. Therefore, the research examines what exactly has changed in Ghana's defence sector using Chuter's conceptual framework. Chuter conceptualizes defence transformation to encompass four major clusters, namely: 1) cultural transformation, which entails the transformation of the culture of the institution, 2) human transformation, the transformation of the composition of the institution with regard to its racial, ethnic, regional and gender composition, etc.; 3) political transformation, which strives to ensure the conduct and character of the institution

conforms to the political features of the democracy within which it is located; and 4) organizational transformation, which constitutes a more technocratic process within which the organization is right-sized, among other factors.[64]

A case study employs a plethora of data collection and analysis tools depending on the needs of the research at a point in time. One of the primary research methods used was field research through the use of semi-structured interviews with a sample size of 72 people. This population was purposively drawn from members of the Ghana Armed Forces; both in active service and retired, technocrats, politicians and ordinary citizenry to support the theoretical and conceptual frameworks. This method was preferred because the focus of the research, defence transformation processes in Ghana is largely un-documented and thus requires qualitative interviews with the relevant stakeholders to generate data. The study made use of a broad review of the secondary data from existing literature on civil military relations and democratic governance of security and defence sector in West Africa, in general, and Ghana, in particular.

For the case study, qualitative content analysis of primary and secondary data was used to identify and analyse issues that are of theoretical importance and relate meaningfully to the central research question.[65] The data was therefore clustered and analysed into four broad themes of defence transformation proposed by Chuter. These approaches also enabled the researcher to examine the role Ghana's defence sector in the consolidation of democracy. Furthermore, data gathered on civil-military relations in Ghana was analysed using the theoretical lens of Rebecca Schiff's concordance theory of civil-military relations to explore how the theories and principles of civil-military relations apply in the Ghanaian context. The findings and conclusions of the study are therefore based on subjective interpretations of the available data informed by the evidence from the literature review and interviews.

1.6 Scope of the study

The DAC/OEDC Guidelines on Security System Reform and Governance, outline the core actors of the security and defence sectors to include the armed forces; police; gendarmeries; paramilitary forces; presidential guards, intelligence and security services (both military and civilian); coast guards; border guards; customs authorities; reserve or local security units (civil defence forces, national guards, militias).[66]However, this study is selectively focused on Ghana's defence sector. The key actors here include Ghana Armed Forces (the army, air force and the navy) and defence management institutions and oversight bodies such as Ministry of Defence and Parliament respectively. The study focuses on various

reform processes in Ghana's defence sector since the return of the country to democratic rule in 1992. Specifically it highlights the various initiatives implemented by successive governments since the inception of the Fourth Republic to transform the defence sector. For comparative purposes, the study takes a panoramic look at the armed forces and the political development processes since independence to highlight the consistencies or otherwise of the current situation. For the purpose of the study, analysis of developments in the defence sector is limited to periods from 1992 to 2016.

1.7 Limitations of the study

Research on the military has a set of practical challenges for civilian researchers especially. These often relate to issues of access to spaces and research participants, classified documents, gatekeeper relations and the often gendered military hierarchical culture.[67] One major limitation of the research is the challenge of gaining access to the defence sector in Ghana; as such matters are usually regarded as sensitive and confidential. To overcome this challenge requires practical approaches to negotiating one's relationship to the military establishment. The researcher had to rely on her professional experience as staff of the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC), an institution affiliated to the Ministry of Defence, Ghana to obtain access to key informants and documents from the Ghana Armed Forces. In this regard, valuable data was secured through formal and informal contacts with serving and retired officials of the Ghana Armed Forces. Another limitation was sensitivity and confidentiality of defence and military issues in Ghana. To overcome this challenge, the research objectives and purpose of the study were clearly stated and shared with relevant informants. Findings and conclusions of the research are therefore informed by the qualitative analysis of the available primary and secondary information.

1.8 Rationale and Originality of the study

In most African countries, the security and defence sectors have played a dual role in maintaining state stability, while at the same time being a major destabilizing factor. Some recent analyses have pointed to the problematic issue that military acceptance of civilian authority remains a missing piece of Africa's democratic transition puzzle. [68] At the same time, the competence and knowledge of civilian authorities about military affairs is also lacking. Particularly, application of principles of good governance to the defence sector though not impossible appears daunting for African democracies. Accordingly, the process of defence transformation can be considered as essential to the process of democratic consolidation. The study seeks to contribute to the growing literature on transformation processes of the security and defence sectors in Ghana through a deeper examination of the processes so far, as well as the application of some of the theoretical and conceptual

constructs on civil-military relations and defence transformation to the Ghanaian experience. A lot of work has been done on defence reforms in post-conflict societies in Africa. However, there exist only a few analyses in the area of defence transformation in transitional democracies like Ghana, that are perceived to be doing well in terms of its democratic governance process. This study therefore, seeks to address that gap in literature by conducting a detailed study of Ghana's defence transformation processes. The study could serve to inform defence and security policy in Ghana, especially as the country is yet to adopt a comprehensive national security framework and defence policy. Lessons learnt from the Ghana case could potentially be applied in other West African countries which have similar socio-political histories and face common challenges in terms of defence reform.

1.9 Organization of the study

The study is organized into seven chapters. Chapter one constitutes the background to the problem and research objectives. The second chapter reviews some of the scholarly works on civil-military relations and defence transformation. It seeks to identify the gaps in the existing literature and set out the theoretical and conceptual framework upon which the study is hinged. In doing this, the chapter navigates through the literature of civil-military relations, generally and the military in African politics, in particular. Some of the prevailing analysis of the challenges of military disengagement in politics were explored to set the tone to holistic transformation of defence in the region as means of enhancing efficiency and effectiveness of the armed forces *vis–a-vis* their evolving role in the contemporary governance and development process. The review of literature in the field of civil-military relations and African militaries establishes the knowledge gap on how defence transformation could contribute to healthy civil-military relations which is deemed essential for democratic consolidation and political stability in emerging democracies. In this regard, chapter three explains the research methodology employed to answer the research questions. This chapter therefore reflects on some of the key research paradigms and philosophies that inform the research design, methods of data collection and analysis of results.

Chapter four provides the background to Ghana's current political dispensation. It situates the discussion within the paradigm and normative shifts in civil-military relations following the advent of the post-Cold War international system. To place the Ghana Armed Forces within this context, the chapter traces the post-independence political trajectory of Ghana during which the country witnessed musical chairs of military and civilians in politics from 1959 to 1979. This is followed by a discussion on the PNDC regime and democratic transition from 1981-1992. Against this background, the chapter then examines the place of the Ghana Armed Forces in the emerging democratic dispensation under the Fourth

Republic (1992-2016). It also analyses the constitutional and institutional mechanisms that exist for managing civil-military relations and the role of armed forces in the current democratic dispensation. Essentially, the chapter argues that post-Cold War international system has necessitated a rethink in entire defence set up in most countries around the globe. In the case of countries that transition from authoritarian military regimes to democracies as Ghana, it is more imperative to clearly situate the armed forces, as an important state institution in the democratic process.

Having established the place of the Ghana Armed Forces in the "new" democracy, the next chapter takes a critical look at the defence sector in its present state through the lens of the defence transformation process as posited by Chuter, in order to gauge the extent of change within Ghana's defence sector. The chapter attempts to examine those changes or non-changes which have taken place within Ghana's defence sector in terms of cultural, human, organizational and political transformation. The chapter argues that, the defence sector in Ghana has seen some changes. Particularly, the Ghana Armed Forces, as an institution has seen some changes with regards to human, cultural, political and organizational setup. However, these transformations have not been comprehensive and a well-coordinated national process. This sets the pace to examine how the changes in the defence sector have contributed to the current state of civil-military relations in the Fourth Republic.

Based on the analysis of the preceding chapters, chapter six looks at the state of civil-military relations in the Fourth Republic through the concordance theoretical framework. The chapter basically argues that civil-military relations in Ghana's Fourth Republic despite its chequered history is experiencing some relative improvement and thus contributed to the country's growing democratic credentials. It is gradually moving from frostiness to relative thawing of relations. Particularly, there has not been any overt attempt at overthrowing a government since 1992. This state of affairs, however, has been achieved by partnership or concordance between two actors- the political elites and military on some of the variables of concordance proffered by Schiff- the social composition of the officer corps, political-decision-making process and the recruitment method and military style. There is the realization among these actors that their mutual interests would be best served within a democracy, notwithstanding the challenges.[69] The citizenry, the third partner, is not essentially part of the equation.[70] The chapter takes the discussion further to examine the current state of the relationship between the military and key civil society groups and the media. A changing relationship is seen as the GAF is becoming increasingly receptive to civil society and media. Nonetheless, there remains mutual mistrust between the military and CSOs and media due to difference in organizational cultures and approaches to business.

The concluding chapter seven reflects on the research question and objectives of the study and declares the key findings, and possibilities that exist for effectively transforming the defence sector in Ghana. The strengths and weaknesses of the work are also noted with some recommendations made on future areas for research.

1.10 Summary

The defence sectors, particularly the armed forces, are considered essential agents for the consolidation of new democracies in West Africa. Ghana in particular has made relative gains in reversing the endemic militarization of politics especially from the 1960s through to the 1980s. The country has since 1992 evolved into a relatively stable democracy. Efforts at defence and security sector governance contributed significantly to this achievement in a troubled sub region prone to coups and political instability. The study undertakes a deeper examination into the transformation processes taking place in the GAF to make it play an efficient and effective role in the process of consolidation of the country's relatively young democracy. The subject area, especially the essence of management of the defence sector in nurturing democracy and the approach taken in this work are key factors that help convey the novelty of the study. The subject area of defence sector transformation, remains largely understudied in most non-post conflict but post-authoritarian West African states. A review of the literature is required to identify the knowledge gap which this study could possibly contribute to fill.

Endnotes

[1]The fifteen countries in West Africa are: Ghana, Togo, Benin, Cote d'Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Senegal, Gambia, Nigeria, Mali, and Niger. All these state are members of the Economic Community of West African states.

[2] Zack-Williams, Tunde, Frost, Diane, and Thompson, Alex, (2002), *Africa in Crisis: New Challenges and Possibilities*, London: Pluto Press.

[3]Bryden, Alan and N'Diaye, Boubacar, (2011), "Mapping Security Sector Governance in Francophone West Africa", In, *Security Sector Governance in Francophone West Africa: Realities and Opportunities*, edited by Bryden, Alan and N'Diaye, Boubacar, 1-16, Geneva: Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces DCAF; Crawford, Gordon and Gabriell, Lynch, (2011), "Democratization in African 1990-2010: An Assessment", *Democratization*, 18(2):275-310.

[4]Aning, Kwesi and Bah, Sarjoh, (2009), "ECOWAS and Conflict Prevention in West Africa: Confronting the Triple Threats", New York: Center on International Cooperation, September, p.12.

[5] Chazan, Naomi, Lewis, Peter, Mortimer, Robert, Rothschild, Donald, and Stedman, John, (1999*), Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa*, Third Edition, Boulder, Co: Lynne Rienner Publishers; Jenkins, Craig, and Kposawa, Augustine, (1992), "The Political Origins of African Military Coups: Ethnic Competition, Military Centrality, and the Struggle over the Postcolonial States", *International Studies Quarterly*, 36(3):271-291.

[6] Welch, Claude, (1986), "From 'Armies of Africans' to 'African Armies': The Evolutions of Military Force in Africa", In: *African Armies: Evolution and Capabilities*, edited by Arlinghause, Bruce and Baker, Pauline. 11-13, Colorado: World View Press; Goldsworthy, David, (1986), "Armies and Politics in Civilian regimes", In: *Military Power and Politics in Black Africa*, edited by Baynham, Simon, 97-128, New York: St Martin's Press.

[7] Souaré, Issaka, (2010), "Critical Assessment of Security Challenges in West Africa", Situation *Report*, Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, October 18; Souare, Issaka, (2014), "The African Union as a Norm Entrepreneur on Military Coups d'état in Africa (1952-2012): An Empirical Assessment', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 52(1):69-94.

[8] Kandeh, Jimmy, (2004), "Civil-Military Relations", In: *West Africa's Security Challenges: Building Peace in a Troubled Region*, edited by Adebajo, Adekeye and Ismail, Rashid, pp.145-168. Boulder Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Shaw, Martin, (1991), *Post-Military Society*: *Militarism, Demilitarization and War at the end of Twentieth Century*, Cambridge: Polity Press.

[11] Edgerton, Robert, (2002), *Africa's Armies: From Honor to Infamy*, Bolder Colorado: Westview Press.

[12]Assensoh, Akwasi, and Alex-Assensoh, Yvett, (2003*), African Military History and Policies: Ideological Coups and Incursions 1900-Present*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

[13] Bryden, Alan, and Olonisakin, Funmi, (2010), "Enabling Security Sector Transformation in Africa", In: *Security Sector Transformation in Africa*, edited by Alan Bryden and Olonisakin, Funmi, 291-220, Geneva: DCAF, LIT VERLAG.
[14]Ngoma, Naison, (2006a), "Civil-Military Relations in Africa: Navigating Uncharted Waters", *African Security Review*, 15(4): 98-111.
[15]Gutteridge, William, (1967), "The Political Role of African Armed Forces: The Impact of Foreign Military Assistance", *African Affairs*, 66(263): 93-103.
[16]Killingray, David, (1982), "Military and Labour Recruitment in the Gold Coast during the Second World War", *The Journal of African History*, 23(1): 83-95; Aboagye, Festus, (1999a), *The Ghana Army: A Concise Contemporary Guide to its Centennial Regimental History 1897-1999*, Accra: Sedco Publishing Limited.
[17] Van den Berghe, Pierre, (1970), "The Military and Political Change in Africa", In: *Soldier and State in Africa: A Comparative Analysis of Military Intervention and Political Change*, edited by Welch, Claude, 252-266, Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Welch, (1986), op. cit. p.16.
[20] Ngoma, (2006), op. cit.
[21] Van den Berghe, (1970), op. cit.
[22]Gutteridge, (1967), op. cit., p.94.
[23]Goldsworthy, (1986), op. cit; Boubacar, N'Diaye, (2005), "Not a Miracle After all: Côte d'Ivoire's Downfall: Flawed Civil-Military Relations and Missed Opportunities", South *African Journal of Military Studies*, 33(1):89-118.
[24] Fayemi, Kayode, (1998), "The Future of Demilitarization and Civil Military Relations in West Africa: Challenges and Prospects for Democratic Consolidation", *African Journal of Political Science*, 3(1): 82-103.
[25]Van den Berghe, (1970), op. cit.
[26]Souare, (2014), op. cit.
[27]Rupiya, Martin, (2013), "Sub-Saharan Africa: Decolonization to Multiparty Democracy and the Challenges of Transforming Military Institutions'" In *Military Engagement: Influencing Armed Forces Worldwide to Support Democratic Transitions*, Edited by Blair, Dennis, Vol. 2, 188-214, Washington, D.C.: Brookings institution Press.
[28]Bryden, Alan, N'Diaye, Boubacar and Olonisakin, Funmi, (2008), "Understanding the Challenges of Security Sector Governance in West Africa", In: *Challenges of Security Sector Governance in West Africa*, edited by Bryden, Alan, N'Diaye, Boubacar and Olonisakin, Funmi, 3-26, Geneva: DCAF, LIT VERLAG.
[29] Soeters, Joseph, and Manigart, Philippe, (2008), "Introduction", In: *Military Cooperation in Multinational Peace Operations—Managing Cultural Diversity and Crisis Response*, edited by Soeters, Joseph and Manigart, Philippe. 1-10, London: Routledge.
[30]Collier, Paul, and Anke, Hoeffler (2004), "The Challenge of Reducing the Global Incidence of Civil War", *Copenhagen Consensus Challenge Paper*, 26 March. Available at http://www.copenhagensonsensus.com/Files/Filer/CC/Papers/Conflicts_230404.pdf (accessed in December 4, 2012); Hutchful, Eboe, (2003), "Pulling from the Brink: Ghana's Experience", in: *Governing Insecurity: Democratic Control of Military and Security Establishment in Transitional Democracies*. Edited by Gavin Cawthra and Robin Luckham, 78-101, London: Zed Books.
[31] Alao, Abiodun, (2000), "Security Reform in Democratic Nigeria", Conflict, Security and Development Group Working Paper, Centre for Defence Studies, Kings College, University of London.
[32] Jaye, Thomas, (2008),"Liberia's Security Sector Legislation", Geneva: Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF); Podder, Sunkaya, (2013)," Bridging the 'Conceptual–Contextual' Divide: Security Sector Reform in Liberia and UNMIL Transition", *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding*, 7(3): 353-380; Ebo, Adedeji, (2007), "The Role of Security Sector Reform in Sustainable Development: Donor Policy Trends and Challenges", Conflict, S*ecurity and Development*, 7 (1): 27-60.
[33] Sharman, Jake, (2009), *Strengthening Security Sector Governance in West Africa*. New York: Center on International Cooperation; Jaye, Thomas, and Ebo, Adedeji, (2008), "Liberia", In: *Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector in West Africa*, edited by Ebo, Adedeji and N'Diaye, Boubacar. 139-158, Geneva: DCAF.

[34]Williams, Rocky (1998), "Towards the Creation of an African Civil-Military Relations Tradition", *African Journal of Political Science*, 3(1):20-41.
[35]Williams, (1998), op. cit.
[36]Boafo-Arthur, Kwame, (2008), "'Democracy and Stability in West Africa", Claude Ake Memorial Papers, Volume 4, Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute; Gyimah-Boadi, Emmanuel, (1994), "Ghana's Uncertain political opening", Journal *of democracy*, 5(2): 75-86; Ocquaye, Mike, (1980), *Politics in Ghana: 1972-1979*, Accra: Tonardo Publications.
[37] Hutchful, Eboe, (2006), "Ghana", In: *Budgeting for the Military Sector in Africa: The Process and Mechanisms of Control*, edited by Omitoogun, Wuyi, and Hutchful, Eboe. 72-80, Oxford: SIPRI.
[38] The military regimes apart from the NLC which ruled from February 1966-September 1969 were the National Redemption Council (January 1972- October 1975), The Supreme Military Council (SMC) 1 (October 1975 - July 1978)and SMC 2 - (July 1978 - June 1979), the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council, (June 1979-September. 1979) and the Provisional National Defence Council (Dec 1981-Jan 1993).
[39] Austin Denis and Luckham, Robin, (1975), *Politicians and Soldiers in Ghana.* London: Frank Cass Paperbacks, p.5.
[40]Austin and Luckham, (1975), op. cit. p.3.
[41]Finer, Samuel, (1962), *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics*. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, p.23.
[42]Hutchful, (2006), op. cit. p. 80
[43]Ibid.
[44]Thom, William, (1986), "Sub-Saharan Africa's changing military capabilities", In: *African Armies: Evolution and Capabilities*, edited by Arlinghause, Bruce and Baker, Pauline, 97-112, Colorado: World View Press.
[45] Aning, Kwesi and Aubyn, Festus, (2013), "Ghana", In: *Providing Peacekeepers The Politics, Challenges, and Future of United Nations Peacekeeping Contributions*, edited by Bellamy, Alex, and Williams, Paul, 269-290, Oxford University Press.
[46] Republic of Ghana, (1992),1992 Constitution, Accra: Government Printer
[47]Hutchful,(2006), op. cit.
[48] Ibid.
[49]Ostheimer, John, (1986), "Peacekeeping and Warmaking: Future Military Challenges in Africa", In: *African Armies: Evolution and Capabilities*, edited by Arlinghause, Bruce, and Baker, Pauline, 32-51, Colorado: World View Press.
[50] Chuter, David, (2000), *Defence Transformation: A Short Guide to the Issues*. ISS Monograph No. 49, August.
[51] Ibid.
[52]Hutchful, Eboe, (1997), "Military Policy and Reform in Ghana", *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 35(2): 251-278; Aning, Kwesi and Lartey, Ernest, (2009), Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector: Lessons from Ghana. New York: The Center on International Cooperation.
[53]Aning, Kwesi, (2004), "Military Imports and Sustainable Development: Case Study Analysis—Ghana", *African Security Dialogue and Research*, Available at http://allafrica.com/download/resource/main/main/idatcs (Accessed on November 28, 2017).
[54]Luckham, Robin, (2003), "Democratic strategies for security in transition and conflict", In: *Governing Insecurity: Democratic Control of Military and Security Establishment in Transitional Democracies*, edited by Cawthra, Gavin, and Luckham, Robin, London: Zed Books, p.3.
[55] Bruneau, Thomas, and Mate, Cris, (2008), "Towards a New Conceptualization of Democratization and Civil-Military Relations", *Democratization*, 15(5):910.
[56] Houngnikpo, Mathurin, (2012), "Africa's Militaries: A Missing Link in Democratic Transition", *Africa Security Brief*, January, p.2.
[57]Barracca, Steven, (2007), "Military Coup in the Post-Cold War era: Pakistan, Ecuador and Venezuala", *Third World Quarterly*, (28) 1:137-154.

[58]Croissant, Aurel, Kuehn, David, Chambers, Paul, and Wolf, Siegfried. (2010), "Beyond the Fallacy of Coup-ism: Conceptualizing Civilian Control of the Military in Emerging Democracies", *Democratization*, 17(5): 950-975
[59] Barraca, (2007); Jaye, (2008), op. cit.
[60]Hutchful, (1997), op cit.
[61] Geertz, Clifford, (1973*), The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays*, New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers.
[62] Ibid.
[63] Schiff, Rebecca, (2009*), The Military and domestic politics: A Concordance Theory of Civil-Military Relations*, London: Routledge; Schiff, Rebecca. (1995), "Civil-Military Relations Reconsidered: A Theory of Concordance", Armed *Forces & Society*, 22 (1):7-24.
[64] Chuter, (2000), op. cit.
[65]Sarantakos, Sotirios, (2005), *Social Research*. Third Edition. New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
[66]DAC/OEDC *Guidelines on Security System Reform and Governance* (2005).
[67] Rech, Mathew, Jenkings, Neil, Williams, Alison and Woodward, Rachel, (2016), "An Introduction to Military Research Methods", In: *The Routledge Companion to Military Research Methods*, Edited by Williams, Alison et al. 1-20. London: Routledge.
[68] Hougnikpo, (2012), op. cit.
[69] Agyemang-Duah, Barfour (2002), "Civil-military Relations in Ghana's Fourth Republic", *Critical Perspectives* No.9, Accra: Ghana Center for Democratic Development.
[70] Cleary, Laura, (2012), "Lost in Translation: The Challenge of Exporting Models of Civil-Military Relations", *Prism*, 3(2), p.20.

CHAPTER TWO

A Review of the Civil-Military Relations Problem and Defence Transformation in Africa

2.0 Introduction

The armed forces as an institution of the state occupy a unique role in any society. In most cases, the operations of the armed forces are linked to the existence of the state. Tasked with ensuring the defence of the state, armed forces are closely related to the larger society. For example, military expenditure has significant bearing on the national economy, while its human resource requirement has implications for able-bodied citizenry. The way armed forces operate and are managed sets them apart from other institutions of the state and their relationship with the society as a whole. Besides the traditional protective role of the military against external enemies, the institution has evolved over the years to serve a number of societal goods. As Giuseppe Caforio notes that 'the state is the sole client of the military and no other client is permitted.[1] Rocky Williams adds, that

> "The control of state over the military and the context within which the military practice their profession is not only economic, but comprehensive. Accession, promotion, training, missions, force structure, etcetera are all determined directly or indirectly by the state. The state control over the military as institution is not transitory, but continuous. Therefore, considerations of the state and its impact on the state are often in the foreground of any discussion of civil-military relations."[2]

Martin Edmonds argues that the study of the relations between the armed forces and the society is a relatively new field of enquiry. Its emergence and expansion like other fields of inquiry is a product of its social and political relevance on one hand, and the development of new theories and analytical approaches on the other.[3] Civil-military relations have received a great deal of scholarly attention in the field of social sciences, particularly from political scientists, historians and sociologists. Gregory Foster, for example adds that civil-military relations have become issues of universal concern in the post-modern world. In this regard, it must be defined by four imperatives: globalization, global democratization, the continued viability of the state and the performance and legitimacy of the military, acting as both organ of the state and an important institution of the state.[4] The role of the military in nation- building and consolidation of nascent democracies compels a deeper study of civil-military relations. In essence, civil-military relations are concerned with the interfaces between the military sector and the different segments of the society in which the military exists and operates. The focus of these important relations is especially on processes,

institutions and mechanisms by which the military sector is brought under constitutional civil authority. These therefore, include how the military interfaces with state institutions, civil society, media, and social groupings such as ethnic and religious groups within the society.[5]

This chapter reviews some of the scholarly works on civil-military relations and defence transformation. It seeks to identify the gaps in the existing literature and set out the theoretical and conceptual framework upon which the study is hinged.

2.1.1 Clarification of Key Concepts

The traditional concern with civil-military relations has been the political role of militaries, motivations and causes of military intervention in politics,[6] and how to manage civil-military relations to curb coups d'état.[7]Other related concerns have been the nature of military governments.[8] However, with the transition to democratic rule in most coups d'état prone continents like Africa, Latin America and to some extent the Middle East, coupled with the obvious limitation of the traditional approaches, some civil-military relations analysts have proposed a more holistic approach to the governance of the security and defence sectors. In this milieu, terms such as civilian and civil control, democratic control and oversight have been at the crux of the civil-military relations debate. A brief clarification of these concepts might be useful for this study. Civil control has been defined by Chuter as the obedience owed to the state (*civis*) by the military.[9] This implies the allegiance of the armed forces to the larger civil society and not only the government. Chuter argues that in reality, civil control is only a technicality, but the important issue is for the military to accept that it is the servant of the nation of which the state is the agent.[10] While it is incumbent on the military to adhere to that principle, the politicians and civil servants are expected to believe in this same principle.[11] In addition, the term, civilian control, often seen as the critical component of democratic and civil control rather than an independent variable, is achieved through the appointment of civilian political officials to positions of responsibility over the armed forces. It also requires granting of decision making powers to civil servants. Nonetheless, actions of both politicians and civil servants must be guided by a constitutional order or framework subject to the rule of law.[12] Civilians (politicians and technocrats) must also have the competence to engage the military in the governance process. However, this is most lacking in most African countries.[13]

Democratic control has been defined as the subordination of the armed forces to democratically elected political authorities, who are responsible for taking decisions that concern the defence of country.[14] Robin Luckham argues that the concept of democratic control recognizes that civilian governments are not necessarily democratic.[15] Further, he

adds that democratic control can be seen as a contested process, not as a fixed attribute of existing democracies. This is because, first, democracy itself has a contested nature, and second, some of the largest democratic deficits can be found in the security sector. Arguably, even some democratic governments have the tendency to halt democracy at the barracks doors or in the corridors of the secret state.[16] Therefore the concept requires a more nuanced understanding of political governance, including the fact that even democratic governments may abuse their national security powers and misuse their military forces. Democratic deficits in the security sector manifest themselves in the form of pervasive secrecy, lack of accountability, corruption, human rights abuses, over reliance on coercion, political militaries etcetera, and thus present different challenges to policy.[17] Democratic control needs to be buttressed by principles and supported by certain activities. For instance, civilian authorities should have effective control over the military's missions, force composition, and budget and procurement policies. Defence and military policies must be defined or approved by the civilian leadership, but the military must enjoy a substantial operational autonomy in determining which operations are required to achieve the policy objectives defined by the civilian authority. [18] Other conditions like democratic parliamentary oversight institutions, a strong civil society and an independent media should watch over the activities of the military. This would help ensure transparency and accountability to both the population and the government.

In addition, the term control in the civil-military relations discourse presents some challenges. To some analysts, it implies a relationship of power and superiority, and evokes a scenario of an uncompromising military desperate to grab power, which needs to be constrained by clearly defined constitutional provisions.[19] The term also implies a pejorative meaning in some languages.[20] In the view of other analysts, it implies a dictatorial approach, even though it actually seeks to prescribe a more collaborative relationship.[21] To this end, a more sensitive term management is being proposed by some analysts. This term implies the generation of capability through careful planning and efficient and effective use of resources.[22] It has been noted that the doctrine of democratic civilian control of the military boosts the legitimacy, capabilities, and performance of the armed forces.[23] However, it is illustrative to note that achieving this principle in emerging democracies is not devoid of challenges. In most instances in emerging democracies, the assertion of civilian control has been problematic, because it has not been linked to a broader policy framework or initiatives. [24]

2.1.2 Exploring the Civil-Military Relations Problem

The literature in the field has largely focused on the control of the armed forces by the highest political or civilian authority. Prominent among the wide range of issues is whether civil-military relations are conflictual or cooperative, reflecting the balance of power

between civilians and the military. Other concerns of the debates include direct and indirect interaction among ordinary people, institutions and the military. Matters of legislative wrangling, funding, regulation and the use of the military; as well as the complex bargaining between civilians and military elites in the definition and implementation of national security policy are essential to the debate.[25]

It is widely held by theorists that the civil-military problem lies in the notion that the very institution created to protect the polity can become a threat to the polity.[26] The problem is therefore balancing the somewhat uneasy relationship between the military and *civis*: the state, civilian political authority and the society in general. It is argued that on the one hand, the military must be strong enough to prevail in war as the main purpose of establishing it is the need or perceived need to protect the state by either attacking other groups or to ward off attack by others. Therefore, the military must be strong enough to squarely meet the threats confronting the state. To this end, it should not be vitiated to make it weak to protect. On the other hand, just as the military protect the state against perceived or real enemies or external attacks, it must conduct its affairs in ways that do not destroy or prey on the society it is intended to protect.[27] Therefore, the military's monopoly over coercive force must not be directed at the very society it is meant to protect. The direct seizure of political power by the military has been the traditional concern of civil-military relations theory.[28] The phenomenon of coups has been the traditional worry because it significantly shows the crux of the problem of the military exploiting their coercive powers to displace civilian authorities.[29] Under the broad issue of coup d'états, various political scientists have offered a two-pronged interpretation: a) frequency of coup d'états, b) the likelihood of success of coups.[30] Nonetheless, other issues of how a parasitic military could destroy the society by draining it of the resources needed for other socio-economic developments in a quest for a strong military to ward off real or imagined external enemies of the state has been worthy of scholarly and policy debates. Another key concern of civil-military discourse has been the issue of obedience: whether the military will obey their civilian masters, or will use their monopoly of coercive power to resist civilian authority. [31]

Rahbek-Clemmensen *et al* argue that different scholars mean different things when they refer to the civil-military gap.[32] They succinctly conceptualize these varied gaps into four distinct (though not mutually exhaustive) types: cultural, demographic, policy preference and institutional. First, the cultural gap refers to whether the attitude and values of civilian and military populations differ. Second, the demographic gap is whether or not the military represents the population in its partisan and socio-economic makeup. Third, the policy preference gap separates the military and civilian elites based on agreement or disagreements on a range of public policy issues. Fourth, the institutional gap relates to whether the relationship between military and civilian institution is in harmony or

conflictual. While recognizing the ever-increasing need of the civil-military relations debates, they advocate for a clarification of frameworks from which debates are constructed. In this regard they rightly argue that a specification of distinct conceptualizations of the gap could improve the literature.

Analysts through several generations have offered different points of view on the civil-military problem and how to resolve it. Early political thinkers such as Plato in *The Republic,* Nicolo Machiavelli in *The Prince,* Clausewitz in *On War*, have all attempted to provide theoretical explanation of the problem. While Machiavelli calls for close attention to military affairs if one wants to remain in power, Clausewitz, points to central role of the military in achieving policy objectives of the state through war. However, recent debates have dwelt mainly on the works of Samuel Huntington, Morris Janowitz, Samuel Finer, Peter Feaver, among others, who belong to the institutional-separation approach.[33] These works provide useful analytical frameworks for contemporary debates on civil-military relations. This school of thought is based on descriptive generalization of conditions in the post-World War and Cold War eras of the 1950s, and 1960s. It emphasizes control of the armed services as precondition to safeguarding state sovereignty and national interest. This includes issues such as preventing armed forces from interfering in political systems they are created to defend and ensuring that armed forces serve the interest of their civilian masters; whether in preserving territorial integrity or in defence of the national interest abroad. This school is also concerned with separation of civil and military spheres. In other words, the focus is on institutional structures and interactions between civilians and military officers within decision making structures. Samuel Huntington's seminal work, *The Soldier and the State*, provides a classical explanation of the above mentioned approach to maintaining civil-military relations. In the words of Huntington,

> "the military institutions of any society are shaped by two forces; a functional imperative stemming from the threats to the society's security and a societal imperative arising from the social forces, ideologies, and institutions dominant within the society… military institutions which reflect only social values may be incapable of performing effectively their military function…It may be impossible to contain within a society, military institutions shaped purely by functional imperatives."[34]

Therefore, interaction of these two forces is arguably the essence of the civil-military problematic. He underlines that any system of civil-military relations involves a complex equilibrium between authority, influence, ideology of the military on the one hand, and the authority, influence ideology of non-military groups on the other.[35] Huntington rightly

recognizes that there is tension between the desire for civilian control and the need for military security. Huntington thus proposes two main principles: objective civilian control- which entails maximizing military professionalism and subjective civilian control: which refers to maximization of civilian power. In his view, the civil-military problem can be resolved through a system of objective civilian control over the military, which involves enhancing military security. From Huntington's analysis, there is a form of civilian control that enhances subordination of the military and military fighting power. The main crux of Huntington's objective control is professionalism of the military, particularly the officer corps. In essence, he argues that it is professionalism, defined by expertise, responsibility and corporate identity that distinguish the modern military officer from his peers in years gone past. The specific skill or expertise of the military officer is the management of violence which includes: 1) organizing, equipping and training of this force, 2) the planning of its activities; and 3) the direction of its operation in and out of combat.[36] The officer corps as a professional body, specifically its nature also presents a unique cast to the problem of civil-military relations. Objective civilian control recognizes the existence of autonomous professional military establishment and respect for an independent sphere of military action. This proscribes political interference in affairs of the military in order not to undermine its professionalism. In addition, objective civilian control seeks to minimize military power by rendering it politically sterile and neutral; without necessarily weakening the ability of the military. By this assertion, Huntington anticipates the existence of a highly professional officer corps ready to carry out the wishes of the legitimate political authority of the state. He did not however elaborate on the knowledge on military issues required of political authority.

By subjective control, Huntington refers to maximizing civilian power. This involves strengthening the power of civilian groups in relation to the military. Under this principle, civilian political leaders determine what the military does, but allow military professionals the autonomy to determine how best to do it. To establish this system successfully requires that civilians adopt a more conservative ideology that is more supportive of the military as a social institution. Minimizing military power requires maximizing the power of civilian groups in relation to the military, through civilian control by governmental institutions, like parliament, civilian control by social class, and civilian control by constitutional form. In this context, civilian control is exercised through several institutional arrangements aimed at limiting the capacity of the military to act autonomously in certain critical areas that have political implications.[37] These include military doctrine and policies, operational plans, weapons systems, organization, recruitment and promotion of officers. Civilian control is therefore effective when civilian authorities or institutions, especially the executive and legislative arms of government can delimit the military sphere of action in accordance with the political objectives that autonomously influence politicians and the military abiding by

these civilian directives.[38] The critical issue is how to prevent interference in government and policy-making by the military, as well as to ensure the supremacy of civilians in military affairs.[39]

As argued by Yagil Levy control over the military operates mainly through institutional mechanisms that have an effect on the manner in which policy makers activate the military. In addition to monitoring of the military by elected civilians, collective actors working outside the formal institutions, mainly social movements and interest groups, can influence institutional policy making through diverse ways such as lobbying, protests, court appeals, and the media.[40] Parliamentary control in particular, aims at curtailing the power of the executive. It aims at increasing the oversight role of parliament on the armed forces rather than civilian control in general. This may often result in a struggle between the legislature and the executive, by default the presidency. For example, in the United States the executive identifies civilian control with presidential control because it believes Congress is too large and poorly organized to effectively control the military forces. In brief, both the executive and legislature are concerned with their power distribution rather than between the civilian and the military. This phenomenon can be found in other political systems like Ghana, where issues of national security and defence is often vested in the executive presidency with little or no input from parliament even though the latter has an oversight role over such national issues as defence budget.[41] Most often the institutional capacity and knowledge base of parliament on defence issues are limited thereby undermining effective oversight.

In addition, Huntington emphasizes civilian control by constitutional form and believes that only democratic governments can ensure civilian control. This is based on the assumption that policy in a democracy is determined by persuasion and compromise, rather than force, or threat of it as happens in totalitarian societies. Therefore, the military who wield the most powerful instruments of force are more powerful in totalitarian states than in democracies.[42] However, he notes that this is not always the case, because in democracies the military undermines civilian control and acquires enormous power through legitimate processes and institutions, albeit not clearly identified. While this assertion is rightly so, democracy or a semblance of it in African societies does not necessarily result in civilian control of the armed forces; some analysts claim that democracy itself has a contested nature, and some of the largest democratic deficits can be found in the security sector.[43] Arguably, even some democratic governments have the tendency to halt democracy at the barracks doors or in the corridors of the secret state. Therefore the concept of civilian control requires a more nuanced understanding of governance, including the fact that even democratic governments may abuse their national security powers and misuse their military forces.

2.1.3 Critics of Huntington

Huntington's thesis has been widely criticized by succeeding analysts.[44] It is however important to contextualize Huntington's theory. His historical analysis and theorizing on civil-military relations is largely influenced by Anglo-Saxon experiences especially the experience of the US from World War II (WWII) to the Cold War era. It however, provides a universalist prescription with little relevance to post-Cold War emerging democracies like those in Africa.[45] Rebecca Schiff argues that these ethnocentric prescriptions do not take into account the local specificities in terms of political cultures of other societies.[46] Similarly, others such as Samuel Decalo, Thomas Bruneau, Zoltan Barany, argue that Huntington's framework could possibly be of utility for discussing civil-military relations in advanced and stable democracies.[47] However it is less useful for societies with turbulent political landscape in transitioning democracies in Asia, South America and Africa facing serious political and military problems with high levels of violence. Decalo, in particular, questions the utility of Huntington's paradigm to addressing civil military relations in Africa. He argues that the subordination of the military as hypothesized by Huntington has not worked very well in Africa because most of the states on the continent do not operate within an established framework of viable and widely based institutions, even when they have been legitimized. [48]

Another critic of Huntington, James Burk, argued that Huntington's analysis was based on selective use of data and exclusive focus on civilian control of the armed forces.[49] For instance, the approach focuses on external guarantees, a range of institutional checks and balances to ensuring a healthy civil-military relations. Such formal mechanisms of control may include parliamentary oversight, civilian control of defence budget process, etcetera to constrain military activities and pre-empt their involvement in politics. However, this mechanism alone may not holistically explain stable civil-military relations in Africa. Williams, for instance contended that despite the existence of formal mechanisms and institutions of civil control which are largely influenced by Anglo-Saxon or Western ideas, the reality underpinning African civil-military relations is the fact that the subordination of the armed forces to civilian control in most countries, when this occurs, has been as a result of complex systems of processes and interfaces of a non-institutional nature.[50] Hence, in most cases, real control of the armed forces by civil authorities, whether they are democratically elected or not, is exercised by a range of subjective interfaces and partnerships which may include informal mechanisms or merely the formal expression of power relations.

Furthermore, while Huntington's rigid separation of purely military sphere and the civil society appear logical, it is doubtful that this could actually play out in practical terms considering the complexity of defence affairs and the ubiquity of the military. As such there are either no purely military areas or purely civilian ones. For example, the role of the military in providing military advice on force levels, weapon systems and expenditure, and that of civilians; providing political advice, diplomacy, tax policy and political acceptance is not always the case in practices.[51] This is because no society including democratic ones could possibly allow so much military influence in the sense posited by Huntington. There is the likelihood of danger in discussing the relationship between politics and the military without the experience of either.[52] Similarly, Godfred Uzoigwe argues with demonstrated cases that there is no state, traditional or modern, where the military is totally separated from political structures even though the degree of integration of the military and politics may vary from state to state.[53] Therefore the military is a crucial political institution within the state whether it is an industrialized or developing one.

In addition Burk contends that the liberal thought underlying Huntington's work is primarily concerned with civil-military relations that preserve the military's ability to protect democratic values by defeating external threats.[54] This theory is not persuasive for the post-world war II era. This is because Huntington's proposition of a professional military mastering the functional requirements for war, organization and training of the military to meet these needs, and lead the military to fight on the orders of political authorities is consistent with the military's aim to protect democracies from external enemies. However, this proposition is doubtful in an era of advanced technology beset by weapons of mass destruction; there can be no clear distinctions between means and ends of wars, or between the policy decisions of political leaders and the operational decisions of the military. In practical terms, there is no clear distinction on political or military spheres as the ends depends to a large extent on the means by which they are being pursued. Moreover, Huntington's objective control does not clearly indicate how democratic values ought to be protected.

Peter Feaver also believes that objective and subjective civilian control are controversial in practical terms; Huntington's framework ought to have added assertive control that reflects the existence of civilian meddling and military professionalism.[55] For instance, he argued that the US military, by Huntington's measure of expertise, corporateness and responsibility, has remained highly professional in spite of extensive civilian control or even micromanagement by some civilian authorities. Some stern critics of Huntington's hypothesis that professionalism leads to subordination like Samuel Finer have argued, that acceptance of civilian control does not necessarily prevent rejection of civilian control.[56]

Indeed, some military with professional outlook by all standards have actually carried out coups or even subverted civilian authorities. Besides the analytical flaws pointed out by other writers, Huntington's work despite its continued relevance to the civil-military relations debate does not adequately explore the discourse beyond preventing military intervention in national politics. Whilst some of Huntington's prescription might have contributed to curtailing the spectre of coups d'états in emerging democracies in Africa, there is the need to explore how best these mechanisms could have contributed to building effective and efficient military institutions needed for consolidation of democracy.

Unlike Huntington who focused on the state, scholars like Morris Janowitz and Martin Edmond have emphasized the sociological angle to the analysis of civil-military relations.[57] They rely mainly on the assumption that healthy civil-military relations depend on the extent to which the military mirrors the society from which it is drawn. In *Professional Soldier*, Janowitz challenged Huntington's approach by arguing that technological advancement, societal changes and missions had led to an increased inevitable political role for the professional soldier.[58] In other words, in the post-WWII era, the military ought to move closer to society, embrace civilian values as much as practicable and avail itself to professional reforms and new organizational techniques. He contends that a politicized officer is actually a more adequate representation of civil-military relations in the developing world. Janowitz contends that it is professional socialization of the military through its relationship with and sympathy for values of the society it serves that ensures civilian control of the armed forces. To him, military professionalism in the nuclear era differs significantly from the early days of canons and muskets.[59] In essence, a professional conscripted military is different from military professionalism in an all-volunteer force. In this regard, he departs from Huntington's assertion that the key to civilian control is the fusion of military and civilian values, because an apparent gap between the two could result in the alienation of the military from civilian authority, making the military act in its own interest. In Janowitz's view, the military officer is required to have skills that can be compared to those of civilian administrators and political authorities without necessarily becoming politicized. He thus conceives of a dynamic military organization that changes with different political conditions. Burk in his critique argues that Janowitz recognized the blurring of military and political spheres and as a result some tension between civilian and military elites in praxis.[60] Nevertheless Janowitz did not adequately address the issue of how to manage the tensions to sustain and not to undermine democratic values.

In the midst of the above mentioned criticisms, the study agrees with Donald Travis' observation that the strategic and historical backdrop underpinning the emergence of Huntington's objective control paradigm might help reveal the original intentions and how it can be applied to present circumstances.[61]

2.1.4 Military Influence

In another stream, the civil-military relations literature, especially in advanced democracies, has focused on a wide range of issues such as the influence of the military on decision making; military public support for or opposition to an announced civilian policy; compliance; degree to which the will of civilians always prevail over that of the military command;[62] and how the military sustains and protects democratic values.[63] Feaver situates the discourse on civil-military relations in post- 9/11 United States of America and argues that the persistent dilemma facing democratic societies is that they require a strong military to meet external security threats (the functional imperative), and at the same time, a strong military may become an internal threat to the liberal values modern democracies attempt to uphold (the societal imperative).[64] The central thesis of Feaver's work is how civil-military relations in the US play out on a day-to-day basis through the principal-agent framework. This theory specifies the conditions under which civilians would be expected to monitor the military intrusively or non-intrusively and the conditions under which the military would be expected to work or shirk its responsibilities.[65] Feaver's theoretical position views civil-military relations as a principal-agent relationship, with the civilian executive monitoring the actions of military agents, who he termed the armed servants of the state. The model assumes that democracy requires civilian control of the military, even when civilians are wrong. Civilians have the right to be wrong. Following this assumption, civilians are the "principals" in the model who hire military professionals as their "agents" to prosecute their military security policy.[66] He thus argues that the essence of civil-military relations is a strategic interaction between civilian principals and military agents. Military obedience is not automatic but depends on strategic calculation of whether civilians in authority will catch and punish behaviour.

Feaver's analysis does not always make clear that his theory is that of a restricted control. Though it fits within the domain of democratic civil-military relations it does not offer an exhaustive framework for analysis. Burk, for instance argues that military obedience to civilian masters is a necessary condition for democracy (as it may be for authoritarian regimes as well).[67] Democracy requires more from civil-military relations than military obedience. In addition, Feaver's agency model acknowledges the need for continued theoretical development and empirical research into relations of control and into the connections between effective civilian control and other aspects of civil-military relations. The extensive focus on applying the model to the context of US civil-military relations raises questions about the suitability of the model for transitional or yet to mature democracies as in Africa. This limitation of the agency model is recognized by Feaver himself, when he calls for a significant modification to the theory if it were to be applied to

'coup-prone' countries such in Africa. He however, does not provide any hint of those modifications.

In an attempt to test the applicability of Feaver's model to the African context where there is no established culture of submission to civilian authority among military forces, and where coups d'état present a real danger, Deane Baker contends that, even under these difficult situations, the Agency theory is an extremely important analytical tool.[68] He is of the opinion that regional organizations offer potential benefits to civilian principals in their aim of ensuring military obedience, even in the absence of a well-established tradition of military professionalism. Baker argues that in states where submission of the military to civilian authorities is presumably absent and where civilian governments are faced with few resources to coercively apply power over their military agents, these civilian governments can still put in place both monitoring and punishment mechanisms, through their membership of regional organizations. He makes reference to normative frameworks of such regional organizations as the African Union (AU) Constitutive Act (2002), African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance in Africa (2007), and Southern African Development Commission (SADC) Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (2001), as well as SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections (2004) which calls for zero tolerance for unconstitutional takeovers.[69] In the case of Lesotho, SADC intervened in 1998 for a suspected coup and AU suspended Mauritania in 2005 as a result of coup. SADC and AU, (ECOWAS in Sierra Leone) have respectively intervened to oust usurpers of power, with varying degrees of success. In addition, these organizations have several sanction mechanisms which they have applied to punish coup makers. One may however argue that, the application of such scenarios and the mixed outcomes do not provide strong arguments about the role of regional organizations in ensuring adherence to the principle of civilian supremacy. In some cases, sanctions and expulsion have not been effective deterrence against military intervention in politics.[70]

2.1.5 From Control to Partnership and Shared Responsibility

As a point of departure from earlier analysis on civilian control, some scholars provide other framework of analysis. Dale Herspring also argues for a shared relationship between senior civilian officials and the military officer corp. He departs from the prevalent analysis on political control, the idea that unless strong controls are placed on the uniformed military, it will have an unhealthy impact on policy and may even seize control of it. In his view, political control is a given in most advanced democracies, as officers took oaths recognizing civilian supremacy. This is also true for coup prone states. The question is why do officers in such states fail to abide by their oath and heed to the code of service. He therefore proposes an approach of shared responsibility.[71] The term shared responsibility is

borrowed from Douglas Bland, who argues that civil control of the military is managed and maintained through sharing of responsibility for control between civilian leaders and military officers.[72] In this regard, civil authorities are responsible and accountable for some aspects of control, while military leaders are also responsible and accountable for others. This relationship and management of responsibilities are subject to national regimes of principles, norms, rules and decision-making processes around which expectations of actors may converge in matters of civil-military relations. Herspring lists some eight indicators of shared responsibility. These include respect for military symbols, non-interference in promotion process by civilian authorities and efforts to induce civilian values or bring about radical change, and toleration of dissent. In addition, the civilians should display sound executive leadership, which believes in the necessity for a viable, strong military and respects it.[73]

The shared responsibility approach also acknowledges that a conflictual relationship is not only normal but can be positive and healthy, if it is regulated. Therefore, any attempt to eliminate conflict will remove the needed "give and take" which is a critical part of shared responsibility. This is because conflict is inherent or ubiquitous; it is the engine that drives national security decision-making processes. He argues further that the biggest problem with a focus on control is that while it distorts the process, it also gives little insight into the nature of the relationship between the military and the civilian masters. In this regard, civil-military relations should be about more than averting military coups.[74] Herspring's approach to the question of inevitability of conflict in civil-military relations, is how best to manage it. While drawing inferences from Huntington, he argues that politicians should determine the policy and goals of the country, while the military professionals implement their orders. He, however, disagrees with Huntington that military influence is the critical factor in civil-military relations; though he does view it as important. In essence, it is the nature of the institutions that helps define healthy civil-military relations. For that matter, it is important for civilians to understand and appreciate the military culture and for the military to appreciate civilian culture. Accordingly, conflictual relations can be improved depending on how civilian authorities treat the military and respect the military culture among several attributes. Respect for the military culture could lead to attaining 'shared responsibility'. However, there is no guarantee that shared responsibility will necessarily result in good military advice.[75] This is perhaps due to the reason that humans including generals and admirals are imperfect. Therefore, there could be ebb and flow in civil-military relations. The goal is not to create a civilian authority that easily gives in to demands of the military. Civilian authority can get the best of the military if they understand the military from a cultural angle, and respect it but not adopt it. Respect for the military culture does not lessen civilian control rather makes civil-military relations the act of persuasion.

Herspring's piece however presents a narrow focus on attaining the "shared responsibility" he advocates. While emphasis is what the civilian authority ought to do in its relations with the military, there is not enough analysis on how the military ought to treat and understand civilian authority. Again, the role of other state institutions in achieving the shared responsibility is not well illuminated. At the same time the responsibility of the military and political authority towards the general populace or society and vice versa is not covered in the framework of Herspring's analysis. He draws extensively on the experience of mature democracies like the US and Canada, thus, it is imperative to test this framework in emerging democracies characterized by conflictual civil-military relationship and see how the shared responsibility could contribute to ensuring consolidation of democracy.

Levy argues that the prevalent discourse has neglected the power relations that form the context for the interaction between the sides, and the power and resources that each side brings to the interaction. He notes that effectiveness of civilian control of the military depends on two relations of exchange: first, the republican exchange, where the state provides its citizens with rights in exchange for their military sacrifice; and second, the control exchange: in which the military subordinate itself to civilian rulers in exchange for resources (material and symbolic) provided by the state.[76] At the same time, civilian institutions deploy the military in accordance with the politically agreed goals, costs, and rewards given to those sacrifices. Therefore, if there is equilibrium between these two relations, civilian institutions can establish firm supremacy or control over the military, and if there is no equilibrium, there is the likelihood of a challenge to civilian control.[77] Levy notes the need for a balanced exchange while recognizing that relations of exchange obviously represent a structural pattern rather than overt bargaining between civilian state agencies, social groups and the military over terms of exchange. The interactions among these actors bring about their willingness to ignore certain interests such as autonomy, possession of free time, and money in return for structure-generated rewards like legitimacy and protection. Therefore a balanced or imbalanced exchange is a subjective construct depending on people's subjective perceptions of the asymmetrical or symmetrical structure of rewards and sacrifices (republican) or rewards and subordination (control exchange).

Hence, if both sides see themselves as similarly obligated in the exchange, then there is a balanced exchange. When both relations are balanced, civilian institutions establish their supremacy over the military and control it effectively. At the same time, these institutions provide the military with a mutually agreed upon level of resources to maintain it, thereby increasing the motivations to accept subordination to civilian authorities. Levy uses case studies from the US' Bush Surge strategy in Iraq, and Israel to illustrate how the balance or imbalance of the two exchanges have produced firm civilian control of the armed forces or

even otherwise prevented civil-military crisis. However, Levy acknowledges the need for further research to test the validity of his model on other cases. Particularly, one could argue that the model of civilian control could be best applicable to at least advanced democracies; it does not explore its utility in complex civil-military dispensations like those of Africa. It is simplistic to assume that a balance or imbalance of the republican and control exchange could work in a typical African civil-military context.

Travis proffers the pragmatic civilian control which recognizes that there are innumerable ways that military professionals and civilian political leaders can interact with one another during times of peace (to prepare for crises) and war (to achieve peace). In his view relationships between the many actors at play in the national security realm must adapt and practice inclusion (provisional and participatory) to stay effective.[78] In this regard, pragmatic control operates on the assertion that the methods used by civilians to control the military, and the ways that civil-military relations are conducted, should be determined by the kind of conflict being waged and the practical context of the environment. This is because conflicts or wars vary in their character. Therefore waging different wars require varied civil–military relationships. From the pragmatic control approach, civil–military relationships are based on a threat, crisis, or mission, instead of position, profession, or institution. This therefore requires an intellectually broadened military culture which is capable of partnering with the broader national security establishment to set the conditions that will identify the most acceptable and suitable options for as many political actors as possible.[79] Pragmatic control might be useful to the African context whose civil-military relations appears in constant flux and require pragmatism in the way political actors set the military to action. However, the model will require some modifications because of the lack of an intellectually broadened military culture and political actors also lack the requisite knowledge on how to relate and control the military effectively.

2.2 The African Military and the Coup Interregnum

During the 1960s and 1970s, three overlapping issues dominated the literature on the military in developing countries. These revolved around the conditions of democracy and civilian control. As armies moved into politics, the focus then shifted to the role of the military in development or modernization. This was followed by the focus on political order precipitated by deep hegemonic crises that engulfed developing countries and in their relations with the West.[80] Military intervention in politics has been at the heart of the civil-military relations debate especially in the developing countries of Africa and Asia. The extensive scholarly attention has focused on the political as well as socio-economic factors underpinning the spectre of coups in politics and the performance of military governments.

Samuel Finer, provides an insightful perspective of the global phenomenon of military intervention in politics. He examines the motives that may stimulate or preclude such interventions.[81] Finer uses a variety of case studies from different parts of the world to illustrate several factors such as strong, weak, and divided civilian organization, little or no civilian governmental and political structures, as catalysts of military intervention in politics. Finer defines military interventions in politics as the armed forces constrained substitution of their own policies and/or their person for those of recognized civilian authorities.[82] According to him, for the military to intervene, it must have the occasion and disposition to do so, that being the combination of a conscious motive and a desire to act.[83] He approached the issues by identifying the military against the politics of the day; their political strengths and weakness, their disposition and opportunities for intervention, and levels, modes and results of intervention. The armed forces as an institution is created to achieve specific objectives; primarily to fight and win wars, in addition to assisting civil power. To do this, it is well structured in terms of organization and coherence often characterized by certain features as centralized command, hierarchy, discipline, intercommunication, *espirit de corp* and a corresponding isolation and self-sufficiency.[84]

Further, the central and often contentious question of civil-military relations was elucidated by Finer. In contrast to the widely held assumption that it is natural for the military to obey civilian authority, Finer argues that civilian control of the military is not natural. The issue is how civilians exert control. Where there are strong civilian institutions, the likelihood of military intervention is rare. In this regard, Finer is of the opinion that instead of inquiring why the military engages in politics, it should rather be why they ever do otherwise. He identifies three major advantages of the military: 1) superiority in organization, 2) highly emotionalized symbolic status, and 3) a monopoly of arms or force.[85] Based on these advantages, Finer throughout his analysis, seeks answers to why military intervention in politics or military government is the exception rather than the rule? And how and why do civilian rules persist. His central response to the above questions is based on the political weakness of the armed forces, i.e. the lack of technical ability to administer and the lack of legitimacy to do so. Finer posits that in less developed economies it is easier for the military to function as administrators in the provision of law and order; all that is required is communication. Nonetheless, as societies become more sophisticated, with an expanded economy and increased division of labour, the technical skills of the military are often very low. Drawing from the backdrop of political weakness of military forces on one hand, and the potential for intervention on the other hand, Finer proffers a theoretical paradigm of four levels of continuum of countries as the core of his thesis. Finer recognizes the distinct categories of countries in which governments have been repeatedly subjected to interference by their armed forces. He reckons that despite the pattern, the military work with governments usually from the behind the scenes. He indeed argues that, even in cases

of successful military intervention there is the high tendency for the military to resort to some quasi-civilian façade of government behind which they would retire as quickly as possible. However, Finer's thesis did not provide a context-specific or distinct explanation of military intervention in politics. In addition, although, Finer wrote the piece in an era where there was less emphasis on democratization in the Third World, his analysis was oblivious of the need to transform militaries in Africa and elsewhere where the phenomenon of coups remain a major stumbling block to the consolidation of democratic rule.

In his criticism of propositions by theorists like Huntington and Finer, Chuter highlighted the inherent danger of the prevalent thesis of civil-military relations that projects the military institution as hungry for political power and thus must be controlled and minimized.[86] He believes such a problem does not necessarily exist because this is not the case of all military interventions. He argues that the relations between the military and the civil power are often highly complex and dependent both on personalities and cultural and historical factors. Besides, the military does not often act as a unified body hungry for power. Rather, it is often groups within them that act in concert with some parts of the political systems, and against other parts. This is especially so when a part or all of the officer corps of the military act collectively to take over political power. The reasons behind such actions are often complex and confused. Different segments of the military or individuals may have different agendas. Again, the appearance of a particular military leader does not necessarily represent that of the military institution. Chuter however, agrees with Finer that civilian politicians also benefit from military rule and there could be many segments of the society that believe in the policies carried out by the military. In this regard Chuter argues that the central problem of civil-military relations as perceived by earlier theorists may not exist at all. [87] However, this does not mean civil-military relations are excellent everywhere or the management of defence does not present challenges. There is always a struggle for power and influence in almost all governments or large bureaucracies. Indeed controversies in defence between military and elected political authorities may happen in diverse forms including decisions on forces levels, equipment and even peace missions. It is noteworthy that the military does not always form a unified bloc. There may indeed be internal organizational politics within the military. Conversely, civilians in defence may also tend to agree more with military colleagues than other civilian politicians or technocrats in government. These internal bureaucratic battles are not a zero-sum game, the outcomes are contingent on the particular circumstances, issues and the side parties find themselves.

The prevalence of military regimes and authoritarian civilian government in Africa in the 1960s up to the late 1980s saw an attendant militarization of politics and society on the

continent. This was manifested by the excessive influence of military organization and values on social structures.[88] As emphasized by Luckham, the difference between military and civilian governments in most African states is increasingly blurred. [89] This is because in most military and civilian governments alike, power is most often distributed and held on to through the control of the state security apparatus and organized military force. In post-military societies, Shaw argues that the military as an institution exists on the margin of such societies. The irony is that while armed forces may sap large economic resources of the state and constitute an extremely dangerous means of violence, they only constitute a smaller and at times isolated section of the societies they find themselves in. [90]

2.2.1 The Colonial Legacy

Much has been written on coups in Africa from various perspectives; among most analysis is the role of colonialism and its aftermath on political challenges in Africa. Welch argues that until African armies became politically active in the immediate post-independence era, scholarship on African political change had paid little attention to the role of the military. Armed forces were not considered as a potential significant independent political actor.[91] In his view two main factors account for this: the manner in which colonial territories gained independence and the historical colonial heritage of African armies. The armies were largely a colonial creation for the sole purpose of curtailing internal resistance to colonial rule.[92] It is been argued that the colonial patterns of recruitment exploited existing group rivalries in African societies, to the extent that certain groups were not represented in the colonial regiments. Therefore, at independence, the same colonial armies formed the nucleus of the formed militaries of the newly independent states. As the military became the most visible expression of sovereignty, underrepresented groups could not identify with this national symbol.[93]

Moreover, the colonial legacy permeated into the post-independence makeup of the military where people from certain relatively deprived regions in terms of economic and educational opportunities opted for military service. For example in Ghana, many men from the north, the military offered opportunities for wages, and a more attractive form of labour to that offered in mines or farms in the south.[94]The colonial authorities did not prioritize the indigenization of the officer corps. Similarly, post-independence African nationalist leaders were much more concerned with tackling the immediate challenges of nation building and state building and thus paid little attention to the military. Partly due to the lack of local expertise, many of them maintained the pre-independence status quo with European officers in command of most post-independence armies. As noted by Baynham, the principal change from Gold Coast Military Forces to Ghana Military Forces in March 1957 was one of nomenclature. The continuation of expatriates in the key military postings, and

the early uninterrupted dependence on Britain for equipment and officer training, ensured that continuity was maintained. In British eyes, it had ensured that the Ghana army inherited a spirit and tradition of professionalism and political impartiality. It also ensured that black officers were properly qualified and competent to carry out their duties, and issues of commissions, promotions, and postings were based on considerations of suitability and merit.[95] The organizational structures and outward similarities derived from the colonial forces were also accompanied by continuity in the officially perceived function of the military. Therefore at independence, the job envisaged for the army was essentially the same as before to continue to have an efficient function of maintaining internal security and frontier defence. The dignified role of providing a vivid expression of the state's sovereignty with guards of honour, parades, and Independence Day marches was maintained. [96]

Unlike in other sectors like the civil service, there was a snail pace towards the indigenization or Africanization of the officer corps in some African countries.[97] There was also little spending on the military in some post-colonial governments like Ghana. Kwame Nkrumah and his Convention Peoples Party (CPP) government were preoccupied with other matters of state and thus took little interest in the army it had acquired almost intact from Britain. There was no immediate attempt made to redefine the role of the armed forces, nor were there demands for increases in military expenditure.[98] Major-General Alexander,[99] captured this succinctly that,

> "For most of the new African leaders the problem of the armed forces was unexpected and unwelcome. Unexpected, because in their pursuit for power they had assumed that after having attained independence neither internal security nor external defence would not constitute a grave threat; and unwelcome because they would have preferred to devote resources to economic and social ends. But in some cases, the threats were soon found to be more serious than foreseen, and moreover, armed forces became a status symbol."[100]

Direct military involvement in African politics started through mutinies over internal issues such as promotions and wages. Subsequent military interventions arose as a result of a combination of many factors namely economic, cultural and political, the declining prestige of political parties and strong leaders as well as the growing consciousness on the part of the military of their powers. Baynham argues that institutional instability within the armed forces was created by the progressive and rapid Africanization of the officer corps in the immediate post-independence era. In most cases, this was pursued for political rather than military imperatives.[101] The indigenization process led to erosion of skill and in most instances the breakdown of discipline. He notes that the rapid promotion of relatively

inexperienced officers to high executive positions created unrealistic career ambitions in junior officers. Therefore lack of proper regulation of recruitment and progression coupled with promotional bottlenecks provided a breeding ground for discontent and conspiracy among the military. These among other factors led to the preponderance of the "Men on horseback" syndrome in Africa. Naison Ngoma notes that with particular reference to Africa, civil-military relations has been heavily influenced by the colonial history which caused fear and even dislike for the colonial army, and this still impacts on relations in the post-cold war era.[102]

This is compounded by the fact that most of the successor post-independence elites missed the opportunity to seize the transitional moment to transform the basis for security delivery and governance through a participatory conversation about a national vision of security to include citizens' security needs and protection. Rather, the security establishments were mobilized in large part for regime security, whether under direct military rule or civilian authoritarian systems.[103]

Robinowitz and Jargowksy argue that the persistence of ethnic ties in the military is in large part a vestige of colonial administrative policies when, commonly, the military rank and file were recruited from relatively disadvantaged regions. For example in West Africa, the dominant pattern was for colonial administrations to recruit soldiers from the so-called martial tribes in the relatively impoverished Northern Sahel. The officer corps, in contrast, was recruited from the better-privileged, wealthier southern ethnic groups.[104] Similarly, Bagayoko *et al* argued that "state security elites have never been purely passive players in the games of political patronage and identity politics. Since colonial times many have instrumentalized ethnic, religious and other identities to cement their grip on power, to ensure the loyalty of their military and security establishments, to divide their opponents, to map threats, to marginalize dissenting voices and generally to manage the complex security problems of multi-ethnic states."[105] In order to consolidate their power and to keep security institutions loyal, post-independence African leaders employed a variety of mechanisms such as recruitment and promotion policies which favour particular clans, localities or ethnic groups. Others also introduced mechanisms of political patronage and influence-buying inside security institutions themselves; or establish parallel security structures including presidential guards, paramilitaries and militias linked by particularistic ties to the regime.[106] Some security services continue to operate with obsolete legal frameworks governing them.

Even though the armed forces played a minimal role in the independence struggles across the continent; some were indeed instrumental in the independence struggles of a number of African states and thus influence civil-military relations in the post-independence era.[107]

Koonings and Kruijt aptly note that in countries like Algeria, Eritrea (and Zimbabwe) where the armed forces (and/or armed groups) played a decisive role in the independence struggle and the founding of independent state, the result has been a strong identification of the military and the nation. This phenomenon they referred to as the birth right principle by which the armed forces consider themselves as guardians of a nation's core principles and basic values.[108] For example, the armed forces of Guinea Bissau continue to lay claim to their historical legitimacy from the liberation war, as the primary reason for the frequent intervention in politics. Elements within the army and veterans often use their positions for personal gains at the expense of advancing democracy and national interests.[109] Hutchful also observes that the civil-military trajectories of African states are indeed varied. He notes that in countries that gained independence through armed struggle, the emerging regimes were able to organize or create their own armed forces and were more successful in imposing control than those that did not.[110] Countries that were confronted with initial challenges by the armed forces in the early days of independence like Senegal, Tanzania and Kenya, were able to reorganize and institutionalize their civil-military relations to sustain civil rule. While others like Ghana and Uganda were unable to do so and thus became enmeshed in a cycle of coups and counter-coups.

2.2.2 Causes of Military Intervention in African Politics

Decalo contends that two schools of thought have provided varied explanation on causes of coups in Africa. The first one relates to the social, economic and political problems and weaknesses that pull the military into a power and legitimacy vacuum. The second strand of analysis relates to organizational theory that attributes to African military certain traits of professionalism, nationalism, cohesion and austerity; all of which pushes the armed forces into the political arena to save the state from the scourge of inept, corrupt and self-seeking politicians.[111] Decalo sees these strands of analysis as broadly two sides of the same coin. He argues that while several factors account for military interventions in African politics, the core analytical flaw lies in the confusion of real systemic tensions, which are the backdrop of politics in all African states.[112] In his words, 'it is simplistic, ethnocentric and empirically erroneous to relegate coups in Africa to the status of a dependent variable, a function of the political weakness and structural fragility of the African states and failings of civilians elites, thus ignoring fundamental behavioural dynamics and motivations granted their full role in triggering coups.[113]He reckons that coups in Africa are often the result of complex idiosyncratic and power motivations purely from the perspective of socioeconomic structural or systemic insights, particularly from the empirical vacuum on the internal dynamics of little-studied African armed forces. Most especially, covert ambition, fear, greed and vanity have propelled the military into politics. [114]

In most instances, the official justifications provided by the coup makers and taken on face value by the larger society are the systemic problems confronting the country and corporate motives of the military. For instance, Colonel Akwasi Afrifa in his account of the first coup in Ghana notes that

> "… with the vastness of the problems facing Ghana, a military coup was the only open course to rescue our people from tyranny and alien ideologies. A coup in itself is not a good thing; but it is one of the most effective methods of restoring the constitutional rights of the people when they have been deprived of the constitutional means for changing a corrupt and tyrannical government."[115]

In reality, once in power, the military leaders fared no better than the toppled civilians in dealing with the socio-economic and political problems that confronted them. Decalo also asserts that the motivations for coups directly reflected on the nature of military regimes they set up; its primary characteristics, governing style and pre-occupation.[116] In this regard, he identifies four typologies of military rule: a) radical military rule, where Marxist ideology has been fused into authoritarianism to produce a semblance of populist developmental models for Africa, for example in Congo and Benin; b) personal dictatorships in which military despots monopolize all power and society for their personal aggrandizement, such as Uganda under Idi Amin, and Central African Republic under Bokassa; c) managerial brokerage, where a flexible military junta attempts to perform the brokerage role noted of political elites, in order to secure systemic legitimacy, for example Togo; and, d) the holding-operation modality, which is an all-encompassing term that accommodates the short-term goal of early stages of military rule, where the military junta carry out a 'time and task-limited function', for example Niger.[117] Decalo based his analysis on empirical cases of five Francophone African countries and Uganda, nonetheless his generalizations arguably hold true for most African states have experienced military rule under any one of the above-mentioned modalities.

Akwasi Assensoh and Alex-Assensoh, in addition to providing various reasons for coups in Africa underline the ideological reasons and foreign actor interests behind coups in Africa.[118] Most coups occurred in the Cold War period of heightened super power rivalry. They therefore argue that in the quest for ideological allies, the then super powers, US and Soviet Union, were behind the ouster of regimes that were deemed unsympathetic to their respective camps. For instance the 1966 coup in Ghana against Nkrumah's government is alleged to have been orchestrated by local actors in the armed forces, police and even the civil service with the tacit support of western powers, namely US, Britain and West Germany.[119]Antony Clayton encapsulates a much broader perspective of the extent of external ideological reasons behind military interventions in African politics in the Cold

War era, including all overt and covert forms including formal military intrusion, invited or uninvited; clandestine operations, provisions of training, equipment, intelligence and defence pacts.[120] He argues that in addition to often cited reason of political motives and ideological motives of the external powers; there were purely economic and strategic reasons, such as for sources of energy, markets, raw materials, investments and military base facilities, which Africa presents to these powers. [121]

2.2.3 Beyond Coups d'états: A New Conceptualization of Civil-Military Relations?

The end of the Cold War and the wider acceptance of liberal democracy brought with it a compelling global rethink of the role and mission of armed forces in democracies. Alexander Lambert observes that the change in the post-Cold War security landscape from an overly militaristic conception of national security to a more human security focus that seeks a merger of security and development, has necessitated the evolution of a new framework of analysis for civil-military relations and democratic civilian control of armed and/or security forces.[122] Among the notable shift in this era, is that civil-military relations are increasingly viewed within the concept of security and defence reforms as new paradigms of international security development.

Within the discourse are a flurry of concepts such as security sector reform, development, management, reconstruction and transformation. Each of these emphasizes a particular type of context or approach. Yet the dominant discourse in policy terms is undoubtedly that of security sector reform (SSR*)*. Since the inception of the concept, SSR has been considered as a critical component of establishing a security environment conducive to long-term sustainable development, especially in transitional societies. Notwithstanding the relative scepticism that accompanied the first decade of the SSR debate and its governance and development linkages, major international development partners and organizations continue to assert the critical role of SSR processes in the long-term pursuit of both security and development objectives.[123] The main crux of this agenda is the need for the effective and efficient provision of state and human security within a framework of democratic governance.[124] The related concept of democratic civilian control also seeks to link security with governance. This calls for further conceptualization beyond the traditional/conventional concept of civilian control of the military and related issues of preventing military praetorianism.[125] In spite of the dominance of the SSR concept, some African scholars and practitioners emphasize the need for transformation rather than reform as a point of departure for positive change in relation to the security sector and its governance in Africa.[126] As argued by Bryden and Olonisakin the apparent rethink in the evolving body of analysis on Security Sector Reform (SSR) in relation to Security Sector Transformation (SST) is informed by two imperatives. The first is derived from a seeming

interchangeable use of terms without due consideration of differences in meaning, inference and resonance. The second is found in an apparently reflexive juxtaposition of SSR and SST in terms of the legitimacy and sustainability (and therefore utility) of the two approaches. One argument that has been consistently made, even if sometimes relegated to the background in relation to other explanations, is that SSR is conceptually flawed and thus of limited relevance to Africa. SSR is portrayed as a piecemeal and narrow approach to changing the security establishment, thus making the case for a wholesale and complete transformation of the security sector. SST according to this narrative is taken to mean a complete change in the system that governs the security establishment rather than a more gradual reform process, which presumably still leaves the form and function of the sector largely intact. SST is therefore set to address the structural change(s) required to make SSR efforts effective and result in greater impact on the ground. [127] Security sector transformation concerns the need for comprehensive change that radically alters the status quo of power relations in terms of the provision, management and oversight of security in Africa. Transformation seeks change in the organizational character of the security sector; its cultural make-up; human resource practices; political relationships with elected authorities and the civil power.[128]

This shift has also necessitated a move in focus from civilian supremacy to other issues such as military effectiveness and efficiency and the role of the military in the consolidation of democracy. For instance, Thomas Bruneau and Cristiana Matei advance the argument beyond the issue of control to include two important elements: effectiveness and efficiency.[129] Other analysts such as Lisa Brooks,[130] Stephen Biddle Long, and Deborah Avant have also explored the relationship between military effectiveness and civil-military relations.[131] Avant, particularly, argues that, there are ambiguities and contradictions in the current conceptualization of what constitutes good civil-military relations. She asserts that, any analysis of a good civil-military relationship should rely on a balance between an efficient and an accountable military. [132] Cottey *et al* also call for a reconceptualization of civil-military relations from the first generation debate that focused on the threat of praetorian military intervention in domestic politics and the resultant need for enforcement of civilian control, to the second generation debate on the relationship between democracy and civil-military relations in terms of democratic governance of the security and defence sector.[133] They contend that this re-conceptualization with particular reference to emerging democracies would lead to a shift from the earlier question of reforming core institutions for political control of the armed forces to the second generation problem of establishing effective structures for democratic management of defence and security. However, they reckon that the issue of establishing effective control of the defence and security sector will remain a challenge for emerging democracies of Eastern and Central Europe (and Africa),

largely as a result of limited state capacity.[134] Three key challenges are central to this: i) development of effective structures for planning and implementation of defence policies; ii) development of effective systems of parliamentary oversight of civil-military relations and defence policy; iii) engagement of civil society as a core component of oversight and accountability in defence and security matters.[135]

Furthermore, Bruneau and Matei contend that the excessive focus on civilian control in the literature presents a stumbling block to understanding the larger and more complex relationship between democracy and security forces, particularly with regards to roles and missions.[136] As far as Bruneau and Matei are concerned, the presence of unquestioned civilian control is no guarantee that civilian policy makers will make good decisions or implement policy to achieve military success. They argue that the challenge today is not only in asserting and maintaining control, rather, it is developing effective militaries and other security instruments to execute a range of roles and missions, such as: 1) fight and be prepared to fight external wars; 2) fight and be prepared to fight internal wars or insurgencies; 3) fight global terrorism; 4) fight crime; 5) provide support for humanitarian assistance and civic duties and, 6) prepare for and execute peace support operations.[137]

Apart from the issue of control, analysis must consider the effectiveness of security forces and the cost of achieving it as essential factors to understanding the relationship between elected leaders and security forces in a democracy. They note for the security forces to be effective in fulfilling any of the above mentioned six roles and missions, there should be three basic requirements. Firstly, plans should be put in place, which may take the form of a strategy or even a doctrine. Example: national security strategies, national military strategies, strategies for disaster relief, doctrine on intelligence, counter-terrorism doctrine. Secondly, there must be structures and processes for the formulation and implementation of the plans. These may include ministries of defence, national security councils or other means of inter-agency coordination. Third, a country must commit resources, such as political capital, money, and personnel, to ensure equipment sufficiency, trained forces and other assets needed to implement the assigned roles and missions. Therefore the absence of any one of these three components makes it difficult to imagine how any state would effectively implement any of these roles and missions.[138] In essence, they argue that "civilian control is basic and fundamental, but is irrelevant unless the instruments for achieving security can effectively fulfil their roles and missions. Moreover, both control and effectiveness must be implemented at an affordable cost or they will vitiate other national priorities."[139] Bruneau and Matei's piece is doubtlessly a significant contribution to the civil-military relations debate and might have a considerable influence on future research, however, there is need to test the utility of such a framework on emerging

democracies like Ghana where most often issues of defence are often not in the public domain and institutions of oversight are overly weak.

Closely related to issues of efficiency and effectiveness of the military is the conceptual shift from mere civilian control to democratic control. Luckham argues that the concept of democratic control recognizes that civilian governments are not necessarily democratic.[140] Democratic control has been defined as the subordination of the armed forces to democratically elected political authorities, who are responsible for taking decisions that concern the defence of the country.[141] Nonetheless, Lambert underlines that democratic and civilian control are not necessarily means of establishing effectiveness and professionalism in the provision of security, rather it also requires efficiency and accountability in the use of public means and the provision of public services.[142] He further contends that democratic accountability, transparency and public access to information on issues relating to defence and security are particularly challenging due to their often classified nature. In this regard, in democratic societies, especially those emerging ones, democratic control, public oversight and good governance play a particularly vital role in the security sector. More essentially, effective implementation of democratic civilian control should not only be concerned with sound civil-military relations and security policies supported by the public. As a matter of necessity, it should be seen as contributing an essential element to healthy societal and political relations, as well as national cohesion and solidarity. [143]

Lambert claims that democratic civilian control can only work in practice, provided there is an effective separation of constitutional powers among the key organs of government- the legislature and judiciary must have a clear operational independence from the executive and the head of state. [144] While this appears theoretically appropriate, in most African states, achieving this is often difficult because in most cases issues of defence and security are mostly concentrated with the executive and shrouded in secrecy. Weak parliaments do not offer effective oversight due to several reasons. For instance, Aning and Lartey argue that the highly complex nature of the security sector environment presents a particularly difficult challenge for effective exercise of oversight. [145]This is partly due to the fact that some of the issues involved in performing oversight functions of this sector are often too technical for members of parliament or politicians who do not have the requisite technical experience or any specific training in issues dealing with security and/or defence issues.[146] Aning and Lartey adopts a triple A's (Authority, Ability, Altitude) approach to review the functionality and effectiveness of parliamentary oversight of security sector, in general.[147] Generally, the authority of parliament over defence is derived from the legal frameworks that governs this sector. These include constitutions, Standing Orders of Parliament and other legislations.[148] The ability of parliament has been conceptualized as “the capacity of

parliament to hold government accountable over the security sector and is a function of the resources (human, financial and technical expertise) available to the parliament". [149] Attitude used here refers to "the political will, of parliament towards the whole idea of oversight of the security sector." If parliamentarians lack the will to exercise their oversight functions, then they will bring neither their authority nor their ability to bear.[150] Therefore, these three facets must be viewed in parallel. However, some essential elements of attitude such as integrity, courage, and vision; values difficult to quantify, especially in a consolidating democratic process like that of Ghana.[151]

2.2.4 The Challenge of Disengagement

Since the Third Wave of democratization began in Africa form the late 1980s, it was much anticipated by many pundits that political militaries would be history. Koonings and Kruijt conceptualize political armies as those "military institutions that see involvement in/or control over-domestic politics and government business as core part of their legitimate function,"[152] They contend correctly that while there has been a decline in authoritarian regimes, the process of democratic consolidation has not been without challenges. Issues of poverty, social exclusion, governability problems, globalization and conflicts of diverse character continue to put democratic governance under pressure in Africa and elsewhere.[153] Therefore the issue of political armies is still an important area of scholarly and policy-oriented analysis.

Koonings and Kruijt offer three compelling frameworks for further analysis. First, they claim that there is sufficient evidence in several countries that the military as a class or as an institution still remains influential in national politics. They still hold onto their self-acclaimed long-term role of shaping the fate of the nation. This emanates from long history of military dominance in politics especially in countries where the military still wield a considerable guardian role in civilian politics. Second is the fact that in countries where the military have supposedly handed over the political mantle as part of the reassertion of civilian politics, ongoing societal problems present uncertainty for consolidation of democratic governance. Third is what they term the long-term analytical consideration.[154] They argue that it is of essence for a continuous examination of political armies from both historical and comparative perspectives because in recent decades, the roles or terms of reference of militaries has evolved dramatically. In this regard, there is a need to investigate the ongoing preoccupation of the military with nation building, the real or imagined threat to this project, and above all, the remoulding of political armies in the globalizing post-Cold War era. [155] Furthermore, Koonings and Kruijt note that the current understanding of political armies should not be limited to the classical relationship of military intervention (and the attendant dictatorship) and civil supremacy. [156] This is because the current picture

is a more complex one of the military adhering to democratic principles, but in an uneasy posture toward civilian politics. Likewise, Sagaren Naidoo notes that in almost all African countries, the military's institutional footing is unlikely to disappear or cannot be brought to an end. In this regard, the institutionalization of civil-military relations provides the fundamental basis for legitimization of the military as an important actor and promoter of democratic governance.[157]

Earlier on, Hutchful argued that, the militarization of politics in Africa goes beyond situations of overt military intervention in politics.[158] For instance, in apartheid South Africa, the government has remained formally civilian, but politics and the economy became heavily militarized, with the overly institutionalized influence of security and intelligence agencies, in a way typical of most military regimes. In addition, authoritarian civilian regimes for reasons of regime security depend heavily on the illegal use of the armed forces and other specialized security units as agents of repression. In countries like Guinea under Lansana Conte, and Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwe, civil-military relations were excessively personalized.[159] So a comprehensive grasp of the civil-military problematic in Africa encompasses the age-old question of governmental control of the armed forces which was increasingly displaced by the issues of whether the state could maintain its monopoly over the use of violence in the face of challenges by other actors than the state and official armies, especially in the 1980s and 90s. These entrepreneurs of violence were mostly splinter groups from official militaries and other informal armed bodies like rebels, guerrillas, and etcetera. These events undermined both state and armed forces and intensified the interlocking crisis of civil and military authority.[160] Hutchful argues that without an end to militarization, no solutions to Africa's problems are possible. He thus contends that among the key institutional and political issues that need to be addressed but are often neglected is the question of the democratic subordination of the armed forces and security agencies.[161]

Luckham focuses on the political and policy problem associated with efforts at bringing the military under democratic control in Africa. The path to democracy has varied among African countries; while some transitioned through scenarios such as reforms of existing constitutional arrangements to allow for multiparty elections others transited through negotiated pacts extricating the military from power. In countries like Ghana such arrangements led to the preservation of military interests and shaped the political character of the transition process often the former military regime becoming a key political actor.[162] He argues that in many African states, the door to democracy was opened not only by donor pressures or by policy choices of the military and political elites, but through 'demilitarization by default'; reduction in militaries due to state failure induced declining economies and post-Cold War withdrawal of foreign support. This weakened the resolve of

the authoritarian regime to hold on to power in the face of widespread domestic resistance.[163] In addition, a notable feature of developments that propelled the transition to democratic governance did not only arise from civil and political society, in some cases it came from within the ranks of the state's own military and security establishments, for example Mali and Malawi. In Mali in particular, a coup in 1991 by military reformers opened the political space for democratization.[164] Nonetheless, the military is key contributing factor in the on-going political crises which was exacerbated by the coup in March 2012. These developments also pose several policy dilemmas for many enthusiasts of democracy and the donor community making efforts to tame African militaries to ensure their respect of democratic rules and principles. These problems include the a) disengagement- how to persuade the military and security establishments to accept long-term and unconditional military withdrawal from power; and b) the classic problem of control-preventing intervention or re-intervention of the military against established democratic institutions. This point is also reiterated by Pita Agbese that, in spite of the relative successful transition from authoritarianism to democracy in many African states, establishment of effective strategies of civilian control over the military is one of the primary challenges to the transition process.[165]

As enumerated by Ebere Onwudiwe, strategies that have been proffered for democratically controlling the armed forces in Africa include reduction in the size of the armed forces; redesigning of their missions, and in some cases transforming the military into a developmental armed forces and entrenchment of constitutional clauses that abolish coups.[166] Luckham particularly notes that, the most prescribed solution by Western donors has been the professionalism of the military.[167] He argues that unlike advanced democracies, not all forms of professionalism of African armies, especially those that focus on internal security and intra-state conflicts are non-political. He reckons that while African militaries may want to establish their autonomy in resistance to efforts at making them more democratically accountable, they are at the same time reluctant to relinquish those habits of power they acquired in the years of political involvement. Some African countries provide useful lessons on how some civilian governments though not always democratic have employed varied mechanisms to keep the military out of politics. They include incorporating military elites in patronage networks of the governments, ethnic manipulation and penetration of the armed forces by state intelligence service and use of foreign patrons, usually through defence pact with former colonial masters and western nations.[168] Some of these have a damaging effect on professionalism in the armed forces and have also not necessarily resulted in effective democratic control.

Luckham's position was reiterated by other analysts such as Hutchful that attempts at fostering democratic control must take into account a comprehensive review of the role and

mission of the armed forces, doctrine, institutional structures, budgetary sustainability, equipment and force levels necessary for restoring military efficiency and internal functions under democratic dispensations.[169] Luckham notes that there are varied steps that can be taken to promote military reforms in Africa; however, there is the need to identify and avoid forms of support that have the likelihood of aggravating the underlying political conflicts and inappropriate professional models and powerful, but unaccountable and unsustainable security bureaucracies.[170] While Luckham rightly recounts the problems of military disengagement and democratization in Africa, his analysis did not venture into a deeper enquiry into the process of transforming African armies into effective state institutions needed for democratic growth.

In another work on military forces in African states, Herbert Howe highlighted the problem of the military in Africa's path to democratization. Howe's central thesis examines how African states may prevent the menace of conflicts and achieve greater security through the development of highly professional militaries. The central focus of Howe's work is on military capabilities and the armed forces' political responsibility, primarily in relation to military operations and their conduct toward the civilian population.[171] In seeking answers to the above issue, Howe explores the practical or psychological problems which constitute obstacles to democratization in African states especially during the first four decades of independence. He analyses the peculiar security and military tensions facing contemporary African governments and thus identifies unprofessional militaries, irrelevant or dangerous military solutions as among the major contributory factors to Africa's ongoing security predicament. On the essential issue of military professionalism, he notes that the political nature of the state strongly influences military professionalism-a concept that includes both military capabilities and political responsibility to the state as well as competent and loyal militaries that can contribute to safeguarding political and economic development.[172] Howe argues forcefully that, the most critical security dilemma is the tension between military capabilities and military loyalty. In Africa, many governments in their quest for political survival or regime stability have paid attention to military loyalty at the expense of capability. He thus believes that, personal rule which has dominated Africa's governance landscape since independence has often weakened military professionalism. There has been a breach of the civil-military divide by civilians attempting to manipulate military affairs on the one hand, and by military officers pursuing political control of the state on the other. In the ensuing milieu, the resultant weaker militaries have increasingly become a threat to legitimacy of the state in the post-Cold War era.

He identifies three strategies employed by African states to address the security threats since the early 1990s. These include regional intervention forces like the Economic Community of West Africa Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), private security companies

(Executive Outcomes) and Western-sponsored capacity building initiatives to upgrade state militaries such as the US-sponsored African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI). Howe argues that these strategies have very limited utility to African states, and thus likely to fail unless African states explore and emphasize indigenous approaches to military professionalism. He argues further that military professionalism requires an institutionalized system of stable and widely accepted political values that exist independent of a specific regime. Military professionalism is a parallel process in which civilians and military officials agree to stay away from each other's realm of affairs. [173] However, Howe did not offer a comprehensive approach to enhancing military professionalism, one of the focuses of defence transformation. For instance, he provides the rational for upgrading African military forces, but he does not sufficiently explain how the forces would aid multiple institutional and capacity building needs of African states.[174]

Mathurin Hougnikpo also examines political militaries and their interventions in African politics and their impact on democratic societies. He notes that the reoccurrence of coups in African countries in recent years makes total military disengagement from politics a dream. The phenomenon of coups in Africa has defied most theoretical explanations. However, there is thin layer of hope as some African militaries have gradually metamorphosed from enemies to promoters of democracies in countries like Benin.[175] He argues that despite the popular assertion on the issue of civilian control of the military would deny any political role to the military as evidently exposed by the concept of 'apolitical' armed forces; the typical African army is a direct political stakeholder. As African countries pursue the democratic path, the issues of political role of the armed forces will linger on until there is the consolidation of competitive systems, with clearly defined roles and responsibilities between civilian and military. Therefore, only a redefinition of boundaries by a more astute civilian management will prevent military intervention in political process.[176]

Most African states have gradually in principle accepted constitutional means to attaining power. This view informed by a liberal model of civil-military relations has led many African states to accept the concept of 'apolitical' professional armies subject to democratic civil control, which should be legitimate. However, the chequered civil-military relations history makes it imperative for the establishment of some form of contract between the military and civilian elites, which includes a code of conduct for the armed forces and security services, constitutional provisions. Hougnikpo observes that effective governance of the security sector is a crucial issue globally, but more critical for emergent democracies in Africa. As widely noted by other analysts that uncontrolled or undirected security sector with the monopoly of violence can become a force unto itself, proper governance and regulation that are based on informed and active legislation, clear governmental policy framework and laws, effective civilian executive authorities and an active civil society to

keep the security sector transparent, accountable and efficient is necessary in Africa. This is to ensure that the security sector, particularly the armed forces are governed in accordance with principles of democratic control and accountability.[177] In addition, Hougnikpo calls for restructuring of civil-military relations to give a genuine chance to democracy. In this regard, Africa needs a positive, rather than a zero-sum approach to repair the state and empower civil society and at the same time recognizing the contribution of the military in the process. Tensions are inevitable in all institutions, both civilian and military. Following the decades of mistrust, the military and civilian politicians have to redesign their relationships to foster smooth political transition. It is important for African institutions and leaders to work out a compromise that allows an appropriate dispensation of security. [178]

Furthermore, Barany contends that, the transition literature has focused less on the military as an important institution of the state. Barany defines a democratic army as a force that does not support one political party or another rather the principle of good governance. He offers a three-pronged contention that first, "democracy cannot be consolidated without military elites committed to democratic rule and obedient to democratically elected political elites".[179] Regimes that are in the process of systematic political transitions are susceptible to domestic instability and external threats. They therefore need armed forces that obey the commands of emerging civilian authority. Second, "building democratic armies are more difficult to accomplish in some context than others." This is because the political and socioeconomic settings for building democratic armies vary and thus pose different challenges to those states nurturing democratic armies and civil-military relations. Third, "numerous generalizations can be made to help understand the transformation of military politics in different environments."[180] All the same, providing substantive and useful explanations for civil-military relations in such varied political and socio-economic environments is virtually impossible for a general theory. Barany provides a cross-continent empirical analysis informed by methodological vigour on selected cases in a) post-war states- total defeat in major wars like WWI or civil war; b) post-military regimes and c) post-colonial states and post-unification and apartheid. His analysis of civil-military relations in post-colonial African states like Ghana, Tanzania and Botswana highlighted the different trajectories in the immediate post-independence era. Despite his clearly articulated bias for democracy as a good and desirable objective, his analysis on Ghana for example did not explore beyond the immediate post-independence period of rampant military rule interspersed with short-lived civilian rule. Specifically, what has been done or being done to build democratic armed forces as a stakeholder in consolidation of Ghana's democracy.

On the dilemma of the military and democratization in African politics, Esew also argues from a power theory perspective that once the military had had a taste of power in countries

like Ghana and Nigeria, there was a conflictual relationship between soldiers and political elites resulting in a power game between the two.[181] He adds that in Africa, political power comes with the distribution of national wealth, and thus once the military have tasted power, letting it go becomes difficult. He therefore sheds some insights into the nature and patterns of military and political transition in Ghana and Nigeria by highlighting the socio-political and economic factors which largely influenced the success or failure of political transitions in these countries. In relation to Ghana, Esew examines the various transition programmes from military to civil rule from the first coup in 1966 to the last coup in 1981. He argues that the first military government, the National Liberation Council (NLC), set up a transition programme to ensure a near swift return to civilian rule because it did not intend to stay in power for too long and because there was an alternative political elite to whom the military wished to hand over power. The second transition programme under the National Redemption Council of General Kutu Acheampong was unexpectedly prolonged because General Acheampong was not willing to hand over power.[182] This coupled with the looming national crisis indeed propelled a palace coup to remove him. Nonetheless, the inconsistencies of the successive Supreme Military Council regime under Lieutenant General Frederick William Akuffo provided the impetus to junior rank intervention of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) led by Jerry Rawlings. The AFRC did hand over the mantle of leadership to a civilian government after four months of "house cleaning", only to return 27 months later. Since then the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) held a strong hand on power with little tolerance for opposition. It later metamorphosed into a political party and won the first elections following the opening up of the political space in 1992.

2.3 A Conceptual Approach to Defence Transformation

Some strategic shifts in the post-Cold War international system brought about by the emergence of transnational terrorism, proliferation of nuclear and weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts and the changing nature of warfare and crisis, peacekeeping, technological advancement in weaponry, communication and logistics are some of the important drivers of defence reform and transformation. There have been some shifts in military posture, doctrines and defence policies in many countries.[183] In addition, political, economic and social changes have propelled countries to reconsider their defence structures. For example, issues of gender, human rights and minorities are being reconsidered to create opportunities for women and other minorities in the military, which they have not traditionally enjoyed.[184]

The concept of defence transformation was originally conceived as the process by which the information Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) would be achieved.[185] This gained

global attention following the appointment of Donald Rumsfeld for the second time, as Defence Secretary of United States (US) in 2001. The concept was subsequently adapted by advanced western countries. However, it is believed the events of 9/11 ended the apparent "strategic pause"[186]in defence that began with the end of the Cold War. Rumsfeld defines transformation as a "process that shapes the changing nature of military competition and cooperation through new combinations of concepts, capabilities, people, and organizations that exploit our nation's advantages and protect against our asymmetric vulnerabilities to sustain our strategic position, which helps underpin peace and stability in the world."[187] Similarly, Kugler, defines military transformation "as a process of pursuing major changes to military forces in order to greatly elevate their future combat capabilities for information-age operations. The key terms of transformation and its principal determinants are "process, change, and capability." [188]According to Kugler, transformation has three main features; firstly, it aims at major changes and improvements, not just minor ones. Secondly, it is a dynamic and ongoing process, not a static condition with a fixed end; and thirdly, it is also a process of creative exploration and experimentation whose destination will be determined only as it unfolds over a period of years. [189] Further, defence transformation has been defined "as a continuous process that shapes the nature of military competition and cooperation through new combinations of emerging technologies, streamlined organizational structures, innovative processes, and adaptive personnel developments that exploit national advantages and protect against asymmetric vulnerabilities."[190] In sum, defence transformation aims at total overhaul of the defence sector of a state to meet the needs and features of the democracy in which the state finds itself.

The concept of defence transformation is often used interchangeably with the term defence reform. While the two terms may be interrelated, defence reforms, however, refer to series of coordinated actions designed to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of a state's armed forces. [191] The major difference is that, while reform is often a piecemeal and incremental approach to state restructuring; transformation seeks a total overhaul of the normative, organisational and cultural environment of defence in a democracy.[192]Although the objectives for defence reform may depend on the peculiar circumstances of individual countries, a core objective of defence reform is often is to ensure that the ministry or department of defence and the military are effectively overseen and controlled.[193]

Chuter defines defence transformation to encompass four major clusters, which are cultural transformation, entailing the transformation of the culture of the institution; human transformation, entailing the transformation of the composition of the institution with regard to its racial, ethnic, regional and gender composition, etc.; political transformation, which strives to ensure the conduct and character of the institution conforms to the political

features of the democracy within which it is located; and organizational transformation, which constitutes a more technocratic process within which the organization is right-sized, among other factors.[194] It is argued the only properly transformed armed forces can effectively provide peace, security, and stability. Therefore, defence transformation provides the only means to adapt in the constantly changing security environment, and as well to retain the relevance of national armed forces, military advantage over asymmetric and adaptive adversaries, and to improve military effectiveness.[195]

Many West African countries are faced with the challenge of defence sector transformation to align their post-authoritarian defence forces with the demands of new democratic societies.[196]In transitioning democracies, especially in post-conflict contexts, security and defence sector transformation processes are often carried out for a total overhaul of the security and defence architecture to align it to the prevailing democratic culture. This is often followed by periodic strategic defence review processes. Both processes often involved national consultative processes and internal debates involving all relevant stakeholders including political leadership, government ministries and agencies, the people, the military and other actors. During these processes, gamuts of issues are considered. These include: threat assessment, defence choices and political consequences, the balance between non-military and military means of addressing threats, resource allocation for defence and security and non-military uses of the armed forces.[197]

It is argued that transformation of the defence and security sector could provide a meaningful basis for addressing historically rooted pathologies that have resulted in deep cleavages between state, security sector and citizens in many African countries. For instance, it could be used to address the structural change(s) required to make SSR efforts effective and result in greater impact on the ground.[198] Williams writes that transformation of the defence community is a concept that spans a wide variety of inter-related fields. Defence transformation goes beyond the demand for a reduction in defence spending and requires a fundamental change in defence policies, cultures, management and practises.[199] The transformation processes, if pursued thoroughly, could have an impact on every aspects of an organisation's existence. This therefore requires astute management to ensure success.[200] Williams adds that for transformation processes to be successful, it is essential for the following three factors to be acknowledged during the management stage. Firstly, the importance of decisive and strategic leadership of the process itself. Secondly, the importance of ensuring that the process enjoys high levels of legitimacy (buy-in); and thirdly, the importance of determining the scope of the transformation process itself–such as organisational culture, traditions, leadership style, and racial and gender composition.[201]

Transformation of defence or the military in particular, is often characterized by interrelated variables. These may reside in diverse areas such as recruitment, organization, equipment, training and sustenance of the military forces.[202] Besides, transformation is not confined to the military sphere but also requires considerable civil-military interactions. These interactions may relate to tangible issues as the commitment of the societal wealth and human resource to transformation efforts. There may be other intangible factors that could affect civil-military relations. For instance, efforts at transforming the military may be obstructed if deemed inconsistent with the societal norms, history and collective memory.[203] In this regard, striking a balance between these societal imperatives emanating from civilian sphere and the functional imperatives from the military sphere could result in considerable tension. There is therefore the need for strategic interaction between the military and civilian elites to ameliorate these sources of tensions. This interaction often involves an exchange of information relating to the costs and benefits of a particular transformation programme.[204]

Le Roux notes that, very often discussions on defence transformation are often confined to narrow or simplistic view that is synonymous with reduction in the size and budgets of defence forces especially in post-conflict countries. However, the issue of defence transformation is much more complex and multifaceted and goes beyond simply a cutback exercise. It is more concerned with bringing defence in line with the principles of democracy and responsible and accountable governance.[205] It is needed in both countries emerging out of conflict and those seen to be relatively stable though a generic model cannot be applied to all countries without taking into account their specific circumstances such as political, economic, social, security and institutional factors. He acknowledges that the process in Africa including countries like South Africa that have seen relative gains in transforming their defence forces is fraught with numerous challenges. Among the challenges is that of transforming defence sectors to ensure appropriate, adequate, accountable and affordable defence sector for both national and regional purposes. As observed by Shelton and Alden, in the immediate post-apartheid South Africa, the consolidation of civilian control remained an elusive goal to be accomplished in the short term. The government was confronted with finding the balance between imperatives of transformation and the development of an effective defence force appropriate to the needs of the changing international environment.[206]

Particularly on the issue of the governance and management of defence in Africa, Le Roux, like other analysts, argues that African militaries are generally a power unto themselves. They are often not transparent to civil society and efficient. There is lack of transparency on defence budgets and little control is exercised over defence expenditure. African governments and defence establishments face multiple challenges including the

establishment of good governance and adherence to constitutions; building democratic civil-military relations; crafting defence policies that reflect the current national and regional security needs. Other challenges relate to role definition for the armed forces; improving efficiency in defence management; enhancing professionalism of the defence sectors; regional security collaboration and institutionalization of good planning, programming and budgeting practices in defence establishments.[207]

Therefore, the transformation process in Africa could benefit from the case specific application of certain factors such as good governance, integration, demobilization and reintegration processes, efficiency, determination and redefinition of functions and structures, organizational culture and sustainability. These are common factors in all transformational processes. While Le Roux's generic model for security sector transformation is rational it is drawn mainly from the South African experience that offers valuable lessons for other African countries. However, practicalizing these propositions in different counties might require remodelling of measures and techniques that take into account the specificities and history of the country. Similarly, Luckham and Hutchful argue that in reality, it is much easier for analysts to make proposals for security/defence sector transformation in Africa than to have them operationalized by African states to make their citizens more secure.[208] Luckham and Hutchful also contend that such proposals will become empirically flawed and of little use as guides to action if they do not reflect Africa's unique historical and developmental experiences.[209] In this regard, they are of the view that in order to consider how to properly transform security, "one must first understand the sources of insecurity and bad governance including state failure, societal militarism and political violence which have prevailed in many parts of the continent."[210] Luckham and Hutchful further note that the critical issue is how to transform security in a political marketplace in which many of the most important actors who are self-interested and predisposed to patrimonial politics, face international constraints and have little real desire for change. Even in relatively consolidated democracies, like Ghana, reforms have been selectively implemented with little real enthusiasm for democratic accountability on the part of their governments and security institutions.[211]

For the study of defence transformation processes in Ghana, the discussion could equally be situated within the newer defence transformation conceptual frameworks, as proposed by Chuter. Defence transformation is a multifaceted process that concerns the structuring and management of defence. The Ghana case finds itself straddling both the old civil-military relations theory, and the new SSR frameworks, as there has not been any coordinated approach towards changing/reforming the military to conform to democratic principles, or to reducing the power of the military within society in order to ensure greater civilian control. The process has been ad hoc, individualized and not institutionalized as would

have been expected. However, there is a general view that in spite of this "something" has changed within the Ghana armed forces and Ghanaian society that needs to be studied. The question is what exactly has changed? Thus the thesis seeks to determine what has changed and whether that change has made a meaningful contribution to civil-military relations and political stability. In order to do this Chuter's four clusters; cultural transformation, human transformation, political transformation, and organizational transformation, are used as frameworks for analysis. This has implications for the number of countries which had been in a similar situation as Ghana – transitional democracies – which did not suffer civil wars, but nonetheless require a coherent policy and practice towards transformation of their defence sector. Ghana's process at transforming the defence sector is analysed within the above mentioned conceptual framework to observe how the theory and principles of civil-military relations and defence transformation apply in the Ghanaian context.

2.3 Theoretical Framework: Concordance Theory of Civil-Military Relations

The preceding analyses do not provide an adequate theoretical and conceptual framework for transforming civil-military relations in Ghana and thus propel the need to situate the research into theoretical and conceptual tools of analysis. This section of the chapter presents the theoretical and conceptual frameworks upon which the study is hinged. Williams argues cogently that there exists no single template according to which the African civil-military relations systems can be constructed.[212] Despite the generic similarity between the formal institutions of civil control, de facto control over the armed forces in Africa is often maintained by a series of discourses that are country specific and thus not easily transferrable to all countries. In this regard, the study situates the discussion within theoretical and conceptual paradigms. First, it adopts Schiff's Concordance Theory of civil-military relations developed in the 1990s. Secondly, the conceptual tool employed by the study is Chuter's approach to defence transformation.

Schiff belongs to the non- institutional separatist school of thought on civil-military relations discussed earlier in section 2.1.5. The Concordance Theory takes into account both the institutional and cultural perspectives of individual context in explaining civil-military relations. Schiff's theory does not proffer a separation of civil and military sphere, and issues of control, rather partnership or cooperation. According to Schiff, to prevent the military from interfering in domestic politics, three societal institutions: the military, political elites and citizenry must work and maintain cooperation or partnership agreement in four areas; the social composition of the officer corps; political decision-making process; method of recruitment of personnel and style of the military. Schiff argues that concordance theory seeks to resolve two problems in the theory of separation. The first problem is that the prevalent theories are largely drawn from the experiences of the US. This assumes that

in order to prevent domestic military intervention, the post-WW II US or Western-styled institutional separation should be applied to all other nations. While the US example may be well grounded in particular history and cultural experiences, it may not be applicable to all contexts or nations. Secondly, the dominant theories focus on institutional analysis, and thus argue for separation of civil-military institutions.[213] Schiff notes that such method fails to take into account the cultural and historical conditions that may promote or discourage civil-military separation. Accordingly, concordance theory carries the issues beyond institutional analysis to address pertinent issues of a nation's culture. As captured by Schiff, "concordance theory argues that the three partners... should aim for a cooperative relationship that might involve separation but does not require it."[214] The theory seeks a high level of integration between the military and other parts of the society as one of the several types of civil-military relationships.

As noted above, within the concordance framework, the military, the political leadership and citizenry are viewed as partners. The theory predicts that when these partners agree about the role of the armed forces, it reduces the likelihood of military intervention in domestic politics in a particular state. Schiff provides definitions of the three partners involved in the concordance theory. She defines the first partner, the military as "the armed forces and personnel who represent the military."[215] This comprises the officers and enlisted personnel.[216] The second partner, political leadership is defined in terms of function. Schiff notes that the exact nature of government institutions and the method of their selection are less important when determining concordance. What is more significant is identifying the elites who represent the government and have direct influence over the composition and support of the armed forces. These governmental elites include cabinets, presidents, prime ministers, party leaders, parliaments, and monarchs. The third partner the citizenry is defined as "individuals who are members of unions or associations, urban workers, and entrepreneurs, rural farm workers, those who may have the right to vote, or other groups that may be disenfranchised."[217] She argues that the prevalent civil-military theories tend to focus on the institutional civilian and military separations. The extensive reliance on political institutions as the main civil component of analysis does not take the citizenry into account. Schiff acknowledges that the relationship of civil institutions to the military is important, but it is only a partial reflection of the dynamics of civil-military relations. In this regard, concordance theory does not lump political and civil institutions together. Rather, it considers the citizenry as an important partner distinct from military and political elites. Therefore, incorporates additional elements of society that affect the role and function of the armed forces.[218]

Schiff posits four primary indicators of concordance. The four indicators are: (1) the social composition of the officer corps; (2) the political decision making process; (3) the military

recruitment method; and (4) the military style. These four indicators are essential elements of concordance because they show specific conditions that influence agreement or disagreement among the three partners. The social composition of the officer corps is a primary indicator because officers are usually career soldiers who help to define the relationship between the military and society, and provide a linkage between the citizenry and the military as well as the military and the government.[219] The political decision making process includes "the institutional organs of society that determine important factors for the military such as budget, materiel, military size, and structure".[220] The military recruitment method is defined as the method for enlistment of soldiers into the armed forces. Finally, military style is concerned with how people perceive the military and what the ethos and appearance of the military is from both internal and external perspectives. Military style refers to the general characteristics that differentiate the military elites from other groups. As captured by Charles Moskos, the military style related directly with human and cultural elements of the armed forces: its looks, overt and subtle signals it conveys and its ritual- are all part of a deep and nuanced relationship among soldiers, citizens and the polity.[221] On hindsight, concordance theory seeks to expand the limited scope of civil-military theory developed by traditional separation theorists such as Huntington.[222] The theory presents a direct relevance for both the study of civil-military relations and its practical application in the developing world.[223] Particularly, it takes into cognizance the context specific societal factors and dynamic relationships that underpin civil-military relations in different societies in developing democracies.

2. 3.1 Weaknesses of Concordance Theory

Like any theoretical framework, concordance theory has attracted some criticisms, for example, Richard Wels argues that the theory lacks two essential elements which any new theory in relation to an earlier one must contain.[224] First, an accurate statement of the old to-be-displaced theory, and second, a set of related conceptual statements that is different from its counterpart in the existing theory. Wels argues that concordance does not necessarily present a new theory rather; it provides a useful point for reconsideration of trends in civil-military relations.[225] Wels noted that concordance theory's emphasis on dialogue, accommodation and shared values among the military, political elites and the citizenry on the role of the armed forces as necessary conditions for preventing military intervention in politics. However, he believes this does not differ significantly from the proposition of earlier theories, especially Huntington's concept of fusion- that calls for merger of political and military functions.[226]

In her critique, Avant argues that the problem with concordance theory is that, the military may not need to intervene in politics if it can get what it wants without intervening.[227]

Particularly the concordance model does not capture the phenomenon of an "agency reversal" where agents by virtue of their specialization assume increasing control over an issue and causes attention to shift to the agent as the principal's preference becomes unclear. Additionally, Schiff's concordance theory might have limited utility in its application in societies in Africa where the civil society is not seen as a significant factor in the civil-military relations debate. Often the relationship between the two is characterized by uneasiness and at times fear of the military arises from peoples' experiences with the military during times of armed conflict and military rule. This point is well illustrated by Cleary that the attempt by the theory to draw the society as an important partner in the debate does not always hold for some African and Latin American countries where "the focus is on military-political/administration relations; society does not really factor into the equation". [228] In addition, ''the military perceives the civilian politicians as ignorant, uneducated and corrupt, while civil servants are seen as overly bureaucratic, incompetent and inefficient." In this milieu, the populace is largely seen as uninterested and ignorant of security issues.[229] It is therefore necessary for one to explore in detail the reasons why citizens appear uninterested in the civil-military relations issues.

Schiff uses Pakistan as one of the cases to demonstrate how the lack of concordance (discordance) among the three partners on the four indicators contributes to coups. However, in his critique of the applicability of the concordance theory, Zulfiqar Ali contends that in the case of Pakistan, it is rather concordance among two unequal partners –the military and international actors, particularly the US, and not discordance that accounts for military coups.[230] He notes that the 1958 coup especially points to the marking influence of the military upon citizenry, political and juridical process and decision making. Ali argues that abstract theoretical approach of the concordance theory (three partners, partnership and four indicators) tend to overshadow the institutional and cultural conditions of Pakistan irrespective of its multicultural and pluralist approach.[231] He considers the approach of concordance theory as simplistic which fails to recognize that the judiciary, media, and international actors, especially the US, play an essential role in domestic military intervention. Notwithstanding these criticisms, concordance theory presents yet another analytical framework for the study of civil-military relations outside the advanced democracies of the West.

2.4 Summary

The chapter has reviewed some of the pertinent literature in the field of civil-military relations on African militaries, coups and defence transformation in Africa. The literature reveals various theoretical and conceptual positions on civil-military relations. However, the varied theoretical propositions provided by the likes of Huntington, Janowitz, and

Feaver could possibly be of utility for discussing civil-military relations in advanced and stable democracies. Indeed, most of the frameworks discussed above do not provide a comprehensive framework for detailed analysis of the African civil-military landscape. The repertoire of literature on African militaries and the issue of coups have highlighted the various motives and dispositions of military interventions in politics. Nevertheless, beyond the phenomenon of coups, most of the analyses do not to capture detailed examination of how to transform African militaries into effective and efficient institutions to contribute to the process of democratic consolidation and state building. Therefore, a major lacuna clearly stands out in the literature and thus provides the basis for deeper enquiry towards a more holistic approach to transforming civil-military relations and defence in Ghana. Addressing these theoretical and analytical gaps in the literature therefore propels the need to situate the research in the Schiff's concordance theory and Chuter's conceptual framework of defence transformation.

Endnotes

[1]Cafario, Guiseppe, (2007), "Trends and Evolution in Military Profession", In: *Social Sciences and the Military: An Interdisciplinary Overview*, edited by Cafario, Giuseppe, London: Routledge, p. 219.
[2]Williams, John, (2007), "Political Science Perspectives on the Military and Civil-Military Relations", In: *Social Sciences and the Military an Interdisciplinary Overview*, edited by Cafario, Guissepe, London: Routledge, p-90.
[3] Edmonds, Martin, (1988), *Armed Services and Society*, Leicester: Leicester University Press.
[4]Foster, Gregory, (2005), "Civil-Military Relations: the Post-Modern Democratic Challenge", *World Affairs*, 16(3): 91-100.
[5]Hougnikpo, Mathurin, (2010), *Guarding the Guardians: Civil-Military Relations and Democratic Governance in Africa*, Farnham: Ashgate; Ebo, Adedeji, (2005), "Towards a Code of Conduct for Armed Forces and Security Forces in Africa: Opportunities and Challenges", *Policy Paper* 05, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of the armed forces (DCAF), March.
[6] Finer, Samuel, (1962), *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics*. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.
[7]Huntington, Samuel, (1957), *The Soldier and the State; The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relation.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
[8]Janowitz, Morris, (1960), *The Professional Soldier: A social and Political Portrait*. London: The Free Press. Corporation; Janowitz, Morris (1977*), Military Institutions and Coercion in the Developing Nations,* London and Chicago: The University Of Chicago Press.
[9] Chuter, David, (2000), *Defence Transformation: A Short Guide to the Issues*. *ISS Monograph* No. 49, August.
[10]Chuter, David, (2011), *Governing and Managing the Defence and Security Sector*, Pretoria: ISS.
[11]Cleary, Laura, and McConville, Teri, (2006), "Commonalities and Constraints in Defence Governance and Management", In: *Managing Defence in a Democracy*. Laura R Cleary and Teri McConville, 3-16, London: Routledge.
[12]Ibid.
[13]Aning, Kwesi, and Lartey, Ernest, (2009), "Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector: Lessons from Ghana", In: *Parliament oversight of the security sector in West Africa*, edited by Sherman, Jake, New York: Center on International Cooperation; Boraz, Stephen, and Bruneau, Thomas, (2006), "Reforming Intelligence: Democracy and Effectiveness", *Journal of Democracy*, 17(3): 28-42.
[14]Rose, Charlie, (1994), "Democratic Control of the Armed Forces: A Parliamentary Role in Partnership for Peace", *NATO Review*, Web Edition, 5(42):13-19.
[15]Luckham, Robin, (1996), "Crafting Democratic Control over the Military: A Comparative Analysis of South Korean, Chile and Ghana", *Democratization*, 3(3):215-245; Luckham, Robin, (2003), "Democratic Strategies for Security in Transition and Conflict" In: *Governing Insecurity: Democratic Control of Military and Security Establishment in Transitional Democracies*, edited by Cawthra, Gavin, and Luckham, Robin, 1-23, London: Zed Books.
[16]Luckham, (2003), p.15.
[17]Luckham, (2003), p.15.
[18] DCAF (2008), "Backgrounder: Democratic Control of the Armed Forces", 05.
[19] Chuter, (2011) op. cit.
[20]Cleary, Laura, (2006), "Political Direction: the Essence of Democratic, Civil and Civilian Control", In: *Managing Defence in a Democracy*, edited by Cleary, Laura and McConville, Teri, 32-45, London: Routledge.
[21]Bland, Douglas, (1999), "A Unified Theory of civil-Military Relations", *Armed Forces & Society*, 26(7): 17-25.
[22]McConville, Teri, (2006), "The Principles of Management Applied to the Defence Sector", In: *Managing Defence in a Democracy*, edited by Cleary, Laura and McConville, Teri, 109-124, London: Routledge
[23] Hougnikpo, (2012), op. cit.
[24]Cleary and McConville, (2006), op. cit.

[25]Burk, James, (2002), "Theories of Democratic Civil-Military Relations", *Armed Forces & Society*, 29(1): 7-29.
[26] Feaver, Peter, (1996), "The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz and the question of civilian control", *Armed Forces & Society*, 23(2): 149-178; Feaver, Peter, (2016), "Civil–Military Relations and Policy: A Sampling of a New Wave of Scholarship", *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 1-18.
[27] Feaver, (1996), op. cit.
[28]Huntington, (1957); Finer, (1962), op.cit.
[29]Finer, (1962,); Feaver, (1996); (1999a), op. cit.
[30]Feaver, Peter, (1999), "Civil-Military Relations", *Annual Review of Political Science*, 2: 211-41.
[31]Ibid.
[32]Rahblek-Clemmensin, Jon, Archer, Emerald, Barr, John, Belkin, Aaron, Guerrero, Mario, Hall, Cameron and Swain, Katie, (2012), "Conceptualizing the Civil-Military Gap: A Research Note", *Armed Forces & Society*, 38(4):669-678
[33]Huntington, (1957); Janowitz, (1960, 1977), Finer, (1962), Feaver, (1999, 2003), op. cit.
[34] Huntington, (1957), op. cit. p.2.
[35]Ibid.
[36] Ibid. p.11
[37] Ibid.
[38] Ibid.
[39] Aning, Kwesi, (2001), **"**Civilian Control and the Security Sector, *Governance,* 7(1), Accra: Institute of Economic Affairs.
[40] Levy, Yagil, (2016), "What is Controlled by Civilian Control of the Military? Control of the Military vs. Control of Militarization", Armed Forces & Society, 42(1): 75-98.
[41] Aning and Lartey (2009), op. cit; Hutchful, Eboe (2003), 'Pulling from the Brink: Ghana's Experience', In: *Governing Insecurity: Democratic Control of Military and Security Establishment in Transitional Democracies*, edited by Cawthra, Gavin, and Luckham, Robin, 78-101, London: Zed Books.
[42] Huntington, (1957), p. 82.
[43] Hutchful, Eboe, (1997a), "Demilitarization the political process in Africa: Some basis issues", *Africa Security Review*, 6(2):3-16.
[44]Schiff, Rebecca, (2009*), The Military and Domestic Politics: A Concordance Theory of Civil-Military Relations*, London: Routledge; Schiff, Rebecca, (1995), "Civil-Military Relations Reconsidered: A Theory of Concordance, *Armed Forces & Society*, 22 (1):7-24.
[45]Decalo, Samuel, (1989), "Modalities of Civil-military stability in Africa", *Journal of Modern African studies*, 27(4): 547-578; Schiff (1995; 2009), op. cit; Bruneau, Thomas, (2012), "Impediments to the accurate conceptualization of civil-military relations", In: *Routledge Handbook on Civil-Military Relations*, edited by Thomas Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei,13-21, London: Routledge.
[46]Schiff, (1996; 2009), op, cit.
[47] Bruneau, Thomas, (2012), op. cit.; Barany, Zoltan, (2012), *The Soldier and the Changing State: Building Democratic Armies in Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Americas*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
[48]Samuel Decalo (1989), op. cit.
[49] Burk, (2002), op. cit.
[50]Williams, Rocky, (1998), "Towards the Creation of an African civil-military relations tradition", *African Journal of Political Science*, 3(1):20-41.

[52] Chuter, David, (2009), "Civil-Military Relations: Is there Really a Problem?", *Journal of Security Sector Management*, 7(2): 1-17.
[53]Uzoigwe, Godfred, (1977), "The Warrior and the State in Precolonial Africa: Comparative Perspective". *Journal of Asian and African studies*, X111(1-4): 20-48.
[54]Burk, (2002), op. cit.
[55]Feaver, (1996), op.cit.
[56]Finer, (1962), op, cit.
[57] Janowitz, (1966); Edmonds, (1988), op. cit.

[58]Janowitz, (1966), op. cit.
[59]Ibid.
[60]Burk, (2002), op. cit.
[61]Travis, Donald, (2016), "Saving Samuel Huntington and the Need for Pragmatic Civil–Military Relations", *Armed Forces & Society*, 43(3) 395-414.
[62]Feaver, (1999), op. cit.
[63]Burk, (2002), op. cit.
[64]Feaver, Peter, (2003), *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight and Civil-Military Relations*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
[65]Feaver, (2003), op. cit.p.3
[66]Ibid, p.6.
[67]Burk, (2004), op.cit.
[68]Deane-Peter, Baker, (2007), "Agency Theory: A New Model of Civil-Military relations for Africa?", *African Journal on Conflict Resolution*, 7(1): 113 – 135.
[69]Ibid.
[70] Ibid.
[71]Herspring, Dale, (2013), Civil-*Military Relations and Shared Responsibility: A Four-Nation Study*, Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press; Herspring, Dale. (2012), "Searching for a More Viable Form of Civil-Military Relations: The Canadian and American Experience", In: *Civil-Military Relations in Perspective*, edited by Chimbala, Stephen, 31-61, Farnhman: Ashgate.
[72]Bland (1999), op. cit.
[73] Herspring, (2013). op. cit. p.9.
[74]Ibid.
[75]Ibid.
[76]Levy, Yagil, (2012), "A Revised Model of Civilian Control of the Military: The Interaction between the Republican Exchange and the Control Exchange", *Armed Forces & Society*, 38(4): 529-556.
[77]Ibid, p. 530.
[78] Travis, (2017), op. cit.
[79] Ibid p. 400.
[80]Luckham, Robin, (1994), "The Military, Militarization and Democratization in Africa: A Survey of Literature and Issues", *African Studies Review*, 37(2):13-75.
[81]Finer, (1962*)*, op. cit.
[82] Ibid. p.20.
[83] Ibid. p.23.
[84] Ibid. p.7.
[85] Ibid. p.6.
[86]Chuter, (2009), op. cit.
[87]Ibid.
[88]Shaw, Martin, (1991), *Post-Military Society: Militarism, Demilitarization and War at the End of the Twentieth Century*. London: Polity Press
[89]Luckham, (1994), op. cit.
[90]Shaw, (1991), op. cit.
[91]Welch, Claude, (1986), "From 'Armies of Africans' to 'African Armies': The Evolutions of Military Force in Africa", In: *African Armies: Evolution and Capabilities*, edited by Arlinghause, Bruce and Baker, Pauline,11-13. Colorado: World View Press; Welch, Claude, (1970), "The roots and implication of military intervention", In: *Soldier and State in Africa: A Comparative Analysis of Military Intervention and Political Change*, edited by Welch, Claude, 1-61, Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
[92]Baynham, Simon, (1985a), "Divide et Impera: Civilian Control of the Military in Ghana's Second and Third Republics", *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 23(4):623-642.
[93]Lock, Peter, (1999), "Africa, Military Downsizing and the Growth in the Security Industry", In: *Peace, Profit or Plunder? The Privatization of Security in War-Torn African Societies*, edited by Cilliers, Jakkie and Mason, Peggy

11-35. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies., p. 21
[94]Addae, (2005) op, cit. p. 163.
[95] Baynham, Simon, (1985b), "Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?: the Case of Nkrumah's National Security Service", *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 23(1): 87- 103.
[96] Ibid.
[97]Alexander, Templer, (1964), *African Tightrope: My Two Years as Nkrumah's Chief of Staff*, London: Pall Mall Press; Welch, (1970); Baynham, (1984), op. cit.
[98] Bayham (1985a), op. cit.
[99] A British officer who served as Kwame Nkrumah' Chief of Staff from 1960-1961.
[100]Alexander, (1964), p. vii
[101]Baynham, (1985a), op. cit.
[102]Ngoma, Naison, (2006a), '"Civil-Military Relations in Africa: Navigating uncharted waters", *African Security Review*, 15(4): 98-111; Ngoma, Naison, (2006b), "Myths and realities of civil-military relation in Africa and the search for peace and development", *Journal of Security Sector Management*, 4(1):1-28.
[103]Bryden, Alan, and Olunisakin, Funmi, (2010), "Conceptualizing Security Sector Transformation in Africa", In: *Security Sector Transformation in Africa*, edited by Bryden, Alan, and Olonisakin, Funmi, 3-26, LIT Verlag: Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces; Bryden, Alan and Olonisakin, Funmi (2010), "Enabling Security Sector Transformation in Africa", In: *Security Sector Transformation in Africa*, edited by Bryden, Alan, and Olonisakin, Funmi, 291-220, Geneva: DCAF, LIT Verlag.
[104] Rabinowitz, Beth and Jargowsky, Paul, (2017), "Rethinking Coup Risk: Rural Coalitions and Coup-Proofing in Sub-Saharan Africa", *Armed Forces & Society*, XX(X):1-25.
[105] Bagayoko, Niagale, Hutchful Eboe, and Luckham, Robin, (2016), "Hybrid Security Governance in Africa: Rethinking the foundations of security, justice and legitimate public authority", *Conflict, Security & Development*, 16(1): 1-32.
[106] Ibid. p.11.
[107] For instance in Ghana activities of the World war veterans and the events of 28th February 1957 contributed to mass agitation for independence and accelerated the pace towards the granting of independence by the British in March 1957. Mention can also be made of experiences of Southern African countries where nationalist armies were instrumental in the struggle against colonial rule and apartheid in South Africa.
[108]Koonings, Kees, and Kruijt, Dirk (2002), "Military Politics and the Mission of Nation-Building", In: *Political Armies: the Military and Nation Building in the Age of Democracy*, edited by Koonings, Kees and Kruijt, Dirk, 9-32, London: Zed Books.
[109] Embaló, Birgit, (2012), "Civil–Military Relations and Political Order in Guinea Bissau", *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 50(2):53-281.
[110]Hutchful, Eboe, (1997b), "Military and Police Reforms in Ghana", *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 35(2): 251-278.
[111]Decalo, Samuel, (1990), *Coups and Army Rule in Africa*. Second edition, New Haven: Yale University Press
[112]Ibid.
[113]Ibid, p.4
[114]Ibid p.4
[115]Afrifa, Akwasi, (1966), *The Ghana coup: 24th February 1966*, London: Frank Cass and Company, pp.85-86
[116]Decalo, (1990), op. cit.
[117]Ibid, p.32.
[118]Assensoh, Akwasi, and Alex Assensoh, Yvett, (2002*), African Military History and Policies: Ideological Coups and Incursions 1900-Present*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
[119]Ibid.
[120] Clayton, Antony, (1986), "Foreign Intervention in Africa" In: *Military Power and Politics in Black Africa*, edited Simon Baynham, 203-258, New York: St Martin's Press.
[121]Clayton (1986), op. cit.

[122]Lambert, Alexander, (2009*), Democratic Civilian Control of Armed Forces Post-Cold War Era*. Geneva: DCAF.
[123]Schnabel, Albrecht, and Farr, Vanessa, (2011), "Returning to the Development Roots of Security Sector Reform", In: *Back to the Roots: Security Sector Reform and Development*, edited By Schnabel, Albrecht, and Farr, Vanessa, 3-28. Geneva: DCAF.
[124]Bryden and Olonisakin, (2010), op. cit.
[125]Lambert, (2010); Luckham, (2003), Cleary and McConville, (2006), op. cit.
[126] Bryden and Olonisakin, (2010), op. cit.
[127] Ibid.
[128] Ibid.
[129] See also Thomas Bruneau and Harold Trinkunas, (2006), "Democratization as a Global Phenomenon and its Impact on Civil-Military Relations", *Democratization*, 13(5):776-790.
[130]Brooks, Risa, (2006), "An Autocracy at War: Explaining Egypt's Military Effectiveness, 1967 and 1973", *Security Studies*, 15(3):396-430. Brooks argues in reference to Egypt's triumph in the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War, that changes in the balance of civil-military power in the state borne from more fundamental differences in domestic politics in the autocracy—shaped three areas of military activity critical to military effectiveness: strategic assessment, command, and control, and leadership.
[131]Biddle, Stephen, and Long, Stephen, (2004), "Democracy and Military Effectiveness: A Deeper Look", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 48(4)525-546; Avant, Deborah (1998), "Conflicting Indicators of 'Crisis' In American Civil-Military Relations", *Armed Forces & Society*, 24 (3):375-388.
[132]Avant, (1998), op. cit.
[133]Cottey, Edmonds, and Foster, Anthony, (2002), "The Second Generation Problematic: Rethinking Democracy and Civil-Military Relations", *Armed Forces & Society*, 29(1):31-56.
[134]Ibid.
[135]Ibid, p.41.
[136]Bruneau, Thomas, and Mate, Cris. (2008), "Towards a New Conceptualization of Democratization and Civil-Military Relations", *Democratization*, 15(5): 909-929.
[137]Ibid.
[138]Ibid, p.921.
[139]Ibid. p.921.
[140]Luckham, Robin, (1996), "Crafting Democratic Control over the Military: A Comparative Analysis of South Korean, Chile and Ghana", *Democratization*, 3(3):215-245; Luckham, (2003), op. cit.
[141]Rose, (1994), op. cit. p.13.
[142]Luckham, Robin, and Hutchful, Eboe, (2010), "Democracy and War- to-peace transition and Security sector transformation in Africa", In: *Security sector transformation in Africa*, edited by Bryden, Alan and 'Funmi Olonisakin, 185-204, Geneva: DCAF.
[143]Lambert, (2010), op. cit. p.5.
[144]Ibid.
[145]Aning and Lartey, (2009), op. cit.
[146]Aning and Lartey, (2009); Boraz and Bruneau, (2006), op. cit
[147] Adedeji, Ebo and N'Diaye, Boubacar, (2008), *the Opportunities and Challenges of Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector in West Africa*, Geneva: DCAF Aning and Lartey, (2009), op. cit.
[148]Standing Orders of the Parliament of Ghana, Commencement: 1 November 2000. Accra.
[149]Aning and Lartey (2009), op. cit. p.6-7.
[150] Ebo and N'Diaye, (2008), op. cit.
[151]Aning and Lartey, (2009), op. cit. p.6-7.
[152] Koonings, Kees, and Kruijt, Dirk (2002), "Military Politics and the Mission of Nation Building", In: *Political Armies: the Military and Nation Building in the Age of Democracy*, edited by Koonings , Kees and Kruijt, Dirk, London: Zed Books., p.1.
[153]Hutchful, (1997b); Aning and Bah, (2009), op. cit.
[154]Koonings and Kruijt, (2002), op. cit.
[155]Ibid.

[156]Ibid.
[157]Sagaren, (2006), op. cit.
[158]Hutchful, (1997b), op. cit.
[159] Alao, Abiodun, (2012), *Mugabe and the Politics of Security in Zimbabwe*, Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press.
[160]Hutchful, (1997b), op. cit.
[161]Ibid.
[162]Luckham, (1995), op. cit.
[163] Ibid. p.49.
[164]Hutchful and Luckham, (2010); Sangaré, Nouhoum, (2008), "Mali", In: *Challenges of Security Sector Governance in West Africa*, edited by Bryden, Alan, N'Diaye, Boubacar and Olonisakin, Funmi, 185-204, Munster: LIT.
[165] Agbese, Pita, (2004), "Democratic and Constitutional Control of the Military in Africa", In: *The Military and Politics in Africa: From Engagement to Democratic and Constitutional Control*, edited by George Klay Kieh and Pita Abese, 183-212. London: Ashgate.
[166]Onwundiwe, Ebere, (2004), "Military Coups in Africa: A Framework for Research" In: *The Military and Politics in Africa: From Engagement to Democratic and Constitutional Control*, edited by Klay, George and Abese, Pita, 17-35. London: Ashgate.
[167]Luckham, (1995), op. cit.
[168]Goldsworthy, David, (1981), "Civilian Control of the Military in Black Africa", *African Affairs*, 80(318): 49-74.
[169]Luckham, (1995); Hutchful (1997b), op. cit.
[170]Luckham, (1995), op. cit.
[171]Howe, Herbert (2001), *Ambiguous Order: Military Forces in Africa:* Boulder Colorado*:* Lynne Reiner Publishers.
[172] Ibid p.2.
[173] Ibid. p.9.
[174]Makinda, (2001), op. cit.
[175]Hougnikpo, (2010), op. cit.
[176]Ibid.
[177]Ibid. p. 154
[178]Ibid.
[179] Barany, (2012), op. cit. p. 3
[180] Ibid. p.3
[181]Esew, Ntim-Gyakari, (2012), *The Military and Democratization in Africa: A Critical Analysis of Transition to Civil rule in Nigeria and Ghana (1960-2000*). Verlag: Lambert Academic Publishing.
[182]Ibid.
[183]Geneva Center for Democratic Control of Armed Force (DCAF) (2000), "Defence Reform", *Backgrounder* 10; Jasper, Scott, (2009), "The Capabilities-Based Approach," In: *Transforming Defence Capabilities: New Approaches for International Security*, edited by Jasper, Scott, 1-24. Boulder Colorado: Lynne Reiner Publishers.
[184]DCAF (2000), Defence Reform, *Backgrounder* 10, op. cit.
[185]Guillem, Piella, (2016), "Transforming the Spanish military", *Defence Studies*, 16(1): 1-19; Prezelj, Iztok, Kopač, Erik, AlešŽiberna, Anja, Kolak and Grizold, Anton, (2016), "Quantitative Monitoring of Military Transformation in the Period 1992–2010: Do the Protagonists of Transformation Really Change more than other Countries?", *Defence Studies*, 16(1): 20-46.
[186]Prezelj, et al, (2016), op. cit.
[187]Rumsfeld, Donald (2003), *Transformation Planning Guidance*, United States of America Department of Defence.
[188]Kugler, Richard, (2006), *Policy Analysis in National Security Affairs: New Methods for a New Era*. Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, cited in Prezelj, et al (2016), op. cit.
[189]Kugler, (2006), op. cit. p. 288.

[190]Jasper, (2009), op. cit. pp. 2-3
[191] Ibid. pp. 2-3.
[192]Williams, Rocky, (nd), "The transformation of the South African Defence Sector since 1990" 39-60, Geneva: International Institute for Security Studies and DCAF.
[193]DCAF (2000), op. cit.
[194] Chuter, (2000), op. cit
[195]Prezelj, et al, (2006), op. cit. pp. 22-23.
[196] Le Roux, Len, (2003), Defence Sector Transformation, *African Security Review*, 12(3): 5-15.
[197]Cleary, Laura, (2006), "Political Direction: The Essence of Democratic, Civil and Civilian Control" In: *Managing Defence in a Democracy*, edited by Cleary, Laura and McConville, Teri. 32-45, London: Routledge.
[198]Bryden, Alan, and Olonisakin, Funmi, (2010), "Enabling Security Sector Transformation in Africa". In: *Security Sector Transformation in Africa*, edited by Bryden, Alan, and Olonisakin, Funmi, 291-234, Geneva: DCAF.
[199]Le Roux, (2003), op. cit. p. 12.
[200] Williams, Rocky (2005), "Human Security and the Transformation of the South African Security Environment from 1990-2004: Challenges and Limitations", *Journal of Security Sector Management* (March 2005): 1.
[201]William (n.d), op. cit. p.40.
[202]Fasana, Kenton, (2011), "Using Capabilities to Drive Military Transformation: An Alternative Framework", *Armed Forces & Society*, 37(1):141-162.
[203]Ibid.
[204]Ibid.
[205]Le Roux, (2003), op. cit.
[206] Shelton, Garth, and Alden, Chris, (1998), "Brave New World: The Transformation of the South African Military", *Comparative Strategy*, 17(4):345-362.
[207] Le Roux, Len, (2004), "Challenges for Defence Management in Africa", In: *Guarding the Guardians, Parliamentary Oversight and Civil-Military Relations: Challenges for SADC*, edited by Le Roux, Len, Rupiya, Martin, and Ngoma, Naison, Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies (ISS), p.88
[208]Luckham and Hutchful, (2010), op. cit.
[209]Ibid.
[210]Ibid. p 29.
[211]Ibid.
[212]Williams, Rocky, (1998), "Towards the Creation of an African civil-Military Relations Tradition", *African Journal of Political Science*, 3(1):20-41; Williams, Rocky (2002), "Mapping a New African civil-Military Relations Architecture", In: *Ourselves to Know: Civil-Military Relations and Defence Transformation in Southern Africa*, edited by Williams, Rocky, Cawthra, Gavin and Abrahams, Diane, 265-281, Pretoria: ISS.
[213]Schiff, Rebecca, (2009*), The Military and Domestic Politics: A Concordance Theory of Civil-Military Relations*, London: Routledge, p.33.
[214]Ibid. p.33.
[215]Ibid. p.43.
[216]Ibid. p.43.
[217]Ibid. p.44.
[218]Ibid. p.44.
[219]Ibid. p.45.
[220]Ibid. p.45.
[221]Moskos, Charles, (1981), *Institutions versus Occupation: Contrasting Models of Military Organization*. Northwestern University Evanston.
[222]Minaudo, Michael, (2009), "The Civil-Military Relations Cube: A Synthesis Framework for Integrating Foundational Theory, Research, and Practice in Civil-Military Relations", A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in Partial fulfilment of the requirements of the SE 704 Civil-Military Relations,

Newport: Naval War College. Available at http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA499826 (Accessed on April 25, 2013).
[223]Williams, (2002), op. cit.
[224] Wells, Richard, (1996), "The Theory of Concordance in Civil-Military Relations: A Commentary", *Armed Forces & Societ*y, 23 (2):269-275.
[225]Ibid.
[226]Ibid.
[227] Avant, Deborah, (1998), "Conflicting Indicators of 'Crisis' in American Civil-Military Relations", *Armed Forces & Society*, 24 (3):375-388.
[228] Cleary, Laura, (2012), "Lost in Translation: The Challenge of Exporting Models of Civil-Military Relations", *Prism*, 3(2), p.20.
[229]Ibid.
[230] Ali, Zulfiqar, (2014), "Contradiction of Concordance Theory: Failure to Understand Military Intervention in Pakistan", *Armed Forces & Society*, 40(3):544–567.
[231]Ibid.

CHAPTER THREE

Methodology

3.0 Introduction

This chapter reflects on some of the key research paradigms and philosophies that inform the research design, methods of data collection and analysis of results. The literature of research methodology in the social sciences has centred mainly on the philosophical contentions between quantitative and qualitative approaches to research. John Smith aptly summarizes these debates as "in quantitative research facts are used to construct our beliefs, while in interpretative or qualitative research, beliefs determine what should count as fact."[1] Kenneth Howe also argues that in practice, the difference between quantitative and qualitative data, design, analysis, and interpretation depend largely on differences in research interests and judgments about how best to pursue them.[2] To navigate through this methodological divergence the pragmatic or mixed approach recognizes and utilizes both quantitative and qualitative approaches where appropriate.[3] In this regard, Julia Brannen asserts that the case for separate paradigms stems from the fact that qualitative and quantitative researchers hold different epistemological assumptions. They belong to different research cultures and have different researcher biographies that work against convergence. Nonetheless she points out that there are more overlaps than differences in the two approaches. For instance, she asserts that the widely held claim that qualitative research uses words while quantitative research uses numbers is overly simplistic. [4]

The debate on methodology is often resolved through a combination of the research needs and the worldview of the researcher. This makes it necessary to establish the philosophical position of the researcher and the philosophical needs of the study before an appropriate research method is chosen. The study adopts a qualitative approach to research design, data gathering and analysis as the researcher's philosophical position is established in a social constructivist or phenomenological orientation. [5] The basis of qualitative approach is discovering meaning and involves both interpretation and a critical approach to social reality.[6] This approach is particularly well-suited for exploring complex issues whose study processes occur over a period of time as it stresses the validity of multiple meaning, structures, context and holistic analysis.[7] The uniqueness of qualitative approach is that it is primarily concerned with processes rather than outcomes. Researchers are interested in understanding how things occur.[8] Besides, qualitative research occurs in natural settings where human behaviour and events occur. In addition, the qualitative researcher often aims to gather in-depth understanding of social behaviour and the reasons underlying such behaviour.[9] Qualitative methods are often used to address research questions that require

explanation of social phenomena and their contexts. This approach is preferred for the purpose of this study due to the emphasis it places on social and political processes and institutions. As such, the central focus of this study- civil-military relations and defence transformation can be best studied through this approach to examine how relationships have evolved over time.

3. 1 Philosophical Underpinnings of Qualitative Research

There is no single approach to any research paradigm in general and qualitative research, in particular. Any approach taken may be underpinned by several factors including the researcher's ontological and epistemological beliefs. According to the theory of science, relationships among these constructs are such that; "ontology defines epistemology, which in turn defines methodology, which then determines applied methods."[10] On the one hand, ontology refers to a theory of being. This relates to beliefs about the nature of the social world and what can be known about it. In the social sciences, key ontological questions include whether or not social reality exists independently of human conceptions and interpretations; whether there is a common, shared, social reality or just multiple context specific realities; and whether or not social behaviour is regulated by laws; that can be considered as immutable or generalizable.[11] These positions are often categorized broadly into objectivism and constructivism. Objectivism as an ontological position asserts that social phenomena and their meanings have an existence that is independent of social actors. [12] Constructionism also stress that social phenomena and their meaning are continually being accomplished by social actors. Therefore social phenomena and categories are not only produced through social interaction but they are in a constant state of revision. [13]

Epistemology, on the other hand, is a theory of knowledge that is concerned about the nature of knowledge and how it can be acquired. An epistemological position lays the foundation for the knowledge-building process.[14] Some of the issues at the core of the epistemological debate include how the relationship between the researcher and the researched is understood.[15] It is therefore necessary to explore briefly the ontological and epistemological positions adopted within this study, to generate a better understanding of methods of data collection and analysis.

Qualitative research finds resonance in both positivist and post-positivist positions. Historically, it was defined within the positivist tradition, where qualitative researchers attempted to do good positivist research with less rigorous methods and procedures.[16] Nonetheless, qualitative method is most preferred by those coming from non-positivist or interpretivist epistemological positions such as hermeneutics, phenomenology and social

constructivism among others. Although these philosophies are related, they embrace different perspectives on the aim and practice of understanding human action, different ethical commitments, as well as different stance on methodological and epistemological issues of representation, validity and objectivity.[17]

Generally, the post-positivists challenge the traditional notion of absolute truth or knowledge and recognize that people cannot be entirely positive about their claims of knowledge when studying the behaviour and actions of humans.[18] This worldview is associated with the works of 19th century writers like Comte, Mill, Durkheim, Locke and Newton. The post-positivists are also of the view that the social world is patterned and that causal relationships can be discovered and tested through reliable strategies.[19] In this sense, they move away from the positivist idea of proving *causal* relationships that constitute the social world, and rather build evidence to support a pre-existing theory.[20] Flowing from the post-positivist school of thought, interpretivism is generally based on the interpretation of interactions and the social meaning that people assign to their interactions.[21] In this regard, the interpretivists believe in relative and multiple realities. Lincoln and Guba write that these multiple meanings are very difficult to interpret as they depend on other systems for meanings.[22] Therefore, the knowledge generated from this discipline is perceived through socially constructed and subjective interpretations.[23] The methodological implication of having multiple realities is that research questions cannot be definitively established before the study begins; rather, they evolve and change as the study progresses especially through the discovery of surprising findings.[24]

Similarly, the social constructivists basically assume that knowledge is socially constructed by people active in the research process, and that researchers attempt to understand the complex world of lived experience from the point of view of those who live it.[25] This interpretive framework is very common in phenomenological research studies. The phenomenologists are, as well, concerned with how individuals make sense of the world around them and how in particular researchers or philosophers should bracket out preconceptions in their grasp of that world. [26] This paradigm is often associated with works of early writers like Alfred Schultz, Edmund Husserl, Max Weber, who recognize the fundamental difference between the subject matter of the natural and social sciences and the need for an epistemology that will reflect and capitalize on the differences. Fundamentally, the difference lies in the fact that "social reality has a meaning for human beings and therefore human action is meaningful-that is it has meaning for them and they act on the basis of the meaning that they attribute to their acts and to the acts of others."[27] In sum, the phenomenologist considers human behaviour as the product of peoples' interpretation of the world. In this regard, they attempt to understand human behaviour from the point of view of the people concerned.[28]

Qualitative researchers often use a variety of epistemological positions and methods to secure an in-depth understanding of the phenomenon under study. The researcher adopts an interpretivist epistemological orientation. The study of people and their institutions in the social world requires a different logic of research procedure, one that reflects the distinctiveness of humans against the natural sciences. Based on a constructivist ontological position, the researcher believes that social interaction is in constant state of revision, so this study present a specific version of social reality rather than one that can be considered as definitive. This study adopts a holistic approach to qualitative research that integrates ontology, epistemology, methodology and methods.[29] This approach brings out the linkages between philosophical foundations and the research method or techniques employed based on one's epistemological and ontological orientations to understand and describe civil-military relations and process of defence transformation in emerging democracies.

3.2 Research Design: Case Study

Although other qualitative and quantitative research designs such as surveys, experiments and historical analysis are worthy of mention, the epistemological position of the researcher and the aims and needs of this research rule them out. The qualitative research design selected for this study is a single-case study. This is because the study aims at deeper and insightful understanding of a complex social phenomenon of defence transformation processes and civil-military relations in Ghana, rather than measurements; thus the use of other strategies like experiments or surveys are not possible.

Table 2-3: Choice of Research Strategy

Strategy	Type of research question	Requires control of behavioural events	Focuses on contemporary events
Experiment	How, why	Yes	Yes
Survey	Who, what, where, how many how much?	No	Yes
Archival analysis	Who, what, where, how many, how much	No	Yes/No
History	How, why	No	No
Case study	How, why	No	Yes

Source: Adopted from Yin, (2003)

3.2.1 Case Study

Case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in detail within its real-life context, and particularly when the boundaries between the phenomenon and context are not clearly known.[30] In other words, case study focuses on one or just a few instances of a particular phenomenon with a view to providing an in-depth account of events, experiences and relationships of a larger population.[31] Robert Yin adds that "case study inquiry copes with the technically distinctive situation in which there will be many more variables of interest than data, and as one result relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in a triangulating fashion, and as another result benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data collection and analysis."[32] It is most suitable for situation where the researcher has little control over events. This is because, the main concern here is investigating contemporary phenomenon as they occur in their natural setting, so there is no pressure on the researcher to impose controls or change circumstances.[33]

There are several methods of conducting a case study research. These include multiple or comparative, single, holistic or embedded case studies. The choice of a particular case study research design may be guided by what Robert Yin terms as five component of research design, namely 1) a study's question; 2) its propositions if any; 3) its units of analysis; 4) the logic of linking data to the propositions; and 5) the criteria for interpreting the findings.[34] In most instances, social science analysts tend to favour multiple case studies over single cases due to their varied advantages. For example, multiple case studies involve extensive study of several instrumental cases to provide understanding and insights. This provides improved ability to theorize over a broader context.[35] Therefore a major strength of a comparative case design is its ability to allow the distinguishing characteristics of two or more cases to serve as a springboard for theoretical reflections about contrasting findings.[36]As argued by Robert Yin, evidence from multiple cases is often seen as more compelling and thus can be regarded as more robust.[37] Despite these advantages, multiple case studies have some weaknesses. For instance, in comparative cases, researchers tend to pay less attention to the specific context and more to the ways in which cases can be contrasted.[38] In addition, doing two or more case studies may require extensive resources and time beyond the means of a single researcher.[39] This study therefore rules out multiple or comparative cases as the rationale for doing a single-case which is detailed below cannot be satisfied by multiple cases.



Figure 1-3: Case Study Design

Source: Author, adopted from Yin, (2003)

The choice of a single-case study design on Ghana is informed by a number of factors. First, a single-case is most suitable for the key research question- how can defence transformation contribute to healthy civil-military relations necessary for democratic consolidation in emerging democracies such as Ghana? Case study research designs are generally suitable to exploring 'what', 'how' and 'why' questions.[40] This is because such questions deal with operational links that need to be traced over time, rather than mere frequencies or incidences.[41] This design could be effectively employed to test the underlying research proposition/hypothesis-how does defence transformation contribute to improved civil-military relations, which is deemed essential for consolidation of democracy and political stability in emerging democracies.

In addition, a single-case study represents the critical case for testing the theoretical framework-concordance theory of civil-military relations upon which the study is hinged. Rebecca Schiff considers the unique historical and cultural experiences of nations and moves beyond institutional analysis of civil military relations by arguing that in order to prevent the military from interfering in domestic politics, three societal institutions: the military, political elites and citizenry must work and maintain cooperation or partnership agreement in four areas; the social composition of the officer corps; political decision-

making process; method of recruitment of personnel and style of the military.[42]Besides, Schiff's theoretical proposition, there is a general view that something has changed within the Ghana Armed Forces (GAF) and Ghanaian society that needs to be studied. Therefore, the research will examine what exactly has changed in Ghana's defence sector through Chuter's conceptual framework on defence transformation. Chuter conceptualizes defence transformation to encompass four major clusters, namely; cultural transformation, human transformation, political transformation, and organizational transformation.[43] The above theoretical and conceptual frameworks have specified a clear set of assumptions and therefore a single case on Ghana could enable us to confirm, challenge or even extend the theoretical and conceptual framework.[44] Putting it succinctly, a single-case study is more compelling because there exists no exhaustive study on Ghana or any other West African country through the dual lenses of Schiff's theory of civil-military relations and Chuter's framework for defence transform

Moreover, single case is a representative case, as it captures the circumstances and conditions of an everyday situation.[45] Therefore a single case enables the study to capture the circumstances and conditions of everyday situation as civil-military relations and democratic consolidation in emerging democracies. More so, a single case is the longitudinal case- studying the same single case over a period of time could help specify how certain conditions change over time.[46]

A widely held criticism of single case study is that it provides little evidence for scientific generalization. For instance, Arendt Lijphart argues that a single case study "can constitute neither the basis for a valid generalization nor the ground for disproving an established generalization."[47] Contrary to this criticism, single-case studies focus on circumstantial uniqueness and not the obscurities of mass representation.[48] It therefore allows for thick description and deeper understanding of processes.[49] When a researcher strategically concentrates efforts on a particular case, there is the obvious opportunity to delve much deeper into issues and discover new things and complexities that might not have become apparent through more superficial multiple-case research.[50] This increases the accuracy of findings in case study research.

3. 2.2 Case Selection

Case study research designs often employ an admixture of case selection strategies in order to obtain validity and representativeness of their findings. For this study, the case-selection approach is a typical case. This exemplifies what is often considered as a typical set of values, based on some general understanding of phenomenon.[51] Ghana presents a case for an in-depth study because the GAF, despite their chequered history has gradually

metamorphosed into a very professional and a reputable institution. Unlike the past, where the military was seen as an employer of last resort for school dropouts, the Ghana Armed Forces has become an attractive institution to the extent that, every year, thousands of qualified young men and women and professionals apply and troop to screening centres for enlistment.[52] This is partly due to high levels of unemployment in the country. Nonetheless, GAF now boast of a generation of highly educated and qualified officer corps who have sound appreciation of the tenets of civil-military relations. The Armed Forces are also held in high esteem by the population despite the seemingly uneasy relationship between the armed forces and general populace. Various internal and external initiatives have been made to reform this institution from its predatory nature to its present state. The study therefore explores the factors that have contributed to the changing outlook of the Ghana Armed Forces and overall effect of this on civil-military relations in Ghana. A single-case study approach therefore has the advantage of enabling a detailed investigation and analysis on how defence transformation could contribute to improved civil-military relations essential for the consolidation of democracy in Ghana.

In addition, analyses on civil-military relations and defence transformation have been done on advanced democracies. The very few analyses on emerging democracies in Africa have concentrated on post-conflict security and defence sector reforms. Moreover, only a select few African countries have actually embarked upon a holistic process of defence transformation. Reforms of the security and defence sectors in Africa appear to be lagging behind processes in other areas of public policy even in countries that have institutionalized democratic governance.[53] South Africa arguably presents a very well-articulated process of transforming her defence sector following the end of apartheid and the accession of a new democratic order in 1994. Therefore non-conflict countries such as Ghana which have remained relatively stable since the return to constitutional democracy requires a systematic investigation to actually establish the real changes in the defence sector. Ghana represents a typical case for study, because the history of its civil-military relations does not differ significantly from most West African countries. Therefore the findings and recommendations that may arise from the case study could form the basis for further studies and provide relevant lessons or policy recommendations for other West African countries in need of holistic transformation of their defence sector.

Furthermore, the choice of Ghana as a single-case study is also informed by need for readily available quality data from both primary and secondary sources to enable the researcher to successfully address the key research questions. The selected case appears challenging for practical reasons of gaining access to the military for information. Often, negotiating access to case study settings like the military can be tasking in the research process. In most instances, getting access to key informants, documents and even settings

like the military can generate ethical issues of confidentiality. To overcome this challenge, the researcher benefited mainly from her professional experience as a staff of an institution affiliated to Ministry of Defence of Ghana. She made use of familiarity with the GAF setting to establish formal and informal contacts with serving and retired officials of the Ghana Armed Forces, to gather the necessary data. Findings of the case study are therefore based on available primary and secondary sources of information.

3.3 Methods and Sources of Data Collection

Case studies often employ a number of data collection and analysis techniques across multiple time periods depending on the specific needs of the situation under the study. Researchers often rely on interviewing, observing and documentary methods of data collection and analysis tools.[54] The strength of this method is its ability to deal with a full repertoire of evidence emanating from documents, interviews and observations.[55] In case study research, evidence is often built up from multiple sources and if possible shown to be congruent with the conclusions.[56] This strategy contributes to enhancing the credibility of data. [57] As compared to other qualitative approaches, case study research, allows investigators to collect and integrate quantitative survey data, which could help towards a holistic understanding of the phenomenon under study.[58]

For this study, one of the primary methods of data collection is field research to support the conceptual and theoretical claims through structured and semi-structured interviews with a purposefully sampled population from Ghana's defence sector and civilians. Interviews are essential source of information for case studies because case studies usually concern human affairs.[59] The choice of semi-structured interview was deemed appropriate because the topic of civil-military relations and the defence sector is highly sensitive. Therefore through interviews, the researcher was able to focus her questions to selective subjects. In this regard, a case study protocol/ interview questions was used to seek answers to the research questions. This helped increase the reliability of the case study research and guide the researcher in data collection.[60] In addition, semi-structured and structured interviews were conducted with a cross section of Ghanaian society as most of the time civil-military relations are gauged through the interaction between society and the military.

Qualitative interviews are more suitable for research in social and political processes, particularly for enquiring on how and why things change.[61] This method is preferred because the focus of the research: civil-military relations and defence transformation processes in Ghana are largely un-documented and thus require qualitative interviews with the relevant stakeholders to obtain primary information. Generally, interviews provide most favourable means of collecting data on personal perspectives, and experiences of

individuals, particularly when sensitive topics are being explored. Interviews also provide the researcher an opportunity to deeply uncover new clues, secure vivid and accurate accounts of people's personal experiences.[62] For this study, semi or unstructured, open-ended questions, informal interviewing is preferred as it allows for more flexibility and responsiveness to emerging themes for both the interviewer and respondents.[63]

The study makes use of primary and secondary sources and materials. This includes relevant literature on civil-military relations, defence transformation, security sector reform and democratization in West Africa, in general, and Ghana, in particular. A careful study was done on policy-relevant materials relating to Ghana's defence sector, official reports of commissions that have been instituted in the past to review aspects of the defence sector, as many of these commissions proposed particular changes within the GAF.

3.4 Sampling Technique and Sample Population

Due to the limitations of the research and resource constraints, it is imperative to select a population and how to study them in relation to the theoretical context and the hypotheses or aims of the research.[64] In this regard, sampling becomes an important element in research planning and design. Sampling theory assumes that inferences or conclusions can be drawn about the population from which the sample is taken.[65] As the design for this research is a case study, purposive sampling is most appropriate for selecting the unit of analysis or population.

In purposive sampling which is a non-probability technique, subjects or respondents are selected because they are likely to generate useful data for the study. In the words of Patton the "logic and power of purposeful sampling lie in selecting information-rich cases for in-depth study. Information-rich cases are those from which one can learn a great deal about issues of central importance to the purpose of the research."[66] This approach is based on the researcher's practical knowledge and pragmatic considerations of the research area, the available literature and evidence from the study itself.[67] It takes into consideration theoretical issues thorough the development of a framework of variables that could influence the contribution of an individual. However, a major disadvantage of purposive sampling is the subjectivity of the researcher's decision making. This could lead to bias and a significant threat to the validity of the research conclusions. While bias in research is not entirely negative, it can be seen in a neutral or even a positive sense as simply referring to the fact that the researcher has adopted a particular angle or perspective.[68] Nonetheless, the negative effects can be minimized by ensuring that there is an internal consistency between the aims and epistemological basis of the research, and the criteria used for selecting the purposive sample.[69] It is however comment worthy that findings based on limited sampling

could be subject to possible biases such as respondent and selection bias along with the inherent problems of trustworthiness and authenticity in self-reported data. For this study, some efforts were made to limit this through a triangulation of methods. First, interview questions were developed based on the conceptual and theoretical frameworks underpinning the research. Different people were asked the same set of questions for their response. Secondly, multiple respondents were interviewed. For instance, respondents from the institution under study were selected across several generations of the GAF. Some respondents were also selected outside the institutions for their views on the Ghanaian military. In addition, accounts of these respondents were also crosschecked with the available data from institutional reports and literature.

Qualitative research typically involves the use of small samples in order to extract rich and thick data.[70] Most importantly, the nature of data obtained determines the size. This is unpredictable.[71] The major limitation of this sampling technique is the subjective nature of the process of choosing respondents. For a study of this nature, a number of subjects could have been higher, however, it was limited people related to defence sector and purposefully selected citizens of Ghana. For a single-case study on Ghana, a sample size of 72 people was interviewed to gather rich and manageable data. The sample was selected based on their representativeness to include people from Ghana's defence sector such as officers and men/women of GAF both retired and active, technocrats, academics and civilian authorities and ordinary civilians. With regards to the ranks of members of the GAF, there is a sample bias towards the officer ranks. People in this group represent views of leadership which often shape organizational culture and developments within the armed forces. Nonetheless, the views of a few personnel from the enlisted ranks were sought to capture varied opinions on developments in the GAF.

Considering the challenges in accessing information from the military, interviews were conducted with some identified retired and serving officers of the GAF. It was observed in the course of the interviews that retired officers provided open and detailed responses than some officers in active service. Some amount of snowballing was employed as some respondents provided the researcher with links to additional respondents who provided deeper insights on the issues under investigation. Interviews were also conducted with persons such as a minister of defence, ranking member of Parliamentary Committee on Defence and Interior who served during the period under study. The researcher also sought the views of some experts of former members of the British Military Assistant Technical Team (BMATT) in Ghana and foreign defence attaches in Accra. The interviews were conducted in two phases. The first phase of the interviews took place from October 2014-December2015. The second phase of the interviews was conducted between April-July

2016. Some follow-up interviews were conducted in 2017 to clarify earlier recorded information.

Civil-military relations are often gauged through the relationship between the military and political class. This thesis went further to look at the relationship between the military and the general society. Some ordinary civilians were also sampled for interviews. Two categories of respondents were studied. The first group comprises of civilian personnel of the Ministry of Defence and affiliated institutions like the KAIPTC. This group of civilians was considered because of their close proximity with the military makes them better placed to share their experiences on the relationship between the military and society. In order to gain some perspectives on the civil-military relations from the view of the ordinary citizens in the society, about 45 people where sampled from cities in three regions in Ghana, Greater Accra, Ashanti and Central Regions. These people from divergent backgrounds both the formal and informal sectors were asked a series of open-ended questions. The criteria for selection of participants included age, affiliation with the defence sector and residency in Ghana. With regards to age, people from 18 years and above were considered because this is the official age of maturity and consent in Ghana. The average age of respondents interviewed was about 35. Some people within this age bracket have witnessed developments during Ghana's era of coup d'états and constitutional democracy. Nonetheless some of respondents who were born during the era of coup d'états have not actually experienced coups d'états as adults. They may have however come in contact with members of the armed forces in the Ghanaian society. People from these regions, particularly Accra and Kumasi were sampled because Accra is the national capital and Kumasi is considered as the second business city. Each of these regions hosts a military command. Accra hosts the Southern Command, while Kumasi formerly hosted the Northern Command, now the Central Command. People from these two regions were selected because of the visible presence of the military in these urban cities of Accra and Kumasi. During the era of military rules in Ghana, some of the human rights abuses and excesses of military personnel took place in Accra and Kumasi. Therefore people from this town may have different perspectives on civil-military relations. The third town, Cape Coast was selected because it is one of the three regions in Ghana which does not have a visible military presence in the form of military based. In this regard, the people from this region may also have varying views on the subject of civil-military relations.

The interview questions were first pre-tested on some respondents at the KAIPTC to ensure that the questions were understood by the target respondents and could generate the intended responses. Based on the initial responses and concerns of anonymity by some respondents, the questions were subsequently revised. During administration of the interview questions, the researcher took into account the varied educational background of

the respondents. For respondents who could not read and understand the questions in English, they were interviewed in the local language and responses were recorded in the English language by the researcher. Efforts were made to minimize errors and biases of the researcher in recording by reading out the recorded answers in the local language for the interviewees to confirm whether their views were captured accurately by the researcher.

3.5 Data Analysis

Qualitative data analysis often involves a triangulation of a gamut of techniques for interpreting data obtained for each study unit or research questions. Most often, the researcher usually starts analysing during the process of data collection, so that questions that remain unanswered (or new questions that come up) can be addressed before data collection is over.[72] Data analysis in qualitative studies can be described as a reflective process which involves: 1) organizing raw data; 2) entering and coding data; 3) searching for meaning through thematic analysis; 4) interpreting meaning; and 5) drawing conclusions. All these are done while keeping in mind the bigger picture of the research questions, aims and objectives, methodological constraints and theory.[73] The use of thematic, rather than statistical analysis sets apart qualitative data analysis process from quantitative ones. Qualitative analysis also demands a more organic process in which the steps of data entry and coding, data analysis and interpretation are more closely entwined rather than distinct.[74] For the purpose of the case study research design, data is analysed based on content analysis.

Content analysis is a useful method of assessing the relative importance of messages within published documents. This method is often used in media research. However, the researcher felt that content analysis of some key primary and secondary documents would add a novel and useful level of insight. This also provides a useful way of analysing comparative themes across an extended time period.[75] Qualitative content analysis consists of a bundle of techniques for systematic data analysis.[76] In most cases, qualitative data will be analysed in the following steps: a) ascertaining the units of analysis (example text, interview transcripts or other forms of verbal communication); b) identifying and evaluating the items that are of theoretical importance and relate meaningfully to the central research questions.[77]

One of the commonly used strategies for analysing case study data is to follow the theoretical positions that underpin the study.[78] Data analysis was guided by the key themes that were derived from the research objectives, and the theoretical and conceptual issues from the literature. To achieve the stated objectives of the case study, data gathered on civil-military relations and Ghana defence transformation process is analysed through the

dual lens of Schiff's concordance theory and defence transformation posited by Chuter. In order to gauge the level and extent of change within Ghana's defence sector, the data is clustered and analysed into four broad themes of defence transformation proposed by Chuter- human transformation; cultural transformation; political transformation and organizational transformation. Interview notes and transcripts from the in-depth interviews were coded under the four themes to facilitate the identification of similarities and differences in the responses. Under each theme, the researcher created categories of responses to the interview questions. This method is generally considered to be the most appropriate because it allows the data to direct the development of themes.[79] Furthermore, data gathered on civil-military relations in Ghana is analysed using the theoretical lens of Schiff's concordance theory of civil-military relations to explore how the theories and principles of civil-military relations apply in the Ghanaian context. Responses gathered from the questionnaires were categorized under the themes established from the theory.

The findings and conclusions of the study are based on interpretations of the available data from the interviews and complemented with an analysis of literature and few official documents. The study was designed to ensure objectivity, reliability and validity. Objectivity was ensured through an unbiased analysis of interview notes coupled with the fact that the assessments and conclusions were drawn from both primary data gathered and available secondary data. In order to achieve validity, data and method triangulation were employed in the study. For instance, during the second phase of interviews, some respondents were asked again to clarify some of the earlier given responses in order to ensure accuracy of the data gathered.

3.6 Ethical Considerations

Research ethics seeks to ensure that in addition to adopting an appropriate methodology, a study or research is also conducted in a manner that is responsible and morally defensible.[80] The practice of research ethics is guided by divergent theoretical frameworks, namely, the normative/deontological and the consequential/teleological. On the one hand, the normative ethics include the deontological perspective, which argues that 'the end never justify the means." In this regard, ethical considerations should never be compromised.[81] Two strands of views emanates from the normative perspective- the Universalist and relativist. On the other hand, consequential or teleological approach, proffers that "the morality of the means can only be judged by the context of what is achieved." These divergent views are summarized in the table below. In essence the controversies around ethical issues have arisen purely out practice, rather than in principle.

Table 3-3: A Summary of Ethical Stance

	Universalist	**Contingent/relativistic**
Deontological/non-consequential	Ethical principles should never be compromised, breaking these rules is both morally wrong and damaging to social research	Duties to particular countries, communities, professional groups and clients
Teleological/consequentialist	Means do not overlap with ends. However, following a set of universal rules or practices can often be relied on to pursue ends.	Acts should be judges purely on their possible outcomes-the end justifies the means. That morally questionable acts are justifiable if they produce 'good'

Source: Adopted from Gary, 2014

In line with the normative theoretical propositions, ethical principles were duly observed during the data collection and analysis. Generally, the four main areas of ethical principles include:

- Avoid or do no harm to participants;
- Ensure informed consent;
- Respect for the privacy of participants; and
- Avoid the use of deception.

As the study involves human subjects, the researcher sought ethical review and approval from the Cranfield University School of Management Research Ethics Committee. The research project was considered to constitute low risk to participants. Hence the Low Risk Project Submission Form was submitted together with the research proposal and draft interview questions. The approval was formally granted in writing. Respondents were contacted by means of emails and telephone calls. They were provided with an introductory letter from the researcher's institution and brief overview of the research objectives. Respondents provided emails and verbal acceptance to participate in the study. Respondents were presented with consent form to sign, indicating informed consent. Some respondents were initially reluctant to formally sign the consents for various reasons, including anonymity. This challenge was however addressed when the researcher explained the basis for the consent forms and gave them the highest assurances of anonymity. Issues of confidentiality were explicitly assured as the consent forms enabled interviewees to

indicate if they wish to remain anonymous or otherwise. It came out that most serving personnel of the GAF interviewed requested for anonymity while retired personnel and other civilians were not particularly keen on anonymity. The researcher secured permission from respondents for audio recordings of the interviews. The recordings and interviews notes therefore provided primary data for content analysis.

3. 7 Summary

The research set out to adopt a qualitative approach to research design, data collection and analysis. This approach acknowledges the strength and limitations of qualitative research. Particularly, for a subject area, as defence transformation in West Africa, where is the limited literature, the focus on a single case study allows a deeper reflection on the political process of the country and how it informs the organization of the defence sector. As the study was interested in primary data that was not readily available, semi-structured interviews allowed respondents to share their insights and allowed follow up questions on emerging themes. Through this approach, the researcher was led to other respondents who were not initially thought of, but offered rich and informative data. In order to be able to contextualize the analysis that emerged from the methodology, the next section of the research provides a semi-historical account of political transitions and civil-military relations from independence in 1957 to 1992 when the Fourth Republic was inaugurated.

Endnotes

[1]Smith, John, (1983), "Quantitative versus qualitative research: An attempt to clarify the issue", *Educational Researcher*, 12(3): p.10.
[2] Howe, Kenneth, (1988), "Against the Quantitative-Qualitative Incompatibility Thesis or Dogmas Die-Hard", *Educational Researcher*, 17(8):10-16.
[3]Onwuegbuzie, Anthony, and Leech, Nancy, (2005), "On Becoming a Pragmatic Researcher: The Importance of Combining Quantitative and Qualitative Research Methodologies", *International Journal of Social Research Methodology*, 8(5): 375-387; Johnson, Burke and Onwuegbuzie, Anthony (2004), "Mixed Methods Research: A Research Paradigm Whose Time Has Come", *Educational Researcher*, 33(7): 14-26.
[4]Brannen, Julia, (1992), *Mixing Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Research*. London: Avebury; Brennen, Julia, (2005), "Mixing Methods: The Entry of Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches into the Research Process", *International Journal of Social Research Methodology*, 8(3):173-184.
[5]Kreuger, Larry and Neuman, Lawrence, (2006), *Social Work Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Applications*, New York: Pearson Education & Allyn and Bacon; Lincoln, Yvonna and Guba, Egon, (1985*), Naturalistic inquir*y, Beverly Hills, CA: Sage; Creswell, John, (1994), *Research Design: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches*, London: Sage; Sale, Joanna, Lohfeld, Lynne, and Brazil, Kevin. (2002), "Revisiting the Quantitative-Qualitative: Implications for Mixed-Methods Research", *Quality and Quantity*, 36(1): 43-53.
[6]Creswell, (1994), op. cit.; Ahiadeke, Clement, (2008), *Research Methodology: Theory and Practice in the Social Science*. Accra: Sundel Services; Hess-Biber, Sharlene, and Leavy Patricia, (2010), *The Practice of Qualitative Research*, Second Edition, Thousand Oaks: Sage Publishers; Merriam, Sharan, (2009), *Qualitative research: A Guide to Design and Implementation*. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass; Creswell, John, (2009), *Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches*. Second Edition, Los Angeles: Sage Publications.
[7]Snape, Dawn and Spencer, Liz, (2003), "Foundations of Qualitative Research", In: *Qualitative Research Practice: A Guide for Social Science Students and Researchers*, edited by Ritchie, Jane, and Lewis, Jane, 1-23, London: Sage.
[8]Merriam, Sharan (1998), cited in Creswell, (1994).
[9]Patton, Michael, (1990), *Qualitative Evaluation and Research Methods*, Second Edition, London: Sage Publications.
[10]Slevitch, (2011), op. cit.
[11]Snape and Spencer, (2003), op. cit.
[12] Bryman, Alan, (2012), *Social Research Methods*, Fourth Edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
[13] Ibid.
[14]Hess-Biber, Sharlene, (2006), "The Craft of Qualitative Research: A Holistic Approach", In:, *The Practice of Qualitative Research*, edited by Hesse-Biber, Sharlene and Leavy, Patricia, Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications
[15]Hesse-Biber and Leavy, (2010), op. cit.
[16]Denzin, Norman and Lincoln, Yvonna, (2000), "The discipline and practice of qualitative research", In: *Handbook of Qualitative Research* 2, edited by Denzin, Norman and Lincoln, Yvonna, 1-28, CA: Sage, pp. 1-28.
[17]Schwandt, Thomas, (2000), "Three Epistemological Stances for Qualitative Inquiry: Interpretivism, Hermeneutics and Social Construction", In: *Handbook of Qualitative Research*, edited by Schwandt, Thomas, 189-213, Thousand Oaks: Sage.
[18]Creswell, (2009), op. cit.
[19]Hesse-Biber, (2006), op. cit.
[20]Ibid.
[21]Ibid.
[22]Lincoln and Guba (1985), op. cit.
[23]Guba, Ergon, and Lincoln, Yvonna, (1994), "Competing Paradigms in Qualitative Research", In: *Handbook of Qualitative Research*, edited by Norman, Denzin and Yvonna, Lincoln, 105-117, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage; Hesse-Biber, (2010), op. cit.

[24]Bryman, Alan, (2012), *Social Research Methods*, Fourth Edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
[25]Schwandt, (2000), op. cit; Creswell, (2013).
[26]Bryman, (2012); Hesse-Biber, (2006).
[27]Bryman, (2012), p.30.
[28]Bryman, 2012).
[29]Hesse-Biber and Leavy, (2010).
[30]Yin, Robert, (2003), *Case Study Research: Design and Methods*, Third Edition. Thousand Oaks: Sage.
[31]Denscombe, Matyn, (2010), *The Good Research Guide for Small-scale social research projects*, Fourth Edition, Berkshire, England: Open University and McGraw-Hill; Gerring, John, (2008), "Case Selection for Case-Study Analysis: Qualitative and Quantitative Techniques:, In: *The Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology*, edited by Janet M. Box-steffensmeir, Henry, Brady and David, Collier, 645-685, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
[32]Yin, Robert, (2009), *Case Study Research Design and Methods*, Fourth edition. Thousand Oaks: Sage,p.18
[33]Denscombe, (2010), op. cit.
[34]Yin, (2003) op. cit.
[35]Berg, Bruce, and Lune, Howard (2012), *Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Science*, Eighth Edition, Boston: Person Education Inc.
[36]Bryman, (2012).
[37]Yin, (2003).
[38]Dyer, Gibb, Wilkins, Alan, Eisenhardt, Kathleen, (1991), "Better Stories, Not Better Constructs, to Generate Better Theory: A Rejoinder..." *The Academy of Management Review;* (16):3; 613-619.
[39]Yin, Robert, (2014), *Case Study Research Design and Methods*, Fifth Edition, Thousand Oaks: Sage
[40]Yin, (2003), op. cit.
[41]Yin, (2003), op. cit
[42]Schiff, Rebecca, (2009), *The Military and Domestic Politics: A Concordance Theory of civil-Military Relations*, London: Routledge.
[43] Chuter, David, (2000), *Defence Transformation: A Short Guide to the Issues*. ISS Monograph No. 49, August
[44]Yin, Robert, (2009), *Case Study Research Design and Methods*, Fourth edition. Thousand Oaks: Sage.
[45]Ibid.
[46]Bouman, Garry and Atkinson, Garry, (1995), *A handbook of Social Science Research: A Comprehensive and Practical Guide for Students*. Second Edition. New York: Oxford University Press.
[47]Lijphart, Arend, (1971), "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method", *The American Political Science Review*, 65(3):691.
[48]Osuala, Esogwa, (2005*), Introduction to Research Methodology*, 3rd Edition, Onitsha: Africana-First Publishers Limited.
[49]Geertz, Clifford, (1973*), The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays*, New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers.
[50]Denscombe, (2010), op. cit.
[51]Gerring, (2008), op. cit.
[52]Addae, Stephen, (2005), *A Short History of Ghana Armed Forces*, Accra: Ministry of Defence.
[53]Bryden, Alan, and N'Diaye, Boubacar, (2011), "Mapping Security Sector Governance in Francophone West Africa", In: *Security Sector Governance in Francophone West Africa: Realities and Opportunities*, edited by Bryden, Alan and N'Diaye, Boubacar 1-16, Geneva: DCAF.
[54]Denzin and Lincoln, (2000), op. cit.
[55]Yin, (2009), op. cit.
[56]Osuala, (2005), op. cit.
[57]Patton, (1990); Yin, (2003; 2009), op. cit.
[58]Baxter and Jack, (2008), op. cit.
[59]Yin, (2003), op. cit.
[60]Ibid.

[61]Rubin, Herbert and Rubin, Irene, (2005), *Qualitative Interviewing: The Art of Hearing Data.* Second Edition, Thousand Oaks, London: Sage Publications.
[62]Burgess, (1982), op. cit.
[63]Jackson, Ronald, Darlene, Drummond and Sakile, Camara (2007), "What is Qualitative Research?" *Qualitative Research Reports in Communication*, 8(1):21-28.
[64] Davidson, Julia, (2006), "Sampling", In: *The Sage Dictionary of Social Research Methods*, edited by Jupp, Victor, pp.272-3, London: Sage Publications. (Accessed on March 19, 2014).
[65]Bryman, (2001); Davidson, (2006), op. cit.
[66]Patton, (1990), p. 169
[67]Marshal, Martin, (1996), "Sampling for Qualitative Research", *Family Practice*, 13(16):522-525; Patton, (2002), op.cit.
[68] Hammersley, Martyn, (2006), "Bias", In: *The Sage Dictionary of Social Research Methods*, edited by Jupp, Victor, pp. 18-9, London: Sage Publications (viewed 19 March 2014).
[69]Oliver, Paul, (2006), "Purposive Sampling", In: *The Sage Dictionary of Social Research Methods*, edited by Jupp, Victor, 245-6, London: SAGE Publication (viewed 19 March 2014).
[70]Onwuegbuzie, Anthony, and Leech, Nancy, (2007), "Sampling Designs in Qualitative Research: Making the Sampling Process More Public", *The Qualitative Report*, 12(2): 238-254.
[71]Sarantakos, Sotirious, (2005), *Social Research*. Third Edition. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
[72]Hordon, Anita, Hodgon, Catherine, and Fresle, Daphne, (2004), *How to Investigate the Use of Medicines by Consumers.* Geneva: WHO and University of Amsterdam.
[73]O' Leary, Zina, (2010), *The Essential Guide to Doing Your Research Project*, Los Angeles: Sage Publications.
[74]O'Leary, (2010), op. cit.
[75]Matthews, Bobs and Ross, Liz (2010), *Research Methods: A Practical Guide for the Social Sciences*, First Edition, Philadephia: Trans-Atlantic Publications, Inc.; p. 397.
[76]Mayring, Philip, (2000), "Qualitative Content Analysis", *Qualitative Social Research*, 1(2), Art. 20, Available at http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de (Accessed on June 24, 2013).
[77]Sarantakos, (2005), op. cit.
[78]Yin, (2003), op.cit.
[79] Guba, Ergon, and Lincoln, Yvonna, (1985), *Naturalistic Inquiry*, Newbury Park: Sage; Strauss, Anselm, & Corbin, Juliet, (1990), *Basics of Qualitative Research. Grounded Theory Procedures and Technique*, Newbury Park: Sage.
[80]Gray, David, (2014), *Doing Research in a Real World*, Third Edition, London: Sage Publications Ltd.
[81]Gary, (2014), p.68; Murphy, Elizabeth, and Dingwall, Robert, (2001), "The Ethics of Ethnography", In: *Handbook of Ethnography*, edited by Atkinson, Paul, Amanda Coffey, Sara Delamont, John Lofland and Lyn Lofland, London Sage Publications Ltd; Murphy, Elizabeth, and Dingwall, Robert, (2007),"Informed Consent, Anticipatory Regulation and Ethnographic Practice", *Social Science & Medicine*, 65:2223-2234.

CHAPTER FOUR

Setting the Historical Context: The Armed Forces and Democratic Developments in Ghana

4.0 Introduction

In order to place the Ghana Armed Forces (GAF) in context, the chapter traces the post-independence political trajectory of Ghana during which the country witnessed musical chairs of the military and civilians in politics. This is followed by a discussion on Ghana's return to democracy in 1992, and what has been done in reference to the defence sector. Specifically, it seeks to examine the role of the GAF in the emerging democratic dispensation under the Fourth Republic. It also analyses the constitutional mechanisms and legal frameworks that exist for managing civil-military relations and the role of armed forces in the current democratic dispensation. The chapter argues that the post-Cold War international system has necessitated a rethink about the entire defence set up in most developing countries around the globe. In the case of countries that transition from authoritarian military regimes to democracies as has Ghana, it is important to clearly situate the armed forces, as an important state institution in the democratic process.

4.1 The Military and Politics in Post-Independence Ghana: from 1957-1979

Colonial rule is formally dated from 24 July 1874, when the British colonial power issued a Proclamation by which they established the Gold Coast Colony and Protectorate.[1] Before the British, other Europeans like the Dutch and Portuguese made contacts for trade and other purposes with pre-colonial Gold Coast in the 17th century when the Gold Coast was thus incorporated into the world capitalist system. Both labour and natural resources were exploited; and its economic and social surplus was appropriated to the benefit of the metropolitan powers in Western Europe.[2] Colonialism also brought together people of diverse ethnic or social groupings under a unified colonial state.[3] The country's colonial experiences and politics in the immediate post-independence period have been well documented and thus fall outside the purview of this chapter.[4]

At independence in 1957, Ghana attempted to practice multi-party democracy, at least in formal constitutional terms.[5] But the country's high hopes of socio-economic and political developments that came with attainment of political independence were soon truncated as the country became enmeshed in successive periods of military rule, interspersed with short-lived returns to constitutional rule. These years of military interventions engendered an unstable political and socio-economic environment in Ghana.[6] The 1956 independence elections brought the Convention People's Party (CPP) to power, with Kwame Nkrumah as

the first Prime Minister.[7] Nkrumah adopted a brand of African socialism that came with elaborate programmes of national development such as the construction of state owned industries and educational institutions, as well as key national assets like the Akosombo Dam.[8]Subsequently on 1st July 1960, the First Republic came into being with the adoption of the 1960 Republican Constitution. This was followed by a declaration of one-party presidential system in 1964 by Nkrumah, with himself as President-for-life. Nkrumah and his Convention People's Party (CPP) thus became the centre of all economic and political activity in the country.[9]His government combined democratization with dictatorship to ensure political stability. His domestic politics marred his socialist-developmental agenda when existing structures were modified to suit his personal rule. For instance, the neutrality of the civil service was destroyed by its politicization. Nkrumah tolerated little opposition and imprisoned those who challenged his political supremacy by the introduction of the Preventive Detention Act (PDA) in 1961.[10] Nkrumah also became engrossed in his pan-Africanist agenda as he saw Ghana's economic and political development as possible only in conjunction with liberation of the rest of the continent.[11] Nkrumah's economic policies were confronted with challenges. For instance, he had that strong belief that strong political leadership was the main tool for pursing his economic agenda. To this end he appropriated himself the key role in the process and listened less to his technical advisors and appointees.[12] He also paid little or no attention to the massive domestic corruption and economic decline, including an increasing balance of payments deficit. The country's fragility as a neo-colonial state was also dramatically demonstrated when the price of cocoa, the backbone of the economy, suffered sharp falls on the world market.[13] These factors among others led to the collapse of Nkrumah's government when he was overthrown on 24 February 1966 by the National Liberation Council (NLC) led by Lieutenant Colonel Emmanuel Kotoka.[14]

While several reasons were given for Nkrumah's overthrow including the involvement of external actors,[15] the corporate interest of the military and police has been given as the primary reason for the first coup. It was argued that the military and the police had been severely under-resourced during Nkrumah's rule. Robert Dowse, for instance, argues that, "the conspirators seemed primarily to have been moved by a combination of fear and resentment. They feared the President's Guard Unit, built by Nkrumah with Russian help, might displace regular units of the army in presidential favour".[16] The First Republican constitution did contain some provisions for civilian control of the armed forces.[17] The first president, as the Commander-in-Chief and the "Fount of Honour," was vested with extraordinary powers such as ruling by decrees and dissolving parliament at any time he deemed necessary. With regards to the military, he had powers to commission officers into the armed forces and order their engagement in various operations for the defence of Ghana, preservation of public order, emergency relief and for any other purpose the

Commander-in-Chief may consider as expedient".[18] The president also had powers "in a case where it appears to him expedient to do so for the security of the State, to dismiss a member of the Armed Forces or to order a member of the Armed Forces not to exercise any authority vested in him as a member thereof until the Commander-in-Chief otherwise directs."[19] There were allegations that Nkrumah abused his powers as the military resented Nkrumah's sporadic interference in the internal affairs of the military including promotions and recruitment and the difficult peacekeeping missions such as the one Nkrumah had ordered in Congo.[20] There was also the firm belief that Nkrumah was planning to deploy the army in the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe.[21] As will be discussed later, governments after Nkrumah were also not devoid of these issues.

At independence, Ghana, inherited an armed force that was made up of soldiers and few Ghanaian officers.[22] This is because the British colonial military system did not allow indigenous officers, especially in the early days. The Gold Coast army was led by British Officers and Non-Commissioned officers. It was only from 1947 that some attempts were made to commission few African officers.[23] Notably in 1957, the 28 Ghanaian officers were mostly Southerners-Ga, Ewe, Akan, while the rank and file was dominated by people from the northern parts of the country. As noted previously, people to the South had ready access to secular educational system brought about by colonial rule, while the north primarily served as labour reserve for the colonial economy. Even though, the most educated Ghanaians at that time preferred jobs in the civil service than the military as officers, the very few secondary schools graduates who joined the military were mostly southerners.[24] Nkrumah's defence policies necessitated rapid *Ghanaianization* of the officer corps, accelerated promotions as well as the expansion of the armed forces in general.[25] This corps of officers rose to senior officer ranks quickly. As the armed forces was not balanced socially especially in terms of its ethnic and regional make up, existing ethno-regional tensions found its way into the military.[26] It is widely argued that for purposes of personal and regime security, Nkrumah adopted varied mechanisms including divide and rule tactics and the use of parallel security structures, the Soviet-trained and well-equipped presidential guards.[27] The paramilitary structures were led by his ethnic Nzima kinsmen and northerners.[28] Nkrumah's actions and inactions, especially his perceived dislike for Ewe and Ga officers contributed to the demise of the First Republic in February 1996.[29]

While ethnicity is not considered as a primary reason for the first coup in Ghana, events leading to the coup point to an ethnic conspiracy in the armed forces against Nkrumah. For instance, the key actors in the military-cum police junta that overthrew Nkrumah were made up of Ewes.[30] Nonetheless, the regime had a mixed ethnic makeup with Ga, Akan and Northerner officers playing key roles.[31]The coup appeared to have been influenced by the threats Nkrumah's policies and actions posed to the corporate interests of the military and its allied security services, the police, rather than particular officers from particular ethnic

groups seeking their ethno-regional and political interests.[32] For instance, Afrifa wrote in his justification for the coup that "the dismissal of two senior Generals by Kwame Nkrumah was one of the major factors that led to the coup of the 24th February. As a result of this action the Ghanaian officers and men felt that the profession of men-at-arms had been disgraced and that their Generals as well as they themselves had been humiliated".[33] However, ethnic conspiracy was an important reason behind the trust and solidarity behind the coup and the disintegration of the ties also contributed to the demise of the National Liberation Council (NLC).[34]

Some have observed that the army's acquisition of a new political role from 1966 onwards exposed the soldiers to unaccustomed societal demands. To this end, latent divisions in the military establishment especially those of an ethnic and regional character became more acute after the violent seizure of office.[35] This lends credence to Finer's theoretical position that military intervention fragments the security forces, encourages counter-coups and ultimately forces the military's disengagement.[36] Having seized power in the period of heightened ideological rivalry of the Cold War era, the NLC laid claim of their right-wing ideologies embarked on programmes to halt the economic decline and maintain political stability.[37] It banned the CPP and released all political prisoners held under Nkrumah's Preventive Detention Act (PDA). Political administrative structures were constituted across all regions of the country. These bodies were made up of mixed membership of the army, police and civil servants, with the senior military officer in a particular region as the final authority.[38] The economic policy of the NLC was a departure from the state-led or socialist paradigm of Nkrumah. The NLC embraced the International Monetary Fund (IMF) prescriptions of debt rescheduling, deflation, private enterprise and sale of state enterprises.[39]

The NLC initially indicated that it would stay in power as a "holding operation," after which the country would return to civilian rule within three years.[40] The regime initiated a gradual transition process. A failed coup on 17 February 1967, in which Lieutenant Colonel Kotoka was killed, brought about some changes in the political landscape as the NLC set a firm date for restoration of civilian rule.[41] Political committees were set up to supervise the transition to civilian rule. Particularly, a campaign was launched to re-educate Ghanaians on their civic rights and responsibilities. This was done through the Civic Education Forum (CEF), a civil society forum led by Professor Kofi Abrefa Busia.[42] Members of the erstwhile CPP regime were also barred from contesting elections by the passage of the Election and Public Offices Disqualification Decree of January 1968 (NLC Decree 345).[43] The NLC set up a constitutional commission in September 1966, seven months after the coup to draft the Second Republican Constitution. Subsequently, a new constitution was adopted in August 1969, few days to elections to return the country to constitutional rule.[44]

The Progress Party (PP) won the August 1969 elections and formed a government led by Prime Minister Busia. This gave birth to the Second Republic on October 2, 1969.

The 1969 Constitution, appeared as a departure from the enormous powers granted to Nkrumah by the 1960 Constitution. It provided for a Westminster parliamentary system of government with a prime minister as head of government and a non-executive president as head of state. However, the framers of the constitution introduced the controversial indemnity Clause that debarred any court action against the 24 February 1966 coupists and their collaborators.[45] The Busia government was faced with a weak economy as the preceding NLC regime could not effectively resuscitate the economy. The Busia government instituted liberal economic policies to address Ghana's chronic trade imbalances, import cuts and foreign debts. For example in 1970, the government imposed enormous surcharges on most imported goods, while loosening the import licensing system. It also attempted to restrict the outflow of foreign exchange by eliminating most foreigners from small scale and petty commerce. Further, there were increment in taxes and imposition of a development levy on all salaries.[46] Efforts were made to reduce public expenditures by trimming military budgets and decreasing its subsidy of civil servants' housing and other amenities. These produced mixed outcomes and contributed to the untimely demise of the government. Even though Busia was elected for his charisma and perceived democratic credentials, his respect for democratic principles became questionable upon assumption of office as prime minister.[47] His relationship with the military appeared problematic. His approach at using ethnic manipulation to secure civilian control of the military proved ineffective as his government succumbed to another coup d'état on January 13, 1972. [48]

Under successive regimes issues such as generational differences between senior and junior officers, negative effects of rapid promotion and ethno-regional tensions within the armed forces in general, and the officer corps, in particular, continued and contributed to the fall or otherwise of successive military and civilian governments. For example, during the Second Republic, the Akan-Ewe uneasy relationship turned murkier when the most senior Ewe officers in the armed forces were removed for various reasons.[49] Busia was keenly aware of the potential threat posed to his administration by Ewe officers in command of troops. So his approach was to continue the ethnic manipulation initiated by Afrifa in1969 to fill the crucial commands with Akan officers who were seen as sympathetic to the PP government.[50] Ewe officers were incrementally shifted from significant command positions to other jobs. As a result, only one Ewe officer, Colonel Tevie, remained in a senior position by the end of the government in 1969.[51] By the end of 1971, Ewe domination in the military had been eroded significantly by Busia's effort at redesigning ethnically the senior profile of the security establishment including the police.[52] Busia believed any attempt to overthrow him militarily could come from Ewes or non-Akans in the armed

forces; paradoxically he was overthrown by a junta led by an Akan officer, Colonel Ignatius Kutu Acheampong[53] under the National Redemption Council (NRC). Busia contemptuously described the army's intervention as an "amenities coup."[54] The military, in particular, felt slighted by the Busia regime as its economic policies affected officers personally. For instance, due to budgetary cuts to the armed forces, some benefits like car maintenance allowances were abolished, while rents were increased and officers were asked to pay part of their utility bills for electricity and water which were previously supplied free of charge by the government.[55] These developments point to a lack of concordance between the government of the day and the military and possibly led to the military's intervention in politics.

Aside from the military grievances, Busia's regime became unpopular at home as its economic policies recorded abysmal results. For instance, a sharp drop in cocoa prices on the world market, increasing unemployment, rise in prices of essential commodities, coupled with high taxation and low performance of the commercial sector, made life difficult for the ordinary Ghanaian.[56] The economic policies instituted by the Busia government could not halt the crushing foreign debt and considerable internal economic dislocation caused by previous regimes of the CPP and NLC. His foreign policies also alienated Ghana from other African countries.[57] However, the government had its merits. For example, as argued by Le Vine,

> "…it represented an attempt at democratic government on a continent increasingly ruled by petty dictators, military juntas, and authoritarian single-party regimes. It gave institutional legitimacy to an articulate-if sometimes angry-but loyal opposition…though admittedly moderate success, and tried to live up to, a constitution expressly conceived to prevent the political excesses of the Nkrumah period."[58]

The NRC was comprised of military, police and civilians from all segments of society. In his effort to salvage the worsening economy, General Acheampong reversed fiscal policies of the previous regime and embarked on sweeping economic reforms including revaluation of the national currency, the Cedi, and repudiated much of the foreign debt by his *Yentua, yentua* (We won't pay)[59] mantra. Some initiatives were introduced aimed at making the country self-sufficient. For example, "Operation Feed Yourself" was introduced to encourage Ghanaians to go back to agriculture in order to achieve self-sufficiency in staple food crops, such as rice and maize. Another "Operation Feed Your Industries" was launched to boast production of raw materials such as cotton for the textile industries.[60] Ghanaians were also encouraged to patronize locally-made goods. The cocoa industry was also given a boast by the setting up of the Ministry of Cocoa Affairs and cocoa production recorded a modest increase.[61] Although Acheampong's pragmatic economic policies

brought about some level of economic growth, (especially in its early years), high inflation still aggravated the economic situation of ordinary Ghanaian.[62]

In October 1975, the NRC was renamed the Supreme Military Council (SMC). This move, considered by some as a mini-coup d'état, reinforced the powers of Acheampong as Chairman of the SMC and head of state. It also consolidated the position of the armed forces as the SMC became the highest legislative and administrative authority in Ghana.[63] General Acheampong mooted the idea of a "Union Government" (UNIGOV) as part of his plans for transition to civilian rule in October 1976. The UNIGOV idea, though not very clear in meaning, was supposed to abhor political party systems. The *ad hoc* committee set up in January 1977 to study the proposed establishment of the Union government, subsequently defined it as

> "a form of government of the people, having its philosophical foundation in the concepts of national unity and consensus, and selecting its functionaries from all levels and sections of the community on a basis other than membership of an institutionalized political party or parties."[64]

In essence, the proposed UNIGOV was to be based on an executive president nominated by a presidential electoral college, to head a non-parliamentary cabinet, with a strong representation from the armed forces, in most important advisory bodies like the council of state, national defence and security councils. There was a proposal for a single chamber legislature to be elected on a non-party basis.[65] The UNIGOV idea was met with stiff opposition by civil society even though the Ghanaians had supposedly voted for the idea in a controversial referendum on 29th March 1978.[66]

The Acheampong regime was widely regarded as a failure due to numerous factors. The primary reasons included the worsening economic conditions, endemic corruption and the UNIGOV experiment. With regards to corruption, an informal practice called *kalabule* [67] became wide- spread in the society. This took multiple forms of bribing, hoarding, profiteering, and smuggling, selling of import licenses, and the issue of tickets to young women who paraded the corridors of power offering themselves for sexual pleasures in return for favours.[68] The regime also contributed to further deterioration of the economy, as the policies introduced failed to address economic challenges facing the country. A significant portion of the society was excluded by the systems of patronage created by the regime and therefore increased state fragility.[69] These developments led to opposition and protest against the regime which were often met with repressive measures.[70] In the midst of the controversies, Acheampong was removed in a palace coup by his Chief of Defence Staff, General FWK Akuffo, on July 5, 1978.[71] This brought about the Supreme Military

Council II, which was a "reformed" version of the same military government. General Akuffo made some attempts at reforming the economy and succumbed to the growing demands for a transition process to civilian rule. Subsequently, a transition timetable was announced and a constituent assembly was convened to draft a new constitution. The ban on party activity was lifted paving the way for election campaign in January 1979. However, an atmosphere of growing economic insecurity and intense popular frustration was widespread in the country.[72] It was therefore not surprising that the regime did not survive as the military lost credibility in the eyes of the public. A group of radical junior officers and other ranks, under the umbrella of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council, (AFRC), led by Flight Lieutenant Jerry John Rawlings toppled the SMC II on June 4, 1979.

The June 4 coup d'état was preceded by a failed attempt on 15 May 1979, in which Rawlings and his men were arrested and put to a public trial.[73] The successful coup d'état was subsequently termed a "revolution" by Rawlings to cleanse the military and the general society of its institutionalized corruption.[74] In Rawlings' own words

> "…our immediate task was to cleanse the armed forces, which had lost its bearings in the wilderness of indiscipline and unprofessional behaviour. But our fundamental long term aim was to launch a revolution which would cleanse the whole nation, turn the hearts and minds of our people against social injustice."[75]

It therefore, embarked on a violent "housecleaning" exercise during its brief three-month stint in power. This was particularly targeted at the bureaucratic and military establishment, leading to the arrest of scores of civil servants, senior officers, wealthy entrepreneurs and traders.[76] Eight senior military officers, including three former heads of state were executed. Several others were sentenced to death in absentia, and jailed a number of other military officers and civilians. Personal properties and assets were also confiscated by secret tribunals.[77] However, the execution of senior military officers coupled with the resignation and flight of others from the barracks led to collapse of the command system.[78] The ARFC allowed the transition process initiated by the erstwhile NRC/SMC II regime to continue. Subsequently, after nearly eight years of military rule characterized by change of guards, another attempt at constitutional rule brought the People's National Party (PNP), led by Dr Hilla Limann, into power on September 24, 1979. The 1979 Republican constitution was promulgated by the AFRC regime on the same date by the AFRC Decree Number 24. However, Limann's government also faced multiple challenges with the economy, politics and above all a decomposed military.[79] With regards to the military, the problem was not only of establishing civilian control, but, it was also a matter of institutionalizing control at lower organizational levels within the military. This is because the unity of command had been fragmented, dividing the senior officers from a resentful and suspicious rank-and-file.

Particularly, the mutiny by the junior ranks had itself undermined hierarchical norms and led to the incremental breakdown of discipline and stability.[80] Notably, a major challenge for the Limann Government was what to do with Rawlings and the former members of the AFRC, as well as the insurgent ranks who remained in the camps.[81] The civilian government made some aggressive efforts to bring the armed forces under its control with mixed outcomes.[82] Some of the measures employed were no different from earlier governments. These ranged from ascriptive manipulation of sensitive commands surveillance, to a closely coordinated programme of psychological warfare in which the battle for hearts and minds could be won by discrediting the former regime.[83] An accompanying strategy was designed to weaken the military by creating internal divisions and mutual suspicions between officers and ranks, on the one hand, and Ewes and non-Ewes, on the other. This strategy of divide and rule was applied with some success to the leadership of the AFRC. The government also contemplated the option of disbanding the armed forces with the assistance of foreign military forces. This option was later discarded because of the high risk involved.[84]

However this potpourri of mechanisms to confine the military to the traditional role failed to deliver the desired result. Notably allegations of corruption against senior government officials of the PNP also led a steady decline in popularity of the government.[85] In the ensuing milieu the Third Republic became the shortest in Ghana's history, having stayed in office for only 27 months and was toppled on December 31, 1981, by the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC).[86]Aside from the preponderance of military intervention in politics, other reasons could be adduced for the demise of the Third Republic. Most of these reasons are however, attributable to the processes of political enfeeblement, social fragmentation and economic decline that had plagued Ghana since the early years of independence.[87] Naomi Chazan captures this succinctly stating that:

> "By 1981 the economy of Ghana was on the verge of collapse: production rates were substantially below 1970 averages, agricultural output was stagnant, alarming shortages were recorded in basic commodities, the debt burden had increased, and foreign interest and investment in the Ghanaian economy had virtually disappeared… Scarcity intensified social and cultural cleavages as well. Ethnic tensions escalated, regional identities became more pronounced".[88]

These factors contributed the cycle of coup d'états in Ghana. Nonetheless, after each coup d'état, there were processes at returning the country to constitutional rule in which the military play continued to key roles. These political changes are summarized in table four below.

Table 4-4: Political Changes in Ghana from 1957-2017

Duration	Name of Government/Regime	Type	Republican Status
6 March 1957- 24 February 1966	Convention Peoples' Party (CPP)	One-Party Democracy	First Republic From 1 July 1960
24 February 1966-1 October 1969	National Liberation Council (NLC)	Military and Police Regime	
1 October 1969-13 January 1972	Progress Party (PP)	Multiparty Democracy	Second Republic
13 January 1972-July 5, 1975	National Redemption Council/Supreme Military Council (SMC)I	Military	
5 July 1975-4 June 1979	Supreme Military Council (SMC) II	Military	
4 June 1979-24 September 1979	Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC)	Military	
24 September 1979-31 December 1981	Peoples National Party (PNP)	Multi-Party Democracy	Third Republic
31 December 1981-7 January 1993	Provisional National Defence Council	Quasi-Military Regime	
7 January 1993-7 January 2001	National Democratic Congress (NDC)	Multiparty Democracy	Fourth Republic
7 January 2001-7 January 2009	New Patriotic Party (NPP)	Multiparty Democracy	Fourth Republic
7 January 2009-7 January 2017	NDC	Multiparty Democracy	Fourth Republic
7 January 2017-7January 2021	NPP	Multiparty Democracy	Fourth Republic

Source: Author's compilation

4.3 Political Transitions and the Military

Almost all announcements of coups d'états come with either explicit or implicit intention of a return to civilian rule. Political transitions in post-independence Ghana have been led and determined by the military since the first coup d'état in 1966.

The political transition doctrine, also known as "transition paradigm", argues that any country in which there is a shift away from an authoritarian regime is deemed a country in transition to democracy.[89] The transition paradigm also points to three sequential phases on which democratization appears to build. These are the 1) opening, 2) break-through; and 3) consolidation phases. The opening phase is the means through which the political transition begins and coincides with a reformist move usually promoted by the governmental authority. The break-through phase coincides with the collapse of the old regime and the establishment of a new democratic government that comes to power through a precise political path. This is often done through the conduct of national elections, enactment of a new constitution, and establishment of a new democratic institutional structure. The consolidation phase is seen as the climax of this 'natural' progression towards democracy.[90] This is the stage in which democracy is institutionalized and manifested through the implementation of state reforms, holding of periodic elections, flourishing of civil society and the overall acceptance of the society of democracy as rule of the game. [91]

The transition paradigm has been subjected to criticisms due to its denial of the determinant impact of structural factors and conditions like economic situation, history, institutional legacies, ethnic diversity and socio-cultural dimension in transitional countries.[92] Moreover, analysis of political situations of the Third Wave of Democracy countries raises some questions about the validity of the transition paradigm. Specifically, only a few out of the nearly one hundred countries that were considered as transitional in the early 1990s had truly embarked upon the democratic enterprise. [93] In addition, democracy entails the adherence to basic political and civil rights and the presence of institutions. According to Yusuf Bangura (1992), of all processes of democratization, it is most essential about the demilitarization of the state and its institutions and democratization of the rules governing economic and political competition.

With regards to transitions from military to constitutional rules, the nature of military rule and the complexion of military leaders have an important bearing on the conduct of democratization process. [94] The military have, regardless of their own proclamations ventured in to the political arena for varied reasons. The political orientation of military governments in the country has also fluctuated. While in office, the military has been far from a stabilizing element, but has, at different points, been a conservative, reformist, dictatorial, populist or revolutionary force. Each military regime in the country has differed from its predecessors and how it ensured a transition process to constitutional rule.[95] As

noted earlier, the first post-military transition process was initiated by the NLC brought in the Second Republic in 1969. Another transition process by the SMC II from 1972 and later Rawlings from 1979 gave birth to the Third Republic in 1979. The last transition in 1992 was also led by the PNDC will be discussed in greater detail in subsequent sections of the chapter.

The drafting of new constitution is essential to almost all transition processes as coups often come with suspensions of earlier constitutions and dissolution of governments. In Ghana, the military rulers initiated the processes through several measures including the composition of constitution commissions and constituent assemblies to draft and debate new constitutions for the consideration of the military. The general public is eventually made to decide on the draft constitution through referendums. In most instances, the military rulers have the liberty to amend the draft constitution in their interest.[96]Most especially, constitution-making provided opportunities for both established and newly emerging social groups to safeguard their interests.[97]This was the situation in almost all transition processes in Ghana from 1966 to 1992. Despite the adoption of new constitutions, in most instances, a military regime would want to hold on to power until it could be assured of an acceptable successor regime, or at the very least of constitutional rule which would provide a framework within which the regime could establish itself.[98] For instance, the constituent assembly for the 1979 Third Republican Constitution, adopted a provision indemnifying all members of past military regimes-NLC, NRC, SMC I and II.[99] The indemnity clause while not meant to free past military rulers from responsibility for crimes and misdeeds committed while in office, was seen as an attempt to legalize military rule and an implicit attempt allow corrupt rulers to keep their ill-gotten wealth.[100] Similarly, Section 34 of the transitional powers under the 1992 Fourth Republican Constitution grants indemnity to all past coup makers and their functionaries against any liability for acts or omissions during their regimes.[101]

4.4 The PNDC Regime and Democratic Transition from 1981-1992

It is important to situate any discourse around democracy and security sector oversight and governance in Ghana within the country's historical experience. Particularly, the role of the military in Ghana's turbulent political past contributed to a distinct developmental trajectory in which the statutory security sector, in general, and the military in particular, is now increasingly willing to subject itself to democratic, civilian control and oversight.[102] Some have argued that despite the general assertion that coups d'état are the end of democracy,[103] the situation in Ghana is different in that, the last military intervention in December 1981, laid the ground for a return to democracy as well as restructuring and restoring the domestic and international legitimacy of the GAF.[104] A narrative on the nature of the PNDC regime and the political transition process is therefore important.

From December 1981, the PNDC began putting the country under control of the military with little or no oversight over the performance of the security sector, except for a secretive clique around the head of the PNDC, Chairman John Rawlings.[105] The 31st December 1980 coup was dubbed "the peoples" revolution by Chairman Rawlings, who called for a "holy war" against "enemies of the people." [106] The PNDC regime (1981-1993) was an authoritarian one that ruled by decrees, but was not a typical military government as all cabinet and almost all leading members of the regime were civilians. Arguably, it did not represent the corporate interest of the military neither was it a civilian government.[107] The regime tried to rid itself of the military burden by insisting from the beginning that it was a "people's government."[108] Nonetheless, the regime relied on support from sections of the military for survival especially in the first precarious months in office. For example, officers and other ranks were appointed as second-in-command in all ministries, state organizations, agencies, regional and district administrations.[109] It is arguable though that it was not the object of the regime to institutionalize the military or its interest in Ghanaian politics.[110] The PNDC was an amalgamation of several interest groups: radical Marxist scholars, liberals, socialists and military officers. It espoused socialism led by political and social forces who were in the least, bent on ridding the Ghanaian society of its corrupt elements and creating a new egalitarian political and economic system.[111] Indeed, the regime took steps towards repairing the tainted image of the military. This included purging the military of perceived corrupt and politicized elements including those who led previous coups against elected governments.[112]

The 11-year rule of the PNDC and its attempt at directing the democratization process could be categorized into 3 distinct phases, each with its own policy choices.[113] The early period of the PNDC, could be described as the populist phase, or PNDC I, where the regime was most radical. During this period, the regime sought to bring about democratization by incorporating the people into politics both as guardians against elite abuse and as contributors to the construction of a new Ghana.[114] The idea of the peoples' revolution informed adoption of leftist economic policies and the creation of revolutionary structures such as the Citizens Vetting Committees, (CVCs), Peoples' and Workers' Defence Committees, (PDC/WDCS), and other parallel structures within the military. These committees were charged with decision making in workplaces and the communities. The committees were first coordinated by an Interim National Coordinating Committee. The Defence Committees initiated a reign of terror on Ghanaians. For instance, people with private cars were ridiculed as exploiters, and many Ghanaians of high social or business standing were removed from their posts without any evidence of malpractice. In some cases, armed soldiers, collaborated with the Defence Committees, but frequently acted on their own to terrorize civilians.[115] As part of efforts at reforming the basic structures of the revolution, membership of the defence committees was liberalized and P/WDCs were later

re-christened Committees for the Defence of the Revolution (CDRs). The same term was used for similar organizations in Burkina Faso following the coup d'état in August 1983 that brought Captain Thomas Sankara to power. Rawlings had developed a strong personal friendship with Sankara and the two leaders seemed to be mutually inspired by their revolutionary ideas.[116]The Defence committees were initially coordinated by an Interim National Coordinating Committee and later reorganized under the National Defence Committee, (NDC). Another body, the National Investigations Committee was responsible for overseeing the behaviour of public officials, while Citizens' Vetting Committees (CVC) reviewed the earnings of individuals with large bank accounts or extravagant lifestyles.[117] In line with the revolutionary antics, civilian members of the defence committees were given military training.[118] The PNDC also enjoyed the support from several radical movements, such as the June Fourth Movement (JFM), the New Democratic Movement (NDM) and the Kwame Nkrumah Revolutionary Guards (KNRG). These groups were also mobilized to implement a series of economic activities, including the evacuation of cocoa from the rural areas and urban clean-up operation.[119]

Other structures like the People's Tribunals (PT) were established at regional and community levels to serve as powerful instruments for pursuing revolutionary justice goals.[120] These tribunals often described as "kangaroo courts", imprisoned people while others were condemned to death after dubious trials.[121] The roles of these structures were formalized by the promulgation of the PNDC (Establishment) Promulgation Law 42.[122] Despite the existence of this legislation, the Peoples and CDRs faced serious challenges such as lack of clarity in terms of their functions and conflicts with existing structures of power. Members of the committees also abused their positions by using the committees to pursue personal vendettas and opportunism.[123] Particularly, the abduction and killing of three high court judges and a retired army major on 30 June 1982, brought to the fore the excesses of the regime.[124] The activities of private media were largely curtailed by the Criminal Libel Law and prosecution of daring journalists, thereby stifling press freedom.[125]

4.4. Towards Economic and Political Liberalization

In the early 1980s, in the face of mounting economic problems, PNDC was faced with challenges to its legitimacy by local political actors. Serious questions were also raised about the regime's political and ideological stance. Those attacks resulted in considerable instability for the early years of the regime.[126] The period from 1983 to late 1985, was described by Naomi Chazan as the PNDC II, where the regime sought to redirect democratization efforts through encouraging the rehabilitation of the economy and exploring alternative venues to democratic politics.[127] The earlier emphasis on participation was replaced by a stress on hardwork. In this regard, Chairman Rawlings proclaimed production and efficiency as the watchwords of the regime. He also called for the "populist nonsense" to give way to "popular sense."[128] Due to initial failed attempts at repairing the

country's economic crisis, the regime was unable to follow through its revolutionary and populist political and economic policies. It made a U-turn from its leftist stance to embrace the neo-liberal orthodoxy of the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP) and Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) of the International Financial Institutions-World Bank and IMF from April 1983.[129] The reasons why the PNDC regime which had professed socialist leanings implemented IMF/World Bank-sponsored adjustment policies have been well captured elsewhere.[130] To reiterate this point briefly, Kusi for instance, argues that, Ghana had reached abysmal levels in its socioeconomic development by the early 1980s.[131] This required effective and sustainable economic measures to salvage the economy. The country depended largely on cocoa export for bulk of its foreign earnings. However, over the years, poor agricultural policies, coupled with lack of incentives for agricultural production, overexploitation of cocoa farmers, and poor agricultural pricing policy contributed to a significant decline in cocoa production from 403,000 tons in 1970 to 179,000 tons in 1983.[132] In addition, non-performing state-owned enterprises constituted a huge drain on government finances. So the regime was faced with a challenging economic situation and most importantly, little or no aid came from the leftist or socialist fraternity.[133]

Following the shift in economic direction, Ghana implemented six IMF reform packages between 1983 and 1992, in which the most severe of austerity measures were put in place. This attracted stiff opposition from local actors such as trade unions and professional bodies.[134] These programmes necessitated balancing of macro-economic indicators to reduce the budget deficit and major structural reforms under the aegis of economic liberalization. These included downsizing the civil service, price controls, privatization of state enterprises, removal of subsidies, and free trade.[135]However, structural adjustment had mixed impact on Ghana's development. In one sense, the reforms and the renewed access to international finance arguably facilitated the country's economic recovery.[136] On the other hand, opinions have varied on whether the poor people in Ghana actually shared in the economic recovery as workers faced hardships under the ERP, partly due to the massive retrenchment carried out as part of the reforms.[137] This led some analysts to ponder on whether the economic improvement was merely a statistical artefact, or a temporary upturn prompted by the inflow of international capital. These concerns raised further doubts about the 'sustainability' of enforced structural adjustments, as well as fears about relapse of the economy when the flow of funds dries up.[138]

Besides the economic stabilization, ERPs and SAPs also had political liberalization as conditionalities. Therefore, Ghana's political liberalization process resulted from internal and external pressures which intensified from the late I980s. It is argued that it was economic rather than political forces that compelled the PNDC to yield to the demands of democratization.[139] This notwithstanding, the PNDC, adopted a piecemeal approach to democratization. Since its rise to power on December 31, 1981, it redefined its

interpretation of democracy on several occasions. Each revision came with new policy measures.[140] The PNDC exerted its control over the institutional arrangements, sequencing, or timing of the transition.[141] For instance, to follow up plans for a more measured transition to democratic rule, the electoral commission was renamed National Commission on Democracy (NCD) and tasked to formulate a new framework for politics in the principles of peoples' democracy. The NCD was set up by PNDC Law 42 in 1982. In keeping with Section 32 of the PNDC law 42, the NCD was required to perform the functions of an Electoral Commission (EC) and to help develop a programme for returning Ghana to democratic rule.[142] The NCD was therefore, mandated to design a 'true democracy' for Ghana that takes into consideration the tradition, history and socio-cultural values of Ghanaians.[143] In addition, it was also expected to educate Ghanaians on the objectives of the revolutionary transformation in order to advance democracy and assess limitations to the achievement of the democratic system. However, the NCD was generally dormant except for occasional elite-type sponsored seminars. It could not provide any sense of direction in the political debate that ensued.[144] The debates on the future political system centred around two opposing views. One view particularly preferred by the PNDC stalwarts was a no-political system of government because proponents of this view attributed the country's problems to party politicians. The other view was for a multiparty system, due to people's bitter experience under Nkrumah's one party system.[145] The multiparty system triumphed.

4.4.2 The Promise of a 'Peoples' Democracy

While the PNDC was implementing the SAP programmes aimed at economic recovery, the third phase of the PNDC regime's democratic experimentation commenced. This phase appeared with a merger of involvement in politics with participation in formal political institutions and stressed the establishment of viable channels for political activity.[146] The PNDC regime as particularly concerned with the social inequities that had emerged during the implementation of the structural adjustment programme. So it decided to tackle the connection between political and social issues more directly. The process started with the creation of local government structures in 1982 and elections in 1988. Particularly, in May 1982, the PNDC formally declared its commitment to decentralization based on the "power to the people" slogan that was ushered in by the 31st December 1981 revolution.[147] This commitment was followed with the announcement of a decentralization plan that aimed at introducing participatory democracy with a four-tier hierarchical administrative level. These levels included: i) area and town or village council-operating under the defence committee; ii) district councils, with members elected from nominations by 'popular organizations'; and iii) regional councils, consisting of elected representatives from the districts.[148] The super-imposition of the CDRs on the local council system appeared as a major attempt to politicize the latter and bring it under direct control of the revolution. The

regional councils in particular were seen as the representatives of the central government in the field and thus were to oversee the establishment of the P/WDCs in the communities and workplaces.[149] This notwithstanding, Agyeman-Duah aptly captured the sentiments that

> "it seem that the PNDC was hesitant 'to deliver' on its promises of participatory politics made in 1982. After five years, no mass organization for the 'oppressed and exploited' had been formed, no election for a 'constituent assembly' had been held, and no constitution 'to serve the people's interests' had been written."[150]

After the initial delays at delivering the purported "peoples' democracy", on the fifth anniversary of the PNDC in 1986, Chairman Rawlings announced a plan to hold local elections as a first step towards encouraging greater popular participation.[151] The District Assembly elections were depicted as a further stage in the creation of a 'true' democracy, and as the culmination of efforts "…to democratize state power and advance participatory democracy and collective decision-making at the grassroots."[152] Since 1988, district assembly elections are held on periodic four-year basis. However, it is noteworthy that Ghana's decentralization process had not been effective due to several factors including, but not limited, to overly bureaucratic public administrative structures.[153]

4.4.3 The Birth of the Fourth Republic in 1992

Ghana's electoral process to democratic rule formally started in January 1991 when a timetable was outlined. A new constitution was adopted in April 1992.[154] This was followed by a lift on the ban on political activities in May 1992 with a seven-month window to presidential and parliamentary elections in November and December 1992 respectively.[155] The NDC subsequently won the 1992 presidential elections held under the supervision of the Interim National Electoral Commission (INEC).[156] This paved the way for the inauguration of the Fourth Republic on 7th January 1993. The transition came in the wake of the post-Cold War wave of democratization manifested by both internal and external clamour for democratic governance, and particularly the indirect political pressure from the World Bank and IMF. In what has been described by some analysts as "transition without change", the Rawlings led-National Democratic Congress (NDC) administration succeeded itself-the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC).[157] Rawlings resigned from the military and contested the elections as a civilian, a phenomenon described by Durotoye and Griffiths, as "political transmutation."[158] He was thus a central figure in an essentially elite-driven process of incremental transition.[159] It is argued that the transition process was designed to give Ghanaians no alternative to Rawlings.[160] The domestic opposition was very weak and largely ineffectual.[161]

The elite-driven transition was not based on a pact between the PNDC regime and local opponents. Rather, it ensued from a pragmatic and dynamic response of the PNDC, and firmly led by Rawlings to anticipated pressures of the international financial institutions (IFIs) for political liberalization.[162] The survival of the Rawlings regime could also be attributed to the strong financial support from external factors such as IMF and World Bank and relatively ineffective opposition to its authoritarian rule.[163] The PNDC regime was faced with challenges of legitimacy and authority, especially from local actors partly due to its chequered human rights records. It, however, differed from earlier authoritarian regimes principally due to the willingness to hold periodically more-or-less free multi-party elections and to some extent respect the civil and political rights of citizens.

Ghanaians enjoyed some political freedoms to form associations, including political parties, subject to certain legal requirements and, in the midst of acrimony and threats, an independent press continued to exercise limited freedom of expression. However, under the democratic facade, the old neo-patrimonial rules of the game continued, manifested by centralization of power, personal loyalties, pervasive clientelism, and corruption.[164] Particularly, unofficial presidential control of coercive force weakened the formal democratic institutions designed to monitor, check, and discipline the Government between elections.[165] The Ghanaian democratic transition of 1992 had its own flaws, but it was a remarkable step towards democracy because it constitutes the ability to transform an authoritarian militarized state into a near-democratic one. This involves reinstatement of institutions, constitutional rule, and operation of a multiparty political system, rule of law, judicial independence, press freedom, local government and public probity in a state that has suffered considerable decay.[166] A new political liberalism was also instituted together with neo-liberal economic management strategies that had been practiced for some years with the support of international financial institutions and the other development partners.[167]

4.5 From Coups d'états to Democratic Consolidation?

As noted earlier, Ghana's democratic process was confronted with challenging beginnings. Notwithstanding the numerous challenges and deficits, multi-party democratic rule had been established in Ghana's Fourth Republic. Since 1992, the country has held seven successful elections (1992, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012 and 2016), producing three political turnovers between the two major political parties, New Patriotic Party (NPP) and NDC.[168] The peaceful political turnovers have also taken place in an environment of burgeoning institutional context and a political terrain very accommodative of vibrant media and civil society.[169] Ghana now ranks high on most of the basic measures of democracy and good governance, including protection of fundamental civil liberties and human rights.[170] Compared to centuries-old democracies in other parts of the world, the country's democracy is relatively young. Nonetheless, considering the retreat of democracy

in some West African states, one could argue on the basis of the longevity test that Ghana has come of age having enjoyed 25 years of stability since the advent of the Fourth Republican constitution in 1992 with three difficult political turnovers, in 2000, 2008 and 2016; and two closely fought elections in 2008 and 2012.[171] The 2012 elections was perhaps one of the most challenging in the country's political history. Considering the closeness of the results to the previous presidential election in 2008, the stakes were especially high for the incumbent NDC and opposition NPP. The contentious campaign was characterised by wide range of issues, of which education and job creation were the most dominant.

Despite the challenges with the electoral process and the tense political atmosphere, Ghanaians once again went through the elections, albeit with logistical challenges with the biometric voting system. Like all elections under the Fourth Republic, reports of voter irregularities surfaced. Subsequently, the opposition NPP challenged the election results and petitioned the Supreme Court to annul the results. After eight months of legal battle, amidst political uncertainty, the Supreme Court upheld the results. The elections petition, particularly, brought to light some apparent challenges of the electoral system, including issues of over voting; voting without biometric verification; absence of the signature of the presiding officers on results sheets; duplicate serial numbers; duplicate polling station codes; unknown polling stations.[172] These developments have once again brought to the fore the pressing need for electoral reforms.[173] Some reforms were carried out. Ghana again went to the polls in December 2016. The political climate preceding the elections was once again tense and characterized by localized violence, hate speech and violent actions of political actors, thereby threatening the peace and stability of the country. Nonetheless, the country pulled through another relatively successful election that brought the NPP to power.

There is no widely accepted measure of consolidation of democracy. According to Larry Diamond "consolidation is the process by which democracy becomes so broadly and profoundly legitimate among its citizens that it is very unlikely to break down. This involves behavioural and institutional changes that normalize democratic politics and narrow its uncertainty. This normalization requires the expansion of citizen access, development of democratic citizenship and culture, broadening of leadership recruitment and training, and other functions that civil society performs....most urgently, it requires political institutionalization."[174] Similarly Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan identified three core dimensions: behavioural, constitutional and attitudinal. Behaviourally, a democratic regime is consolidated when "no significant political groups seriously attempt to overthrow the democratic regime or secede from the state." [175] One of the key elements towards the consolidation of democracy is a well-governed security sector, made up of civil, political and security institutions responsible for protecting the state and the communities within

it.[176] Attitudinally, when "the overwhelming majority of the people believe that any further political change must emerge from within the parameters of democratic formulas." Constitutionally, when all actors in the polity, governmental and non-governmental alike, "become subjected to, and habituated to the resolution of conflict within the specific laws, procedures and institutions sanctioned by the new democratic processes."[177] They argued that, democratic consolidation is a particular, institutionalised, form of democracy, a procedural system with the following characteristics: (1) open political competition; (2) several freely competing parties; and (3) an array of civil and political rights guaranteed by law. Political accountability is crucial and operates mainly via the relationship between voters and their elected representatives. In addition, a state bureaucracy that is usable by the democratic government and an institutionalized economic society.[178]

Ghana has considerably met some of the above criteria. For instance, there has not been any overt attempt at usurpation of democratic rule since 1992. Elections have become widely accepted as the only means of attaining political authority. Elections are more than mere formalities, their regular conduct is central to democratization. Besides infusing government with new blood, elections may contribute to the maturation of nascent democratic cultures.[179] The country has made significant progress at institutionalizing electoral democracy. Ghana's most notable achievement has been the progressive improvement of electoral management and the increasing acceptance of election results as fair by participants and observers alike.[180] While there were significant disputes about the 1992 elections that ended military rule, subsequent elections after 1992 have witnessed remarkable improvements, though complaints of electoral malpractices surfaced. Notably, the change in administration in 2000 from the NDC to the NPP took place without major challenges to the outcome of the election. Secondly, the political turnover in 2008 from NPP to NDC took place amidst some difficulties with the electoral process. Again, the political turnover in 2016 from NDC to NPP occurred amidst forceful takeovers of public assets and violence by political supporters. As noted earlier, the difficulties of the electoral process were also brought to light in the 2012 elections petition to the Supreme Court by the NPP.

These notwithstanding, the three relatively peaceful political turnovers demonstrate that Ghana has passed Huntington's "two-turnover" test by which a government loses an election, the opposition wins it and then, next time, loses power.[181] According to this view, after two cycles of peaceful leadership replacement, most political actors have both won and lost without revolting, which indicates that they have accepted the rules of the electoral game. Obviously, political turnovers do not guarantee democratic gains, but they may help build trust in the rules of the game and boost the legitimacy of the political process. They are ultimately necessary for the institutionalization of competitive multiparty politics.[182] It is evident that Ghanaians have accepted that democratic elections as the preferred way to

attaining political power to run the country. Many citizens have come to accept democratic elections as the preferred means of accession political power.[183] The popular support for democracy is evident in almost all Afrobarometer surveys. For instance, in 2008, the survey found that 79 percent of Ghanaians sampled prefer democracy to other forms of government. This rose to 82% in 2012. [184] The strong support for democracy is manifested by progressive increase in voter turnout since 1992. From a low of 50.2% in 1992, turnout was 77.9% in 1996, 60.8% in 2000, and 85.0% in 2004. However, there was a drop to about 72.9%, in 2008 still high by national and international standards.[185] Presidential elections in 2012 and 2016 recorded voter turnouts of 79.43% and 68.62% respectively.[186] While Ghanaians have come to accept democracy, they have reservations with developments in the current democratic dispensation. For instance, as shown in the chart below, the country recorded signs of increasing deterioration in overall governance performance over the last decade (2006-2016) as shown by the Mo Ibrahim Index of African Governance.[187]

Figure 2-4: Ghana's Governance Score from 2007-2016

Source: Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2017.

4.6 The Ghana Armed Forces in a 'new' Democracy: 1992 to 2016

Historically, local armies existed before the advent of colonial rule in the Gold Coast, but these were not standing armies. [188]The Ghana Armed Forces has its root in the colonial

Gold Coast Constabulary (GCC) raised in 1874 and re-designated the Gold Coast Regiment (GCR) in 1901. The GCR fought in defence of the British Empire in German Togoland, Cameroon, and East Africa during the First World War. It also fought on the side of the Allied Forces during the Second World War as West African colonies became important to Britain's war effort as sources of manpower and raw materials. [189] The GCR was later amalgamated with other armed units of the West Coast into the West African Frontier Force (WAFF) created in 1897 on the orders of the British Secretary of State for Colonies, Lord Joseph Chamberlain, to raise regular military units in all colonies.[190] The WAFF led by British officers and British Non-Commissioned Officers (NCO) became an integral part of the British Army for the purpose of maintaining internal security and defence of the colonial territories.[191] The Headquarters of the West African Command was established in Accra and remained there until 1956.[192] There had been earlier attempts to raise regular colonial units as far back as 1821 when Governor Charles McCarthy raised the Royal African Colonial Corps of Light Infantry (RACCI). However, this unit was annihilated in local battles and the Governor was killed.[193]

Colonialism created a system which made extensive use of forced labour, with the north used as an area of labour reserve and deliberately underdeveloped.[194] In the Gold Coast, people from the northern territories were mostly used for forced labour. The northerners were noted for their martial qualities and deemed loyal and honest, hence their recruitment into the colonial armies.[195] It has been argued that, the colonial authorities believed that due to their remoteness the northern ethnic groups would prove more effective at suppressing anti-colonial uprisings in the south.[196] Festus Aboagye argues that the British preferred the fighting qualities of the Hausa[197] race, and therefore, recruited mostly northern Muslims into the Gold Coast Constabulary.[198] Glover's Hausa forces from Nigeria were indeed used as the nucleus of the Gold Coast Hausa Constabulary from 1879. [199] Likewise, David Killingray notes that, the Gold Coast Regiment of the Royal West African Frontier Force (RWAFF), consisted of about 1,000 men recruited exclusively from the Northern Territories, including French subjects from across the border, led by British officers.[200] The colonialists believed that southern Christians posed high risk for desertion. Southerners, especially Ashanti, partly due to their numerous wars with the colonial powers and relatively better economic opportunities as cocoa farmers, detested joining the colonial army. [201] The few southerners, who were enlisted especially in peacetime, were mostly deployed in clerical and technical positions and as bandsmen.[202] It has been argued that the colonial patterns of recruitment exploited existing group rivalries in African societies, to the extent that certain groups were not represented in the colonial regiments. Therefore, at independence, the same colonial armies formed the nucleus of the formed militaries of the newly independent states. As the military became the most visible expression of sovereignty, underrepresented groups could not identify with this national symbol.[203]

As noted in chapter two, the colonial legacy permeated into the post-independence makeup of the military where people from certain relatively deprived regions in terms of economic and educational opportunities opted for military service. For many men from the north, the military offered opportunities for wages, and a more attractive form of labour to that offered in mines or farms in the south.[204] For instance, even after a decade of independence, about 60% of the personnel of the GAF were people of northern descent.[205] Beside northerners, Ewes also showed interest in military service. Some officers interviewed have argued that, the people from relatively resource-endowed areas such as the Akans did not show a lot of interest in military service.[206] This probably accounted for their low numbers in the armed forces. However, as mentioned earlier, southerners constituted majority of Ghanaians in the officer corps and senior positions in GAF in the immediate post-independence period. This is because they better had access to secular education.

The 1960 First Republican Constitution provided for the establishment of the GAF.[207] This was reinforced by The Armed Forces Act, 105 (1962) that "provides for the raising and maintenance of the Army, Navy and Air Force of Ghana, for matters connected therewith and for the repeal of certain enactments relating to the existing forces and other defence matters."[208]The GAF is a tri-service institution made up of the army, navy and air force operating under a Joint Service General Headquarters. Of these services, the army is most senior in terms of age and size, as it constitutes about 80% of the total strength. The Navy and Air Force were post-colonial institutions created in 1959 by the first African government by an act of Parliament.[209] Currently, each of the three services is made up of various specialized units. For example, the army is made of six infantry battalions, as well as a number of combat support units including armour, artillery, engineers and signals. The total strength of the GAF is around 15, 500, making it one of the largest in West Africa.[210]

As discussed earlier, after independence in 1957, the new armed forces soon became a major political destabilizing force especially in the first three decades of independence.[211] As captured by a retired Ghanaian general, "about three-quarters of post-independence history Ghana has been under military rule marked by excesses such as human rights abuses. This led to negative perceptions of the military because people think the country's developmental challenges have been caused by the military."[212] Some of the regimes were quasi-military made up of a mix of military, police and civilian actors. This notwithstanding, coups d'états, especially junior-led ones like the AFRC regime in 1979 and the early revolutionary days of the PNDC in 1981 led to what Eboe Hutchful described as the decomposition of the GAF because command and control and discipline were severely damaged. [213]

The acquisition of power and its proximity to state resources and dissipation has been the bone of contention between the military and political elites in most developing countries.

Esew argues that "the military has not tasted power and consequently were subservient to civil authority. Having, tasted it however, they feel they should seize it again once their corporate interest is threatened."[214] Similarly, others opine that as the military have exercised power for a long period in Ghana's political history, it was difficult for them to accept civilian control.[215] As aptly captured by a former military ruler, Colonel Ignatius Kutu Acheampong that "once you have touched the magic wand of power, never dream that you can go back to your village, the barracks or wherever you were before."[216] Nonetheless, the military returned to the barracks in 1993. As Ghana transitioned into a democracy in the wake of the post-Cold War democratization wave, it became necessary to clearly place the military to conform to the political features of democracy. In transitioning democracies, especially in post-conflict contexts, defence transformation processes are often carried out for a total overhaul of the defence architecture to align it to the prevailing democratic culture. Likewise, in advanced democracies, strategic defence review processes are carried out periodically. Both processes often involve national consultative processes and internal debates involving all relevant stakeholders including political leadership, government ministries and agencies, the people, the military and other actors. During these processes, a gamut of issues is considered. These includes: threat assessment, defence choices and political consequences, the balance between non-military and military means of addressing threats, resource allocation for defence and security and non-military uses of the armed forces.[217]

In the case of Ghana, the context was different as the country was not a typically post-conflict one. However, the dynamics, particularly decay of the security sector that led to state collapse in conflict societies were similar to the Ghanaian situation especially in the late 1970s up to early 1980s. This situation notwithstanding, the above mentioned processes of defence transformation were not holistically followed through. Indeed, during the constituent assembly deliberations on the 1992 constitution, issues of defence were discussed. The subsequent provisions on the armed forces under chapter 17 of the 1992 constitution was couched with some caution due to the civil-military relations history of the country and diverging views among the pro-PNDC and anti-PNDC members of the constituent assembly on the role of the armed forces in the new democracy.[218] It is argued that during the first civilian government of Rawlings' National Democratic Congress (NDC) from 1993-2000, Rawlings did not consider it a priority to warm the perceived cold relations between the military and civilians. The military remained visibly strong in the Ghanaian society. Since 1992, the country has endeavoured to establish democratic control over the security sector in general and in particular, to improve civil-military relations through a number of institutional reforms which has contributed to improved security sector governance.[219] These reforms will be highlighted in the next chapter. It has been observed that, in the Fourth Republic, both political and military elites have come to the realization

that institutionalization of democratic and civilian control serves their mutual interests.[220] Particularly, coups d'états leaders and military officers have learned through their past experiences that there are no quick-fix solutions to the country's socio-economic and political problems. Coups d'états have actually undermined the professionalism of the military as well as command structure, discipline and efficiency.[221]

As argued by Samuel Huntington, democracy operates based on accepted separation between the military and the civilian spheres.[222] This distinction means that the military are expected to refrain from politics unless through constitutionally approved channels. Similarly, politicians are not to interfere in purely operational matters of the military. Military leaders can however, contribute to the formulation of policy, only that they should do so in such a way that it does not undermine the authority of the civilian decision makers.[223] The powers of the military are determined in terms of the law, specifically the Constitution and the Defence Act. The key questions here are how has the GAF been placed as an important state institution in the Fourth Republic? What constitutional mechanisms exist for managing civil-military relations? To answer these, one explores how constitutional arrangements underpinning the current democratic terrain ensure civil and democratic control of the armed forces.

4.6 The 1992 Constitution and the Ghana Armed Forces

The 1992 Constitution of Ghana explicitly addresses the issues of democratic control. Specifically, Chapter 17 of the constitution stipulates the role of the armed forces. Particularly, Article 210(1-3) states that:

> (1) There shall be the Armed Forces of Ghana which shall consist of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force and such other services for which provision is made by Parliament.[224]
>
> (2) No person shall raise an armed force except by or under the authority of an Act of Parliament.
>
> (3) The Armed Forces shall be equipped and maintained to perform their role of defence of Ghana as well as such other functions for the development of Ghana as the President may determine.

The above constitutional provision is in line with the earlier Armed Force Act of 1962. The constitution also outlines certain structures and mechanisms aimed at ensuring democratic control of the armed forces. Specifically, the President as the Commander-in-Chief is vested with the power of appointment of persons to hold offices in the armed forces. The Armed Forces Council, among other functions advises the president on issues relating to

defence.[225] In other words, the 1992 constitution vested political command of the Armed Forces in the President who is the Head of State and Commander-in-Chief, acting in consultation with the Armed Forces Council. According to the Constitution, the overall coordination of national security policy is placed under the National Security Council which is chaired by the President. The National Security Council (NSC) is the strategic decision-making organ. The NSC is made of the following: the president; the vice-president; the ministers of defence, interior, foreign affairs and finance, and such other ministers as the president may determine; the representatives of the services, namely: the chief of defence staff and two other members of the armed forces, the inspector-general of police, the commissioner of police for the council of the minister of interior, and one other member of the police force; the director- general of the Prisons Service, the directors of intelligence (external, internal, and military respectively), and the commissioner of Customs and Excise and Preventive Service (Now part of Ghana Revenue Authority, GRA). To ensure strong links with the highest level of the government, the secretary of the cabinet also acts as the secretary of the NSC.[226]The often sensitive posts of National Security Coordinator and National Security Advisor or Minister for National Security are responsible for the National Security Secretariat. The National Security Coordinator and his deputy are supposed to lead in the collation of information in relation to the security of Ghana, and transmitting them to the office of the president. The Minister for National Security is responsible for policy and political control of NSC.

The administration as well as operational control and command of the Armed Forces is vested in the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS).[227] The CDS is subject to the overall control of the Commander-in-Chief, acting in consultation with the Armed Forces Council.[228]This command is exercised under the direction of the Minister of Defence, in times of peace, and under the direction of the President, in times of war or state of national emergence. However, this constitutional provision on the function of the CDS in practice is often fraught with challenges as there is lack of clarity in the constitution about what constitutes day-to-day operational matters in which in the CDS could take decision without recourse to the Armed Forces Council.[229]

Besides the constitutional guarantees on the roles of the armed forces in Ghana's security set up, SSR discourses emphasize the need for national security policies to be moved beyond state centric security to human security to meet the security needs of citizens. In the case of Ghana, although it is not explicitly stated in the 1992 constitution, there appears a shift from regime security to human security in which the military is expected to provide the enabling environment for the citizens to realize their potential and ensure well-being.[230] For instance, the Directive Principles of State Policy that guide all citizens, Parliament, the President, the Judiciary, the Council of State, the Cabinet, political parties and other bodies and persons in the application or interpretation of the Constitution also enjoins the state to

protect and safeguard the independence, unity and territorial integrity of Ghana, and seek the well-being of all her citizens.[231] This role expected of the armed forces goes beyond physical protection to providing security to the economic and strategic interests of the country. Therefore, the 1992 constitution clearly provides a legal framework for the role of the armed forces as well as retooling and restructuring of the armed forces.[232] Unlike past constitutions of Ghana, the 1992 constitution did provide a framework for the GAF to be deployed in civic activities to support the development of the country.

4.6.1 A 'New' Role for the Ghana Armed forces in a Democracy?

The traditional mission of the GAF is to "protect by land, sea and air, the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ghana against internal and external aggression thereby contributing to the transformation of the economy to achieve growth and accelerated poverty reduction especially among the vulnerable and excluded."[233] Basically, the role of the GAF in the current democratic dispensation includes the following:

1. defend the territorial integrity against internal and external threat;
2. support the police in providing internal security;
3. support national development;
4. project Ghana's foreign policy through UN and regional peacekeeping; and;
5. collaborate with ECOWAS, AU for regional peace and security.[234]

With regards to the traditional role of the armed forces, Ghana has not been at war with any other state. However, there were periods of uneasy relations with some neighbours such as Togo (1960-1990s) and Burkina Faso (1987-1994) which centred on political leadership in the past.[235] Although the country is not experiencing a national-scale conflict or undergoing some form of humanitarian crisis, Ghanaians are not living in absolute freedom from fear.[236] Among the security challenges faced by the country are protracted internal security challenges: chieftaincy disputes; conflicts over natural resources, political and election-related violence, communal violence, and crimes such as armed robbery.[237] Even though these security threats do not result in crisis of national magnitude, they often result in the loss of lives and property and thus constitute a threat to the relative peace and stability of the country. Moreover the changing nature of security threats in the sub-region brought about by multiple and interlinked threats of piracy, smuggling of natural resources, terrorism, money laundering, drug trafficking, human trafficking among others.[238] This has necessitated the need for appropriate response by the military.[239]

The relative stability and territorial integrity of Ghana can be attributed partly to the alertness and astuteness of its armed forces.[240] Ghana also enjoys friendly relations with its

neighbours despite some periods of uneasy relations in the past. As done in some countries across the globe, the military is often called to help in cases of lawlessness where the police are often seen as ineffective or even corrupt. Over the years, the GAF has been engaged in different operations and initiatives to support the police in the maintenance of internal peace and security. For example, *Operation Gongong*, aimed at assisting the civil authorities to maintain peace was launched to restore peace in the Dagbon/Nanumba/Konkomba areas of the Northern Region in the 1990s. Following the outbreak of conflict in other parts of northern Ghana, for example, in Bawku between the Mamprusis and Kusasis in December 2008, the military was deployed to assist the police. Troops are deployed in various trouble spots such as Bawku, Nakpanduri, Bunkpurugu, and Alavanyo to ensure calm.[241] Another example is *Operation Calm Life*, launched in 2002 to assist the police in combating armed robbery in the urban areas and highways. This operation has arguably led to a reduction of armed robbery cases in the urban areas particularly in Accra and Kumasi.[242]

The GAF also supports the democratization process by providing security during elections and other national events. For instance, the armed forces help in securing and transporting the ballot papers to every part of the country, including the remote areas.[243] Of particular mention is *Operation Peace Trail*, which is activated every election year to assist the civil authority in the maintenance of a peaceful atmosphere before, during and after the elections.[244] The GAF is an integral part of the National Election Security Taskforce (NESTF). This body is formed and led by the Inspector General of Ghana Police. The NESTF includes representatives from other security agencies namely, the Ghana National Fire Service (FNFS), Ghana Immigration Service (GIS), Ghana Prisons Service (GPS), National Security, the Bureau of National Investigations (BNI) and External Intelligence Service.[245] Other members include the National Commission for Civic Education (NCCE), the Ghana Information Services, the National Ambulance Service and the National Disaster Management Organization (NADMO).[246] The NESTF is the highest body responsible for formulation, planning and implementation of security measures for elections exists national level with divisions at regional, divisional and district levels.[247]

However, the involvement of the military in purely internal security functions which are essentially police functions often attracts criticism. Particularly, the use of the military for law enforcement purposes has the tendency to undermine the rule of law. For instance, while the military are trained in the use of lethal force, they may not have the requisite training (unless they are military police) in evidence gathering and preservation of sites.[248] Similarly, a Ghanaian senior officer remarked that "this internal security role has contributed to demystifying the armed forces. However, the challenge is that, this development affects the professionalism of the military as one can cite examples of soldiers engaging in undesirable acts like extorting monies during night patrol on roads."[249]

Similarly, a defence attaché with a foreign mission in Accra remarked that the GAF is often relied on by the state as the institution of last resort in times of crises or disasters. In particular, the deployment of the military in internal peacekeeping mission as a stabilizer force in support of the police. There appears to be an acceptance from the society based on the perception that the military is fair and well-disciplined in maintaining stability and security. However, the deployment of the military in such purely police functions comes with a risk. The military may lose the support of the local community especially in cases where the military is perceived to be biased or unprofessional.[250]

4.6.2 Towards a Developmental Armed Forces

The GAF is increasingly engaged in developmental activities such as disaster relief, civil construction, protection of Ghana's economic interests, agriculture and other income generating ventures like establishment of a shoe factory and a financial institution. For example, *Operation Boafo* assists the civil authority to manage natural and man-made disasters like floods, earth quakes and fire outbreaks. This operation assists NADMO and other state agencies to provide assistance to affected people and offer humanitarian assistance to those who lose their homes and properties. Particularly, the 48 Engineers' Regiment has a disaster management detachment equipped with light and speed boats and other equipment. This unit is always on standby during raining seasons to offer immediate assistance when needed. The 37 Military Hospital in Accra is also the official national disaster management hospital where injured victims are evacuated to for medical treatment.[251]

The GAF is also engaged in a number of activities aimed at safeguarding the economic interest of the country. For example, in the area of maritime security, GAF in collaboration with fisheries ministry, and agencies like the Environmental Protection Authority (EPA), is protecting Ghana's territorial water against illegal fishing. For example, *Operation Stock Control*, launched in December 2008, is a joint Naval/Air Force operation against pair trawling and illegal fishing methods in Ghana's territorial waters. This aims at eliminating the illegal practices that contribute to depleting marine fish stock. The Navy also provides similar assistance on the Volta Lake.[252] Following the discovery of oil in commercial quantities in 2007 and the launch of commercial oil exploitation in the Jubilee oil field in 2010, the GAF through *Operation Jubilee* initiated a plan with other agencies for the emerging oil industry to prevent the insecurities associated with the 'oil curse'. The plan deals with both onshore and offshore threats. The Navy is responsible for off- shore or maritime security and the army is responsible for the on-shore security. Both services are supported by the Air Force.[253] The military is also part of the Petroleum Security Coordinating Committee (PSCC) led by a retired general. In addition, *Operation Cow Leg*

was launched in 2010 to control the negative activities of foreign herdsmen. The herdsmen from neighbouring countries, called *Fulani*, often get into violent conflicts with local farmers because their cattle destroy local farms. The armed forces are also part of national task force against illegal small-scaled miners whose activities have become a threat to the environment in particular and human security in general. [254] Under *Operation Vanguard*, joint-task force from GAF and the Ghana Police Service are deployed to affected mining communities to stop and destroy unauthorised mining pits.[255]

4.7 The Peacekeeping Enterprise

A number of developments towards the execution of the mission of the GAF have arguably contributed to restoring the reputation of the GAF as an important institution in current democratic dispensation. Of particular mention is Ghana's involvement in international peacekeeping. In 1960, the first Ghanaian peacekeeping contingent was deployed in the Congo Crisis on the orders of the first president Kwame Nkrumah. While Ghana's deployment in the United Nations (UN) Operation in the Congo (ONUC) was informed by the pan-Africanist vision of Nkrumah, it was met with some difficulties and controversies.[256] Since then, the country has progressively earned a good reputation for its participation in international peacekeeping. The country is now the ninth largest troop contributing country (TCC) to UN missions.[257] For more than 50 years, the UN has relied on the professionalism of Ghanaian peacekeepers in several missions around the globe such as Lebanon, Afghanistan, Côte d'Ivoire, East Timor, Cambodia, Kosovo, Liberia, Sudan, Rwanda, the Balkans, and Pakistan.[258] Ghana also contributed to other regional peace operations under sub-regional Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group, ECOMOG since its inception in 1990 to help end the bloodshed in Liberia.[259] Others include Sierra Leone, and Côte d'Ivoire as well as continental missions in Somalia and Sudan.[260] The country has about four battalions deployed in peacekeeping missions at any point in time.[261]

Considering Ghana's resource constraints as a developing country, several questions have been raised and reason given on Ghana's continued participation in international peacekeeping missions.[262] In this vein, Aning and Aubyn argue that Ghana's unwavering support for UN peacekeeping is motivated by multiple rationales, including: "to keep its neighbourhood safe and peaceful, a principled commitment to the UN's peace and security architecture, and the operational and financial benefits that stem from providing peacekeepers. [263] In essence, participation in peacekeeping, demonstrates Ghana's commitment to sustain global peace, security, and stability.[264] It also serves as one of the opportunities through which Ghana can demonstrate its influence in world affairs and enhance its image and prestige in the international system.[265] Therefore, peacekeeping

serves as a public good in terms of Ghana's efforts to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and stability.[266]

4.7.1 Benefits from Peacekeeping

Participation in peacekeeping has contributed to better resources, training and international prestige to GAF as an institution. Peacekeeping has become an avenue for the military and police to acquire overseas experience and training.[267] GAF has benefited from diverse internationally sponsored capacity-building initiatives and training assistance programmes such as the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) and African Contingency Operation Training and Assistance (ACOTA) by the US. France has also provided Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping capabilities programme (RECAMP), and Military Training Assistance Programme (MTAP) by Canada.[268] These collaborative training and assistance programmes have also offered opportunities for the GAF to accumulate military equipment and technology by retaining the supplies provided by the UN and other donors.[269] Particularly, the UN has since 2000 been operating the Wet Lease System as against the old Dry Lease System. Under Wet Lease system, troop contributing countries sign a memorandum of understanding to supply a number of troops as well as logistics and equipment for the stated period of operations. The TCCs get monthly reimbursement for troops, equipment and logistics and even take back all their equipment at the end of the operation.[270]

However, Ghana has not had any significant advantage from the supply of equipment as it is unable to purchase and deploy significant quantities of equipment in order to maximize the benefits from the reimbursement of equipment under the Wet lease System.[271] Despite the international peacekeeping accolade, some doubts have been expressed about the war-capabilities of the GAF. Some members of the armed forces interviewed during this study have expressed concerns at the resource constraints of the armed forces and their effects on training and logistics and the overall operational efficiency of the armed forces. It is noteworthy that, in order to improve the logistical needs of peacekeepers and empower them to discharge their duties with minimal hazards, the Government of Ghana has set up an inter-ministerial technical committee in January 2015, to review Ghana's participation in peacekeeping operations. The committee was expected among other functions to formulate policy for accepting offers for participating in new missions, review equipment procurement system, determine procedure for requisition for funds from the GAF Peace Support Operation Account, and review of sources of funding for peace support operation.[272] In addition to the review, there are plans at equipment upgrade to enable the country draw full reimbursement of UN Wet Lease System.[273]

Moreover, at the level of individual officers and soldiers, peacekeeping has brought about greater financial rewards and international exposure. For instance, the daily allowance of

about $35 paid by the UN to troops goes a long way to supplement their local wages. Most military personnel are able to acquire properties such as housing, cars and domestic and commercial appliances and provide for their families partly from the financial rewards they receive from peacekeeping.[274]An often not mentioned point is the institutional and personal benefits of peacekeeping that have invariably contributed to keeping the military busy and possibly taking their minds off intervention in internal politics.[275] Ghana's involvement in peacekeeping has contributed to the country's stability and the consolidation of its democracy.[276] Besides, since independence, one of the factors that have accounted for the military engagement in Ghanaian politics has been grievances over poor economic conditions in terms of salaries and housing facilities.[277] Successive governments since 1992 have implemented policies to improve the economic status of security officers, but their impact has been minimal. Financial rewards from peacekeeping have become means of keeping the military "financially happy".[278] Peacekeeping has contributed to improving civil–military relations at home and contributed to greater professionalism within the military through pre-deployment and in-mission trainings. International requirements for participation in peacekeeping missions also go a long way to keep the military in check. For instance, personnel are required to not have committed any violations of International Humanitarian Law, Human Rights law and Sexual Exploitation and Abuse, and must not be subjects of any disciplinary measures before they are deployed to peacekeeping missions.[279]

In addition, peacekeeping has become an income generation venture for the country as it also benefits from the compensation packages offered by the UN.[280] The government makes an average profit of $3600 annually per soldier on peacekeeping mission.[281] This contributes significantly to the country's foreign proceeds considering the high numbers of troops deployed to missions around the globe.[282] Proceeds of peacekeeping have been used to purchase aircrafts and other equipment for the military. Other national assets like the Presidential Jet too were purchased from peacekeeping funds in 1999.[283] As peacekeeping has become a major preoccupation of the GAF, and income generating venture for Ghana, the recent decrease in peacekeeping funding has possible implications on future of peacekeeping operations globally.[284] For instance, following the announcement by Donald Trump administration in April 2017 to cut more than a billion dollars in US funding to global peacekeeping efforts, the United Nations announced plans to pull more than $600 million from its peacekeeping budget.[285] The proposed budget cuts are result of pressure from key contributors to the UN such as US and the EU who want to see reduction in peacekeeping budget. These developments would make it impossible for the UN to continue to essential work in peacekeeping. These developments therefore call for a deeper reflection on the future use of GAF if peacekeeping operations should reduce.

In addition, it has been observed that the GAF is very experienced in peacekeeping. For instance, when deployed in peacekeeping environments which are often hostile and

unpredictable, Ghanaian peacekeepers endeavour to first establish a strong relationship and trust with the local populace.[286] This is often done by observing the rules of engagement, respecting the customs, taboos, and traditions of the local people and not imposing military culture upon them.[287] Ghanaian troops often undertake more civil-military projects in missions.[288] Also, the generosity of Ghanaian peacekeepers has been documented.[289] There have been examples where Ghanaian troops have paid the school fees of local children, helped teach in community schools with a shortage of teachers, helped to arbitrate disputes between locals, and even provided healthcare facilities for the sick.[290] This trust and relationship-building has proved important for the success and safety of the Ghanaian peacekeepers.[291] Certain material factors including troop numbers, mission budgets and non-materials factors-contextual, societal, and political may account for behaviour of the military in peace keeping environments.[292]

Participation in peacekeeping has exposed many Ghanaian military personnel to the horrors of state collapse and human suffering. To this end, Ghanaian peacekeepers seem to have developed some conflict resolution skills and accommodation that support harmonious civil-military relations.[293] Nevertheless there is the need for deeper enquiry on how peacekeeping has contributed to changing soldiers' self-perception and issues of military ethics. For instance, it is been observed that when it comes to relations between some soldiers and the Ghanaian public especially, there is much room for improvement.[294] As would be discussed in subsequent chapters, cases of military brutality against civilians continue to surface in the media.

4. 8 Summary

The armed forces are an important state institution in any democracy. Since the advent of the Fourth Republic in January 1992 democratic governance has been firmly established in Ghana. Some constitutional and institutional arrangements were put in place to ensure that the armed forces conform to the features of the democracy in which it is located. A professional, disciplined and well-trained armed forces that accepts civilian, civil and democratic control and functions according to the constitution of a country is an important assert for national development especially for young democracies. GAF has since 1992 gradually redeemed its image and reputation needed for the execution of its traditional mandates. In addition to its traditional duty to protect the territorial integrity of Ghana, the GAF has become an important institution in the national development process contributing in diverse ways. New and emerging security challenges also requires appropriate response from the armed forces to keep the polity and people safe and stable.

However, the existence of legal or constitutional requirements is not enough to build democratic armed forces. This therefore calls for holistic defence transformation, or in the

least, institutional reforms. Indeed some *ad hoc* processes have been initiated in that area since the end of military rule in 1992. The subsequent chapters will therefore examine in greater detail what has actually been done through the lens of David Chuter's guide to defence transformation. In doing this, the thesis explores how this could contribute to improving civil-military based on Schiff's Concordance theory. The role of certain key institutions for defence management-Ministry of Defence and parliament will also be examined.

Endnotes

[1] The Gold Coast Colony referred to the European forts and castles inherited by the British while the Protectorate referred to the native states of the south who had fought twice (1826-1874) as allies of the British. See Addo-Fening, Robert, (2013), "Ghana under Colonial Rule: An Outline of the Early Period and the Interwar Years", *Transactions of the Historical Society of Ghana*, 15:39-70.
[2]Rodney, Walter, (1973), *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*, London and Dar-es-Salaam: Bogle-L'Ouverture Publications, and Tanzanian Publishing House.
[3]Oliver, Roland and Atmore, Anthony, (2005), *Africa, Since 1800*, Fifth Edition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Thompson, Alex, (2004), *An Introduction to African Politics*, Second Edition, London: Routledge.
[4] See Austin, Denis, (1970), *Politics in Ghana; 1946-1960*, London: Oxford University Press; Austin, Denis, (1985), "The Ghana Armed Forces and Ghanaian Society", *Third World Quarterly* 7(1): 97-11; Ocquaye, Mike, (1980), *Politics in Ghana: 1972-1979*, Accra: Tornado Publications; Chazan, Noami, Peter, Lewis, Robert, Mortimer, Donald, Rothchild and Stedman, Stephen, (1999*), Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa*, Third Edition, Boulder, Co: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
[5] Since independence, the country has experimented different systems namely: parliamentary, presidential, hybrid presidential, single and multiparty democracy.
[6]Dowse, Robert, (1975), "Military and Police Rule". In: *Politicians and Soldiers, Ghana, 1966-1972, Edited by* Austin, David and Luckham, Robin, 16-36, London: Frank Cass.
[7] The Queen of England, represented locally by a governor was the titular head of state.
[8] This Dam built on the Volta River is largest producer of hydro power for country.
[9] Following Nkrumah's election as the first president in 1960, he took over top party position of the CPP and became the general secretary and life chairman.
[10] Thompson, Scout, (1969), *Ghana's Foreign Policy 1957–1966*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
[11] This point was reiterated in his speech on Ghana's independence on 6th March 1957. Nkrumah, (1964). See also Agyeman-Duah, Barfour, (1987), "Ghana, 1982-6: the Politics of the PNDC", *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 25(4):613-642.
[12] Biney, Ama, (2011), *The Political and Social Thought of Kwame Nkrumah*, London: Palgrave Macmillan.
[13]Zeff, Eleanor, (1981), "New Directions in Understanding Military and Civilian Regimes in Ghana", African *Studies Review*, 24(1): 49-72; Austin, (1985), op. cit.
[14] The NLC was made up of senior army and police officers, namely: Lieutenant Colonel E.K. Kotoka, Major A.A. Afrifa, Lieutenant General (retired) J.A. Ankrah, (Chairman), Lieutenant. Colonel A.K. Ocran, Mr. J.W.K. Harley, the Inspector General of Police(Deputy Chairman), B.A Yakubu, and J.E Nunoo, both police officers.
[15]It is argued that the coup was financed and directed from the United States by the Central Intelligence Agency due to Nkrumah's anti-Western stance. See Assensoh, Akwasi and Assensoh, Yvette, (2002*), African Military History and Policies: Ideological Coups and Incursions 1900-Present*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
[16]Dowse, (1975), op. cit.
[17] Republic of Ghana, (1960), *The Republican Constitution of Ghana.*
[18] Ibid, Article 53.
[19] Ibid, Article 54.
[20]Dowse (1975).
[21]Shillington, Kevin, (1992), *Ghana and the Rawlings Factor*, London: Macmillan Press.
[22] Addae, Stephen, (2005), *A Short History of Ghana Armed Forces*, Accra: Ministry of Defence.
[23] Ibid.
[24]Hutchful, Eboe, (1979), "Organizational Instability in African Military: The Ghanaian Army", *International Social Science Journal*, 31:606:618.

[25] Alexander, (1965), op. cit.
[26] Baynham, Simon, (1985a), "Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?: The Case of Nkrumah's National Security Service", *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 23(1):87-103.
[27] Welch, Claude, (1974), "Personalism and Corporatism in African Armies", In: Political-Military Systems: Comparative Perspective, edited by Kelleher, Catherine, 125-159, London: Sage Publications.
[28]Luckham, (1975), op. cit.; Baynham, Simon, (1988), *The Military and Politics in Nkrumah's Ghana*. London, West View Press.

[29] Baynham, (1985), op. cit.
[30]Hutchful, (1979), op. cit.
[31] The leader of NLC Colonel Kotoka was Ewe. While the rest of the members Major Akwasi Amankwaa Afrifa, was Ashanti, Lieutenant General (retired) Joseph .A. Ankrah, Lieutenant, Ga, Colonel A.K. Ocran, a Breman; Mr. J.W.K. Harley, then IGP, Ewe, B.A Yakubu, northerner and J.E Nunoo, Ga .
[32] Dowse 1975; Col. Afrifa, Akwasi, (19767), *The Ghana Coup*, London.
[33]Afrifa, Akwasi, (1966), *The Ghana coup: 24th February 1966*, London: Frank Cass and Company, p. 102.
[34]Hutchful, (1979), op. cit.
[35] Baynham, Simon, (1985b), "Divide et Impera: Civilian Control of the Military in Ghana's Second and Third Republics", *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 23(4): 623-642.
[36] Finer, Samuel, (1963), "Military Disengagement from Politics" in collected papers on *The Politics of Demilitarization*, London: Institute of Commonwealth.
[37] [37] These included cancelling bilateral agreements with socialist countries.
[38]Austin Denis and Luckham, Robin, (eds.) (1975), *Politicians and Soldiers in Ghana*. London: Frank Cass Paperbacks.
[39]Dowse, (1975), op. cit; Austin, (1985), op. cit.
[40]Goldschmidt, Jenny, (1980), "Ghana between the second and the third republic era: recent constitutional development and their relation to tradition laws and institutions", *African Law Studies*, 81:43-61; Dowse, (1975), op. cit.
[41]Austin, (1970), op. cit.
[42] Luckham, (1975), op. cit.
[43]Armah, Kwasi, (1974), *Ghana: Nkrumah's Legacy*, London: Rex Dowse, (1975), op.cit.
[44] Luckham, Robin, (1975), "The Constitutional Commission 1966-69", In: *Politicians and Soldiers in Ghana*, Edited by Austin, Dennis and Luckham, Robin, 62-88. London: Frank Cass.
[45]Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, (1969), Accra: Ghana Publishing Corporation, Section 13(3).
[46] Le Vine, (1987), op. cit.
[47]For example, he interfered with independence of the judiciary by dismissing judges and newspaper editors who disagreed with him. See Le Vine, Victor, (1987), 'Autopsy on a Regime: Ghana's Civilian Interregnum 1969-72 *'The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 25(1):169-178; Shillington, (1992), op.cit.
[48]Le Vine, (1987), op. cit. p.171.
[49] Asante and Gyimah-Boadi, (2006), Hutchful, (1979), op. cit.
[50] Baynham, (1985a), op. cit.
[51] Austin, Denis, (1985), "The Ghana Armed Forces and Ghanaian Society", *Third World Quarterly* 7(1): 97-11; Ocquaye, Mike, (1980), *Politics in Ghana: 1972-1979*, Accra: Tornado Publications.
[52] Baynham, Simon, (1985b), "Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?: The Case of Nkrumah's National Security Service" *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 23(1): 87-103.
[53] Le Vine, (1987), op. cit.
[54]Baynham, Simon, (1985a), op. cit; Fordwor, Donkor, (2010), The *Origins, Mission and Achievements of the New Patriotic Party*, Accra: Unimax Macmillan.
[55]Baynham, (1985b), op. cit.; Le Vine, (1987), op.cit.
[56]Le Vine, (1987), op. cit; Fordwor, (2010), op. cit.
[57] For instance, in his efforts to address rising unemployment, the controversial Aliens Compliance Order of November 1969 in which over one millions African nationals were expelled from Ghana. This resulted in

reprisal moves by other nations Nigeria who expelled thousands of Ghanaians. See Le Vine, (1987), op. cit. p.170.
[58]Le Vine (1987), op. cit. p.171.
[59] Meaning "we won't pay", "we won't pay."
[60]*West Africa* (1979), cited in Handley, Antoinette and Mills, Greg, (2001), "From military coups to multiparty elections: the Ghanaian military-civil transition", *Working paper* 2, November, Hague: Netherlands International Institute of International Relations, Clingendael.
[61]Price, Robert, (1971), "Military officers and political leadership: the Ghanaian Case", *Comparative Politics*, 3(3):361-381; Price, Robert, (1984). "Neo-colonialism and Ghana's Economic Decline: A critical assessment", *Canadian Journal of African studie*s, 18(1): 163-193.
[62]Le Vine, (1987), op. cit; Goldschmidt, (1980), op. cit.
[63]Goldschmidt, (1980), op. cit.
[64]Republic of Ghana, (1977), *Union Government Report*, paragraph 112, Accra.
[65]Goldschmidt, (1980), op. cit
[66]Esew, Ntim-Gyakari, (2012), *The Military and Democratization in Africa: A Critical Analysis of Transition to Civil Rule in Nigeria and Ghana (1960-2000*). Verlag: Lambert Academic Publishing.
[67] Kalabule means "Keep the lid shut" in Hausa language.
[68] Ocquaye, Mike, (1980), *Politics in Ghana 1972-79*, Accra: Tornado Publications, p. 17.
[69]Ocquaye, (1980), op. cit.; Chazan, Naomi, (1989), "Planning Democracy in Africa: A Comparative Perspective on Nigeria and Ghana", *Policy Sciences*: *Policymaking in Developing Countries*, 22(3/4): 325-357.
[70]Goldschmidt, (1980), op. cit.
[71] The military rulers like Acheampong also became implicated in corruption.
[72]Chazan, (1989), op. cit.
[73] The coup was carried out by a handful of middle ranked junior officers and other ranks under the leadership of Captain Boakye Gyan. Rawlings was subsequently released from detention to lead the coup.
[74]Shillington, (1992), op. cit.
[75]Quoted in Shillington, (1992): 60).
[76]Chazan, (1989), op.cit: Ocquaye, (1980), op. cit
[77]Shillington, (1992); Hutchful, (1997a) op. cit; Baynham, (1985a), op. cit; Hettne, Bjorn, (1980), "Soldiers and Politics: The Case of Ghana", *Journal of Peace Research*, 17(2):173–93.
[78]Hutchful, (1997a), op. cit.
[79] Rawlings refused to be resettled or retire abroad after handing over power in September 1979. He returned to the barracks at his previous rank of flight-lieutenant. His presence became a constant source of embarrassment to the government and the military authorities. Rawlings was subsequently retired by Limann, a move which was seen as mistake of the PNP regime.
[80] Baynham (1985a), op. cit.
[81]Hutchful, (1997a), op. cit; Baynham, (1985a), op. cit.
[82] The Limann government took its first important initiative on 27 November 1979 to dismantle the command structure inherited from the AFRC and replaced the army, air force, navy and police commands. Former AFRC militants and sympathizers were purged from the ranks or sent out of the country. See Hutchful, (1997a), op. cit.
[83] Baynham, (1985), op. cit
[84] Ibid.
[85]Fordwor, (2010), op, cit; Shillington, (1992), op. cit.
[86] The coup was engineered by Captain Kojo Tsikata, a close associate of Rawlings. The PNDC was made up of Rawlings as Chairman, Brigadier Nunoo-Mensah, WO1 Adjei-Boadi, Chris Bukari Atim, Reverend Kwabena Damuah, Sergeant Aloga Akatapore and Amartey-Kwei. Most of this people with the exception of Rawlings and WO1 Adjei-Boadi fell out of the regime for varied reasons.
[87]Chazan, (1989), op.cit.
[88]Chazan (1989), op. cit. p.329
[89]Carothers, Thomas, (2002), "The End of the Transition Paradigm", *Journal of Democracy*, 13(1):.6-9.

[90]Ibid.
[91]Ibid.
[92] Ottaway, Marina, (2003), 'Democracy Challenged. The Rise of Semi-Authoritarian Regimes', Washington D.C., Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
[93]Ottaway, 2003; Carothers (2001; Young, Crawford, (1999), "The Third Wave of Democracy in Africa: Ambiguities and Contradictions", In: State *Conflict and Democracy in Africa*, edited by Joseph, Richard, 15-38 Boulder, Colorado, Lynne Rienner.
[94]Chazan, (1989), op.cit; Essew, (2013), op.cit.
[95]Chazan, (1989), op. cit.
[96]Essew, (2013), op. cit.
[97]Luckham, Robin, (1975), "The Constitutional Commission" In: *Politicians and Soldiers in Ghana*, edited by Austin, Denia and Luckham, Robin, 64-88, London: Cass University Press.
[98]Ibid.
[99]Dadzie, Ato and Ahwoi, Kwamina (2010), *Justice Daniel Francis Annan: in the service of democracy*, Accra: Institute for Democratic Governance.
[100] It is noteworthy that in the absence of trial, General Acheampong was stripped of all his military retirement benefits, including the use of his rank because of alleged economic offence. See Goldschmidt, (1980), op. cit; Republic of Ghana, (1979), Constitution of the Third Republic, Accra.
[101] It is been argued the Transitional Provisions were smuggled into constitution after the Constitutional Committee had finished its work. Some have argued that that provisions offend the spirit of the Constitution, which is guided by fundamental human rights. Indeed there have been calls for expunging the indemnity clause as part of the review of the 1992 constitution. See *The Chronicle*, (2011), 'Dealing with Indemnity Clauses in the Constitution', Editorial, 3 March 3, Republic of Ghana, (1992), *Constitution of the Fourth Republic*, Accra.
[102] Aning, Kwesi and Lartey, Ernest, (2009a), "Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector: Lessons from Ghana", In: *Parliament Oversight of the Security Sector in West Africa*, edited by Sherman, Jake, New York: Center on International Cooperation.
[103]Huntington, Samuel, (1984), "Will More Countries Become Democratic?", *Political Science Quarterly*, 99(2): 193–218;Huntington, Samuel, (1991), *The Third Wave. Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*, Norman OK: Oklahoma University Press.
[104]Shillington, (1992); Jibrin, (2003); Handley and Mills (2002), op. cit.
[105]Ocquaye, Mike, (1995), "Human Rights and the Transition to Democracy in the PNDC in Ghana", *Human Rights Quarterly*, 17(3):566-573; Jibrin, Ibrahim, (2003), "Democratic Transitions in Anglophone West Africa", Monograph Series, Dakar: CODESRIA.
[106]Shillington, (1992), op. cit.
[107]Chazan, (1989); Handley and Mills, (2002); Essew, (2012), op. cit.
[108] Agyeman-Duah, (1987), op. cit.
[109]Ibid.
[110]Handley and Mils, (2002); Chazan (1989).
[111]Handley and Mills (2002), Jibrin, (2003); Ocquaye, (1995), op. cit; Ayee, Joseph, (2007), "A decade of political leadership in Ghana 1993-2004", In: *Ghana: One decade of a Liberal State*, edited by Boafo-Arthur, Kwame, 165-187, London: Zed Books.
[112]Agyeman-Duah, Barfour, (2002), "Civil-military Relations in Ghana's Fourth Republic", *Critical Perspectives* No.9, Accra: Ghana Center for Democratic Development
[113]Chazan, (1989), op. cit.
[114]Ibid.
[115] Agyeman-Duah (1987), op. cit.
[116] Ibid.
[117]Chazan, (1989), op. cit; Gyimah-Boadi, E. and Donald Rothschild (1982), "Rawlings, Populism and the Civil Liberties Traditions in Ghana", *Issue*, 3(4):64-69.
[118] Interview with General Arnold Quainoo (Retired), Former GOC, Accra, 30 October, 2015.
[119]Gyimah-Boadi and Rothschild, (1982); Chazan, (1989), op. cit.

[120]*Daily Graphic*, (1982), January 11 cited in Gocking, Roger, (1996), "Ghana's Public Tribunals: An Experiment in Revolutionary Justice", *African Affairs*, 95(379):197-223.
[121]Gocking, (1996), op. cit; Fordwor, (2010), op. cit.
[122]Republic of Ghana, (1982), PNDC Law 42: Provisional National Defence Council (Establishment) Proclamation (Supplementary and Consequential Provisions) Law. Accra: Government Printer December.
[123]Agyeman-Duah, (1987); Gyimah-Boadi and Rothschild, (1982); Shillington, (1992), op. cit.
[124] Ibid.
[125]Nugget, Paul, (2004; 2012), *Africa since Independence*, Second edition, London: Palgrave Macmillan. Haynes, Jeffrey, (2003), "Democratic Consolidation in Africa: The Problematic Case of Ghana", *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*, 41(1): 48; Gadzekpo, Audrey, (2008), "Guardians of Democracy: The Media", In: *Ghana: Governance in the Fourth Republic*, edited by Agyeman-Duah, Baffour, Accra: Centre for Democratic Development, pp. 195–214.
[126]Ninsin, Kwame, (1987), "Ghanaian Politics after 1981: Revolution or Evolution?", *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, 21(1):17-37.
[127]Chazan (1989), op. cit.
[128]Rawlings, 1983:10, cited in Chazan, (1989), op. cit. p.342.
[129] This decision contributed to break in the ranks of the PNDC regime as some of the radicals of the regime saw this as a betrayal of the people's revolution. See Shillington, (1992); Ninsin (1987), op. cit; Boafo-Arthur, Kwame. (1999), "Ghana: Structural Adjustment, Democratization, and the Politics of Continuity", *African Studies Review*, 42(2): 41-72; Jeffries, Richard, (1992), "Urban Popular attitudes towards the economic recovery programme and the PNDC government in Ghana", *African Affairs*, 91(363):207-226; Handley, Antoinette, (2013), 'Ghana: Democratic Transition, Presidential Power, and the World Bank", in: *Transitions to Democracy: A Comparative Perspective*, edited by Stoner, Kathryn, and McFaul, Michael, 221-243, Balitmore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
[130]Boafo-Arthur, (1999), op. cit; Hutchful, Eboe (1985), "IMF Adjustment in Ghana since 1966", *Africa Development*, 10(1/2):122-136; Kusi, Newman (1991), "Ghana: Can Adjustment Reforms be Sustained?", *Africa Development*, 16(3/4) 181-206.
[131] Kusi, Newman (1991), "Ghana: Can Adjustment Reforms be Sustained?", *Africa Development,* 16(3/4) 181-206.
[132] Ibid.
[133]Shillington, (1992), Yeebo, (2007), "Rawlings: A Threat to Democracy", May, *The Ghanaian Oracle*. Available at https://ghanaianoracle.wordpress.com (accessed on August 23, 2015).
[134]Boafo-Arthur, (1999), op. cit; Jeong, Ho-Won, (1995), "Liberal Economic Reform in Ghana: A Contested Political Agenda", *Africa Today*, 42(4): 82-104.
[135]Boafo-Arthur, (1999); Jeong, (1995), op. cit.
[136]Gyimah-Boadi, Emmanuel, (1995), "Ghana: Adjustment, State Rehabilitation and Democratization", In: *Between Liberalisation and Oppression: The Politics of Structural Adjustment in Africa*, edited by Mkandawire, Thandika, and Olukoshi, Adebayo, 217-29, Dakar: CODESRIA; Boafo-Arthur, (1999); Handley, (2013), op. cit.
[137]Ahiakpor, James, (1991), "Rawlings, Economic Policy Reform, and the Poor: Consistency or Betrayal?", *The Journal of Modern African Studie*s, 29(4):583-600; Amponsah, Nicholas, (2000),' Ghana's Mixed Structural Adjustment Results: Explaining the Poor Private Sector Response', *Africa Today*, 47(2):9-32; Jeong, Ho-Won, (1995), Liberal Economic Reform in Ghana: A Contested Political Agenda,' *Africa Today*, 42(4): 82-104.
[138]Ahiapor, (1991), op. cit; Hutchful, Eboe, (1995), "Why Regimes Adjust: the World Bank Ponders its "Star Pupil", *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, 29(2)"303:317.
[139]Fordwor, (2010) op. cit; Handley, Antoinette, (2013), 'Ghana: Democratic transition, presidential power, and the World Bank", in: *Transitions to Democracy: A Comparative Perspective*, edited by Kathryn Stoner and Michael McFaul, 221-243, Johns Hopkins University.
[140]Chazan, (1989), op. cit.
[141]Formal debates on national political issues started in August I990, with a series of government-orchestrated seminars held at regional capitals. Only a handful of individuals opposed to the PNDC were ever given an

opportunity to present papers, and the majority of participants backed a no-party option. Popular support for a return to multi-partysm, was however clear. See Sandbrook, Richard, and Oelbaum, Jay, (1997), "Reforming Dysfunctional Institutions through democratization? Reflections on Ghana", *The Journal of modern African studies*, 35(4): 603-646.
Handbrook and Olebaum, 1997, op. cit.
[142] Bluwey, Gilbert, (1998), "State Organizations in the Transition to Constitutional Democracy", In *Ghana: Transition to Democracy*, edited by Ninsin, Kwame, Freedom Publications: Accra; Ninsin, Kwame, (1996), *Ghana's Political Transition, 1990-1993: Selected Documents*, Freedom Publications: Accra.
[143]Republic of Ghana, (n.d.). "The Search for True Democracy in Ghana", Accra: Information Services Department, 10-11.
[144]Agyeman-Duah, (1987), op. cit
[145]Jibrin, (2003); Fordwor, (2010).
[146]Chazan, (1989), op. cit.
[147]Ahwoi, Kwamena, (2010), *Local Government and Decentralization in Ghana*, Accra: Unimax Macmillan
[148]Ahwoi, (2010); Agyemang-Duah, (1987), op. cit
[149]Ahwoi, (2010), op. cit.
[150]Agyeman-Duah (1987:622), op. cit.
[151]Chazan, (1989); Aygeman-Duah,(1987), op. cit
[152]Republic of Ghana, (1987), *District Political Authority and Modalities for District Level Elections*, Accra: Ghana Publishing Corporation, p.1.
[153]Ayee, Joseph, (1997), "The Adjustment of Central Bodies to Decentralization: The Case of the Ghanaian Bureaucracy", *African Studies Review*, 40(2): 37-57; Ahwoi, (2010), op. cit.
[154] Some have argued that the PNDC regime selected experts who are sympathetic to the regime to draft a new constitution. The draft constitution was later presented to the Consultative Assembly for consideration. See Fordwor, (2010), op. cit.
[155]Jeffries, Richard, and Thomas, Clare, (1993), "The Ghanaian elections of 1992",*African Affairs*, 92:331-66;Haynes, Jeffrey, (1993), "Sustainable democracy in Ghana: problems and prospects", *Third World Quarterly*, 14(3):451-67; Gyimah-Boadi, Emmanuel, (1994), "Ghana's Uncertain political opening", Journal *of democracy*, 5(2), pp. 75-86.
[156] The Opposition NPP boycotted the Parliamentary elections due to allegation of irregularities in the Presidential elections. See New Patriotic Party, (1993), *The Stolen Verdict: Ghana, November 1992 Presidential election: Report of the New Patriotic Party*, Accra: New Patriotic Party.
[157] This is partly because the eleven-year old PNDC regime rebranded itself as a political party - National Democratic Congress (NDC) to contest the transition elections against divided and poorly organized opposition parties under fairly stage managed transition arrangements.
[158] The term transmutation is used here to describe a particular type of transition where a military ruler creates the circumstances that allow him to "civilianize" his regime. This usually involves careful restrictions on potential opponents, resignation of his commission and election campaigning as a civilian and the use of incumbent advantage to tilt the electoral playing field to his advantage. See Durotoye, Yomi, and Griffiths, Robert, (1997), "Civilianizing Military Rule: Conditions and Processes of Political Transmutation in Ghana and Nigeria", *African Studies Review*, 40(3): 133.
[159]Shillington, (1992); Haynes (1993), op. cit; Nugent, Paul (1996), *Big Men and Small Boys: Power, Ideology and the Burden of History in Rawlings' Ghana, 1982-94*, Frances Pinter Publishers Ltd
[160]Agyeman-Duah, (1987), Shillington, (1992), op. cit.
[161]Gyimah-Boadi, (1994); Haynes (1993); Handley and Mills, (2002); Boafo-Arthur, Kwame, (2008), "Democracy and Stability in West Africa", *Claude Ake Memorial Papers*, Volume 4, Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute.
[162]Haynes, (1993); Jeffrey and Thomas, (1993); Handley and Mills, (2002); Jibrin, (2003), Handley, (2013), op.cit; Opoku, Darko, (2008), "Political Dilemmas of Indigenous Capitalist Development in Africa: Ghana under the Provisional National Defence Council", *Africa Today*, 55(2): 25-50.
[163]Jeong, (1995), op. cit.

[164]Sandbrook and Olebaum, (1997); Clapham, Chrisopher. (1982), "Clientelism and the state", In: *Private Patronage and Public Power: Political Clientelism in the Modern State*, edited by Clapham, Christopher, 1-35, London: Pinter.
[165]Sandbrook and Olebaum, (1997); Ninsin, Kwame, (1993), "Some Problems in Ghana's Transition to Democratic Governance", *African Development*, 18(2):5-22; Bratton, Michael, and van de Walle, Nicholas, (1994), "Neo-Patrimonial Regimes and Political Transitions in Africa", *World Politics*, 46: 453-89.
[166]Jibrin, (2003) Gyimah-Boadi (1991; 1994), op. cit.
[167]Gyimah-Boadi, (1994); Boafo-Arthur, (2007), op. cit.
[168] The country appears to be re-establishing a long-standing two-party tradition.
[169]Anebo, Felix, (2001), "The Ghana 2000 Elections: Voter Choice and Electoral Decisions", *African Journal of Political Science*, 6(1):69-88;Gyimah-Boadi, E, (2009), "Another Step Forward for Ghana", *Journal of Democracy*, 20(2): 138-152;Whitfield, Lindsay, (2009),"Change for a Better Ghana: Party Competition, Institutionalization and Alternation in Ghana's 2008 Election", *African Affairs*, 108(433):621-641;Radelet, Steven, (2010),"Success Stories from 'emerging' Africa", *Journal of Democracy* , 21(4): 87-101.
[170]Fox, Leslie, Hofman, Barak, Anyimadu, Amos, Keshishan, Michael, (2011), *Ghana Democracy and Governance Assessment: Final Report'* New York: USAID.
[171]Abdulai, Abdul-Gafaru and Crawford, Gordon, (2010), "Consolidating democracy in Ghana: Progress and prospects.", *Democratization*, February, 17(1):26-27; Gyimah-Boadi, (2009), op. cit.
[172]Supreme Court of Ghana, (2013), "Judgement of the Presidential Election Petition", Writ No. J1/6/2013, 29th August. Available at http://www.africanelections.org (Accessed on 12 October, 2015).
[173]Salihu, Naila and Aning, Kwesi, (2013), "Do Institutions Matter? Managing Institutional Diversity and Change in Ghana's Fourth Republic", *Policy Brief* 10, Accra: KAIPTC.
[174]Diamond, Larry, (1994), 'Towards Democratic Consolidation', *Journal of Democracy*, 5(3):15
[175]Linz, Juan, and Stephan, Alfred, (1996), *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation.* Baltimore MD: John Hopkins University Press, p.5.
[176]Hendrickson, Dylan, and Karkoszka, Andrzej, (2002), "The Challenges of Security Sector Reform", SIPRI Yearbook: *Armaments, Disarmament and International Security*, Stockholm: SIPRI, pp. 175-201.
[177]Linz, Juan and Stepan, Alfred, (1996), *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*, Baltimore MD: John Hopkins University Press, p.5.
[178]Linz and Stephan, (1996), p. 6.
[179]Bratton, Michael,(2004), "The 'Alternation Effect' in Africa", *The Journal of Democracy*, 15(4).155
[180]Open Society for West Africa (OSIWA), Institute for Democratic Governance (IDEG) and Afrimap, (2007), *Ghana: Democracy and Political Participation.* Dakar: OSIWA; Agyeman-Duah, Barfour, (2008), "Introduction: Fifty Years in Perspective", In: *Ghana, Governance in the 4th Republic*, edited by Barfour Agyeman-Duah, 1-31, Accra: Centre for Democratic Development.
[181]Huntington, (1991), op. cit.
[182]Cheeseman, Nic (2010), "African Elections as Vehicles for Change", *Journal of Democracy*, 21(4), pp. 139-153.
[183]Doorenspleet, Renske, (2012),"Critical citizens, democratic support and satisfaction in African Democracies", *International Political Science Review*, 33(3):279-300.
[184]Center for Democratic Development, Ghana, CDD, (2012), *Ghana Round 5 Afrobarometer Survey: General Findings*, Accra:CDD.
[185]Ibid.
[186] International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), (2016), Elections Guide: Republic of Ghana. Available at http://www.electionguide.org/countries/id/83/ (Accessed on November 28, 2017).
[187] DW news, (2017), Ghana: No Longer an African Role Model?. Available at http://www.dw.com/en/ghana-no-longer-an-african-role-model/ (Accessed on November 30, 2017).
[188]Assensoh, Akwasi and Alex-Assensoh, Yvette, (2002), *African Military History and Policies: Ideological Coups and Incursions 1900-Present.* New York: Palgrave Macmillan; Aboagye, Festus, (1999), The Ghana Army: *A Concise Contemporary Guide to its Centennial Regimental History 1897-1999*, Accra: Sedco Publishing Limited; Aboagye, Festus, (2010), *Indigenous African Warfare: Its Concepts and Art in the Gold Coast, Asante and the Northern Territories up to early 1900s*, Pretoria: Ulinzi Africa Publishing Solutions.

[189]Aboagye, (1999a), op.cit; Addae, Stephen, (2005), *A Short History of Ghana Armed Forces*, Accra: Ministry of Defence;Killingray, David, (1982), "Military and Labour Recruitment in the Gold Coast During the Second World War",*The Journal of African History*, 23(1): 83-95.
[190]Aboagye, (1999a); Addae, (2005), op. cit.
[191]Alexander, Henry, (1965), *African Tightrope: My Two Years as Nkrumah's Chief of Staff*, London: Pall Mall Press; Aboagye, (1999a), op. cit.
[192]Gutteridge, William, (1967), "The Political Role of African Armed Forces: The Impact of Foreign Military Assistance", *African Affairs*, 66(263):93-103.
[193]Aboagye, (1999a), op. cit.
[194]Oliver, Rolland and Atmore, Anthony,(2005), *Africa Since 1800*, 5th Edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Mbembe, Achille (2001), *On the Postcolony*. Berkeley: University of California Press; Ouedraogo, Emile (2014), "Advancing Military Professionalism in Africa", Research *Paper* No.6, Washington, DC: Africa Center for Strategic Studies.
[195]Ray, Subhasish, (2013), "The Nonmartial Origins of the 'Martial Races': Ethnicity and Military Service in Ex-British Colonies", *Armed Forces & Society*, 39(3): 560-575.
[196]Ejiogu, EC, (2007), "Colonial Army Recruitment Patterns and Post-Colonial Military Coup d'états in Africa: The Case of Nigeria, 1966-1993", *Scientia Military*, 35(1): 99-132.
[197]Hausa is one of the dominant ethnic groups in northern Nigeria, Niger and Chad. For reasons of migration and trade the Hausa language is spoken across most parts of West African countries particularly Muslims. See Adamu, Mahdi, (1978), *The Hausa Factor in West African History*, Zaria and Ibadan: Ahmadou Bello University Press and Oxford University Press.
[198]Aboagye, (1999), op. cit. p. 2; Addae, (2005), op. cit.
[199]Addae, (2005), op. cit. p. 7. Glover was a British lieutenant who later became governor of Lagos, Nigeria in the 1800s. He formed and armed a group Hausa ex-slaves for his protection and made a case to the British government for the recognition of this group and was given the official name, Hausa Constabulary in 1865.
[200]Killingray, (1982), op. cit.
[201]Addae, (2005), op. cit.
[202]Ibid. p.166.
[203]Lock, Peter, (1999), "Africa, Military Downsizing and the Growth in the Security Industry", In: *Peace, Profit or Plunder? The Privatization of Security in War-Torn African Societies, edited by* Jakkie Cilliers and Peggy Mason
11-35. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies. (p. 21).
[204]Addae, (2005) op, cit. p. 163.
[205]Ibid.
[206]Interviews, with active and retired members of Ghana Armed Forces, Accra.
[207]Republic of Ghana, (1962), Ghana Armed Forces Act (105). (1962).
[208]Republic of Ghana, (1962), p.271. The GAF was modelled along the British Armed Forces. For example some section of the British Army Act, (1955) were incorporated into the Ghana Armed Forces Regulations made in 1970 See Ghana Armed Forces Regulations V1, 1970.
[209]Addae, (2005), op. cit.
[210]The size of other West African militaries include: Nigeria- 80, 0000; Senegal, 13600; Burkina Faso-11200 Mali-4000(7800 paramilitary); Niger-5,300, Cote d'Ivoire-40,000(Targeted Exact figure not known), Burkina Faso-6950; Sierra Leone-10,500; Liberia-2050; Gambia-800; Guinea-9700; Guinea Bissau-4,450; Togo-8550; Benin-6950; Cape Verde-7150. Most of these countries also have significant numbers of paramilitary forces and gendarmerie for the francophone countries. See *The Military Balance*, (2015), "Chapter Nine: Sub-Saharan Africa", 115(1): 421- 480.
[211]Gutteridge, (1969); Austin, (1975); Le Vine, (1987).
[212] Interview with Major-General Francis Adu-Amanfo, (Retired), Accra, May 19, 2015.
[213]Hutchful, (1997b), op. cit.
[214]Esew (2012), op. cit. p.212.
[215] Interview with Dr Benjamin Kunbour, Minister for Defence, Accra, July, 7, 2015.
[216]*West Africa*, (1979) cited in Esew (2012), op. cit. p. 212.

[217]Cleary, (2006), op. cit.
[218] Interview with Dr Kunbour, Accra, June 15, 2016.
[219]Aning and Lartey, (2009a).
[220]Agyeman-Duah, (2002).
[221]Hutchful, (1997a), op. cit.; Agyeman-Duah, (2002), "Civil-military Relations in Ghana's Fourth Republic", *Critical Perspectives* No.9, Accra: Ghana Center for Democratic Development.
[222]Huntington, (1957), op. cit.
[223]Feaver, Peter, (2003), *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight and Civil-Military Relations*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
[224] Depending on countries, armed forces are often used to refer to all statutory bodies with a capacity to use force, including the military, police, gendarmerie, intelligence services, border, coast and penitentiary guards and other public security forces, as well as non-statutory armed groups. The Ghanaian 1992 constitution adopt a traditional conception of armed forces to refer to only the army, navy and the air force.
[225]The council is made up of the following persons; (a) the Vice-President, as chairman; (b) the ministers responsible for defence, foreign affairs and interior; (c) the Chief of Defense Staff, the Service Chiefs and a senior Warrant Officer or its equivalent in the Armed Forces; and (d) two other persons appointed by the President acting in consultation with the Council of State.
[226]Republic of Ghana,(1996), Security Service and Intelligence Act 526; 1992 Constitution
[227] The vision of the office of the Chief of Defence Staff is to ' ensure that the Ghana armed forces is a highly motivated, technologically savvy modern armed forces that is adaptable and has a high capability to discharges its constitutional mandate effectively and efficiently'. While the traditional role of the armed forces has not changed much in the 'new' democracy.
[228]Republic of Ghana, (1992), op. cit.
[229] Interview with Dr Benjamin Kunbour, Minister of Defence, Accra, June 15, 2016.
[230] Interview with Dr Benjamin Kunbour, Minister for Defence, Accra, July 15, 2015.
[231]Republic of Ghana, (1992), op.cit; Aning, Kwesi, (2005), "Security Sector Governance in Ghana", In: *Security Sector Governance in West Africa*, edited by Osita, Eze and Hettmann, Jens-U. 68-102, Abuja: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.
[232]Interview with Dr Benjamin Kunbour, Minister for Defence, Accra, July 15, 2015; Republic of Ghana, (1992)
[233]This statement is displayed at the office of Chief-of-Defence Staff at Burma Camp.
[234] Interview with Vice Admiral Mathew Quarshie, Chief of Defence Staff, Ghana Armed Forces, Accra, 27 May, 2015.
[235]Pantah, AM, (2002), "Ghana-Togo relations under the National Democratic Congress (NDC) Government", Unpublished thesis, available at http://datad.aau.org/handle (accessed on 10 September 2015); Owusu, Michael, (1997), "Domesticating Democracy: Culture, Civil Society, and Constitutionalism in Africa", *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 39(1):120-152.
[236]Birikorang, Emma, (2004), "Human Security in Ghana and West Africa".
Available at http://centreforforeignpolicystudies.dal.ca/pdf/fff-birikorang.pdf (Accessed on September 15, 2015
[237]Aning, Kwesi, and Abdallah, Mustapha, (2013), "slamic radicalization and violence in Ghana", *Conflict', Security & Development*, 13(2):149-167; Ahorsu, Ken, and Gebe, Yao, (2011), Governance and Security in Ghana: The Dagbon Chieftaincy Crisis, Accra: SIPRI&WACSI; Azuimah, Francis, (2011), "Perception as a Social Infrastructure for Sustaining the Escalation of Ethnic Conflicts in Divided Societies in Ghana", *Journal of Alternative Perspectives in the Social Sciences*, 3 (1):260-278.
[238]Aning, (2007a); Addo, (2008); Aning, (2011).
[239] Interviews with Col. Kotia, Accra, 28 August; Dr. Kwesi Aning, Accra, 8 September; A retired Brigadier-General, Accra, 29 October, 2014.
[240] Interview with Vice Admiral Mathew Quarshie, CDS, Accra, May, 27, 2015; and Col Emmanuel Kotia, KAIPTC, Accra, August 28, 2015.
[241] Interview with Col Vice Admiral Mathew Quarshie, CDS, Accra, May, 27, 2015.
[242]GAF website. Available at http:www.gafonline.mil.gh (Accessed on September 2015

[243] Interview with Lt Col. George Wilson, GAFCSC, Accra, October 15, 2015.
[244]Interview with Lt Col. Clement Dingame, KAIPTC, Accra, October 12, 2015.
[245] These allied security agencies support the Ghana Police Service due to the human resources constraints of the police.
[246]Aubyn, Festus and Abdallah, Mustapha, (2013), "Sustaining Peace and Stability in Ghana: Appraising the Role of the National Election Security Task Force in the 2012 Elections", *African Journal of Elections*, 12(2): 132-151; Aubyn, Festus and Lartey, Ernest, "Assessing the Electoral Security Architecture of Ghana", KAIPTC Monograph (unpublished).
[247]Aubyn and Abdallah, (2013), op. cit; *Daily Guide*, (2015), "Election Security Taskforce Inaugurated", February 13. Available at http://www.dailyguideghana.com (Accessed November 6, 2015).
[248]Cleary, Laura, (2006),"Political direction: the essence of democratic, civil and civilian control" In: *Managing Defence in a Democracy*, Edited by Cleary, Laura and McConville, Teri, 32-45.London: Routledge.
[249] Interview with a Senior Member of Ghana Armed Forces (GAF), June 9, 2015
[250] Interviews with Defence Attaché, Accra, August 31, 2015.
[251] Interview with Vice Admiral Mathew Quarshie, Accra.
[252] The Volta Lake Hosts the Akosombo Dam which is the largest producer of hydroelectric power of the Ghana.
[253] Interview with Lt Col. Clement Dingame, KAIPTC, Accra, 12 October, 2015. (GAF website, 2015).
[254] Interview with a senior officer, Ghana Armed Forces, Accra, October 23, 2014.
[255] Awiah, Dominic, (2017), "Operation Vanguard' launched to wipe out Galamsey", *Daily Graphic*, August 01.
[256]Nkrumah, Kwame, (1967), *Challenge of the Congo*, London: Panaf; Nkrumah, Kwame, (1964*), Africa Must Unite*, London: Panaf; Scott W. Thompson, S.C. (1969), *Ghana's Foreign Policy 1957–1966*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
[257]United Nations (2015), 'Ranking of Military and Police Contributions to UN Operations' July, Available at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2015/jul15_2.pdf (accessed on September, 9 2015); Aning, Kwesi and Aubyn Festus, (2013a), "Ghana", In: *Providing Peacekeepers The Politics, Challenges, and Future of United Nations Peacekeeping Contributions*, edited by Bellamy Alex, and Williams, Paul, 269-290.Oxford University Press. pp. 269-290.
[258]There have been some remarkable Ghanaian commanders such Lt. Gen. Emmanuel Erskine, the first commander of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNFIL) 1978 -1981 and Major General Seth Obeng UNFIL Commander 1999-2001; Major General Delali Johnson Sakyi, Force Commander of the UN Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) in 2014.
[259]Aning, Kwesi, (1996), "Ghana, Liberia and ECOWAS: An Analysis of Ghana's Policies in Liberia", *Liberian Studies Journal*, 21(2):259-99; Aboagye, Festus, (1999b), *ECOMOG: A Sub-Regional Experience in Conflict Resolution, Management and Peacekeeping in Liberia*, Accra: Sedco Publishing Limited.
[260]Birikorang, Emma, (2007), "Ghana's Regional Security Policy: Costs, Benefits and Consistency", *Occasional Paper* No. 20, Accra: KAIPTC.
[261] Interview with Col. Emmanuel Kotia, KAIPTC, Accra, August, 28, 2015.
[262]Aning, Kwesi, (2007b), "Unintended Consequences of Peace Support Operations for Troop-Contributing Countries from West Africa: The Case of Ghana", In: *Unintended Consequences of Peacekeeping Operation*, edited by Chiyuki, Aoi, de Coning, Cedric., and Thakur, Ramesh, 133-15.5.Tokyo: UN University Press; Aning and Aubyn, (2013a), op. cit.
[263]Aning, Kwesi and Aubyn, Festus, (2013b), "Peacekeeping Contributor Profile: Ghana' Providing for Peacekeeping", p.270.
Available at http://www.providingforpeacekeeping.org/2014/04/03/contributor-profile-ghana/ (accessed on September 28, 2015).
[264]Aning and Aubyn, (2013b); Birikorang (2007), op. cite. See also Armah, Kwasi, (2004), *Peace without Power: Ghana's Foreign Policy 1957-1966*, Accra: Ghana Universities Press.
[265]Aning, (2007), op.cit.

[266]Bobrow, Davis, and Boyer, Mark, (1997), "Maintaining System Stability: Contributions to Peacekeeping Operations", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 41(6): 731-784.
[267] Interview with Lt Col. Clement Dingame, KAIPTC, Accra, October 12, 2015.
[268]Aning, Kwesi, Jaye, Thomas and Atuobi, Samuel, (2008), "The Role of Private Military Companies in US–Africa Policy", *Review of African Political Economy*, 35(118):613–28;Aning, Kwesi and Bah, Sarjoh, (2009), "ECOWAS and Conflict Prevention in West Africa: Confronting the Triple Threats", New York: Center on International Cooperation, September .
[269]Birikorang (2007); Aning and Aubyn, (2013b), op. cit; Aning, Kwesi, (2004), "Military Imports and Sustainable Development: Case Study Analysis—Ghana", African Security Dialogue and Research.
[270]Birikorang, (2007), op. cit.
[271]This point was reemphasized during interviews with senior officers of the GAF. See also Birikorang, (2007), *Business World Ghana*, (2012), "The Business of Peacekeeping", August 25.
Available at http://www.businessworldghana.com/the-business-of-peacekeeping/ (accessed on September 28, 2015)
[272]AFnews, (2015a), "Committee to review GAF UN Peacekeeping Operation Inaugurated", First Quarter, no. 122.
[273] AFnews, (2015b), 'Government releases funds for UN Troops', First Quarter, no. 122.
[274]Aning and Auybyn, (2013a), op. cit; *The Chronicle*, (2014), "Soldiers' Peace-Keeping Earnings …" 27 January
[275] Interview with Brigadier- General Frimpong (Retired), Accra, May 14, 2015.
[276]Aning and Aubyn (2013b), op.cit.
[277]Afrifa, Akwasi, (1967), *The Ghana coup: 24th February 1966*, London: Frank Cass and Company; Hettne, (1980); Austin, (1985); Le Vine, (1987), op. cit.
[278]Aning and Aubyn, (2013b); Birikorang, (2007), op. cit.
[279] Interview with Lt Col. Lawrence Deku, Inspector-General Department GHQ, Accra, October 8, 2015.
[280]Aning and Aubyn, (2013b), op. cit.
[281] Interview with Lt Col. Clement Dingame, KAIPTC, Accra, October 12, 2015.
[282] Interview with Col. Emmanuel Kotia, Accra, August 28, 2015.
[283]Aning and Aubyn, (2013b), op. cit.
[284] Coleman, Katrina, (2017), "The Dynamics of Peacekeeping Budget Cuts: The Case of MONUSCO", *IPI Global Observatory*, Available at https://theglobalobservatory.org (Accessed on October 24, 2017).
[285] Bondarenko, Veronika, (2017), "'Gratuitously cruel': United Nations guts more than $600 million in funding to global peacekeeping programs", *Business Insider, Military and Defence*, June 29. Available at http://www.businessinsider.com (Accessed on October 24, 2017).
[286]Ruffa, Chiara, (2014), "What Peacekeepers Think and Do: An Exploratory Study of French, Ghanaian, Italian, and South Korean Armies in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon", *Armed Forces & Society* , 40(2):199-225.
[287]Aning and Aubyn, (2013b), op. cit.
[288]Ruffa, (2014), op. cit.
[289]Aning and Aubyn, (2013b), op. cit.
[290]Aning and Aubyn, (2013b), op. cit.
[291]Ruffa, (2014); Aning and Aubyn, (2013b), op. cit.
[292]Soeters, Joseph and Manigart, Philippe, (2008), "Introduction", In: *Military Cooperation in Multinational Peace Operations—Managing Cultural Diversity and Crisis Response*, edited by Soeters, Joseph and Manigart, Philippe, London: Routledge, p.10; Sowers, Thomas, (2005), "Beyond the Soldier and the State: Contemporary Operations and Variance in Principal-Agent Relationship", *Armed Forces & Society*, 31(3): 385-409.
[293] Levine, Daniel,(2016), "The Impact of Ghanaian Peacekeeping on Domestic Civil–Military Relations", *The Good Society*, 25(1): 81-104.
[294] Interview with Dr Kwesi Aning, Accra, September 9, 2015.

CHAPTER FIVE

The Processes and Mechanisms of Transforming Ghana's Defence sector since 1992

> "*Armed Forces the world over are gradually and systematically changing from their old ways of doing things for the better. Our Armed Forces cannot be left out of the trend*."[1]

5. 0 Introduction

Ghana's history of authoritarianism has influenced the structures and functions of the defence sector. Reform is therefore required if that sector is to be in tune with the country's current democratic dispensation. Ghana is not a post-conflict state, yet, it shares certain similarities including among others the decay of the security sector in the 1970s and early 1980s. Since its inception the Ghana Armed Forces (GAF) has represented an external projection of the British Defence apparatus. Its roles, shape and structure were designed to serve the political, economic and security needs of the colonial power. These have however remained unchanged since independence. But the country the armed forces are supposed to serve has changed tremendously. The doctrine of the armed forces has essentially focused on territorial defence partly due to the geo-political environment of the Cold War era and periods of uneasy tensions with her immediate neighbours like Togo to the east, Côte d'Ivoire to the west and Burkina Faso in the north. Ghana has not been at war with her neighbours except for a few border incursions and subversion activities from neighbouring countries, particularly Togo and Cote d'Ivoire.[2] The current threats facing the country are essentially not territorial.[3] The security threats faced by Ghana, like most West African countries are internal. There are also recent concerns about terrorism and transnational organized crimes.

In transitioning democracies such as Ghana, defence transformation is required for a total overhaul of the defence architecture to align it to the prevailing democratic culture and respond to current security and developmental needs.[4] As noted earlier in chapter four, the framers of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana did clearly stipulate the role and nature of the armed forces in the current democracy. This chapter, therefore, seeks to analyse the changes in Ghana's defence sector since 1992 using Chuter's framework. Chuter argues that, there is no single process called defence transformation, because every country's experience and starting point tends to differ.[5] Chuter therefore proposes four clusters by which the processes of defence transformation could be examined. These include:

1. *Cultural transformation*, which entails the change of the institutional culture, leadership, management and administrative ethos of the institution. This also involves the traditions and value system upon which the institution is based.

2. *Human transformation* involves the reconfiguring the institutional make up with reference to race, ethnic, regional, gender and human resource practices.

3. *Political transformation* refers to efforts to ensure that the conduct and character of the institution conforms to the political features of the democracy within which it is located. This includes the acknowledgement of principles of civil supremacy, transparency and accountability and the existence of appropriate institutions of oversight.

4. *Organizational transformation* involves more technocratic process within which an organization is rightly sized, while its management practices and organizational processes ensures cost-effectiveness and delivers services efficiently.

Ghana's defence and security sectors have seen some transformation, but not a coordinated defence transformation process. The transformation has not come as a result of post-conflict or negotiated settlement. Rather, it emanated from the specific political, economic and security conditions of the country from late 1980s-2000s. During these years, a constellation of donor pressure and local democracy groups created enabling environment for security sector and intelligence reform processes, which compelled political authorities to begin to enact changes in the security system.[6] As noted previously, in chapter four, political transitions under the Fourth Republic involved two different political parties, NPP and NDC with contrasting track records on the defence and security sector.[7] Each of these parties had a peculiar experience in civil-military relations.

From the late 1980s and 1990s a series of extensive reforms were undertaken in Ghana's public sector that culminated in the establishment of the World Bank-funded National Institutional Renewal Programme (NIRP). [8] Despite demands from international development partners to reform the security sector as part of the public sector reforms, the defence and security sectors were left virtually untouched as the Rawlings administration managed to resist their inclusion. [9] There were indeed developments that point to politicization of the military. For instance the Association of Committees for the Defence of the Revolution (ACDR), which were rechristened the Peoples' and Workers' Defence Committee, still operated in the barracks. The government however, embarked on some reforms whose primary objective at the time, was to prevent the occurrence of military intervention, rather than to introduce wholesale democratic reforms in the entire security and defence sectors.[10]

During the first civilian government of NDC (1993-2000), it is argued that the cold war between the military and the civilian public especially, was not ended with the inception of the new democracy. The NDC government, which was an offshoot of the PNDC regime did not consider it a priority to warm relations. It appeared former President John Rawlings was determined to politicize and make the military a constituency of the party, for various reasons including regime security.[11] Particularly, his leadership style and temperament seemed to compound the situation as he appeared more committed to upholding the supremacy of the military and its traditions than subjecting the institution to democratic control, accountability and healthy civil-military reactions.[12] The president appointed soldiers to political positions and as heads of civilian institutions, while serving officers freely engaged in politics.[13] Of particular mention was the 64 Regiment that was largely seen as an elite unit within the armed forces for presidential self-aggrandizement. This unit was formed in the early 1980s as a supposed rapid response force for national emergencies. It was specially trained and well-equipped with its command directly linked to the seat of government. However, the unit was often deployed for unmilitary functions such as private debt collection, civilian arrests and general disciplinary measures against civilians. The deployments were mostly done without due regard to established chain of command of the armed forces.[14]

Rawlings was however, able to control the military and curtail coups d'état. He also attempted to some quiet reforms to professionalize the armed forces and put an end to the revolutionary zealousness that marked the PNDC and rebuild the command and control structures.[15] There were some *ad hoc* processes initiated to reintegrate the paramilitary, notably, the CDRs into the armed forces. However, these encountered some challenges such as ages of the some paramilitary made it impossible for them to join the armed forces. The younger ones were made to go through the enlistment processes and got into the armed forces.[16] Rawlings could be credited for remarkably "controlling the military, preventing coups and maintaining the longest period of 'stability; upon which the Fourth Republic thrived."[17] The control mechanisms employed the Rawlings administration included a combination of factors: hardnosed politics with opponents, draconian security systems and attempts to infuse professionalism in the military. For instance the PNDC government contracted British and Canadian officers in 1985 to train officers at the Ghana Military Academy until 1992.[18]

Further, there were efforts to restore key governance institutions within the armed forces. These included the Armed Forces Council (AFC), the Defence Administrative Committee, and the Defence Staff Committee. These measures contributed to enhancing defence management and suppressed the praetorian tendencies of GAF.[19] The government also set up two committees, namely; General Erskine Commission in 1987, to review the structure of the GAF and Brigadier-General Kpetoe Board in 1996, to the review of roles and

structure of the GAF.[20] The Brigadier-General Kpetoe Board was set up following recommendations made by an earlier Brigadier Twum-Barimah special committee set up by the Armed Forces Council to rethink Ghana's defence policy and restructure the armed forces.[21] These committees spent several spent months visiting military installations and facilities across the country and produced voluminous reports. However, the PNDC/NDC government did not follow up with white papers to signify the acceptance of these reports. The key question is why would a government set up a commission and expend resources on them and refuse to act on their recommendations. These development point to lack of commitment or a deliberate attempt to exert firm control over the military thereby denying the general public accountability.[22]

It is also noteworthy that there were earlier advances by the NDC government at ensuring civilian control over the security sector. These included the enactment of the 1996 Security and Intelligence Services Act (Act 526) to regulate the activities of the security and intelligence agencies and the establishment of Regional Security Councils (REGSECs) and District Security Councils (DISECs). Act 526 is unique because it provides an improved management of security and intelligence in Ghana. Within this act, the military forms part of all security architecture from the national, regional, metropolitan, municipal to district levels. This is significant as it seeks to expand the role of the military beyond the provision of physical security to actually include them in the decision-making and implementation of security policy. Although earlier initiatives by the PNDC/NDC government brought about some reforms in the sector, it did so in the context of a political system that was undemocratic. For instance, the Security and Intelligence Agencies Act (ACT 526) only enumerates the various offices and functions of the national security agencies. However, the act does not articulate the policies which are to be upheld and implemented by these offices.[23]

While the idea of security sector reform gained greater traction after 1996, the political changeover in 2001 from the NDC to the NPP government led by John Kuffour did provide the actual impetus for reform of the defence and security sectors in Ghana.[24] Although enhancing civilian, civil and democratic control as well as professionalizing the military appeared the motiving factor, issues of regime security were of key concern.[25] President Kuffour made security issues a priority on the agenda of his government. This was informed by the politicized nature of the military and its tendencies to intervene in politics. The NPP government made a bold declaration to professionalize the military and make it apolitical. Some reforms were initiated by the NPP government. For example, Armed Forces Defence Committees (AFDCs) and the elite 64th Regiment set up by the erstwhile PNDC/NDC were disbanded. There were pronouncements by key government officials on professionalizing the armed forces and improving civil-military relations. Notably, in 2005,

Vice-President Aliu Mahama suggested that the GAF should further integrate into all dimensions of national life in order to improve civil-military relations.[26] While the government did not come out with a complete national security policy, there were some efforts including a conference on a national security in 2007.[27]

Some measures were initiated by a network of civil society organizations which aimed at fostering civil-military relations and generating greater understanding on SSR issues. These included a series of workshops to deepen the military's appreciation and commitment for constitutional rule.[28] Courses on security sector governance and management were developed and run with the help of local institutions- African Security Dialogue and Research (ASDR), University of Ghana and Ghana Institute for Management and Public Administration.[29] In the same fashion adopted by earlier political administrations, the NPP government approach to reforms was piecemeal. This approach to reforming the defence sector is attributable to the lack of strong political will by successive governments to effectively transform the post-authoritarian armed forces and defence sector.[30] Several reasons accounts for this state of affairs, including the fact that the military remains a very sensitive institution in the political history of Ghana. The untimely demise of previous regimes such as the Third Republic in 1979 is illustrative of what can happen to a civilian political administration that moves too aggressively against the military.[31] The NPP government faced some challenges in overseeing and restructuring the military. For instance, there were accusations against the government for making key appointments in the GAF along ethnic lines. These issues will be discussed in detail in this chapter. Against the background of noted reforms carried out by the two main political administrations under the Fourth Republic, this chapter examines issues of cultural, human (regional balance and gender), organizational (right-size and institutions of defence management), and political (parliamentary oversight) transformation in the defence sector. It will be argued that the defence sector in Ghana has undergone transformation, but in a piecemeal fashion. The major catalysts for change in the GAF have been post-Cold War democratization of domestic politics, the use of the armed forces for both internal security and external peacekeeping purposes, and the impact of the Ghanaian economy on the defence budgetary constraints.

5.1 Cultural Transformation in the Ghana Armed Forces (GAF)

In dealing with the military, it is important for one to understand its culture; especially its norms of behaviour, belief systems, language and ethics, among other features.[32] The military has a distinct culture that must be understood as uniquely different from the civilian world.[33] Military culture can be described by four qualities: First, the culture is learned through socialization training at boot camps and military academies. Second, it is

broadly shared by members, for instance saluting. Third, it must be adaptive to changing conditions, such as on issues of integration of women into the military. Fourth, it is symbolic in nature as exemplified by insignia and language used in the military environment.[34] It is generally held that the military culture is unique because functional imperatives of war and military operations ensure that the military stands apart from the civilian society. The armed forces often have a culture built upon preparedness to fight that involves leadership, management and motivation.[35] The core values of the military culture often involve discipline, courage, and the idea of bravery and sacrifice where individuals must be willing to subordinate themselves for the common good.[36] As noted by Charles Kirke, in military culture a loyalty and identity structure consists of ideas about "belonging." There is emphasis on history and traditions, which are used in indoctrination of a special worldview, which underlines patriotism, sacrifice, heroism, and commitment.[37] In the military, features such as hierarchies and power distances, masculinity, collectivism (in the form of group orientation and cohesion) are fundamental to the structure of the organization.[38]

The culture of the GAF does not differ significantly from the general attributes of military culture in Africa. However, there are peculiarities in terms of behaviour, customs and operating styles, among other features. As noted previously, the GAF was modelled upon the British military system and thus has some of the core cultural attributes of the British system. Typical of most militaries, the organizational culture of the GAF is one of unity of purpose and mutual respect for command and control.[39] Soldiers in Ghana are expected to exhibit the highest professional standards and cultural attributes. However, the reality on the ground is different. The general and historical perception of the culture of the GAF has been negative, characterized by a culture of coups d'état, indiscipline and abuse of civilians. Indeed, an aberration of the ideal military cultural ethos by officers and rank and file of GAF can be linked to Ghana's history of civil-military relations. Since the colonial era, the prevailing culture of the GAF appeared cult-like. Soldiers saw themselves as separate and distinct elite group, close to the colonial powers, and viewed civilians as uncivilized and thus be subjected to violence. People with little or no formal education were recruited as soldiers and kept in the barracks, to "protect them from the ills of the society" and serve the colonial purpose of repressing local dissent.[40] As a result, military personnel had limited contact with the general society, and when they did interact there was a tendency for the military to abuse or bully unarmed civilians.[41]

With the return to democratic rule, the military is striving to court a positive image among the general society from one of brutality to that of people-friendly armed forces.[42] Some of the measures aimed at improving civil-military relations will be discussed in detail in the next chapter. The Ghanaian military is well noted for exhibiting a high sense of professionalism, especially, in peacekeeping environments. Several Ghanaian military

personnel have earned meritorious accolades in international peacekeeping. Nonetheless, the extent of change in the negative institutional culture associated with the GAF is mixed. Typically, the military is often seen as a highly conservative institution and thus resistant to change. There is the need for greater efforts by civilian authorities and the military hierarchy to effect comprehensive reforms.[43] As mentioned earlier, there are efforts at the institutional level for change. These are manifested by pronouncement and posture of the military hierarchy. However, the behaviour of some officers and rank and file towards civilians raises questions. This can be attributed to an institutional perception of superiority of the military over civilians.[44] There is yet to be complete change from the traditional culture of aggressiveness or violence associated with the military. Particularly, the use of the military for internal security purposes frequently brings them into contact with the civilian population. As noted earlier, civilians are often perceived as idle and undisciplined group of people, whom the military has to keep in check or bend backwards to accommodate.[45] This perception may account for the recurrent military callousness even in a democratic dispensation. Likewise, some civilians dislike the military due to the latter's self-perception of superiority and aggressive behaviour.[46] Ghanaians, including members of other security services such as the police have haunting experiences of military excesses in terms of harsh and violent treatments. During the periods of military rule, soldiers often made their presence felt in the street and markets of the major cities, usually in an unwelcome fashion.[47]While the unwelcoming presence of the military in the Ghanaian society and its attendant violence is reduced significantly in recent times, incidences of military brutality continue to surface in the media occasionally. A few such incidences are captured in Table 5-5

Table 5-5: Reported Incidences of Military Brutalities

Year	Location	Incidence
August, 2000,	Teshie, Greater Accra	Shooting incident occurred during passing celebrations of members of Intake 34 of Ghana Military Academy at Next Door Beach Resort, Teshie, led to death of a civilian, Edmund Ofori Ayeh.
April, 2005	Kumasi, Ashanti Region	Residents of the Kumasi suburb of North Suntreso were reportedly subjected to brutalities and massive destruction of property amid sporadic gunshots by a group of men believed to be soldiers. About 50 people, including a 79-year-old blind woman sustained various degrees of injuries, including cutlass wounds. The men were said to be avenging the death of a colleague soldier who had been lynched the previous day by a mob in the neighbourhood.
September, 2007	Suhum, Eastern Region	Two policemen and two soldiers were implicated in the brutal beating that led to the death of a mini-bus driver, George Atuah. The deceased was arrested for allegedly refusing to stop at a police-military checkpoint.
July, 2008	Accra, Greater Accra Region	Some drivers of Commercial vehicles locally known as trotro and their mates were allegedly subjected to dehumanizing methods of punishment by military guards at the 37 Military Hospital for flouting traffic regulations. Some of the drivers complained of being hit by soldiers and forced to arrange dead bodies at the mortuary of the 37 military hospital.
October, 2008	Takoradi, Western Region	Officers from the Air Force Basewere accused of stripping a 70-year old woman and her pregnant friend naked, and forcing several others to remove their shirts. The incident reportedly happened because they were wearing NDC party T-shirts, and using the barracks as a thoroughfare.
November, 2009	Bawku, Upper East Region	Vice President John Mahama condemns brutality of residents by military deployed for internal peacekeeping in Bawku.
August, 2009	Nalerigu, Northern Region	Residents accused soldiers of raping at least three women in the town. They also reported of brutalities and destruction of property during a raid by security officers in an operation to restore calm, following a rampage by locals to demand justice over the murder of former People's National Congress parliamentary candidate, Moses Alando Banaba.
June, 2010	Kumasi, Ashanti Region	Violent Clashes between soldiers and police involving several separate assaults carried by soldiers over two days left 12 police personnel injured and police property destroyed. The attacks began after a police officer attempted to arrest a soldier for riding an unlicensed motorcycle. The soldier threatened him and returned with reinforcements to attack the police officer. In response, members of the Motor Traffic and Transport Unit (MTTU) of the Ghana Police Service in Kumasi refused to work in a dangerous

Year	Location	Incidence
		environment.
April, 2011	Bawku, Upper East Region	Two teachers were stripped naked by soldiers for carrying 34 rounds of ammunition.
February, 2013	Accra	An Accra Fast track court convicted two soldiers for causing the death of former Northern Regional Chairman of the Convention People's Party, Issa Mobila.
September, 2013	Prestea, Western Region	Residents reported of being man-handled by military personnel engaged by mining companies to provide security in mining areas.
June 2014	Burma Camp, Accra	A 30-year old mason petitioned the Commission of Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ), to compel the GAF to apply punitive measures against a group of soldiers who reportedly forced the petitioner to sweep and collect rubbish at Burma Camp as punishment for driving without license within Burma Camp.
February, 2015	Bekwai, Ashanti Region	A 22- year old driver's mate, Stephen Kwaku Manu, died four days after he was allegedly brutally assaulted by uniformed men believed to be soldiers on the Bekwai District Forestry Task Force in the Ashanti Region. Manu was subjected to severe beatings for removing a wooden slab the soldiers had used as a speed rump on the Brosase-Fawoman road in Bekwai.
April, 2016	Tamale, Northern Region	A 16-year old boy Christopher Bamah was reportedly tied to a tree and severely beaten by soldiers for stealing a mobile phone.
December, 2016	Takoradi, Western Region	A group of military personnel numbering 20, from the Air Force, reportedly stormed the Kwesimintsim Police station with two military pick-ups, ransacked and vandalized the place, over the arrest of their colleagues, who were detained in connection with the arrest of a Ghanaian in the British Army for dangerous driving. During the scuffle, two police men of the station were injured.

Source: Author, culled from local newspapers.

The above table points to recurrence of military brutality of civilians even in a democratic dispensation. Typical of such brutality was a case captured on camera on 6th March 2013, when two journalists were manhandled by members of the military police at the independence celebrations parade in Accra for stepping outside a security zone.[48] This incident attracted widespread condemnation in the media. The military high command subsequently rendered an apology to the Ghana Journalist Association after an internal investigation into the incident which authorized sanctions against the soldiers involved, while the victims were compensated.[49] The apology from the military high command signifies attitudinal change in leadership as this would not have happened under military rule. However, even under democratic dispensations such as the first NDC government

under Jerry Rawlings (1993-1996), as a former military officer, Rawlings unapologetically abused civilians. A typical case is the beating of his vice president Mr. Kow Nkensen Arkaah at a cabinet meeting in December 1995. It is illustrative to note that, in most of the above incidences, there were condemnation from official military sources resulting in some internal investigations and disciplinary actions. However, the outcomes were never made public.

Another significant development that points to cultural change in GAF was the gruesome murder of Captain[50] Maxwell Adam Mahama on May 29, 2017, by some residents of Denkyira-Obuasi, in Central Region, who claimed they mistook him for an armed robber. The military officer was head of a contingent deployed to protect mining concession from the activities of illegal small scale gold miners, locally known as *galamsey.*[51] Typically, people expected a brutal response from the military. The heavy military presence in the town after the incident resulted in many residents fleeing their homes. The military earned the admiration and sympathy of the Ghanaian public when no reports were heard of soldiers brutalizing locals of the town. The military high command ignored calls for retaliation by angry soldiers. Rather, members of GAF were urged to exercise restraint and allow law enforcement agencies to deal with the issue leading to arrest and on-going trial of some suspected killers.[52] For instance, at an officers durbar at Burma Camp, Major General Obed Akwa, CDS, noted that a "new image of the Ghana Armed Forces is being carved", adding: "we don't have officers and men who will take reprisal action as perhaps was the case in the past. I like to commend all of them and to urge those who are still deployed in the operational area to live peaceably with their civilian counterparts and allow the law to take its course."[53] Pronouncements such as these from the military hierarchy show that the GAF recognizes the need for a cultural transformation and it is making some efforts in that direction.

This notwithstanding, one may argue that the institutional desire for cultural change is yet to transcend to the level of individual soldiers. The behaviour of soldiers in Ghana points to the assertion that GAF is not very people-friendly because of the perception among soldiers that presenting an unfriendly demeanour is a mark of competent soldering. Some soldiers believe that behaving against community norms makes the effective soldiers.[54] Violence is part of the military's core business as they have the authority to use legitimate violence to defend the state and its interests. Therefore, controlling and coping with it is an inherent challenge many military organizations tend to face.[55] Soldiers as part of their training are subjected to arduous training regimes. The training process often involves purposeful exhaustion, psychological intimidation, and personal humiliation, treatment aimed at breaking down feelings of individualism within new recruits.[56] The primary purpose of basic training in the military is to transform the individual recruit into a combat-ready warrior.[57] This contributes to violent behaviour of soldiers especially outside the combat

zone. There is the need for a total overhaul of military training regimes to make them more humane and possibly contribute to attitudinal changes in the recruits. The GAF once made public statement about introducing reforms in the training of military recruits. This statement was issued when video went viral on social media showing recruits being subjected to beating by a trainer.[58] However, there is little evidence on the ground with regards to the nature of the reforms and their implementation. Further, societal norms often encourage violence, for example, in some African societies; there is the tacit acceptance of violence by the elderly or persons in positions of authority as a normal method of resolving conflict.[59] A typical example is the traditional belief that, men have a right to control or discipline women and children through physical violence. In the case of Ghana, the perception on the part of the military as the upholders of discipline arguably influences the soldiers' violent behaviour. It is therefore, not surprising to see military men taking the law into their hands to discipline civilians whom they perceive to have committed violations of either societal norms or national laws and order.

The transformation of military culture is essential to democratic consolidation, and Ghana's military has made some modest changes most noticeably in the area of recruitment. The current calibre of cadets and recruits, come with relatively higher educational and professional qualifications. A retired Air Vice Marshal interviewed remarked that in the past, highly qualified people could not question authority because "conformity was a norm, and non-conformity was queer."[60] But as people advance in terms of education and technology, things need to change. In this regard, there have been some gradual changes especially with the barracks mentality.[61]He acknowledges some developments such as the 31 December 1981 coup by junior officers changed the GAF to some extent. Hitherto, other ranks could not go to officers' offices, the coup broke the hierarchical relations and was a major awakening that changed the relations and norms of the military.[62] Nonetheless, the issue of power distance remains an attribute of the GAF especially in terms of the relations between superiors and subordinates. The general response of officers interviewed is that this is needed to ensure effective command and control so as not to undermine discipline. There is still some amount of mistrust between officers and soldiers. For instance, during interactions with some officers and other ranks, it became apparent that officers are often perceived differently by other ranks as not serving their interests.[63]

The culture of GAF is largely influenced by the calibre of people that make up that institution. In this regards, efforts at altering the negative culture of GAF must be accompanied by human transformation.

5.2 Human Transformation in GAF

Human resource is an important asset to any institution. There has been human transformation in the GAF. The institution has since independence moved away from the days when people with little or no educational qualification found rescue in military service. As an institution widely noted for its excellence, the GAF continue to upgrade its entry requirement to secure the best qualified and highly skilled of the Ghanaian society. For example, the minimum educational entry requirement for officer corps is now first degree or higher national diploma. While that of the recruits is Junior High School and Senior High School certificates. Like most of the reputed military academies across the world, the Ghana Military Academy is a reputed institution that has produced some good Ghanaian officers as well as, other officers from neighbouring African countries. Military personnel in Ghana now have better access to educational and professional development opportunities. These have contributed to enhancing their professional outlook. However, the current state of the human resource of the GAF could be improved to prepare officers and ranks to adequately meet the need of the 21st century defence and security environment.

Besides the human quality in the armed forces, issues of gender and regional balance are focus of this study. Most countries expect their armed forces to be a fair representation of the entire population with respect to race, ethnic composition, social class, religion and gender. With regards to countries with a history of military interventions in politics, the concern, particularly with respect to the officer corps as leaders of the armed forces, is that, an unrepresentative defence force may pose a threat to the principle of civil supremacy over the military. According to Chuter, human transformation involves the modification of the institutional make up with respect to race, ethnic, regional, gender and human resource practices. This is important because in cases where the armed forces do not represent the demographic composition of the populace, the minorities, or even majorities invariably regard such imbalances as inimical to their political power and safety. The need to foster a non-sexist and non-discriminatory institutional culture in line with the constitutional imperatives is at the heart of defence transformation. This section of the chapter seeks answers to the question of how the GAF transformed its human resources with specific focus on issues of regional balance and gender. For the military especially, personnel are essential for effective and efficient performance of its war and peace time functions.

5.2.1 Regional Balance in GAF

Identity issues such as ethnicity and religious affiliations are often treated with sensitivity in Ghana as they play critical roles in politics and society. Ethnicity is a broad concept that encapsulates the culture, language, religion, heritage, history, territory and consciousness of a distinct group. Most African states have plural societies with deep ethnic or religious

cleavages.[64] Some have argued that the historical evolution of African states makes ethnicity a most significant factor in the internal affairs of these states. Key issues like politics, economics, education, revenue allocations and resource allocations are to a large extent determined by or perceived to be determined by ethnic cleavages and considerations.[65] While ethnicity is not inherently conflictual, it has been observed that political ethnicity, has been a major cause of political instability in Africa.[66] Political developments in the past four decades, regarding competition for political power, have disrupted the political harmony and national integration anticipated by nationalist and pan-African leaders in the post-colonial Africa, partially due to political ethnicity. The modern political elites are increasingly resorting to ethnic support in their quest for political power.[67] Political meddling in the military, especially along ethnic lines, has been cited as one of the underlining causes of frequent military interventions in politics on the African continent, including in Ghana.[68] As mentioned previously, the colonial patterns of military recruitment was mainly based on fictitious martial races or ethnic bias in which people from certain parts of the colonies especially minorities ethnic groups were mainly drafted into the colonial armies for sole purposes of counter-balancing historically powerful ethnicities and suppressing local dissent against colonialism.[69] The post-colonial defence establishment continued along these lines as many African leaders did not seek the opportunity to rebuild national militaries. Rather, most of them maintained the status quo and actually exploited these shortcomings to sustain their authoritarian political systems. Various mechanisms including as political patronage within security and defence institutions were employed by leaders for reasons of regime security.[70]

In the course of the interviews, it was very challenging for interviewees to openly discuss such issues. Therefore getting reliable and statistical data on the regional composition of the GAF was not possible as such records were treated with confidentiality. However, interviews with some serving and retired persons across the ranks of the GAF revealed that the current regional composition of the GAF is relatively balanced as compared to the pre-1992 era.[71] It is notable that the issues of ethnic and regional composition of the armed forces have been very contentious in the past with possible lingering effects on the current state of affairs. This is influenced by the general societal tensions around ethnicity in Ghana. The country has ten administrative regions with about 75 ethnic groups which can be categorized into four main language groups who share a common cultural heritage, history, language, and origin. These are namely: the Akan, Mole-Dagbani and Gonja, Guan, and Ga-Dangme and Ewe.[72] Akan is the predominant ethnic group and constitutes about 47.5% of the population. Among the Akan, the Ashanti are the largest. This is followed by the Mole Dagbani and Gonja with 16.6%, the Ewe, 13.9% and Ga-Dangme, 7.4%. There are other smaller groups which together constitute about 1%.[73] These groups are located in specific geographic locations that make up the 10 administrative regions of

Ghana. Below is a map of Ghana showing the distribution of ethnic groups (these ethnic groups are not however confined only to the areas shown in this figure).



Figure 3-5: Ethnology Map of Ghana

Source: Adopted from Ganle, (2015), original map by Department of Geography & Rural Development, Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology.

The Mole-Dagbani and Gonja occupy the northern two-fifths of the country including the Northern, Upper East and Upper West Regions. The Akan occupy the Ashanti, Brong Ahafo, Central and Eastern Regions. The Ga-Adangbe and Ewe occupies the Greater Accra and Volta Regions. The exceptions are the Guans, who cut across the west-central part of northern Ghana through to the Volta Region, to the southern parts of Eastern and Central Regions.[74] It must be emphasized that no part of Ghana is ethnically homogeneous. The urban areas especially are heterogeneous with people of mixed ethnic or religious descents.

This is partly due to migration to towns and cities for socio-economic reasons. Easy social mobility and inter marriages have led to the scattering of ethnic groups without necessarily weakening their socio-cultural bonds.[75] Ethnic cleavages dating from both pre-colonial and colonial eras, and the effects of colonialism on different ethnic groups, coupled with the uneven distribution of social and economic amenities and opportunities in both colonial and post-colonial Ghana have created tensions among various groups across the country.[76] Historically, ethnic groups to the south, close to the Atlantic coast were exposed to the colonial economy, western education, and Christianity, whereas those to the north, have been less exposed to those influences and are mostly Muslim.[77] These feelings have permeated in the conduct of politics and public service in the country since independence.[78] Particularly, there exists some fault lines among Akans who constitute about half of the population and non-Akans, namely, Northerners,[79] Ewes, Ga and other smaller ethnic groups.[80] Nonetheless, these deep-rooted ethnic cleavages among Akans, especially Ashanti's and some of the above mentioned groups, particularly, the Ewes, have not presented an existential threat to the Ghanaian body politic.[81] However, the exploitation of ethnic and religious identity by the political class if not checked could prove to be costly for the consolidation of Ghana's democracy.

As noted previously, ethnic or regional considerations were used during recruitments in the colonial army which formed the nucleus of the post-independence armed forces.[82]These historical developments have arguably contributed to the present day debates on regional balance in the GAF. Considering Ghana's political history, successive governments since independence have been conscious of issues of identity in the governance process in particular, and the society in general. As a way of dealing with regional balance in public sector employment and government appointments in the current political dispensation, the 1992 constitution has provisions that seek to ensure non-discrimination and regional balance in public sector appointments. Specifically, under the directives of state policy, Article 5 states that:

> 'the State shall actively promote the integration of the peoples of Ghana and prohibit discrimination and prejudice on the grounds of places of origin, circumstances of birth, ethnic origin, gender or religion, creed or other beliefs. A further article 6(b) requires the state to "take appropriate measures to achieve reasonable regional and gender balance in recruitment and appointment to public offices."[83]

Since 1992, there have been conscious efforts to apply this constitutional requirement in recruitment and appointment in GAF. There have been debates in the media especially on how ethnicity and cronyism has undermined efficiency and professionalism in the armed

forces. Concerns of perceived imbalances in recruitment and command appointments in the military often arise during all the different governments under the Fourth Republic. For example, there have been media reports that certain regions, particularly the Volta region and the three northern regions tend to have high numbers in both officer corps and other ranks.[84] This is perceived to have arisen out of irregular recruitment and promotion practices.[85] These concerns were more pronounced following the first political turnover in 2001 under the Fourth Republic when the NPP government felt the military was dominated by Rawlings' ethnic kinsmen and loyalists. According to a newspaper, citing confidential sources, in 2000, Volta region had about 27.28% of officers in the GAF and about 26.98% of the other ranks.[86] Hence there was the need to neutralize the perceived influence of certain groups like the Ewes and northerners, who were seen as largely sympathetic to the erstwhile PNDC/NDC government to ensure survival of the new government.[87] Indeed, there were also perceptions of favourable enlistment processes during the PNDC/NDC era.[88]

Subsequently, from 2001, there were attempts by the government to address the perceived regional imbalances in the GAF through recruitment of more people from other regions.[89] Allegations became rife in media reports that under the NPP, there were some irregular recruitment practices to prevent non-Akans from joining the military, while a lot of serving personnel from Volta, Ga and Northern origin were frustrated out of the service.[90] It was also observed that recruitment practices under the NPP were not based on an official policy. Efforts by the military leadership to achieve a semblance of regional balance came with some challenges. As noted by a senior officer, "people who did not meet the criteria for selection were considered in the name of regional balance."[91]Similarly, some retired and active members of the armed forces interviewed also argued that, the nature of the recruitment was detrimental to the quality of personnel for the armed forces.[92] For instance, when the NPP left office in 2009, a board of inquiry was set up by the military high command to investigate the circumstances that led to a botched recruitment of 420 recruits.[93] Prior to the release of the report of the board, the Director of Manpower and Personnel, Colonel Kwadwo Damoah was released from the service for diverse reasons including the perception of his close affiliation with the erstwhile NPP government.[94]

Per the GAF recruitment policy, personnel are recruited based on their regions of residence and not their ethnic origin. The formula for arriving at force levels to be recruited is based on the country's latest population census and the needs of the armed forces. All ten regions of Ghana are then allocated quotas based on population density.[95] The capital region, Greater Accra often gets the highest quota due to its population density. Due to this policy, it has been argued by several of those interviewed that, the regional composition of the current armed forces is fairly balanced and is no longer dominated by people from the three northern and Volta regions.[96] In 2014, the military introduced an online application system

to reduce the human factor in the selection processes. Each year, the military issues recruitment advertisements with detailed eligibility criteria. These include citizenship, age, character and minimum educational qualifications for the officer corps and other ranks. There are additional special requirements for each of the three services and their respective units.[97]

Nonetheless, it is argued that, it is impossible to achieve regional balance in GAF. This is because people's motivation for joining the military profession differs and is influenced by some social and historical factors. For example, people from certain parts of the country like Volta and northern Ghana, due to socio-economic and historical reasons tend to show more interest in military service than people from the forest and coastal areas. In addition, due to the cosmopolitan nature of urban areas in Ghana, unsuccessful persons in recruitment processes in a particular region may go to other regions and get successfully enlisted. Such persons may not necessarily have social or ethnic ties to the regions and may deny indigenes of other regions the chance to enlist.[98] In addition, there have been efforts by past governments, especially under Nkrumah, to promote national integration and sustain unity among the diverse ethnic groups in Ghana. Some of these measures included the public boarding school system and rotation of public servants across regions. These measures have resulted in inter-ethnic marriages and thus making it impossible to clearly categorize offspring of such unions into distinct ethnic groups. Moreover, recruitment is voluntary in nature, so it is difficult to restrict entry from certain regions or particular ethnic groups who are mostly interested in military service. These developments present practical challenges to measures of transforming human composition of the armed forces with regards to regional representation of personnel.

Despite the existence of constitutional requirements and the armed forces recruitment regulations, yearly recruitment processes have not been entirely devoid of reports and perceptions of political and other ethnic undertones. Interviewees acknowledge that decisions on recruitment figures and promotions are often influenced by the aspirations of the government of the day. Of particular interest is the perceived influence of political and ethnic affiliations in recruitments and promotions in the GAF.[99] There exists in Ghana the custom of "protocol recruitment" where certain highly-connected people are recruited regardless of whether they meet the established recruitment criteria. The "protocol recruitment" is often used to satisfy the wishes of political and economic elites, including top military officers, to secure public educational, employment and other benefits for their wards or people connected to them. This reflects the informal system of patronage that is deeply engrained within the Ghanaian society. There is a practice in the military where senior officers are given quotas (often two persons each) that allow them to bring persons for enlistment into the services. Some have attributed undisciplined practices to protocol recruitment in the military.[100] It is argued that, the prospective applicants of the protocol

system often get in with little or no background checks done on them.[101] The military is often pressurized by politicians with protocol lists of applicants. Nonetheless, there is institutional resistance by the military to ensure that persons coming from the protocol list do meet the laid down criteria. As recounted by an officer who once served as aide de camp of a chief of defence staff, "there had been instances in the past, where the protocol lists were shredded."[102] Nonetheless, people do get recruited through the protocol channel. For example, in December 2015, about 501 recruits undergoing training at the Army Recruits Training School (RTS) were sent home for demonstrating behaviour that were deemed "far reaching and inimical to the security of the state."[103] It is reported that these recruits protested against the strenuous training they were undergoing. Matters arising out of these developments have raised questions about the calibre of persons and how they were recruited into the armed forces.[104] Indeed the decision by the military high command to send these recruits home lends some credence to the relative professional autonomy of the institution amidst political interferences.

5.2.2 Promotion and Regional Balance

Promotions to senior officer ranks and command positions in the armed forces are done in accordance with the constitutional provision that requires the president as the Commander-in-Chief to carry out such functions in consultation with the Armed Forces Council (AFC). Per the Armed Force Regulations, (relating to Administration) promotion of an officer to the rank of Colonel or equivalent and above shall be made by the cabinet acting in accordance with the advice of the AFC.[105]The promotion of any officer to any rank lower than Colonel or equivalent shall require the approval of the Chief of Defence Staff or such officer as he may designate[106]. In line with the above service regulations, promotions in the junior officer corps from Lieutenant to Captain are based on promotional exams. Further, promotion from the rank of Major to Lieutenant Colonel is based on recommendation at the service level. These procedures are the same for equivalent ranks in the navy and air force as shown in Table 6 below. The president is also responsible for top command appointments in the armed forces. It is instructive to mention that, certain criteria are often considered as basis for promotion and appointments. These include command and operational experience, seniority, education and professional qualifications, military training and length of service.[107] These are calculated based on a points-based system.

The practice of promotions based on ethnic ties and personal alliances is a common feature of most militaries across Africa. It is common practice to find the upper echelons of such institutions filled with people from a particular ethnic, religious or regional affiliation, who are deemed more loyal to the political authority or the president. The practice that puts ethnicity and cronyism above efficiency undermines professionalism of those

institutions.[108] However, the practice in the GAF is that, in top level appointments like service chiefs, there are efforts to ensure a modicum of regional balance at the top hierarchy of the institution. The critical concern is whether this practice contributes to watering down ethnic sentiments or rather aggravating the latent tensions. For instance, as argued by an officer, officers and soldiers do not often care about the ethnic or regional affiliations of their commanding officers during operations at home or abroad. However, when it comes to top command appointments, regional or ethnic affiliation becomes an issue, rather than the point-based system of promotion. This may create challenges of finding senior officers from certain regional groupings to fill certain positions rather than concentrating on the professional qualities of officers. Moreover, the appointment of an officer from a particular ethnic group may not necessarily mean that all other related ethnic groups are represented.

Due to political involvement in senior-level promotions and appointment, there is the tendency for officers to seek political favour as opposed to their professional ethics of political neutrality. A retired officer remarked that, "unfortunately some soldiers are dabbling in politics openly while there are allegations of some officers bearing membership cards of political parties."[109] A former staff officer of the GAF also wrote that "…in matters of promotion and appointment, much consideration has been given to "whom you know" and what ethnic group one comes from."[110] The negative effects of political influences in the military as well as other security services is such that some people are often rewarded with promotions and appointments, while some deserving personnel are denied promotions or even frustrated in the service until their subsequent release from the service due to various reasons.[111] This development sacrifices meritocracy.[112] Irregular promotions in GAF have led to officer inflation at certain ranks, such as colonel, with little or no vacancies for such officers.[113]There is the need for the military to place emphasis on merit-based promotions as these could contribute to enhancing professionalism and enhancing the strength and credibility of the military institution among the general public.

Table 6 -5: Promotion Procedures for Officer Corps

Ranks in Army/Navy/Air force	Procedure	Years in ranks
From 2nd Lietenant /Midshipman/Pilot officer to Lieutenant/Sub Lieutenant/Flying officer	Recommendation	2
From Lieutenant/sub Lieutenant/flying officer/ to Captain/Lieutenant GN/Flight Lieutenant	Career planning examination	4
From Captain/Lieutenant GN/Flight Lieutenant to Major/Lieutenant Commander/Squadron Leader	Career planning examination	5
From Major/Lieutenant Commander/Squadron Leader to	Recommendation and	5

Ranks in Army/Navy/Air force	Procedure	Years in ranks
Lieutenant Colonel/ Commander/Wing Commander	availability of vacancy	
From Lieutenant Colonel/Commander/Wing Commander to Colonel /Captain GN/Group Captain	Recommendation and availability of vacancy	7
From Colonel/ Captain GN/ Group Captain to Brigadier-General /Commodore/Air Commodore	Recommendation and availability of vacancy	3
From Brigadier-General /Commodore/Air commodore to Major General / Rear admiral/Air vice marshal	Recommendation and availability of vacancy	
From Major-General/Rear Admiral/Air Vice marshal to Lieutenant-General/Vice Admiral and Air Marshal	Recommendation and availability of vacancy	

Source Armed Force Regulation, Vol. 1(1970).

5.2.3 Towards Gender Transformation in the GAF

The concept of gender refers to the socially ascribed roles to males and females. It includes relationships, personality traits, attitudes, behaviour and values that society ascribes to men and women.[114] The military is a gendered social institution with gendered identities. Its values, practices, rites and rituals often reflect accepted notions of masculinity and femininity.[115] It is argued that, the military is a prototypical masculine institution. Therefore, gender integration in the armed forces has been part of defence transformation and reform discourses of most countries around the globe. For instance, some have argued that integrating gender in the defence sector is a means of responding to different security needs within society and to the changing requirements of the sector itself.[116] It is argued that gender mainstreaming in the defence sector enhances operational effectiveness, helps to create representative and non-discriminatory institutions, and strengthens democratic, civil oversight.[117]

There is official recognition of gender integration in public sector institutions in Ghana. For example, the 1992 constitution, under Directive Principles of state policy, specifically article 35(5), prohibits discrimination and prejudice on the grounds of places of origin, ethnic origin, gender or religion, creeds or other beliefs." Furthermore, articles 17, 24 and 27 of the same constitution contains a number of provision that are relevant to women's right to full and equal participation within the society and the armed forces with regards to non-discrimination on grounds of gender, paid maternity leave, and childcare; of equal

rights to training and promotion. Specifically, under chapter five on fundamental human rights and freedoms, Article 17 (1) says that "All persons shall be equal before the Law," while 17 (2) says "A person shall not be discriminated against on grounds of gender, race, colour, ethnic origin, religion, creed or social or economic status." In addition, Article 24 relates to economic rights. Thus, under 24(1) "Every person has the right to work under satisfactory, safe and healthy conditions, and shall receive equal pay for equal work without distinction of any kind".[118]

> Article 27 specifically relates to women's rights; and contains the following provisions:
> (1) Special care shall be accorded to mothers during a reasonable period before and after child-birth; and during those periods, working mothers shall be accorded paid leave.
> (2) Facilities shall be provided for the care of children below school-going age to enable women, who have the traditional care for children, realize their full potential.
> (3) Women shall be guaranteed equal rights to training and promotion without any impediments from any person.[119]

Beside these constitutional guarantees, Ghana is a signatory to most international and regional instruments relating to the advancement of women.[120] The UN's Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (BFA), often considered as a defining framework for change for gender equality and women empowerment globally was accepted by the government of Ghana in 1995. Since the Beijing Declaration there has been intense gender activism led mainly by civil society organizations and other women groups. In August 2015, the government of Ghana adopted a National Gender Policy to mainstream gender in the national development processes.[121] It is generally held that a reasonably gender balanced force is essential to achieving the defence goals of any nation. Like most militaries in West Africa, GAF is not balanced in terms of gender. Women constitute about 10% of the entire force strength. It is necessary to explore in detail the gender related policies and practices adopted by GAF to achieve gender transformation.

Male dominance in African militaries is a colonial legacy. In pre-colonial Africa, women were part of the native armies and played diverse roles. Their presence contributed to the military power of their kingdoms. For instance, women like Yaa Asantewaa, the queen of Ejisu, Ashanti, actually played significant roles and led wars against British colonial authorities in the Gold Coast.[122] Yaa Asantewaa was the most influential decision-maker in a national security meeting and subsequently the leader of a 5000 army in the last Anglo-

Asante war known as the *Yaa Asantewaa War* of 1900-1901.[123] While Asante lost the war leading to the capture of Yaa Asantewaa, her bravery ignited the independence struggle by the Ashanti Confederacy.[124] Women were not recruited into the colonial army. The involvement of women in the GAF started after independence, when women were recruited to serve in support roles. The first woman to enter the GAF in 1958 was reportedly a nurse.[125] The Directorate of Women's Auxiliary Corps was established in 1964 with the goal of training women and increasing their representation in the armed forces. Women of other ranks were recruited from January 1964 to serve in supporting services as telephonists and signallers.[126] The Directorate of Women's Auxiliary Corps was modelled on the Women's Royal Auxiliary Corps in the United Kingdom.[127] This was the first step towards promoting gender issues in the GAF. As noted by former army commander, a political decision was taken by Nkrumah that every woman in the armed forces should belong to the women's auxiliary corps. For example, the women corps had their own mess.[128] However, the women corps was later disbanded in 1966 following the overthrow of Nkrumah. Since then there has not been establishment of a similar structure or unit within the GAF to address issues gender representation. Nonetheless women are now recruited and trained to serve in all ranks and almost all units expect the infantry.

Low representation of females in the armed forces is part of a larger national problem of gender imbalance in Ghanaian society, especially at the upper echelons of public sector and governance institutions. Since independence, affirmative action policies and directives have been used by governments to address gender and regional imbalances in access to health, education, work and politics.[129] An example is the 1998 Cabinet Directive that was supposed to provide a set of guidelines for the systematic and sustained implementation of the various aspects of affirmative action towards equality of the rights and opportunities for women in Ghana. As a set of special measures adopted by governments to systematically and institutionally address the structural discrimination and collective disadvantages which women suffer as a group, affirmative action in Ghana has produced mixed outcomes. For instance, the country has seen increasing numbers of girls at the basic levels of education, and to some extent in tertiary levels, but it has been less effective in improving women's' representation in public life including the armed forces. It is noteworthy that there are on-going efforts since 2016 towards the passage of the Affirmative Action Bill, into law, to provide legally mandated systems and policies to ensure women's equal participation in the public sector.[130]

The GAF does not have a gender policy to clearly articulate policies and programmes for ensuring gender representation of its force. There is no official recruitment quota system for women. Hence women are not necessarily targeted through recruitment. Nonetheless, there have been some deliberate attempts to increase female representation. In 2001, the GAF high command decided to allocate 10% of total recruitment to females.[131] While this

practice is not backed by a clear policy, it has contributed increasing women representation in the armed forces as women now constitute about 10% of the entire force strength as compared lesser figures before 1992. There is unofficial advocacy programme to encourage women to join the armed forces.[132] In the absence of an official policy on increasing female recruitment, it is therefore challenging for one to assess how GAF implements the unofficial 10% quota. There is the need for more coherent approach at targeting women into the armed forces. A male officer noted that, in dealing with gender issues in GAF, the current practices have been more cosmetic than coherent processes backed by an official policy. As he puts it, "it is more of showing all-female quarter guards rather than a functional issue."[133]

As noted earlier, military service is one of the most sought after jobs in Ghana. This is so because it provides stable employment in a country with high unemployment rates. Recruitment to GAF is very competitive and is based on specific employment requirements. As noted by an officer, issues of gender are often not primary concern when special skills are being sought.[134] However, it is noteworthy that there are different physical requirements such as height for men and women. For example, minimum height of 1.68m (5.6 inches) for males and 1.57m (5.2 inches) for females.[135] It is widely held that, men tend to apply more than females for military service. Various personal, historical and societal perceptions about women in military, whose detailed analysis fall outside our scope, may account for this development. If the current demographics of the country that points to about 51.2%[136] female population is anything to go by, then, the current state of affairs on gender integration in the GAF as a public sector employment provider gives cause for concern. The table 7-5 below presents a general overview of the female strength in the rank and file of the GAF. In the course of the interviews, it became evident that the highest intakes of females often happen in the recruitment of other ranks.[137] However, these figures since 1992 as compared to the strength of the entire armed forces over the years remain low. Even though figures were not provided for the officer level intakes over the years, some personnel interviewed point out that the numbers of female officers are far below that of their male counterparts.

Table 7-5: Recruitment Figures on Female Soldiers from 1993-2015

Year	Army	Air force	Navy	Subtotal
1992	-	-	-	-
1993	-	-	-	-
1994	-	-	-	-
1995	-	13	8	21
1996	7	-	12	19
1997	40	-	-	40
1998	1	-	2	3

Year	Army	Air force	Navy	Subtotal
1999	0	28	20	48
2000	57	-	-	57
2001	-	-	-	-
2002	-	-	-	-
2003	107	48	35	190
2004	86	59	68	213
2005	86	71	36	193
2006	92	50	55	197
2007	101	57	58	216
2008	118	63	-	181
2009	-	-	56	56
2010	55	25	30	110
2011	57	13	13	83
2012	-	18	8	26
2013	39	70	49	158
2014	-	-	-	-
2015	46	82	55	183
Total	**892**	**597**	**505**	**1994**

Source: Ghana Armed Forces, Directorate of Military Records, 2016.

5.2.4 Involvement of Women in GAF Operations

While GAF has made some progress in making some of its operations more accessible to women in order to avoid discrimination, the emphasis has been on recruitment of women, without giving due consideration to gender equality once they are recruited. The situation in GAF does not differ significantly from the practice where gender integration is done from a gender-neutral perspective. This does not bring about gender equality in the armed forces because it obliges women to conform to and assimilate to masculine traits.[138] This state of affairs affects women's ability to function as equals, especially where there are no conscious efforts to value essential feminine traits. Militarized masculinities are privileged leading to subordination of women in the armed forces.[139] Technically, all units and branches in the armed forces are open to women: they can be recruited and deployed into any unit of their choice. However, the reality is that female personnel are mostly deployed to support services because they are stereotypically perceived as not capable of undertaking certain positions like infantry. As observed by a former commandant of the Ghana Military Academy (GMA) that, "females finish training and there are no places to post them to than administrative and support roles. Advancements in technology will eventually make some support services like clerical duties mostly done by female personnel redundant.[140] There is the need to employ innovative measures aimed at attracting and retaining highly qualified female personnel in the GAF who can serve in more diverse roles. Currently, there are more women in the Ghana Air Force and Ghana Navy than Ghana Army. The Ghana Navy started recruiting women in 1992, after nearly four decades of its establishment.[141] It is

argued that there are more women in the navy because the nature of their training is not purely fighting. However, most of the females in the navy are stewards, cooks, supplies personnel. This points to an essentialist understanding of women's role in the armed forces. Female officers in the Ghana Navy, by convention are also not employed in the executive branch which is the command branch of the Navy. This is because the Ghana Navy ships are designed without cabins suitable for women.[142]

There is, however few women in the technical army corps, military police, signal corps, and engineering.[143] As far back as 1963, the Ghana Air Force trained its first two female pilots; Pilot officer Ayele Kome and Pilot officer Millicent Danquah. However, after the departure of these two officers from flying duties in 1968, the Ghana Air Force did not recruit female pilots for another 30 years. In 2001, another duo of females; Selasie Agbenyefia and VC Ayako were recruited and trained as pilot officers.[144] As at 2014, the Ghana Air Force has only three female pilots.[145] Some have observed that women in the Ghana Air Force are employed as helicopter and transport aircraft pilots but not as fighter pilots by convention. This is because of conventional acceptance that flying fighter aircrafts is too complex for women to handle.[146] Interestingly, the first batch of female pilots were trained to fly fighter aircrafts. However, the present batch of female pilots is mostly involved of in transport duties because the GAF is essentially not a fighting military, but the aircrafts are equipped with fighting capabilities. [147]

The changing roles and utility of the military obviously calls for a reconsideration of the role of women in GAF. Some modest efforts have also been made in incorporating females in diverse roles in diplomatic missions, observer missions, peacekeeping, parachute training and physical training instructors.[148] With regards to peacekeeping as noted in chapter four, GAF began participation in international peacekeeping as far back as in 1960. However, Ghanaian female soldiers were not deployed until 1984, when one woman, a nurse was deployed to the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).[149] Women were banned from participating in peacekeeping missions between 1986 and late 1994 due to various reasons including allegations of indiscipline and misconduct. In 1994, the decision was reviewed and one woman was deployed during the ECOMOG operations in Liberia while a few others were deployed to Rwanda. Subsequently, many more women have served in missions like the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) among others. Since 1994, the representation of female personnel on peacekeeping missions has increased steadily. Ghanaian women are allowed to assume operational duties in international peacekeeping.[150]

The increasing representation of women in Ghanaian peacekeeping contingents is in line with UN requirements to incorporate females to enhance mission effectiveness.[151] It is argued that in peacekeeping context, women soldiers have essential traits to contribute. As

such, they are empathetic, more open to negotiation, less likely to behave inappropriately and are therefore valuable assets to missions that involve protection of civilian population.[152] Since the UN Security Council (UNSC) adopted Resolution 1325 (2000), there has been renewed discourses on gender balance in UN peacekeeping forces. Resolution 1325 formally recognized the distinct roles and unique experiences of women in the context of armed conflicts and thus calls for integration of women in peace processes.[153] It seeks about 30% women representation in peacekeeping contingents. It is noteworthy that while the GAF has made efforts to ensure equality in the GAF by increasing the numbers of women on peace supports operations (PSOs), in line with resolution 1325, women are however, not allowed in command and combat positions in Ghanaian contingents.[154] Furthermore, in 2004 the UN Security Council (UNSC) called on member states to implement resolution 1325 through the development of National Action Plans (NAP). Ghana is among several countries to have developed these National Action Plans and implementation plans in 2010.[155] The Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Protection (MoGCSP), working with relevant stakeholders, developed the Ghana National Action Plan (GHANAP I) 2012 – 2014 to enable Ghana take proactive steps in achieving the objectives of UNSCR 1325.[156] With the expiration of GHANAP 1, there was the need to develop a new National Action Plan. Even though the duration for the implementation of GHANAP 1 has elapsed, there is little evidence on the ground with regards its effective implementation. Notably, most security agencies, especially female officers who were to play active roles in the implementation process were neither familiar with the GHANAP I nor involved in the review process.[157]

Notwithstanding the above challenges to incorporating women capabilities in GAF, it is notable that since 1992, some efforts were made at addressing gender issues following some recommendation of top female officers.[158] For instance, there have been some policy reforms to address issues like equal-pay for equal work in the GAF pay policy. Previously women soldiers were paid two-thirds of what their male colleagues earned and were not allowed to do general duties. These practices have changed since 1992.[159] In addition, there are efforts to address gender-sensitive such as a sexual harassment. Even though GAF does not have a comprehensive Sexual Harassment policy, such issues are generally addressed based on existing policy guidelines such as the Code of Conduct for the Armed and Security Forces and the Armed Forces Regulations. GAF address sexual misconduct in its Code of Conduct by drawing from the standards on sexual exploitation and sexual abuse set by the United Nations. Although there is no established policy or specific mechanism for reporting and dealing with sexual harassment, service personnel with complaints, reports or grievances have access to the standard military chain of command. Through this they can approach their immediate superior who will deal with the matter in the same way as any other disciplinary problem through the military disciplinary measures, which could lead to

courts martial, loss of rank and or dismissal. If it is regarded as a serious criminal offence, a matter will be referred directly to the police. However, if the problem exists in the direct chain of command, then there is no independent alternative available within the military. Issues of sexual harassment are often underreported by females due to varied reasons including fear of ridicule, exclusions and the overall consequences on their careers.[160]

There have some policy reforms such as revised maternity leave regulations. Per the GAF Regulations on administration (1970), a pregnant female officer is entitled to twelve weeks maternity leave of which six weeks shall be taken as ante-natal leave and the other six weeks taken as post-natal leave. The regulations say that "maternity leave shall be taken on half pay". The half pay provision is against Ghana's Labour Law (2003) and has since been expunged.[161] Yet, according to GAF regulation on administration, female officers cannot marry and become pregnant in the first three years of enlisting. Female personnel who marry during their first three years could be released as unsuitable for further service, unless in the opinion of the Chief of Defence Staff, their continued employment is in the best interest of the GAF. This is because the first year in military academy is needed to complete foundation training, while the remaining two years is used for other career trainings.[162] However, this provision does not apply to specialists who enlist for short service. It noteworthy that the regulations on marriage and pregnancy have been revised to six months after enlistment. Female soldiers can now marry and get pregnant after six months of joining the force. Some female personnel interviewed were of the view that the revised regulation on marriage and pregnancy has contributed to increasing the interest of women in the military.[163] Furthermore, female persons who marry after securing permission may apply to leave the service at any time after marriage without prejudice to reengagement.[164]

5.2.5 Gender and Career Progression in GAF

In the course of the study, it was identified that, not much has changed in the area of career progression for women in the GAF. While there is no formal restriction on female progression, institutional practices over the years tend to prevent women from getting to the apex in the GAF. For example, one female officer lamented that deployment of women to support services naturally prevents them from getting to the top, which is also true for men.[165] Most women are not deployed to elite jobs often associated with combat. For instance, most females do not go into the infantry, or armed units like the armoury and artillery regiments.[166] These confer higher prestige, rewards and possibilities of quicker advancement in ranks.[167] The absence of women in the pure infantry fields can be attributed to societal thinking or the perception that "women cannot be in the trenches". Indeed, the provisions in the Ghana Armed Forces Command and Staff Instruction Procedure (CSIP) Volume 3 only allow women to be employed in support service roles and not in command

and combat positions. Per the CSIP, combat and command roles where strategic, operational and tactical decisions are taken are stereotypically reserved for their male counterparts. For instance, Article 10.15 of the CSIP specifically states that "every officer must pass in both the practical and written examination before his/her due date for promotion."[168] In practice, a young male officer can rise to become a battalion commander, after successful completion of his Young Officers Course, promotion exams, (both written and practical). He must also pass Combat Team Commander's Course and the junior and senior staff courses at the Ghana Armed Forces Command and Staff College (GAFCSC). On the contrary, women are exempted from taking part in the Combat Team Commander's exams because there is informal acceptance that since they cannot become commanders, they are not allowed to write such examinations.[169]

It is often said that "women are delicate for the front lines" due to their physiological and biological make-up such as menstrual cycles, pregnancy and the effects on their mood and general wellbeing. However, on female deployment, one senior male officer argues that there is the tendency for commanders to over protect females by not allowing them to be deployed for certain "hard" duties which they are capable of doing effectively. Even in internal operations, females are not often taken due to cultural connotations relating to the roles of females.[170] There is the existence of an unspoken barrier where stereotypical societal perceptions on being "just women" and what their roles should be have crept into the institutional culture of the armed forces thereby hindering women's' attainment of leadership positions.[171]

Indeed, "glass ceiling" exists in the GAF whereby women face some institutional barriers in their desire to reach the top of the organization. Typical of most security institutions in Ghana, a woman can complete all her career training and other criteria for promotion, yet she may not be promoted while her male counterparts or even juniors are advanced above her. For example, the societal perception that women are too fragile for certain jobs and they have to submit and support men all tend to provide the basis for discrimination in the workplace. A male officer interviewed remarked that "we have always had women in the armed forces mainly in support roles. Having women in operational units is not healthy because seeing an injured female soldier could hurt military discipline."[172] These views often held by male officers are not backed by data, but rather based on their emotive conviction that women do not belong on the battlefield.[173] Such chauvinist views clearly demonstrate a skewed understanding of women's capabilities and these go a long way to negatively affect the career progression of females in the GAF as the top hierarchy is dominated by males most of whom may share similar sentiments.

As noted earlier, recruitment to GAF is voluntary and based on qualification, people have the option to choose which branch or units they wish to serve in. Logically, men apply and

progress along their career paths faster than women. It is observed that the infantry as well as artillery and armour units are often male-dominated. These units are in principle, open to women, but women often prefer deployment in certain branches that put them in support or administrative functions. Indeed some women in GAF have also accepted stereotypical distinction of what roles they can perform as women. [174] These come with ranks beyond which they cannot rise. If women go into units like signals, engineering and medical corps, they could rise to the top and arguably become generals. Until recently, most senior female officers in the GAF were in the military hospitals and the signals units. [175] For example, since independence, the highest rank ever attained by female officers in the Ghana Army is colonel.[176] This changed in March 2016, when the army announced the promotion of its first female Brigadier-General Constance Afenu [177] who once headed the Forces Pay office.[178] Despite the admiration felt by many female officers, it can be argued that, this promotion is mere tokenism as the institutional masculinist culture and policies are yet to change significantly. Nevertheless, it is a step in the right direction that women can now become generals in the GAF and perhaps pave the way for holistic gender transformation in the institution.

Further, the military is an 'up or out' institution, where people are up for voluntary retirement once they are unable to rise above certain ranks within a certain timeframe. The attainment of higher ranks is determined by institutional, educational and mobility requirements, with the need to deploy to combat or operational zones. All these requirements make it difficult for women to make a career in the military. [179] Certain female-specific reasons like maternity leave, child care, and refusing transfer and deployment due to family reasons tend to affect female progression while men do not typically face these issues. Notably, some existing facilities and training are not gender-sensitive. For example, there is the lack of female facilities like washrooms or ablution units. Even though, there are crèche and day care facilities available in most garrisons in Ghana, there are no workplace child care facilities to support nursing female service members. Moreover, regulations for promotion are not often modified to take into account specific needs of women.

Some of the above mentioned requirements on marriage and pregnancy are unfavourable to female personnel as they may be compelled to put their reproductive rights on hold in order to meet the requirements of their chosen profession. It was observed that, not all females could sacrifice reproductive years for careers and some were mostly not able to complete career training within two years due to reproductive issues. For example, the armed forces regulation on administration states that an unmarried woman who becomes pregnant could be released. It is argued that this clause was put in place for moral reasons. In practice, it is observed this does not really present a challenge to the GAF as personnel are often disciplined. Even those who flaunt this may be protected by the system unless there is an

official disciplinary complaint against them.[180] A noted problem is that, some females are compelled to opt for abortions which is not legal in Ghana unless under certain medical conditions, insanity or rape. This provision also leaves the female personnel at the mercy of her superiors who may choose not to deploy her. The critical concern should be how the GAF could review its rules by taking into consideration the reproductive rights of females whether in marriage or not. In addition, during pregnancy, servicewomen are considered not fit for employment, which means they cannot attend the mandatory military courses required for promotion. This has a negative impact on their career progression.[181]

Generally, the current GAF regulations contain some outdated provisions which require extensive review to bring it in tune with current realities.[182] This point was once captured in one of the review boards that "the Armed Forces Administration is beset with frustrating experiences as a result of obsolete regulations, directives, instructions and non-adherence to procedures and provisions of the regulations. These regulations, instructions and directives/orders are not revised as and when they become obsolete."[183] There is therefore the need for organizational transformation to modify policies and management practices.

5.3 Organizational Transformation in GAF

The central concern of organizational transformation in this chapter relates to the technocratic processes undertaken to ensure that the GAF is rightly sized and how relevant institutions for defence management operate to ensure effectiveness and efficiency of the GAF. Ideally the processes of determining the appropriate strength of an armed force should emanate from the larger national security and defence policies. In the case of Ghana, as noted earlier, there is no comprehensive national security strategy to set the tone for defence policy. Successive governments under the Fourth Republic have rarely issued policy statements or guidelines on defence on a regular basis. Both the NDC and NPP had some sections on defence in their various manifestoes.[184] However, once in government, their respective administrations tended to give low priority to the issues of defence as compared to policies and initiatives that seek to address socio-economic development of the country. The Ghanaian public and civil society do not also demand it from governments and often shy away from public discourse on defence matters. Interestingly, there is a purported defence policy dated in July 2012 and signed by the late President John Atta Mills.[185] However, the processes in arriving at this document are not all-inclusive, as the draft did not go through parliament. A minister of defence interviewed alluded to an on-going process to develop a national security strategy and defence policy for the country.[186] It is not clear when the process will culminate into a comprehensive document. The GAF currently has no doctrine of its own; consequently personnel, training and equipment policies are not based on any adapted or indigenous doctrine. Existing doctrines are rather

based on adopted frameworks from the British system. For example, peacekeeping has become a major preoccupation of GAF. A peacekeeping doctrine adopted in 2014 is essentially an adaptation of the UN Capstone Doctrine.[187] It is noted that currently training in the GAF is mostly directed at peacekeeping training and not for internal operations. As rules of engagement for peacekeeping are different from rules for internal military operations, it is important to train troops to be able to tackle current security threats such as terrorism.

In the absence of clearly defined national security strategy and defence policy, earlier mentioned constitutional provisions such as; The Armed Forces Act 105(1962) and its amendments, Security and Intelligence Act 526 (1996), and various Armed Forces Regulations (Administration, Finance, and Discipline) provide frameworks for the operations of the defence sector. Historically, GAF operated based on OpTraLog (Operational, Training and Logistic) statement issued by the CDS bi-annually. This statement incorporates the policy guidelines and strategic aims of the GHQ and addresses the roles of department under the GHQ.[188] The OpTraLog is based on review of the internal defence environment to show short-term vision of the CDS and set strategic goals for each service.[189]

5.3.1 Right-Sizing the GAF

Military restructuring in terms of size, is seen as vital for more effective and efficient implementation of an extended range of military tasks including issues of force size, use of new weapons and technologies.[190] Generally, decisions on force levels, equipment and logistics requirements of the GAF should be based on current threat assessment of the nation, and the roles/tasks that the GAF are required to perform in the defence of the nation and other external commitments to the international community. It is also important to consider the roles the military would be required to undertake in the socio-economic development process. These decisions often emanate from the Order of Battle (ORBAT), which shows the hierarchical organization, command structure, strength, disposition of personnel, and equipment of units and formations of the armed force. Ideally, ORBAT is revised in response to changing military needs and challenges. Generally, defence force planning has been given very low attention in Ghana. Therefore, in the absence of clearly articulated medium to long term plan, the GAF is being managed on *ad hoc* and short-term (biannual) plans which give it no defined direction or focus.[191]

Opinions have varied among respondents on the size of the GAF. It is believed that Nkrumah's envisaged force level was 27,000 for all ranks. This vision was discarded by the NLC regime. By 1969, total force levels approved was 21,000. However, this level has never been fully attained. In the 1980s the figures were as high as 15,100 and 16,000 in

1985 and 1989, respectively. As shown in chart below, in, the early 1990s, force levels dropped to about 7000-9000 due to various reasons including the post-Cold War demilitarization efforts and reduction in defence spending. From 1995-1996, there was an increase. This is attributed to the budgetary constraints of the era, where ageing warrant officers were not released but there were new recruitments.[192] The figures dropped from 1997-2005. Since 2007, the figures have gone up significantly. In 2015, the strength of the GAF was approximately 15, 500.[193] The army as the senior most institution has about 11,500 of the total strength, while the navy and air force has about 2000 each.[194]It is noteworthy that, the figures below are only approximations, as the actual size of the GAF might be higher than the figures stated.

Approximate Force Strength



Figure 4-5: Approximate Strength of GAF from 1992 to 2015

Source: Author, data sourced from International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance*.

Considering the international norms on force levels not to constitute more than 1% of a country's population, Ghana could have about 240,000 armed forces by its current population size of 24,000,000. Obviously this figure is not sustainable within the contemporary discourse on demilitarization and reduction in military expenditure as well as

the socio-economic needs of the country and role of the GAF. The processes involved in arriving at these figures over the years have not been extensively studied. Respondents interviewed noted that the size of the military is often not determined by clearly defined processes. Even though there is a formula arguably used for the calculation based on population size, the reality is that, like most public sector institutions in Ghana, recruitment figures are determined based on what political leadership thinks it could afford.[195] Some have argued that the current size in terms of personnel is appropriate considering the population size and the economic constraints on maintaining effective and efficient armed forces. The country is not at war or a "nation-in-arms"[196] faced by eminent geostrategic threats. Majority of respondents opine that GAF is not rightly sized and operating at 50% of the required strength to effectively perform its roles and duties. Such views call for more personnel while cognizant of the fact that, defence budgetary constraints makes it impossible in the short to medium timeframe. For instance, as far back as 1996, a review committee proposed an improvement in the military capability to at least one-third of the total strength of Ghana's immediate neighbours in terms of personnel and arsenals. The proposed force strength was 17,000 with corresponding equipment and logistics that could defend the nation, and discharge all assigned international obligations more effectively and efficiently. In this regard, there was a recommendation for an increased defence budget from 0.8% to about 2.5% of GDP to equip and modernize the armed forces.[197] These recommendations were not accepted by the Rawlings-led NDC government.

Furthermore, there have been internal processes aimed at restructuring the GAF to effectively respond to internal security threats. For instance, command structures of the army have been redesigned and increased from two to three with the introduction of a central command. Since 2012, the former northern command in Kumasi has been renamed the Central Command. A new Northern Command has been created with its headquarters in Tamale. The Southern Command remains with its headquarters in Accra. Accordingly, the ten administrative regions in Ghana have been categorized into the three commands as follows: Northern command caters for the Northern, Upper East and Upper West Regions. The Central Command covers Ashanti, Brong Ahafo and Eastern Regions. The Southern command oversees Greater Accra, Volta, Western and Central Regions. While the Central command is a work progress, the ultimate is to establish military base in every region of Ghana. As at March 2016, six regions had military bases. The four regions with no military establishments are Upper East, Upper West, Eastern and Central Regions. Nonetheless, the ongoing re-organization of the military is not backed by a comprehensive force level analysis to inform future recruitments.

In addition, all the respondents emphasized the need for massive investment in the defence sector. Notably, one officer argued that defence diplomacy is an important element of national power. For instance, peacekeeping has become an important feature of Ghana's

foreign goals. The demands of peacekeeping often contribute to increasing recruitment of females in particular, which adds to the overall size of the armed forces. This notwithstanding, the size of the GAF in relation to its internal and external responsibilities, particularly, peacekeeping tends to overstretch the personnel.[198] An estimated 4000 troops are always on peacekeeping duties.[199] These developments in addition to retirement limit the numbers at home. The general consensus gathered from most military personnel interviewed is that, GAF is overstretched in terms of its size and the corresponding tasks.[200] Nonetheless, there was consensus among respondents that the GAF is relatively effective and efficient in achieving its core mission in spite of its resource constraints.[201] Some analysts have argued that international peacekeeping in particular; have contributed to enhancing professionalism as well as effectiveness of GAF. The relatively good performance of the GAF in peacekeeping therefore raise questions about the usefulness of the concept of military effectiveness based on highly bureaucratized institutions with sophisticated documents on strategy and high planning.[202] Nonetheless, Ghana needs to upgrade its defence forces and capabilities, as countries across the globe are moving towards mechanized militaries, but the country is still doing traditional soldiering due to lack of advanced military technologies.[203] Therefore, one can argue that the current force strength should not necessarily be increased, but could be adequately trained and equipped with modern technology and equipment to function effectively at a sustainable cost to the country. As the Ghanaian economy has been a determinant of decisions pertaining to the defence sector, it is imperative to look at the impact of the Ghanaian economy on the defence sector.

5.3.2 The Ghanaian Economy and Defence Expenditure since 1992

As mentioned in chapter four, economic imperatives have been a major drive of Ghana's transition to democracy in 1992. After more than two decades of democratization, the record of economic growth has been mixed. This has impacted on the country's defence spending. In the mid-2000s, the country recorded some marginal growth moving the country from low income to a middle-income economy.[204] While an improved economy could bring about improvement in equipment, training and strategy in the military, there has not been much spending on defence. For example during the 2016 budgetary hearing process of the Ministry of Defence, it was revealed that the ministry is saddled with debts in millions of Ghana Cedis, made up of gratuity, rent, food rations, clothing and fuel among others which has adverse effects on the operations of the armed forces.[205] In April 2015, the government was compelled to return to the IMF to help deal with severe economic challenges whose deeper accounts falls outside the scope here.

Almost all respondents interviewed agreed that the state of the Ghanaian economy has an impact on defence. The defence sector has suffered most as the economic situation of the country declined over the years. A top civil servant at the ministry of defence remarked that "The kitty is not enough, we ask for what we need and government cuts down so we have to work within what is provided."[206] Budgetary constraints have been key reasons behind restructuring of the overall size and strength of the armed forces. Since the 1990s to early 2000s, Ghana's defence spending has hovered around 0.6-1% of GDP.[207] During the NDC government (1992-1999), there seems to have been some reductions in military expenditure. Yet, there are some contradictory analyses on this issue. [208] Notably, in the late 1980s to the 1990s, the Structural Adjustment Programs directed by the IMF and World Bank demanded cuts in the public sector including military spending. There is however, some evidence that points to increase in military spending. [209] See Table 8-5 below.

Table 8-5: Military Expenditure in Ghana 1992-2015

Year	Expenditure in US$ million	Percentage of GDP
1992	32.6	0.7
1993	38.1	0.7
1994	41.4	0.7
1995	42.3	0.8
1996	35.6	0.6
1997	35.7	0.7
1998	44.4	0.8
1999	47.1	0.8
2000	65.9	1.0
2001	41.5	0.6
2002	45.7	0.6
2003	56.8	0.7
2004	55.4	0.6
2005	55.2	0.6
2006	59.4	0.4
2007	91.1	0.5
2008	79.7	0.4
2009	92.7	0.5
2010	88.0	0.4
2011	164	0.6
2012	256	0.8
2013	189	0.5
2014	178	0.5
2015	194	0.5

Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), *Yearbook: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security*, (2016).[210]

The longstanding complaints of underfunding in some sections of the armed services still persists and was emphasized by officers and non-military analysts interviewed. This has resulted in the ageing and deterioration of infrastructure such as barracks and office accommodation and logistics. While some of the existing equipment have reached the end of their life cycle, modern military hardware, technological devices, and carrier vehicles are in short supply.[211] Despite, the low spending in defence, salaries and emoluments of the military are always provided for and thus issues of mutiny over pay is rare in Ghana. As one officer interviewed observed "payment of salaries is always on time, but availability of funds for infrastructural development and procurement of logistics needs to improve."[212] In the face of budgetary constraints, inter-service competition exists within the three arms of the GAF, where the army as the largest service tends to dominate the budgetary process and attracts the biggest spending leading to further deterioration of the air force and the navy.[213]

Since 2006, Ghana has seen an increase in defence spending, attributed to the discovery of oil in Ghana in 2007 and subsequent production from December 2010. With the rise in maritime piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, the navy in particular has seen some modest retooling of equipment.[214] For instance, between 2011 and 2015, there have been 11 recorded cases of actual and attempted piracy attacks on the Ghanaian territorial waters in particular, and several others on the Gulf of Guinea generally.[215] These threats are challenges to political and regional stability and informed the John Mahama government's decision to procure four C-27j Spartan Transport Aircrafts for the air force in March 2013.[216] Therefore the acquisition of this aircraft is expected to enhance easy access to remote areas within the country during emergencies and improve domestic and international operations of the GAF.[217] There have been some efforts to procure various types of ammunitions and weapons and resource all units within the GAF with reasonable levels of vehicles for operational and administrative duties. Examples include four (4) MI171 Helicopters procured in 2013 for troop transport.[218] It is noteworthy that, due to Ghana's economic challenges, defence spending is largely sourced from loans from international and local financial institutions, as well as bilateral donor supports.[219] For instance, the US government under the Foreign Military Financing, (FMF), and programme often provides grants and loans to assist foreign nations in purchasing U.S. military equipment, services and training.[220]

The impact of the economy on defence has compelled the military to strive towards self-sufficiency. For example, in pursuance of the vision of the armed forces to embark on socio-economic development, the Defence Industries Department was established at the ministry of defence to oversee the activities of the newly revamped Defence Industries Holding Company (DIHOC). The DIHOC is part of the Civil–Military Collaboration for Socio-Economic Development in Ghana programme (CIMCSED) launched in 2011. The

commercial activities of DIHOC include a shoe factory which is a public-private partnership between GAF and Knight AS from Czech Republic. This factory produces shoes for the GAF and other security services as well as the general public.[221] Like most public enterprises in Ghana, the viability of this company gives cause for concern. Since the launch of the factory in 2012, it has not been able meet the required work force and production targets.[222] Other income generating activities includes the 37 Military Hospital, in Accra, and a block factory by 66 artillery regiment in Ho. In June 2016, GAF was granted license by Bank of Ghana to operate a financial institution known as Services Integrity Savings and Loans limited. This bank was subsequently opened in December 2016 to cater for the financial needs of military personnel, civilian employees and the general public.[223] The critical question is how much revenue these business ventures could contribute to the defence budget. While the revenue is minimal, the involvement of the Ghanaian military in purely economic or commercial schemes also comes with some concerns for policy makers to consider. These have effects on discipline as by creating avenues for corruption whereby senior military officers may be tempted to focus on material gains through their interactions with civilian contractors through forced coercion. Likewise, civilian elites may turn a blind eye to the military's economic interests due to various reasons.[224] Corruption and embezzlement of public funds is cause for concern because it was part of reasons given for military takeovers in the past. However, the military is not immune to corruption, though this does not feature in public policy discourse.[225] Further research into corruption and its impact on the effectiveness and efficiency of Ghana's defence sector is important.

5.3.3 The Role of the Ministry of Defence in Managing Defence

Considering the very unique nature of defence and often the sensitive or controversial issues that surround defence policies and their implementation, a defence ministry is important as a means of making authoritative judgments and of transmitting the directions of legitimate political authorities to the armed forces.[226] The Ministry of Defence of Ghana (MOD), was established in 1957 with the responsibility of formulating, and managing the implementation of policies aimed at safeguarding the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the nation as well as ensuring the protection of life and property.[227] Over the years, the MOD has evolved and transformed to its current status with regards to the performance of its functions. Currently the existence and mandate of the ministry emanates from the 1992 constitution of Ghana and the Civil Service Act (PNDC Act 327) of 1993. The ministry is the bureaucratic wing of the government that is in charge of policy direction and implementation.[228]

The vision of the ministry is to develop: "a highly professional, effective, efficient and politically neutral Armed Forces which is subject to democratic or civil control."[229] As shown in diagram below, unlike other ministries, the MOD has a peculiar organizational structure. The President of Ghana sits at the apex of the organogram as the Commander-In-Chief (C-in-C) of the GAF**.** This is followed by the AFC which is the governing Council of the Ministry. The Minister for Defence is the Political head of the Ministry. The ministry is made up of two branches, namely, the Civil and Military Branches. The Chief Director (CD) of the ministry is in principle, the head of the bureaucracy who co-ordinates the four divisions stipulated in the Civil Service Act 327. The military wing is headed by the Principal General Staff Officer (PGSO), who is of the rank of Brigadier General. The GAF is headed by the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS).The CDS is the most senior military adviser to the Minister and the Deputy Ministers.



Figure 5-5: Organogram of Ministry of Defence Ghana in 2014

Source: Ministry of Defence, 2014

5.3.4 Challenges of Defence Management in Ghana

As a civil service institution, the ministry is supposed to lead the defence management process. However, in reality, its corps of technocrats and other civilian staff was (and continues to be) skeletal and consists of the Minister, the Deputy Minister (when one was appointed), the Chief Director, their personal assistants, few technical directors, clerks, typists and receptionists.[230] The military as the largest agency within the ministry has dominated the entire establishment. There has been a longstanding requirement for restructuring the MOD to realign the status of the military in relation to the civil service as a way of enhancing civil authority.[231] Efforts have been made in the past to reform the defence sector and subsequently draw up a national defence policy. The Ministry subsequently launched a Performance Improvement Plan (PIP) in 2003 with four main objectives: to improve organizational and management systems; strengthen human capacity and training; establish a management information system to facilitate monitoring and evaluation; and relocate the MOD from Burma Camp.[232] The overall objective was to establish a higher degree of civilian political control over the management of the Defence ministry. Since 2003, when the first phase of the PIP commenced, there has not been any significant development until the NPP government secured the assistance of the UK Security Sector Development Advisory Team (SSDAT).[233]It became clear that before such a strategy could be developed there was the need for greater clarity on the roles and responsibilities of the non-military, civil service component in the MOD in relation to the military counterparts.[234]

It is instructive to note that since the creation of the MOD in 1957, unlike other government ministries, it was first located at the Flag Staff House, (then seat of government) and later moved to the largest military camp, Burma Camp alongside the General Headquarters of the GAF in Accra. This location created a physical and psychological environment which was hardly conducive for civilian control.[235] The ministry has essentially been run by the armed forces while the civilian defence minister remained a figurehead. This is because the ministerial powers are limited and basically reduced to dealing with technical matters such as presenting defence budgets to cabinet and parliament. A minister of defence described the post as that of a "glorified deputy minister."[236] This is because, there is the President at the apex of the structure as the Commander –in-Chief, while the CDS is charge with the day-to-day administration of the armed forces. Nonetheless, under the NPP government (2001-2008), the defence minister, Dr Kwame Addo Kuffour, who served from 2001-2007 appeared very intrusive to the dislike of the military top brass.[237] This was partly attributed to him being the younger brother of then President Kuffour.

In addition, because of the proximity of the ministry to the military, the ministry was not seen as a significant part of the structure. For instance, a former General Officer

Commanding the army in the 1970s remarked that during his time, "we didn't mind the minister of defence."[238] This resulted in considerable passive autonomy as the military was left with much leeway in determining internal affairs and needs of the institution, such as budgets with requirements being communicated to the Minister for evaluation and transmission to cabinet and parliament.[239]Further, the location, arguably affected civil-military relations, especially, access to the general public. Notably, the ministry found it difficult to meet its recruitment target, especially in getting civilian technocrats, partly due to the perception of civilians not being comfortable in a military space.[240] It was observed that in the past some senior to middle level civil servants resisted posting to the defence ministry partly due to its limited functions and the great influence of the military in the running of the ministry.[241] This left the ministry with few civilian technocrats to perform essential tasks such as defence planning, strategic, budgetary and accounting, procurement and other policy initiatives. In this regards, demilitarization of the direction and administration of the ministry has been emphasized to give purely technical issues such as financial administration, procurement, military supplies, personnel and human resource development, education management and public relations to highly qualified and experienced civilian technocrats.[242]

There have been some structural changes towards improving civilian oversight with regards to the role of the ministry in defence management. The ministry is increasingly asserting its role in the execution of these functions mentioned above. For example, since 2009, an office complex has been built for the ministry funded by the Chinese government.[243]This development is an important step towards improving the civilian oversight and defence management in Ghana. This is because the ministry now have the opportunity to function outside the physical environment of the military. Nonetheless, the provision of an office complex alone cannot lead to improved civilian oversight in defence management as the ministry is resource constraint. There is the need to adequately resource the ministry with human expertise and logistics to enhance effective civilian management of the ministry.[244] Of particular interest here, is the role of the MOD in the defence budgeting and procurement processes. It is been observed that the role of the bureaucratic or civil wing of the MOD in the process was minimal and even weak especially before 1999. The MOD had limited functions and indeed acted as a clearing house between the military and political authorities. It is however, important to note that, the MOD alone cannot be blamed for this state of affairs. Other institutions like Parliament and Ministry of Finance also did not perform their functions effectively in relation to the oversight and scrutiny into the defence budgetary and spending processes.

Since 1999 there have been some modifications as part of national budgetary reform processes. There has been some relative improvement in transparency of the defence

budgetary process with introduction of new requirements for detailed explanation and justification for expenditures. Now the directive for budgetary estimate is issued by the Chief Director of MOD upon receipt of policy review by the ministry of finance.[245] Budgets are based on the MTEF, (Medium to long term expenditure framework) that was initiated by the Ministry of Finance.[246] Essentially, the MTEF is an annual, rolling three year-expenditure planning that sets out the medium-term expenditure priorities with budget constraints against which sector plans can be developed and refined. MTEF has helped simplify the budgetary process. Budget estimates are now arranged under four areas (1) Personal Emoluments, (2) Administration, (3) Service, and (4) Investment, thus simplifying the budgetary process by eliminating the many confusing streams of expenditure in previous budgets. MTEF also confers greater budgetary flexibility on Ministries, departments and agencies (MDAs),[247] and contains outcome criteria for the purpose of monitoring performance.[248] The MTEF provides a key entry point for budgetary scrutiny by parliament as it requires details on specific budgetary items. However, this is only possible if the necessary actors are capacitated to engage in debates around resource allocation in support of policy objectives.[249]

5.4 Political Transformation: Parliamentary Oversight

Ghana's political and institutional systems are based on a separation of powers between the executive, legislature and the judiciary branches of government. As noted earlier, the 1992 constitution clearly articulates the role of government especially the executive in relation to the military. Other arms of government like the legislature also have oversight responsibility over the armed forces. The remaining sections of this chapter focus on political transformation in Ghana's defence sector. It explores the efforts being made under the Fourth Republic to ensure that the conduct and character of the military institution conforms to the political features of the democracy within which it is located. Some of these issues have been addressed in chapter four on the place of the armed forces in the new democracy. As mentioned previously, the constitution has clearly spelt out issues of civilian supremacy especially with regards to executive civilian authority. Since 1993, there has been the emergence of armed forces that are comfortable with and realize the need for political directives and control. In this regard, there is the existence of objective and subjective civilian control of the armed forces. For instance, the military high command is often consulted by political authority on issues relating to their expertise.[250] The subsequent sections of this chapter explore parliamentary oversight of the defence sector. It is noteworthy that the subject of parliamentary oversight of defence has not attracted a lot of scholarly attention. Therefore the research had to rely on the few available but dated literature. These are supported by primary data from interviews.

5.4.1 The Practice of Parliamentary Oversight on Defence in Ghana

Generally, security and defence policy is often seen as a 'natural' task for the executive arm of government as they deemed have the necessary knowledge and capacity to act quickly. In this setting, parliament is seen as a less suitable institution for dealing with security issues, especially due to its often time-consuming procedures and lack of full access to the necessary expertise and information.[251]As mentioned in chapter four, the 1992 Constitution of Ghana elaborates on the executive oversight of the security and defence sectors. The role of Parliament resides in its function as the source of legitimacy of all security institutions. According to Article 210(2), of the 1992 Constitution, "no person shall raise an armed forces except by and under the authority of an Act of Parliament." The scope of parliamentary oversight, by contrast, is less explicit; even though the constitution makes reference to the investigative and inquiry functions of committees, it does not make specific reference to oversight of the defence sector. Further, the Armed forces Act of 1962, although amended several times over the years does not make any explicit provision for parliamentary oversight.

As noted earlier, the passage of the Security and Intelligence Service Act 526 of 1996 was seen as an attempt to prescribe in-depth national security architecture for the state. The act also seeks to address the vacuum on parliamentary oversight and civilian control of the defence and security sector and strips the security actors of their hitherto perceived opacity. A case in point is that, Act 526 requires the executive to report to parliament annually through the minister of national security. However, the oversight does not go beyond submission of report by the executive. Over the years this requirement has not been met consistently and parliament does not demand the report.[252] In most cases the post of a minster for national security does not exist for such persons to be summoned before parliament to answer questions. National Security advisors and coordinators, who have direct responsibilities in this regard, are not answerable to parliament, and rather to report directly to the president. Even in instances where the post of a national security minister exists as under the NPP government (2001-2009), when Francis Poku was appointed as Minister for National Security. This brought no significant changes to bear on the process. Typical of NPP administrations, the new Akuffo Addo government (2017) has filled the post of a minister for national security. It is however too early to assess if the minister could bring any political transformation.

It has been observed that years of the coups d'état contributed to institutionalization of the political and institutional autonomy of the armed forces. For instance, Hutchful observed in 2008 that, many in the military are yet to come to terms with the notion of civilian scrutiny

over the defence and security sector.[253] There has been some relative change as the current armed forces appear to have accepted civilian control of the military. However, past experiences in civil-military relations still impact on the present dispensation.[254] For instance, there is still mutual suspicion on the part of both civilian authority and military to the extent that issues concerning the military are often handled tactfully by civilian authorities.

Generally, the institutionalization of parliamentary oversight in Ghana's democratization process has been severely hampered by the sporadic coups d'états and the dissolution of parliament at each military takeover of political power.[255] Since the resumption of parliament under the Fourth Republic in 1993, the institution had to re-establish its influence in the political process. Some analysts have questioned the effectiveness of parliament. Indeed, a former speaker of the house described parliament as a "talking shop" with no teeth to bite.[256] While this assertion is true in the past, some have argued that the Ghanaian Parliaments becoming stronger in recent times in the performance of their primary functions to the satisfaction of majority of Ghanaians.[257]

In practice, parliamentary oversight of the armed forces is done through committees like the Public Accounts Committee (PAC), Finance Committee and the Parliamentary Select Committee on Defence and Interior (PSCD&I).Typically, a parliamentary committee is made up of a number of parliamentarians appointed to carry out certain tasks. Such committees may offer a setting which facilitates detailed scrutiny of draft legislation, oversight of government activities and interactions with the public and external actors. In most cases, significant part of parliamentary work is done at the committee levels rather than in chamber.[258] Ghana's parliament has 12 standing committees and 17 select committees and every member is required to belong to at least one.[259]

The role of the Public Accounts Committee includes conducting examinations of the audited accounts of all public institutions submitted by the Auditor-General. This activity provides the Committee with some measure of oversight over the expenses of the GAF and other agencies. The committee is empowered to question the rationale behind the usage of public funds. The chairman of the PAC is by convention chosen from the largest minority group in parliament. This practice allows the chairman to discharge his functions without fear or favour of the executive.[260] The Finance Committee deals with general issues of finance and the economy, including loans and international business transactions. In principle, it is supposed to monitor the purchase of military hardware from international suppliers.[261]

The PSCD&I in particular, has jurisdiction inter alia over policy, oversight, budget issues, procurement of defence equipment, and the deployment of the military in a state of emergency.[262] The committee does not however have a direct role with issues of promotions in the armed forces even though the executive is involved in some senior officer ranks promotions.[263]The overall responsibility of the committee is to "examine all questions relating to defence and internal affairs" in Ghana.[264] The Committee has two key powers: (i) investigations and (ii) inquiries into the activities and administration of ministries, departments, agencies, public organizations, and corporations as parliament may determine. They may investigate and inquire into proposals for legislation.[265] The committee has the powers of a High Court for the purpose of enforcing the attendance of witnesses, compelling the production of documents and the issuing of commissions for the examination of witnesses abroad.[266] However, it has been observed that the committee seldom exercises such powers.[267] This is attributable to the authority, capacity, and political will of parliamentarians or combination of all factors. Generally, the authority of Parliament over the defence is derived from the legal frameworks that govern this sector, including the 1992 Constitution, the Standing Orders of Parliament and other legislations.[268] The capacity of parliament to hold government accountable over the security sector is a function of the resources (human, financial and technical) available to the parliament".[269] The political will, refers to attitude of parliament towards the whole idea of oversight. If parliamentarians lack the will to exercise their oversight functions, then they will bring neither their authority nor their capacity to bear on the process.[270]

5.4.2 Challenges of Parliamentary Oversight on Defence

Generally, the executive arm of government of Ghana is vested with sweeping powers under the 1992 Constitution. This does not differ significantly from earlier constitutions. This hampers effective oversight responsibility of parliament. For instance, under article 108, parliament is prohibited from carrying out any financial acts unless initiated by or on behalf of the president. This provision prevents parliament from debating matters of public expenditures on its own initiative without request from the executive president. Parliament is in essence denied the power of the purse which is one way to keep the executive in check. Moreover, it is the duty of parliament to receive, examine, debate and approve the president's budget proposals. Parliament has the ultimate responsibility to determine whether the country has a good annual budget or not. As observed by a former member of parliament, "parliament's performance in this area has not been satisfactory. Debates have been too partisan and have not produced the benefits which the framers of the Constitution envisaged." [271] It is argued that for parliament to be effective in its oversight function, it must be independent of the executive. The reality is that the president has effective control over parliament and can obtain approval for virtually everything he wants from

parliament.[272] Notably, appointment powers of the president are enormous including key positions in parliament. Both the speaker of parliament and the first deputy speaker are nominated by the president and approved by members of parliament. In addition, the majority leader and first deputy, the majority chief whip and deputy are all selected by the president. The president also controls the Parliamentary Service Board as the clerk of parliament and members of Parliamentary Service are appointed by the President.

On the whole, the oversight role of parliament in certain critical areas like the security and defence sectors in shaping national security policy and democratic control over the military and ultimately preventing insecurity and promoting stability begs improvement.[273] For instance, in 2013, the Ghanaian parliament was perceived as being little involved in defence policy and the ability of committees to undertake oversight limited by a lack of transparency.[274] There are various gaps in the mandates of the different committees with direct and indirect oversight of the defence sector generally.[275] For instance, although the committee may have the powers to hold an enquiry or investigation into the activities and administration of a ministry or department in line with the standing orders of parliament, many committees cannot initiate any investigation and bring matters before the house except where such matters are referred to them by the speaker of parliament. This renders the committee less effective.[276] Moreover, the committees do not have powers to enforce their recommendations and rest with other agencies like the Attorney-General to initiate appropriate actions against agencies or individuals found to have committed infractions.

Some challenges tend to affect the effective oversight of the defence sector by parliament, including structural and legal constraints. As noted earlier, the role of parliament in relation to the defence sector and the scope of its responsibility are not clearly defined. Also, the lack of a clear national security and defence policy framework currently makes it difficult to determine the roles of the various security agencies and that of parliament. Moreover, the frequent breaks in parliament in the past, and high turnover of parliamentarians currently due to competitiveness of elections, do not augur well for the development of institutional memory and development of consistent culture of oversight.[277] The roles of parliamentary clerks are essential backstop of knowledge to help parliamentarians perform effectively. For instance, the defence and interior committee does not have adequate resources like a library and staff to carry out both clerical and research duties to aid the work of its members. Almost all the parliamentary committee members do not have professional or technical advisors acting independently of the executive to aid their work.[278] There is the need for parliament to explore effective means of documenting practices over the years and building a critical mass of experienced and resourced parliamentary staff to provide the necessary technical assistance to members of parliament towards the effective performance of their core functions. It is illustrative to add that several institutions provide capacity

building courses to parliamentarians and staffers; the Parliamentary Training Institute was launched in 2017 to institutionalize the training of members of parliament and other public sector officials.[279] With regards to the defence sector, the work of this institute can be made more effective if it collaborates with other institutions that have the expertise in defence and security sector training.

Furthermore, the highly complex nature and environment of the security and defence sectors presents a particularly difficult challenge for effective exercise of oversight. This is partly because some of the issues involved in performing oversight functions of this sector are often too technical for members or politicians who do not have the requisite technical experience or any specific training in issues dealing with security and defence.[280] For example, the PSCD&I of the 6th Parliament of the Fourth Republic (2012-2016) had 18 members, with a former military officer and former minister of defence and former deputy minister of defence. With the exception of these three and the chairman who seem interested in military and broader security issues due to his professional background as a journalist, most of the remaining members were first-time parliamentarians with little knowledge and experience in defence issues[281] While some parliamentarians have taken it upon themselves to enhance their capacity in security issues by enrolling in advanced courses in institutions like the KAIPTC, Ghana Armed Forces Command and Staff College, (GAFCSC), majority of members tend to rely on capacity building programmes offered by some civil society groups and international partners in security and defence areas which do not happen frequently due to funding constraints.[282]

The issue of gender underrepresentation in the defence sector is reflected in the composition of the committee as no female parliamentarian sits on the committee. This is reflective of the low female representation in public sector institutions in Ghana, including parliament. For instance, there were only 29 females out of 275 members of the 6th Parliament of the Fourth Republic (2012-2016). The seventh parliament saw an improvement with 37 women out of 275. Since 1992, parliaments have struggled to achieve 30% women representation as identified in the Beijing Platform of Action. As shown in table below, the percentage change hovered around 5.5% for the past 25 years.[283] As discussed under gender transformation, the issues of defence have essentially remained a male domain in Ghana. As the membership of the PSCD&I has been male dominated. A possible reason is that only a few or none of female parliamentarians may have the needed experience on security and defence issues as the committee in parliament are often formed based on areas of expertise and interests of individual members.[284] The PSCD&I of the seventh parliament has three women out of eighteen members. [285] One can argue having women with requisite knowledge on such committees could contribute to articulating the

issues of gender representation in the armed forces to drive a wider national discussion on the issue.

Table 9-5: Women Representation in Parliament 1992-2016

Year	Number of Parliamentary Seats	Number of Women	Percentage
1992	200	16	8.0
1996	200	18	9.0
2000	200	19	9.5
2004	230	25	10.8
2008	230	19	8.2
2012	275	30	10.9
2016	275	37	13.5

Source: Author, adopted from Awuah, (2017)

Furthermore, the security services have peculiar organizational cultures, rules, and practices and are governed by secrecy laws, all of which can potentially pose problems if an oversight committee is not conversant with these institutional norms. The detailed operations, rules of combat, weapons procurement and use by members of this sector are often beyond the professional capacity of the average members of parliament, in general and the members of the select committees in particular.[286] Moreover, there has been little transparency on security and defence issues especially during the Rawlings government as the security sector was seen as the key power base of the regime. Excessive secrecy or confidentiality on issues pertaining to defence issues still persists. During parliamentary debates, issues of defence are often discussed in camera. Even in cases of plenary discussions, questions are rarely asked openly because often, the speaker of parliament would give a preamble invoking reasons of national security and thereby requesting members to be circumspect in their submissions. Moreover, successive parliaments under the Fourth Republic have not been able to overcome the issues of "how far it can or should go in considering the military budget, nor whether it has the right to debate it openly on the floor of the House."[287]

A ranking member of the defence and interior committee interviewed was of the opinion that issues of defence budget are best dealt with at the committee where proper scrutiny can be done.[288] Often, ministers of defence appearing before parliament to answer questions are reluctant to openly discuss certain issues pertaining to the armed forces in plenary and may give out pertinent documents only to the committees in chambers.[289] All the same this assertion may have some merit; plenary discussions on such matters could also enhance transparency and public interest in the defence sector. In the world of technological advancement and the spread of electronic media, certain issues that were considered secret

are no more. For example, issues of arms trade are easily accessible on the internet, thus national security clauses cannot be invoked to conceal certain information.[290] However, some amount of confidentiality may be necessary for reasons of national security, as revealing too much information may create unnecessary alarm in the public and cause the security agencies to lose credibility and trust with both the public and the government.[291] Nonetheless, this justification is often abused in preventing the public from accessing some relevant information. The situation in Ghana is often compounded by the reluctance or inability of both the legislature and the executive under the Fourth Republic to make a reality of the Right to Information Law.[292] A draft bill has been before parliament since 2013. The bill was drafted in 1999 and reviewed in 2003, 2005 and 2007 but was not presented to Parliament. Interestingly, the bill was tabled for consideration in the last days of the sixth parliament in January 2017.[293] President John Mahama in his last State of Nation Address appealed parliament to pass the law when he had earlier said in another forum he could not force parliament to pass the law. Reservations from then minority NPP shot down attempts to pass the bill into law. Like previous government, the Akuffo Addo administration has reiterated its intention to make pass the law.[294] Since the draft bill has to be reintroduced to parliament for consideration, one cannot expect a law to be passed anytime soon due to the length of time required for parliamentary procedures.

Furthermore, the lack of transparency in Ghana's defence spending makes the sector susceptible to corruption. Ghana, like many other countries is faced with corruption risks in its defence sector. These include: corruption in public procurement of weapons and equipment, internal administrative issues such as emoluments and logistical supplies, processes relating to recruitment and promotions and selection of personnel for international peacekeeping missions.[295] Interestingly, a group of about 200 ex-soldiers in January 2016 sued the military high command over under-payment of gratuities contrary to what was approved by the government.[296] Matters arising from the law suit suggest that the armed forces inflated the ranks of the soldiers in submitting their budgetary needs to the government. However, these soldiers were paid in accordance with their appropriate ranks at the time of their release from the service.[297] This development further points to the lack of proper scrutiny and transparency in the military expenditure process thereby making it liable for financial malpractices and corruption.[298]

As noted earlier in chapter four, peacekeeping has become a major preoccupation of the GAF. However, Ghana's engagements in either regional or UN-mandated peacekeeping operations are not adequately guided by parliamentary oversight.[299] Parliament does not have any oversight role or prior approval for deployment of Ghanaian troops abroad for peacekeeping or any other purpose. As part of the enormous range of powers granted the president, is the sole authority to decide on deployment of Ghanaian troops to international

peacekeeping operation. This situation gives excessive leverage for executive manipulation in such operations. This practice has persisted and was recently challenged by some MPs in 2017 when the new government of President Akuffo-Addo announced the deployment of 205 Ghanaian troops to the Gambia in support of ECOWAS mission to enforce the outcome of an election and remove President Yahya Jammeh from office.[300] However, the challenge was only done in the media and was not followed through to a logical conclusion. Other actors like the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Parliament, only play advisory functions to the president.[301]The PSCD&I and the Finance Committee of parliament in particular, discuss and approve budgets meant for peacekeeping procurement and expenses. While the issue of Ghana's peacekeeping enterprise has come up several times in parliamentary debates, especially on defence appropriation, the house has continuously been kept out of information on peacekeeping revenues and how they are being managed.[302] There is the need for the country to allow parliamentary oversight to impact on the totality of executive decisions in relation to military operations both for national defence purposes and peacekeeping missions abroad.[303]

Successive governments and leadership of the armed forces have not been transparent on issues relating to peacekeeping funds accruing to the country. As noted in chapter four, the GAF Peace Support Operations Account in New York, has become an avenue for governments and the GAF to supplement the national defence budget, some of which has been used to purchase aircrafts and other military equipment. However, there have been allegations of corruption surrounding use of the funds by governments and the armed forces.[304] One cannot discount some of these allegations. For instance, the Ministry of Defence in May 2015 set up a committee to review the country's participation in global peacekeeping operations to ensure effective participation and minimize risks. The committee was also tasked to determine the procedure for requisition for funds from GAF Peace Support Operation Accounts and levels of authorization, and review of sources of funding, including determination of dedicated sources of finance/funding for Peace Support Operations.[305] Even at the level of the armed forces, reports often surfaced in the media about scandals involving senior military personnel in relation to contractors and service providers in peacekeeping.[306]

With particular reference to procurement relating to defence, there are tendencies for procurement decisions to be taken with little reference to strategic requirements and military effectiveness is eroded by weak oversight or controls on personnel.[307] Over the years, Ghana has scored low marks on the Transparency International's Government Defence Anti-Corruption Index, for lack of transparency and accountability in the defence sectors. Defence procurement in Ghana, has a mixed history due to both weaknesses in the system and turf wars between the civil and military wings of the MOD. The processes

involve several layers of committees within the MOD and GAF. These include the procurement planning committee, service technical committees, defence contracts committees and tender boards.[308] While there is procurement structure at least on paper, the practice however, has been murkier as allegations of corruption and improprieties arising out of defence procurement occasionally come to public notice. [309] Although the various committees include civil servants from the ministry as well as the minister or deputy, the actual process has been dominated by the military. For instance, a senior civil servant interviewed observed that while the Ghana Public Procurement Act 663 of 2003 prescribes processes to be followed in public procurement, the military often use their 'age-old' procurement procedures.[310] Therefore lack of effective parliamentary oversight on military expenditure makes it difficult to deal with the canker of corruption because the institutional culture of the military makes it very difficult for insiders to report certain unethical or corrupt tendencies in military expenditure. The procurement processes are allegedly often short-circuited by the military under the claim of urgency, such as the need to fill immediate operational requirements for national security and other purposes. Most often, the military have their own preferred list of types of equipment and may have established links with suppliers.[311] There may be instances where orders might have been placed and thus committing the ministry to purchase before authorization is secured from the ministry. Indeed, there have been issues of unethical and corrupt practices against officers who deal with procurement of basic necessities like food rations and clothing.[312]

The nature of the Ghanaian political system, particularly, the excessive politicization of parliamentary debates in almost all issues including defence and security makes it almost impossible for parliament to effectively have oversight into issues brought before it. A notable example was in March 2008, when the debate on the financial proposal for the purchase of some military aircraft was characterized by partisan debate.[313] Both sides of the house engaged in the "politics" of the proposal, rather than focusing on the substantive issues that will inform public debate. Similarly in 2014, debates on a loan agreement between the government of Ghana and VTB Capital Plc of London for $300 million to equip the Ghana Armed Forces (GAF), to enable them to effectively discharge their peacekeeping duties was characterized by heated partisan debates between the majority and minority sides of the house. The Minority raised questions on the genuineness of the deal and voted against the agreement. The majority subsequently used its numbers to approve the deal.[314] Such an approach to parliamentary oversight does a great disservice to national security and must therefore be discouraged. It is also observed that the parliamentary oversight had not worked effectively because the Chairman of defence and interior select committee is often from the majority party in parliament. They risked being punished by removal from such positions if they are deemed to be too critical of "the usual way of doing

things." It is, therefore, important for parliament to recognize the important roles of the various Parliamentary Committees.[315]

5.5 Summary

The end of the Cold War provided opportunities for defence establishments around the world to readjust their structures, strategies, functions and capabilities to meet their current and future strategic needs. While some countries are reforming their defence architecture, the need for transformation, which involves a total overhaul of defence policies, human composition, organizational cultures and technocratic practices at ensuring effectiveness and efficiency, has become too pressing for any country to ignore. In the case of Ghana, there is the urgent need to transform the defence sector to align it with current democratic imperatives as well as ensuring professionalism to redeem the armed forces of its chequered past. Indeed, some changes have taken place within Ghana's defence sector which were clustered and analysed under David Chuter's Guide to Defence Transformation, namely: Cultural, Human, Organizational and Political transformation. The country needs a concerted approach to transform the defence sector to achieve optimal results. It is noteworthy that the transformation in Ghana has happened as a result of the democratization process. Therefore, unlike defence transformation processes outlined in peace agreements, often with detailed guidelines and prescription, Ghana's process has been organic and thus unstructured. The table 11 below provides a summary of the notable changes.

Table 10-5: Summary of Transformation in Ghana's Defence Sector Since 1992

Political Administration	Cultural Transformation	Human Transformation	Organizational Transformation	Political Transformation
NDC 1992-2000	Quiet reforms to ensure professionalism in GAF Current calibre of military officers has better educational qualifications and access to higher educational and professional qualification. GAF personnel exhibit	Reforms of forces pay policies with introduction of equal pay for equal work. Deployment of women are deployed to peacekeeping missions started in 1994	Reintroduction of defence management structures such as the Armed Forces Council, the Defence Administrative Committee, and the Defence Staff Committee Increase in force levels	Chapter four of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana elaborates on the executive oversight of the security and defence sectors The role of Parliament resides in its function as the source of legitimacy of all security institutions as outlined under Article

Political Administration	Cultural Transformation	Human Transformation	Organizational Transformation	Political Transformation
	professionalism in peacekeeping environment		Introduction of budgetary reform process that gives Ministry of Defence a lead role from 1999 process	210(2), of the 1992 Constitution. Quiet reforms to restore discipline, command, and control and greater political control The passage of the Security and Intelligence Service Act 526 of 1996 provide an avenue to prescribe in-depth national security architecture for the state. Issues of security sector reform gained traction after 1996 Parliamentary oversight of the armed forces is done through committees like the Public Accounts Committee (PAC), Finance Committee and the Parliamentary Select Committee on Defence and Interior (PSCD&I).
NPP 2001-2008	Institutional desire to change negative image of GAF. Military officers now have high appreciation of tenets of civil-military relations and constitutional rule	Efforts at addressing the perceived regional imbalances in the GAF begun in 2001 Recruitment is done based on regions of residence rather ethnic origin of applicants.	Since 2001 There has been significant increase in force strength to meet changing requirements of GAF There has been some modest increase in defence expenditure since 2006.	The armed forces appears to have accepted civilian control of the military Political environment was opened to civil society engagement in defence issues Parliamentary oversight is now enhanced.

Political Administration	Cultural Transformation	Human Transformation	Organizational Transformation	Political Transformation
		The ethnic Composition of officer corps relatively balanced. It is no longer dominated by Ewes and Northerners. Revised entry requirement for officers enlistment from advanced secondary school certificate to bachelor's degree Prior to 1992, women female representation was less than 0.5%. Currently women constitute about 10% Since 2001 recruitment aims at 10% women GAF maternity leave regulation was revised in line with Ghana Labour Law (2003)	Reforms of Ministry of Defence to enhance civilian oversight started in 2003. The first phase of the PIP commenced in February 2003 with a course in Defence Management for civilian staff of MOD Ministry of Defence engaged in civil-military dialogues, and participated in events such as the "South-South Dialogue on Defence Transformation" in 2003.	There is improved transparency in defence budgetary processes
NDC 2008-2016	The GAF now apologizes for infraction by soldiers following internal investigation into such incidence	In 2014, an online application system to reduce the human factor in the selection processes Ghana Army got one female brigadier-general in 2016 Three women pilots in Ghana Air	Since 2012, there have been internal processes aimed at restructuring the GAF to effectively respond to internal security threats. Defence policy was adopted in 2012, but not public document Ghana Army now	Parliamentary oversight has improved. Political environment is accommodating to public scrutiny.

Political Administration	Cultural Transformation	Human Transformation	Organizational Transformation	Political Transformation
		Force as at 2015	has three command centres: Northern, Central and Southern	

Source: Author.

In sum, the chapter found that, there is an institutional desire for cultural transformation. This is amplified by pronouncements of the military hierarchy at different points in time. However, the behaviour of individual soldiers requires drastic change. On human transformation, there have been some changes in human composition with regards to regional balance and gender. While issues of regional balance are treated with sensitivity, respondents interviewed have pointed to fairly regionally balanced armed forces as compared to the state of affairs before 1992. However, perceptions of regional imbalances continue to surface in recruitment and promotions in the GAF. Gender mainstreaming has seen some modest improvements in female representation in the armed forces, largely attributed to the emphasis on female participation in international peacekeeping which has contributed to increased recruitment of females. Yet, in the absence of a comprehensive gender policy to guide institutional practices, the GAF remain a male-dominated institution with a prevailing masculinist culture. Multiple challenges have been identified as affecting efforts at enhancing career prospects for women in armed forces in line with current international and regional imperatives on equal representation of demographic makeup of the society.

There have been some organizational transformations to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of the armed forces. The defence and security needs of the country have changed from territorial issues of the immediate post-independence era. However, doctrines underpinning the operations and training of the armed forces have not changed significantly. Divergent views emerged in the course of the study on the right size of the armed forces while budgetary allocation to defence has remained low. An essential institution for defence management such as the defence ministry has seen some modest improvement as compared to pre-1999 years when the military was the main driver of the process. The role of the civil wing was limited to technical matters such as forwarding budget estimates to cabinet. Increasingly, the ministry is now asserting a civilian lead in the management of defence issues.

With regards to political transformation, the principle of civilian supremacy of the executive has been clearly identified by the constitution; while there have been an emergence of an armed force that is relatively appreciative of the principles of civilian

supremacy or control. However, the principle of parliamentary oversight even though not explicitly defined by the 1992 constitution exists in the current political dispensation. The constitution confers on parliament wide-ranging legislative and oversight responsibilities concerning the functions of the armed forces. Other legal frameworks such as the Armed Forces Act 105 (1962), Security Services and Intelligence Act 529 (1996) have also provided the basis for parliamentary oversight. Nonetheless, the effective exercise by parliament of its oversight responsibilities needs some improvements. The challenges have been enumerated in the chapter.

The changes have taken place on an ad hoc basis and in the absence of clear and comprehensive national security frameworks to set the tone for a defence policy. Indeed a defence policy (2012) exists but not in the public domain. There are also questions about the acceptability of the document among the relevant stakeholders. Therefore, the changes identified in the defence sector have not been coordinated through a national process. While transformation may be a priority for the Ministry of Defence and armed forces, in general, the process is hampered by limited political will, strategic guidance, outdated institutional regulations and the effects the Ghanaian economy on defence spending. On the whole, Ghana has made some good progress at transforming her defence sector as part of the democratization process. This notwithstanding there is the need for the country to embark on a holistic defence transformation process that is backed by clear national security and defence policies. The armed forces remain an important and influential state institution, it is critical to explore how the changes and non-change identified in this chapter could contribute to enhancing healthy civil-military relations in the next chapter.

Endnotes

[1]In a speech delivered by Lieutenant General Augustine Blay – Chief of Defence Staff., See "Ghana Air Force inaugurates new officers' rank." September 13, 2012. Available at http://www.gaf.mil.gh/index.php?option=com (Accessed on February 15, 2016).
[2]Ghana Armed Forces, (1996), "Report of the Review of Roles and Structure of the Ghana Armed Forces", Ministry of Defence, Accra, September.
[3] Interview with an officer of Ghana Armed Forces, Accra: January 26, 2016.
[4]Cleary, Laura, (2006), "Political Direction: The Essence of Democratic, Civil and Civilian Control" In: *Managing Defence in a Democracy*, edited by Cleary, Laura and McConville, Teri, 32-45. London: Routledge; Coleman, Carl, (2007), "Defence policy in Ghana: The Past, Present and the way forward", In: *Ghana in Search of National Security Policy, Proceedings of a Conference on National security,* edited by Bluwey, Gilbert and Kumado, Kofi, p. 57. Accra: Legon Centre for International Affairs (LECIA).
[5] Chuter, David, (2000), *Defence Transformation: A Short Guide to the Issues*. ISS Monograph No. 49, August; Chuter, David, (2011), *Governing and Managing the Defence and Security Sector,* Pretoria: ISS.
[6] Kwadjo, Johnny (2009), "Changing the Intelligence Dynamics in Africa: the Ghana Experience", In: *Changing the Intelligence Dynamics in Africa*, edited by Africa, Sandy and Kwadjo, Johnny, 95-235, Birmingham: Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform(GFN-SSR) and African Security Sector Network.
[7]Hutchful Eboe, (2008), "Ghana", In: *Challenges of Security Sector Governance in West Africa,* edited by Bryden, Alan, N'Dyiaye, Boubacar, and Olonisakin, Funmi, 111-132, Geneva: DCAF LIT.
[8]Aning and Lartey, (2009), Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector: Lessons from Ghana". In: *Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector in West Africa*, edited by Sherman, Jake, New York: Center for International cooperation.
[9] Ibid.
[10]Ibid.
[11]Agyeman-Duah, Barfour, (2002), "Civil-military Relations in Ghana's Fourth Republic", *Critical Perspectives* No.9, Accra: Ghana Center for Democratic Development.
[12]Ibid.
[13]Ibid.
[14]Ibid.
[15] Agyeman-Duah, (2002): op. cit; Hutchful, Eboe, (1997a), "Military Policy and Reform in Ghana", *Journal of Modern African Studies* , 35(2): 251-278;
[16] Interview with Dr Benjamin Kunbour, Minister for Defence, Accra, July 7, 2015.
[17]Agyeman-Duah, (2002), op. cit. p.11.
[18]Ibid.
[19] Ibid.
[20]See Erskine Commission, (1988), "Report of the Commission of Enquiry on the Structure of the Ghana Armed
Forces", Accra: Ministry of Defence, Vol. 1; Ghana Armed Forces, (1996), op. cit.
[21] Coleman, (2007), op. cit. p. 55.
[22]Ibid.
[23] Birikorang, Emma, (2007), "Ghana's Regional Security Policy: Costs, Benefits and Consistency", *Occasional Paper* No. 20. Accra: KAIPTC.
[24]Aning and Lartey, (2009), op. cit.
[25] Interview with Commander Ali Kamal-al-Deen, Director of Research, Ghana Armed Forces Command and Staff College, (GAFCSC) Accra, June 9, 2015.
[26] Accra Daily Mail, (2005). "Civil Military Relations Vital for Development." Ghana, 21 September.
[27] See Bluwey, Gilbert and Kumado, Kofi (eds), (2007), *Ghana in Search of National Security Policy: Proceedings of a Conference on National Security,* Accra: Legon Centre for International Affairs, University of Ghana (LECIA) and Ministry of Defence, Ghana.
[28] Agyemang-Duah, (2002), op cit.

[29] International Security Advisory Team, ISSAT, (n.d) "Supporting dialogue on SSR in Ghana". Available at http://issat.dacf.ch/learn/ (Accessed on September 26, 2017).
[30]Hutchful, (2008), op. cit. p 129; Cleary, Laura, (2011), "Triggering Critical Mass: Identifying the Factors for a Successful Defence Transformation", *Defence Studies*, 11(1): 43-65.
[31]Hutchful, Eboe. (1997), "Restructuring Civil Military Relations and the Collapse of Democracy in Ghana 1979–1981", *African Affairs*, 96:535-560.
[32] Hall, Lynn, (2011), "The Importance of Understanding Military Culture," *Social Work in Health Care*, 50:1, 4-18; Olsthoorn, Peter, (2011), *Military Ethics and Virtues: An Interdisciplinary Approach for the 21st Century,* London: Routledge.
[33]Hall, (2011), op. cit. p. 4.
[34]Dunivin, Karen, (1994), "Military Culture: Change and Continuity", *Armed Forces & Society*, 20(*4):*531-547
[35]Dandeker, Christopher and Gow, James (1999), "Military Culture and Strategic Peacekeeping", *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, 10(2):58-79.
[36]Snider, Don, (1999), "The future of Military Culture: An Uninformed Debate on Military Culture", *Orbis*, 11-26; Mileham, Patrick (1999), "Military Virtues 1: The Right to be Different?, *Defense Analysis*, 14(2):169-189.
[37] Kirke, Charles, (2010), "Military Cohesion, Culture and Social Psychology", *Defence & Security analysis*, 26 (2):143–159.
[38]Soeters, Joseph, Poponete, Cristina-Rodica and Page, Joseph, (2006), "Culture's Consequences in the Military", In *Military Life: The Psychology of Serving in Peace and Combat*, edited by Britt, Thomas, Adler, Army, and Castro, Carl, 13-34, WestPoint, Connecticut: Prager Security International.
[39]Interview with Brigadier-General Daniel Frimpong, (Retired) Accra, May 14, 2015.
[40]Ibid.
[41] Interview with Colonel Charles Adu-Brempong, KAIPTC, Accra, October 23, 2014.
[42]Interview with Real-Admiral Matthew Quarshie, CDS, Accra; May 27, 2015.
[43]Norheim-Martinsen, Per, (2016), "New sources of military change – Armed Forces as normal organizations", *Defence Studies*, 16 (3), 312–326.
[44]Interview with Dr Kwesi Aning, Accra, September 8, 2015.
[45] Agyemang-Duah, Barfour, (2002), op. cit.
[46] For instance, the term, *Abongo* was used derogatorily to describe the military, specifically soldiers and non-commissioned soldiers who are often associated with low-levels of education and social status. The word is attributed to former politician and vice president Kow Ackaah who described soldiers as Abongo boys because they wear *abongo* sandals made of vehicle tyres. It is similar to the slung *Zombie*: meaning Soldier who falls in next to lowest category in army classification.
[47]See Nugent, Paul (1996), *Big Men Small Boys and Politics in Ghana*, Accra: Asempa Publishers.
[48]*Daily Guide* (2015), "Military brutality!," March 7; *Daily Guide*, (2015), "Soldiers mete out mob justice", December 30; Peacefmonline,(2014), "Soldiers before CHRAJ for making Worlasi Sweep", June 15, available at https://news.peacefmonline.com/pages/social/201406/203661 (accessed on June 16, 2014); Myjoyonline (2013), GJA Fumes over military's 'one sided' investigation on journalist assaults", April 25, available at ; http://edition.myjoyonline.com/tgnews (accessed on April 26, 2013).
[49]Myjoyonline (2013), "Military command apologizes to GJA, Journalists", May 9. Available at http://edition.myjoyonline.com/pages (accessed on May 09, 2013).
[50] He was posthumously promoted to a Major by President Akuffo Addo in June 2017.
[51] The word is an adulterated version of the English phrase "gather them and sell".
[52] Quicknewsgh, (2017), "Military to Hold Officers Durbar over Mahama's Murder", June 1. Available at http://quicknewsgh.com/ (Accessed on August 24, 2017).
[53] Ghananews, (2017), Capt Mahama's Murder: Report Ready – CDS, May 31. Available at https://www.ghanaweb.com (Accessed on August 24, 2017).
[54]Interview with Dr Kwesi Aning, Accra, September 8, 2015.

[55]Soeters, Joseph, Van Fenema, Paul, Beeres, Robert, (2010), "Introducing Military Organization", *Managing Military Organization: Theory and Practice*, edited by Soeters, Joseph, Van Fenema, Paul, Beeres, Robert, 1-14, London: Routledge.
[56]Snyder (2003), op. cit. p. 191.
[57]Snyder, Claire (2003), "The Citizen-Soldier Tradition and Gender Integration of the U.S. Military", *Armed Forces & Society*, 29 (2):191.
[58]Myjoynoline.com (2014), GAF introduces humane reforms for military training", February 19. Available at www.myjoyonilne.com (Accessed on February 20, 2014).
[59]World Health Organization (2009), "Changing cultural and social norms supportive of violent behaviour," Series of briefings, Malta: WHO.
[60]Interview with Air Marshal Chris Dovlo (Retired), former director of Personnel Administration, GAF, and former commandant of KAIPTC, Accra October 16, 2014.
[61]Interview with Air Marshal Chris Dovlo (Retired), Accra October 16, 2014.
[62]Interview with Air-Vice Marshal Chris Dovlo (Retired), Accra October 16, 2014
[63]Interview with an officer of Ghana Armed Forces, Accra: January 26, 2016.
[64]Erdmann, Gero, and Basedau, Matthias (2007), "Problems of Categorizing and Explaining Party Systems in Africa", German Institute for Global Area Studies, *Working Paper* No.40.
[65] Alao, Abiodun, and Olonisakin, Funmi, (1998), "Post-Cold War Africa: Ethnicity, Ethnic Conflicts and Security", In: *Africa after the Cold War: The Changing Perspective on Security*, edited by Oyebade, Adebayo and Alao, Abiodun, 117-142, Trenton, New Jersey: African World Press.
[66] Udogu, Ike, (2017), "Africa and the search for Political Stability in the New Century", In: *Africa Beyond the Post-Colonial: Political and Socio-Cultural Identities*, edited by Uduku, Ola and Zack-Williams, Alfred, 76-91, London: Routledge, first published in 2004.
[67] Ibid; See also Jockers, Heinz, Kohnert, Dirk, and Nugent, Paul, (2009), "The Successful Ghana Election of 2008: A Convenient Myth? Ethnicity in Ghana's Elections Revisited", *SSRN Electronic Journal*, January.
[68]Afrifa, Akwasi, (1966), *The Ghana coup: 24th February 1966*, London: Frank Cass and Company; Ofosu-Appiah, Seth, (2010), *Allegiance vs. Indiscipline*, London: Xlibis.
[69] Ouedraogo, Emile, (2014) Advancing Military Professionalism in Africa, Research *Paper* No.6, Washington, DC: Africa Center for Strategic Studies.
[70] Bagayoko, Niagale, Hutchful, Eboe and Luckham, Robin, (2016), "Hybrid Security Governance in Africa: Rethinking the Foundations of Security, Justice and Legitimate Public Authority", *Conflict, Security & Development*, 16:1(1-32).
[71]Interviews with Vice Admiral Mathew Quarshie, (then Chief of Defence Staff), Accra: May 27, 2015.
[72]Amenumey, DEK, (2011), *Ghana: A Concise history from Pre-colonial tomes to the 20th century*, Accra: Woeli Publishing Services, p.3.
[73]Ghana Statistical Service, (2012), *2010 Population and Housing Census: Summary Report of Final Results*. Accra: Ghana Statistical Service. Available at http://www.statsghana.gov.gh/docfiles/2010phc/Census2010_Summary_report_of_final (accessed on January 28, 2016).
[74]Amenumey, (2011), op. cit. pp. 4-5.
[75] Asante, Richard and Gyimah-Boadi, Emmanuel, (2006), "*Ethnic Structure, Inequality and Governance of the Public Sector in Ghana", In: Ethnic Inequalities and Public Sector Governance*, edited by Bangura Yusuf, Basingstoke: Palgrave and United Nations Research Institute for Social Development.
[76] Ibid.
[77]Ghanaweb, (2016), Ethnic Groups. Available at http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/tribes/ (accessed on January 28, 2016).

[79] People from the three regions in northern Ghana are commonly known as northerners. Indeed the whole geographical area constitute one region until it was administratively divided into three regions under the PNDC in the 1980s.
[80] Austin, Dennis, (1964), *Politics in Ghana*, London, Oxford University Press; Austin, Dennis and Luckham Robin (Eds) (1975), *Politicians and Soldiers in Ghana*, London: Frank Cass.

[81] Asante and Gyimah-Boadi, (2004), op. cit.
[82]Killingray, David, (1982), "Military and Labour Recruitment in the Gold Coast During the Second World War," *The Journal of African History*, 23, 1: 83–95; Aboagye, Festus. (1999a), *The Ghana Army: A Concise Contemporary Guide to its Centennial Regimental History 1897-1999*, Accra: Sedco Publishing Limited.
[83]Republic of Ghana, (1992) *Fourth Republican Constitution*. Accra: Government Printer.
[84]*Daybreak*, (2010), "Ghana Armed Forces: Policy of Regional Balance Under Threat?" August 27. Available at http://edition.myjoyonline.com/pages/news/201010/54774.php (Accessed on 19 January 2016);
[85]Adu-Amanfo, Francis, (2014), *The Roles of Peace and Security, Political Leadership, and Entrepreneurship in the Socio-Economic Development of Emerging Countries*, Bloomington: Author House; Prah, Prince (2011), "Why Ewe Officers And Men Hate Regional Balance In GAF! " January 28, Available at http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/features (January 2016); Prah, Prince, (2010), "Kokofu Appointments and Promotions in Armed Forces", July 10, available at http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/ (Accessed on January 19, 2016).
[86]*Daybreak* (2001), "Ghana Armed Forces must be Regionally Balanced?" January 21.
[87] Interview with a retired Brigadier-General of the Armed Forces, Accra, October 29, 2014.
[88]Rawlings is an Ewe, but of a Scottish Father.

[90]Biakoye, Nana (2009), "Thank God Damoah has been axed!!!" November 14. Available at http://wwww.modern.ghanaweb.com (Accessed on July 21, 2015).
[91]Interview with a Senior Officer, GAF, KAIPTC Accra; October 23, 2014.
[92]Interview with Air –Vice Marshal Chris Dovlo (Retired), Accra October 16, 2014.
[93]Akuaku, Bennet, (2009), "Fire at Burma Camp" *Daily Guide*, February 16.
[94]Interview with Senior Officer of the Ghana Armed Forces, KAIPTC, Accra, October 23, 2014.
[95] Ibid.
[96]Interviews with members of GAF, Accra, July 17-20, 2015.
[97]See Ghana Armed forces, Recruitment into Ghana Armed Forces. Available at http://www.gaf.mil.gh (Accessed on January 16, 2016).
[98]Interview with Colonel Emmanuel Kotia, KAIPTC, Accra: August 27, 2015.
[99]Prah, Prince, (2014), "Agbadza and Batakari Promotions" available at https://www.modernghana.com/print/581257/1/agbadza-and-batakari-promotions.html
[100]Interview with an officer, GAFCSC, Accra October, 30, 2015.
[101]*The Finder*, (2014), "Protocol Recruitment breeding crooks into the military", 3 September. Available at http://www.myjoyonline.com/new/2014/septemer-3rd (Accessed on July 17, 2015).
[102]Interview with a Senior Officer, GAF, Accra: February 20, 2017.
[103] Peacefmonline, (2015), "Ghana Armed Forces confirm dismissal of 500 recruits" December 26. Available at http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/ (accessed on January 18, 2016).
[104]Odei, J. (2015), "Protocol Recruitment-Ghana Armed Forces", *Daily Guide*, January 12. Available at https://www.modernghana.com/news/667511/ (accessed on January 18, 2016).
[105][105]Ghana Armed forces (1970), Armed Forces Regulations (Administration) Volume 1. Section 2.21–12.40.
[106]Ibid.
[107]Interviews with members of GAF, Accra, July 2015.
[108]*African Defence Forum*, (2016), "Profession of Arms: Building a Military Culture that Moulds Ethical Leaders" pp. 9-13.
[109]Interviews with Brigadier-General Daniel Frimpong, (Retired) Accra, May 14, 2015
[110]Ofosu-Appiah, (2010), op. cit.
[111]Prah, Prince, (2014), "Agbadza and Batakari Promotions" https://www.modernghana.com/print/581257/1/agbadza-and-batakari-promotions.html; see also Adu-Amanfo; Francis, (2014), *The Roles of Peace and Security, Political Leadership and Entrepreneurship in the Socio-Economic Development of Emerging Nations*, Bloomington: Author House Limited.
[112]Adu-Amanfo (2014), op. cit. p. 100.
[113]Informal chat with a senior officer, GAF, KAIPTC Accra.

[114]DCAF, (2011), "Gender and Security Sector Reform: Examples from the Ground", Geneva: DCAF; Dugbazah, Justina, (2012*), Gender, Livelihoods and Migrations in Africa*, Milton Keynes: Xlibris Corporations, pp.19-25.
[115]Barret, Frank (2001), "The Organizational Construction of Hegemonic Masculinity: The Case of the US Navy", In: *The Masculinities Reader*, edited by Whitehead, Stephen and Barret, Frank, 77-99, Cambridge: Policy Press.
[116] DCAF, (2011), Gender and Security Sector Reform: Examples from the Ground, Geneva: DCAF, pp.19-20.
[117]Miranda Gaanderse and Kristin Valasek (Editors), (2011),"Summary of Findings", In: *The Security Sector and Gender in West Africa: A Survey of Police, Defence, Justice and Penal Services in ECOWAS States* Geneva: DCAF.
[118] Republic of Ghana, (1992), 1992 Constitution, chapter 5.
[119] Republic of Ghana, (1992), 1992 Constitution, p. 25.
[120] Such as Universal Declaration of Human Rights, AU Charter on Peoples and Human Rights; African Union Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa (2003) among others. The country is also a signatory and ratified in 1986 the UN Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), 1979.
[121] Government of Ghana.net (2015), "Gov't approves national gender policy" Available at *www.ghana.gov.gh/index.../1822-govt-approves-national*-gender-policy (accessed on February 18, 2016).
[122]See Aboagye, Festus, (2010), *Indigenous African Warfare: It's Concepts and Art in the Gold Coast, Asante and the Northern Territories up to Early 1900s*, Pretoria: Ulinzi Africa Publishing Solutions.
[123] Nti, Nana Bemma, "The Queen Mother's Speech: A Feminist Analysis of Yaa Asantewaa's Legacy and Resolution 1325" (Unpublished).
[124] Aboagye, (2010), op. cit.
[125]Aning, Kwesi and Sjober, Anki, (2011), "Ghana", In: *Summary of Findings, The Security Sector and Gender in West Africa: A Survey of Police, Defence, Justice and Penal Services in ECOWAS States*, edited by Miranda Gaanderse and Kristin Valasek, 105-118. Geneva: DCAF.
[126] DCAF, (2016), "Ghana: Gender Related Human Resources Policies in Armed Forces", In: *Training Resources on Defence Reforms and Gender*, Geneva: DCAF.
[127]Interview with General Arnold Quainoo (Retired), Accra, October 30, 2015.
[128]Interview with General Arnold Quainoo Retired, Accra: October 30, 2015.
[129]Tsikata, Dzodzi, (2009), *Affirmative Action and the Prospects for Gender Equality in Ghanaian Politics*, Accra: Abantu for Development and Friedrich Egbert Foundation: Dugbazah, (2012), op. cit. pp.80-83
[130] Information Service Department,(2017), "Stakeholders Meet to Review Affirmative Action Bill", Available at http://www.ghana.gov.gh/index.php/media-center/news/ (Accessed on September 19, 2017)
[131] Interview with Lieutenant. Colonel Lawrence Deku, Inspector-General Directorate, Ghana Armed Forces Headquarters Accra, October 8, 2015.
[132] Interview with a senior male officer who has been in charge of recruitment exercise. Accra, October 23, 2014.
[133]Interview with a retired senior officer of Ghana Armed Forces, Accra, October 29, 2014.
[134] Ibid.
[135] For Military Police; minimum height of 1.75m (5'9inches) for males and 1.70m (5'7inches) for females. See Ghana Armed Forces GAF 2017/18 Recruitment, Eligibility and Procedures.
[136]Ghana Statistical Service, (2010), "Population and Housing Censuses: Summary Report of Final Result", Accra: Ghana Statistical Service.
[137]Interview with a senior officer GAF, KAIPTC, Accra, October 23, 2014.
[138] Heinecken, Lindy, (2017), "Conceptualizing the Tensions Evoked by Gender Integration in the Military: the South African Case", *Armed Forces & Society*, 43(2):202-220.
[139] Ibid.
[140]Interview with Brigadier-General Daniel Frimpong, (Retired) Accra, May 14, 2015.
[141]Ibid.

[142] Aholo, Francisca,(2016), "The Implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325: Role of the Ghana Armed Forces in Ensuring Female Inclusion in Peace Support Operations", Dissertation submitted to The University Of Ghana, Legon, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the Master Of Arts Degree In International Affairs.
[143]Interview with Brigadier-General Daniel Frimpong, (Retired) Accra, May 14, 2015.
[144]Addae, (2005), op. cit. p.327
[145]Interview with Brigadier-General Daniel Frimpong, (Retired) Accra, May 14, 2015.
[146] Aholo, (2016), op. cit.
[147] Informal chat with a senior officer of GAF, Accra, October 8, 2017.
[148]Interview with Brigadier-General Daniel Frimpong, (Retired) Accra, May 14, 2015.
[149] Brewoo, Serwaa, (2013), "Examining the Roles of Ghanaian Female Peacekeepers in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: The Case of the Ghana Armed Forces and the Ghana Police Service", Dissertation submitted to KAIPTC in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of Master of Arts in Gender, Peace and Security.
[150]Interview with Brigadier-General Daniel Frimpong, (Retired) Accra, May 14, 2015.
[151] Interview a senior officer GAF, KAIPTC, Accra, October 23, 2014.
[152] Heinecken, (2016), op. cit.
[153]United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000).
[154] Aholo, (2016), op. cit.
[155]Ghana National Action Plan for the Implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women Peace and Security (GHANAP 1325), October 2010.
[156] Ibid
[157] Aholo, (2016), op. cit. see also, KAIPTC News, (2017), "KAIPTC's Women, Peace and Security Institute holds Sensitization and Review Workshop for Security Agencies on the Ghana National Action Plan (GHANAP I), 1325", September 6. Available at www.kaiptc.org. (Accessed on October 25, 2017).
[158]Interview with Air- Vice Marshal Dovlo (Retired), Accra: October, 16, 2014.
[159] Ibid.
[160] Pershing, Jana, (2003), "Why Women don't Report Sexual Harassment: A Case study of an Elite Military institution", *Gender Issues*, 21(4):3-30; Heinecken, (2017), op. cit; Bennett, John, (2017), "Combating Sexual Assault with the Military Ethic: Exploring Culture, Military Institutions, and Norms-Based Preventive Policy", *Armed Forces & Society*, 1-24, November .
[161]Interview with Col Emmanuel Kotia, KAIPTC, Accra, February 17, 2016.
[162]Interview with Brigadier-General Daniel Frimpong, (Retired) Accra, May 14, 2015.
[163] Private chat with a female naval officer, Accra, November 20, 2017.
[164]Ghana Armed Forces Regulation (1970), Vol. 1. Administration.
[165] Interview with female officer GAFCS, Accra, February, 28, 2016; Interview with a female other rank, KAIPTC, Accra, March 2016.
[166] Interview with Air-Vice Marshal Dovlo (Retired), Accra: October, 16, 2014.
[167]Archer, Emerald, (2013), "The power of gendered stereotypes in the US marine corps", *Armed Forces & Society*, 39(2): 359–381.
[168] Ghana Armed Forces Command and Staff Instructions Procedures, Volume 3.
[169] Aholo, (2016), op. cit.
[170]interview with Colonel Emmanuel Kotia, Chief Instructor, KAIPTC, Accra, August 27, 2015
[171]Armah, Auguster, (2013), *Breaking the Glass ceiling in the security sector: a comparative analysis of women's promotion in GAF and Police Service*. Thesis submitted to KAIPTC in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of Master of Arts in Gender, Peace and security.
[172]Interview a senior officer GAF, KAIPTC, Accra, October 23, 2014
[173] See McKenzie, Megan, (2015), *Beyond the Band of Brothers: The U.S. Military and the Myth that Women can't Fight*, New York: Cambridge University Press.
[174] Interview with a senior officer, Accra, October 7, 2017.
[175]Interview with a retired senior officer, GAF Accra, October 29, 2014.
[176]Interview with Brigadier-General Daniel Frimpong, (Retired) Accra, May 14, 2015.

[177]Graphic online (2016), "Constance Edjeani-Afenu becomes Ghana's First Female Brigadier-General", March 4. Available at http://www.graphic.com.gh/news/ (Accessed on March 5, 2016).
[178]Frimpong, Daniel, (2015), "Women of Ghana Armed Forces-Bravo!'… My First Ladies..."*Afnews*, Fourth Quarter, p.5.
[179]Iskra, Darlene (2007), "Breaking Through the Glass Ceiling: Elite Military Women's Strategies for Success", Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the University of Maryland, College Park in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Available at http://hdl.handle.net/1903/7734 (Accessed on March 10, 2016.)
[180]Interviews with Col Kotia, female officers.
[181] DCAF, (2016), "Ghana: Gender-Related Human Resources Policies in Armed Forces", *In Training Resources on Defence Reform and Gender*. Geneva: DCAF.
[182]Ghana Armed Forces, (1996), *Report of the Review of Roles and Structure of the Ghana Armed Forces*, Ministry of Defence, Accra, September 1996.
[183] Ghana Armed Forces, (1996), op. cit. Note 4.17.
[184]See New Patriotic Party, (2000), *Development in Freedom: Agenda for Positive Change*, National Democratic Congress (2008), *Manifesto for A Better Ghana, A Better Ghana: Investing in People, Jobs and the Economy*.
[185]Ghana Defence Policy, (2012), July, Unpublished Document.
[186] Interview with Dr Benjamin Kunbour, Accra: July 15, 2015.
[187]Ghana Armed Forces, (2013), *Draft PSO Doctrine by GHQ (IPSO)*, Accra: Armed Forces Printing Press.
[188]Hutchful, (2006)p. 91
[189]Interview with a senior officer directing staff Ghana Armed Forces and Command College, Accra. October 15, 2015.
[190]Kugler, Richard, (2006), *Policy analysis in national security affairs: new methods for a new era*, Washington, DC: National Defense University Press; Jones.
[191]Ghana Armed Forces,(1996) , *Report of the Review of Roles and Structure of the Ghana Armed Forces*, Ministry of Defence, Accra, September.
[192]Interview with Senior Officer of GAF, Accra: February 20, 2017.
[193]Interview with Vice Admiral Mathew Quarshie, CDS, Accra May 17, 2015; See also *Military Balance* (2015), op. cit.
[194]*Military balance* (2015), p. 437.
[195]Interview with a senior officer, GAFCSC, Accra, September 20, 2015
[196]See Horowitz, Dan, (1987), "Strategic Limitations of a 'Nation in Arms", *Armed Forces & Society*, 13 (2), 277–294.
[197]Ghana Armed Forces, (1996), op cit.
[198]Interview with Lt. Col. Clement Dingame, KAIPTC, Accra, October 12, 2015.
[199]Interview with Lt. Col. Lawrence Deku, Accra: February 14, 2017.
[200]Interview with Lt. Col. Clement Dingame, KAIPTC, Accra, October 12, 2015.
[201] Skype Interviews with former BMATT officials, Stuart Cattermal, July 1, 2015 and Steven Bowkett, July 9, 2015.
[202] Parth, Anne-Marie and Schneider, Susanne, (2017), "Civilian Control and Military Effectiveness in South African and Ghana", In: *Reforming Civil-Military Relations in New Democracies: Democratic Control and Military Effectiveness in Comparative Perspectives*, edited by Croissant, Aurel, and Kuehn, David, 103-127. Cham: Springer International Publishing.
[203]Interview with Honourable Derrick Oduro, MP, Ranking Member Parliament Select Committee on Defence and Interior, Accra December 15, 2015.
[204]Tsikata, Kwaku., (2007),Challenges of economic growth in a liberal economy. In: . *Ghana: One decade of the Liberal State*, edited by Boafo-Arthur, Kwame, 49-85, London: Zed Books.
[205]*The Ghanaian Times*, (2014), "Defence Ministry Saddled with Debt", December 17.
[206]Interview with Chief Director, MOD, Accra, May 13, 2015.
[207]Hutchful, (2006), op. cit. p. 75.
[208]Ibid.

[209]Omitoogun, Wuyi, (2003), "Military Expenditure Data in Africa. A Survey of Cameroon, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and Uganda." *SIPRI Research Report* No. 17 Oxford University Press, p.49.
[210] These figure are sourced from budgets statements and may differ in terms of actual spending. See also Nana Ampafo, (2012), "Troubled Waters - Ghana Boosts Military Spending to Protect Oil Find", *Janes Intelligence Review*, 14 March; Republic of Ghana, (2014), "The Budget Statement and Economic Policy of the Government of Ghana for the 2015 Financial Year Presented to Parliament on 19 November 2014; Republic of Ghana, (2015), "The Budget statement and Economic policy of the Government of Ghana for eh 2016 Financial Year Presented to Parliament on Friday 13 November 2015.
[211]Chuter, David and Gaub, Florence, (2016), "Understanding African Armies", *Issue Report No. 27*, April, Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies.
[212]Interview with Lt. Col. Lawrence Deku, Accra, October 8, 2015.
[213]Interviews with Brigadier-General Frimpong, Retired) Accra, May 14, 2015.
[214]Interview with Vice Admiral Mathew Quarshie, CDS, Accra, May, 27, 2015.
[215]ICC International Maritime Bureau, (2016), "Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships: Report for the Period 1 Janaury-31 December 2015", London: ICC International Maritime Bureau.
[216]Interviews with Vice Admiral Matthew Quarshie, CDS, Accra, May 27, 2015.
[217]Ghana Civil Service, (2013), *Annual Performance Report of the Civil Service: Strengthening the Performance Management Culture in the Civil Service.* Available at http://www.ohcs.gov.gh/sites/default/files/.pdf (Accessed on March 3, 2016).
[218] Ghana Armed Forces, (2013), "C-in-C commissions four helicopters for the Ghana Air Force", January 5. Available at http://www.gaf.mil.gh/index.php (Accessed on November 29, 2016).
[219]*Daily Graphic*, (2011), "Ghanaian Parliament Approve Loans for Acquisition of Military Transport Planes, Surveillance Aircraft", July 21.
[220]Interview with Defence Attaché, US Embassy Accra, September, 1, 2015.
[221]Ghana News Agency, (2011), "Ghana will Benefit from DIHOC Partnership - Defence Minister," August 6, 2011. Available at https://www.modernghana.com/print/343928/1/ (Accessed on November 26, 2016).
[222] Adu-Gyamfi, Ameyaw, (2017), "Kumasi Shoe Factory on the Verge of Collapse - Dept Defence Mins Laments", August 17. Available at http://www.peacefmonline.com/pages/local (Accessed on November 6, 2017).
[223] Ghana News Agency, (2016), "Ghana Armed Forces inaugurate Savings and Loans Company", December 4. Available at http://www.ghananewsagency.org (Accessed on September 19, 2017).
[224]Siddiqa, Ayesha (2007), *Military Inc: Inside Pakistan's Military Economy*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
[225]Aning, Kwesi, (2004), "Military Imports and Sustainable Development: Case Study Analysis – Ghana", Africa Security Dialogue and Research; Transparency International (2015), Government Defence Anti-Corruption Index.
[226]Taylor, Trevor, (2006), "The Function of a defence ministry", In *Managing Defence in a Democracy*, Edited by Cleary, Laura and McConville Teri, 92-106, London Routledge.
[227]Ministry of Defence, (2014)," Implementation Of Sector Medium-Term Development Plan (2014-2017), Annual Progress Report For 2014".
[228] Interview with Chief Director, Ministry of Defence, Accra May 13, 2015.
[229]Ministry of Defence (2010), Medium-Term Development Plan 2010-2013.Available at www.mofep.gov.gh/.../Ghana%20ministry%20of%20defence%20mtdp (Accessed on March 13, 2015).
[230] A point emphasize by Current Defence Minister, Kunbour that there is some change but not much due to differences in institutional cultures.
[231]Hutchful, Eboe, (1997b), "Restructuring Civil Military Relations and the Collapse of Democracy in Ghana 1979–1981", *African Affairs*, 96:535-560.
[232]Hutchful, (2008), op. cit.
[233]Birikorang, Emma, (2007), "Ghana's Regional Security Policy: Costs, Benefits and Consistency", Occasional Paper No. 20, Accra: KAIPTC.
[234]Hutchful, (2008), op. cit.
[235]Hutchful (1997b) op cit.

[236] Interview with Dr Benjamin Kunbour, Minister of Defence, Accra, July 15, 2015.
[237]Interview with Major-General Carl Coleman, Accra, June 16, 2016.
[238]Interview with General Arnold Quainoo (Retired), Accra, October 30, 2015.
[239]Hutchful, (1997b) ;(2008), op. cit.
[240]Chuter, David and Cleary, Laura, (2006), "Civilians in Defence", In: *Managing Defence in a Democracy*, edited by Cleary, Laura and McConville, Teri, 78-92, London: Routledge.
[241]Hutchful, (2008), op. cit. p.121; Ministry of Defence, (2014), op. cit.
[242] Interview with Colonel Emmanuel Kotia, Accra, August, 27, 2015.
[243]Modernghananews, (2009), "Veep Commissions New Ministry of Defence Building", December 24. Available at http://www.modernghana.com (Accessed on 9 September 2015).
[244] Interviewswith General Frimpong, Accra, May 14, 2015.
[245] Interview with Chief Director, Ministry of Defence, Accra, May 13, 2015.
[246]Ibid.
[247]Aning (2004), op. cit.
[248]Le Houerou, Phillipe, *and* Robert Taliercio (2002), op.cit; World Bank Group, (1998), p.46
[249]Aning, Kwesi and Lartey Ernest, (2009), op. cit.
[250]Interview with Vice-Admiral Quarshie, CDS, Accra, May 27, 2015.
[251]Born, Hans, Fluri, Philipp, Johnsson, Anders, (2003), *Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector: Principles, Mechanisms and Practices:* Geneva: DCAF and Inter-Parliamentary Union, p. 19-20.
[252]Aning and Lartey (2009); op. cit. Owusu, Ursula, (2015*), Legislative Oversight of the Security Sector: A case study of the Defence and Interior Select Committee of the Parliament of Ghana*, A Dissertation submitted to KAIPTC in partial fulfillment of the award of Master of Arts in Conflict, Peace and Security.
[253]Hutchful, (2008), op. cit. p. 123
[254] Parth and Schneider, (2017), op.cit.
[255]Oquaye, Mike, (2013), "Addressing the Imbalance Between the Arms of Government: Search for Countervailing Authority", Institute of Economic Affairs Newsletter, 19(5). Accra; IEA: Hutchful, (2008), op. cit.
[256]Ala-Adjetey (2006), op. cit.
[257] National Commission for Civic Education (2015), "Assessing the Effectiveness of Parliament in Ghana's Democracy", Accra: NCCE.
[258]Hironori, Yamamoto, (2007), *Tools for Parliamentary Oversight: A Comparative Study of 88 National Parliaments*, Geneva: Inter-parliamentary Union, pp. 15-16.
[259]Standing orders Parliament, Accra: Parliament of Ghana.
[260]Acquaye, Augustus, (2017), "Work of Public Accounts Committee", February 8. Available at http://www.gbcghana.com/1.5453340 (Accessed on September 20, 2017)
[261]Standing Orders of Parliament, p. 165-168.
[262]Aning and Lartey (2009), op. cit; Kotia, Emmanuel, (2011), "The Principle and Reality of Legislative oversight in Defence matters in liberal democracies: an empirical case", *Journal of Alternative Perspectives in the Social Sciences*, 3(1):57-71.
[263]Interview with Honourable Derrick Oduro, Ranking Member, PSCD&I, Accra, December 15, 2015.
[264] Standing Orders of Parliament, 151 (d) and (g), November (2000), 33 Standing Orders of Parliament, Order 158 under 'Functions and Powers of Committees, November 2000.
[265]See Constitution of Ghana, Article 103 (3), 1992; and Standing Orders of Parliament, 190, November 2000.
[266]Constitution of Ghana, Article 103 (6), 1992; and Standing Orders of Parliament, 155, November 2000
[267]Interview with Honourable Derrick Oduro, Accra, December 15, 2015.
[268]Standing Orders of the Parliament of Ghana, Commencement: 1 November 2000. Accra
[269]Aning and Lartey, (2009), op. cit p.6-7.
[270] Ebo and N'Diaye, (2008), op. cit.
[271] Kan-Dapaah, Albert, (2015), "Parliament's Role in the Fight against Corruption", Accra: Institute for Economic Affairs.
[272] Ibid.

[273] Aning, Kwesi and Lartey, Ernest, (2009), op. cit, Houngnikpo, Mathurin, (2012), Africa's Militaries: A missing link in democratic transition. *Africa Security Brief*, January.
[274] Transparency International (2013), "Governance Defence anti-corruption Index Ghana 2013", London: Transparency International. See also, Houses of Parliament, (2015**), "**UK -Ghana Programme on Defence And Security Parliamentary Scrutiny", 150917/Report/Ghana 15. Available at https://www.uk-cpa.org/downloads/file:br3pnoxk5c (Accessed on October 31, 2017).
[275]Aning and Lartey (2009), op. cit.
[276]Ala-Adjettey, (2006), op. cit. p.28.
[277]Hutchful, (2008) op. cit. p. 123.
[278]Ala-Adjettey, (2006), op. cit. p.19.
[279] Ghana News Agency, (2017), "Ghana: Parliamentary Training Institute trains 30 participants in Customer care". Available at http://parliamentafrica.com (Accessed on September 28, 2017).
[280] Aning and Lartey, (2009), op. cit; Kan-Dapaah, (2015), op. cit.
[281]Interview with Hon. Derrick Oduro, Accra, December 15, 2015.
[282] African Security Dialogue and Research (2009), "Workshop Report on Capacity Building for Members of the Parliamentary Select Committee on Defence and Interior and National Stakeholders" 17-19 April, 2009.
[283]Darkwa, Linda, (2012), "Gender, Elections and Violence: Pricing Women out of Democracy in Ghana", in: *Managing Election-Related Violence for Democratic Stability in Ghana*, edited by Aning, Kwesi and Danso, Kwaku, 277-305, Accra: Friedrich Ebert Foundation and KAIPTC; Bawa, Sylvia, Sanyare, Francis, (2013,) "Women's Participation and Representation in Politics: Perspectives from Ghana", *International Journal of Public Administration*, 36(4):282-291; Awuah, Sandra, (2017),"Addressing Gender Imbalance in Ghana's Parliament", *Background Paper*, No. 2. Accra: Research Department, Parliament of Ghana.
[284]Interview with Honourable Derrick Oduro, Accra, December, 15, 2015.
[285] Parliament of Ghana, (2017), "Defence and Interior Committee", Available at https://www.parliament.gh/committees? (Accessed on October 24, 2017).
[286]Ministry of Defence, (2003), "Update on the supply of Helicopters – to the Ghana Armed Forces by Wellfind Ltd" p. 1 quoted in Emmanuel Kwesi Aning, (2004), "Military Imports and Sustainable Development: Case Study Analysis – Ghana," 10.
[287]Aning and Lartey (2009), op. cit.
[288]Interview with Honourable Derrick Oduro, Accra, December 15, 2015.
[289]Ibid.
[290]Ibid.
[291]Aning and Lartey, (2009), p. 12.
[292] Ibid p.10.
[293] Citifmonline, (2017), "Mahama begs Parliament to approve RTI Bill at the 11th hour", January 5. Available at http://citifmonline.com/2017/01/05/ (accessed on September 19, 2017).
[294] Nyabor, Jonas, (2017), "We'll pass RTI Bill this year – Bawumia", February 2. Available at citifmonline.com. (Accessed on October 24, 2017).
[295] Atlantic Council of Montenegro, (2006), "Round table "Assessment of Corruption Risk in the Defence Sector". Available at http://www.ascg.me/en/sadrzaj/round-table-%E2%80%9Cassessment-corruption-risk-defence-sector%E2%80%9D (accessed on March 2, 2016).
[296]*Daily Graphic*, (2016), "225 Ex-soldiers sue CDS" 13 January 2016.
[297]Interview with an officer of Ghana Armed Forces, Accra, 26 January, 2016.
[298]Transparency International (2015), "Government Defence Anti-Corruption Index"
[299]Birikorang, (2007); Aning and Lartey (2009), op. cit.
[300]Classfmonline (2017), "MP challenges Akufo-Addo's Gambia troop deployment"19 January 2017. Available at http://www.ghanaweb.com (accessed on January 31, 2017).
[301]Aning, Kwesi and Aubyn, Festus (2013), "Peacekeeping Contributor Profile: Ghana", *Providing for Peacekeeping*. Available at Available at http://www.providingforpeacekeeping.org/2014/04/03/contributor-profile-ghana/ (accessed on September 28, 2015).
[302]Hutchful (2008), op. cit; Aning and Lartey (2009), op. cit.
[303]Parth and Schneider, (2017), op. cit.

[304]*The Chronicle*, (2016), "Soldiers Go Wild Over Unpaid Peacekeeping Cash", March 31.
[305] Myjoyonline.com (2015), "Ghana to Review its Peacekeeping Operations", May 31. Available at http://www.myjoyonline.com/news/2015 (Accessed on July 19, 2015).
[306]Afnews op cit; Graphic online (2015), "C'ttee to review GAF's participation in UN operations", January 28
[307]Transparency International (2015), op. cit.
[308]Hutchful, (2006), op. cit. p.87.
[309] Interview with Dr Benjamin Kunbour, Accra, July 15, 2015.
[310]Interview with Chief Director, MOD, Accra, May, 13, 2015.
[311]Hutchful (2006), op. cit. p. 88-9.
[312]Interviews with Chief Director, MOD, Accra May, 13, 2015.
[313]Aning and Lartey (2009), p.10.
[314]Graphic online, (2014), "Loan deal for Ghana Armed Forces divides Parliament" July 16, http://www.graphic.com.gh/news/politics/27131 (accessed on 29 February, 2016).
[315]African Security Dialogue and Research (2009), "Workshop Report on Capacity Building For Members Of The Parliamentary Select Committee On Defence And Interior And National Stakeholders" 17-19 April, p.9.

CHAPTER SIX

Concordance Civil-Military Relations in Ghana's Fourth Republic

6.0 Introduction

Civil-military relations in Africa has received a lot of scholarly attention, especially in the immediate post-independence era up to the late 1980s, when the phenomenon of coups d'états became synonymous with politics in Africa. Some of the major debates have been captured in the literature review.[1] Generally, these debates have been informed by the Huntingtonian and Janowitzian schools of thought.[2] The Huntingtonian approach seeks to professionalize the military through objective control. Objective civilian control puts emphasis on maximizing military professionalism and respect for an independent sphere of military action, while subjective civilian control seeks to maximize powers of civilian political authority in relation to the military. Under this principle, civilian political leaders determine what the military does, but allow the military the professional autonomy to determine how best to do it.[3] The Janowitzian perspectives proffers a military institution that is progressive in nature and open to the influences of the wider society in which it finds itself. While these broad theoretical approaches had their own merit, it became apparent that they had limited utility in settings other than Anglo-Saxon, whose civil-military relations are different. The return to democracy across the continent from the early 1990s, brought led to a shift in focus from preventing coup d'états to a more holistic process of building of democratic armed forces to achieve democratic consolidation.[4]

Civil-military relations in developing countries have been likened to a two-sided coin. On one side of the coin, is the nature of civil-military relations together with the evolving and developing political and economic systems. On the other side, is the role of the military in the development process including the making of peace and stability.[5] The role of soldiers in such societies is not only for defence and deterrence. They are essentially part of the development process as they are often called upon to assist in the provision of internal security and also used to secure regime stability. The general concern often relates to how civilians in newly democratizing societies can succeed in reducing military power and establishing effective control over the armed forces.[6] In this vein, Rebecca Schiff, while noting the shortcomings of the earlier, but predominant approaches to civil-military relations, proffered the concordance theory. This theory does not suggest a separation of the civilian and military sphere but argues for partnership or agreement among three societal institutions: the military, political elites and citizenry in four areas, namely, the social composition of the officer corps; political decision-making process; method of recruitment

of personnel and style of the military. Agreement on these issues should reduce the risk of the military interfering in domestic politics.[7] Concordance theory requires the three partners to determine the domestic role and function of the armed forces. This sets the broader relationship between military and society. The theory recognizes that the military is not an essentially hostile and coercive state institution even though the field of civil-military relations developed as a result of the frequent military interventions in politics. Concordance theory recognizes pragmatism in civil-military relations. For example, Donald Travis influenced by Janowitz's idea of pragmatic civilian control, recognizes how a professional soldier, who is a politico-military manager of violence relates with other organs of government in policy making, planning and the management of national security. Here there is the recognition of the numerous ways in which military professionals and civilian political authority interact with one another in times of peace (to prepare for crises) and during war (to achieve peace).[8] The criticisms of Concordance Theory have been captured in chapter two of the thesis. This thesis reinforces the views of Williams that there exists no single template according to which the African civil-military relations systems can be constructed.[9] However Ghana's contemporary civil-military relations can be understood by situating it within Schiff's theory. This theory recognizes both institutional and cultural perspectives in explaining civil-military relations.

Civil-military relations in Ghana's Fourth Republic, despite its chequered history, has experienced some relative improvement and thus contributed to the country's growing democratic credentials. Relations are thawing, as evidenced by the fact that there has been no overt attempt at overthrowing a government since 1992. This state of affairs has been achieved by partnership between two actors- the political elites and military on some of the variables of concordance theory proffered by Schiff- the social composition of the officer corps, political-decision-making process and the recruitment method and military style. There is the realization among these actors that their mutual interests would be best served within a democracy, notwithstanding the challenges.[10]The citizenry, the third partner, is not essentially part of the equation.[11] Even though, the Ghanaian populace are aware of the role of the armed forces in the Ghanaian society and hold the institution in high esteem, responses secured from a randomly selected sample of Ghanaians show a mixed apprehension on the part of ordinary citizens about their perceptions of the armed forces. Some elements within the armed forces have not entirely moved away from the traditional aggressive culture or unfriendly posture towards civilians, despite ad hoc efforts at the institutional level to mend and maintain good societal relations.

Accordingly, the first section of the chapter explores the partnership among the military and political elites. It examines the relationship between the armed forces and the Ghanaian society, including key actors such as civil society and the media.

6.1.1 Politico-Military Concordance in Ghana: Social Composition of the Officer Corps

The military as a profession sees itself as distinct corporate body set apart from laymen due to its expertise and nature of activities. The officer corps is the embodiment of its unique status in the society.[12] It constitutes the critical mass for decision-making and is expected to meet higher professional and moral requirements.[13] As noted by Schiff, the social composition of any armed force is informed by the historical and cultural experiences of that particular country. The officer corps of the GAF is carefully selected and trained to lead the forces. Officers are expected to acquire officer qualities such as intelligence, leadership, self-confidence, courage through their training.[14]To this end, this corps is made up of some qualified and skilled personnel who are recycled back into the society after their military service.[15] Nonetheless, not all members of the officer corps do exhibit the ideal qualities of their profession. There are challenges with regards to their professional development to adequately prepare senior officers to meet the needs of the 21st century defence and security environment.

The social makeup of the armed forces, especially the officer corps, has been an important determinant of civil-military relations since independence. The socio-cultural diversity of Ghana has been illuminated in chapter five. With regards to the social composition of the GAF, it is deeply rooted in the country's socio-cultural history. One can argue that the Ghanaian colonial legacy, and prevailing socio-economic and cultural realities, as well as the evolving recruitment patterns are the bedrock of the social and ethnic composition of the officer corps of the armed forces. As highlighted, the British colonial pattern of recruitment largely favoured people from northern territories who were perceived to have martial traits needed for effective soldiering and suppressing anti-colonial sentiments in the south. Furthermore, people from the north and other less natural resource endowed areas of the south opted for military service as it offered better employment opportunities than working on cocoa plantations in the south.[16] Due to various historical reasons noted earlier, the officer corps was dominated by people from the southern part of Ghana. Nonetheless, in present day Ghana, issues of regional affiliation are officially prohibited in recruitment policies and by national laws. While various reasons including the general lack of employment opportunities may influence the decisions of people to voluntarily put themselves up for military service, one cannot discount the role of social factors such as ethnic or regional ties within the armed forces. For example, Maurice Garnier argues that in advanced and industrialized democracies, social composition of recruited cadets who later become officers does not necessarily lead to changes in the dominant organizational ideology of the military.[17] While this argument could hold for some developing countries as well, the social makeup of the GAF has been a factor in the country's turbulent history of

civil-military relations. For instance, issues of ethnicization of the military by different civilian and military regimes contributed to the cycles of coups d'état in the country.

Apart from the socio-cultural underpinning of coups d'états, the military's claim to power was partly based on the belief among some officers and at times, the rank and file that, civilian political elites were the major participants and beneficiary of economic mismanagement, as well as the instigators of internal political strife. In this vein, military involvement in politics became the order of the day not because of the superior firepower of the military, but because the civilian political order proved unsatisfactory in most countries.[18] Paradoxically, the military in government also fared no better than the civilian elites they ousted. Coups became the quick root to power and the agency for guaranteed self-aggrandizement among officers.[19]

In most African countries, the inability of successive governments, both civilian and military to count on the loyalty of the armed forces to stabilize their political existence, together with the breakdown of the command structure and control in the military establishment undermined the professionalism of the armed forces to carry out its basic functions.[20] It is generally held in the predominant theories of civil-military relations that military professionalism is embodied in the officer corps[21] Professionalism in Huntington's view, is manifested by expertise, corporateness, and responsibility. Huntington argued that a professional military does not dabble in politics and coups d'état are violations of military professional ethics.[22] However, this Huntingtonian perspective has been widely criticized for its lack of nuanced explanations for the phenomenon of coups in non-western societies.[23] For example, Richard Price argued that, this line of argument does not make allowances for situations where the soldiers' definition of their proper professional roles, tasks, and autonomy differ significantly from that of the political elite. In such situations, the commitment of soldiers to their profession may lead them to intervene politically in order to protect professional autonomy and prerogatives. This was particularly the case in some new states with mal-integrated social systems where it was not uncommon to find politicians and soldiers holding widely differing expectations.[24] Also, in most developing societies, military officers are often seen by the society or even by themselves as modernizing elites with superior capability than that of their civilian counterparts.[25]

It can be argued that, while the social composition of the GAF has been a critical factor in the country's civil-military relations history, it is often the lack of agreement or concordance between the military, especially the officer corps and civilian politicians that often precipitates military coups. For instance, during the Second Republic, the approach of Prime Minister Busia in dealing with top brass of the military contributed to the untimely demise of his government. Aside the insensitivity of the government to mounting military grievance, and cuts in the budgets of the armed force, the apparent reproach by Busia

manifested by his actions, such as anger at the vilification of Lieutenant-General Albert Ocran, former member of the Presidential Commission and Chief of Defence Staff, when the later publicly demanded that Busia and cabinet declare their assets in accordance to the constitution. Again, Busia was said to have forcefully retired Lieutenant-General Michael Otu, Chief of Defence Staff, and Brigadier-General R. J. Acquah. He also authorized a public trial of Brigadier- General Alfred Kattah, on a charge of stealing, which according to his colleagues should have been quietly handled by a court-martial.[26] There have been similar cases in the Fourth Republic. For example, after the political turnover in 2001, some senior generals were released from the military by the NPP government. There were challenges of how to reintegrate these older soldiers into society without them posing threats to the survival of the new political administration.[27]

Since the return to democracy in 1992, there have been conscious efforts by successive administrations to ensure a modicum of regional balance within the armed forces, in general, and among the top hierarchy of the armed forces, in particular. As noted in chapter five, the issue of regional balance remains a very sensitive issue in the military. Efforts are made by government to maintain a semblance of regional balance in appointment to top service commanders such the Chief of Defence Staff, Chiefs of Army, Air Force and Naval staff respectively.[28] Even though the general conditions of service of the armed forces begs improvement, the general view held by respondents notably, civilians and rank and file of GAF is that, the officer corps have better conditions of service. For instance, like most top public and civil servants in Ghana, some key appointment holders in the military hierarchy live in some of the affluent areas of the capital city and other urban areas across Ghana. The conditions of service and other benefits senior officers are generally perceived to be better as compared to other public servants in the security services. While military salaries are not public knowledge, they are paid on time. Officers are also entitled to facilities such as housing, free utilities, official vehicles, and other allowances such as clothing and good pension.[29] Since 2007, military salaries are subject to annual review. Previously salaries were reviewed biannually.[30] Based on the author's interviews with some mid-career officers, it was revealed that the conditions of service of the officer corps, especially below the rank of a colonel, are not as rosy as perceived by outsiders. This is reflective of the general conditions of service for public servants in Ghana. In spite of this, the officer corps is associated with affluent lifestyle that comes with perks of military service.[31] In addition, there are significant differences in the conditions of service between officers and other ranks. Generally, officers are highly paid. They also have better facilities than the rank and file. For example, in military barracks across the country, the officer corps have separate accommodation and other facilities like mess and sports whose standards are higher than those for the rank and file.

Reforms discussed in chapter five have gone some way to generate a level of agreement between the military and political elites on the social composition of the officer corps. As noted under the discussion on human transformation in chapter five, governments under the Fourth Republic have endeavoured to abide by the constitutional requirement on regional balance in public sector institutions like the armed forces despite the noted challenges. This has arguably contributed to the improved state of civil-military relations in the country. However, this state of affairs does not take away the real or imagined perceptions of regional and politically motivated appointments and promotions within the officer corps.[32] The improved civil-military relations in the country has been attributed to the current generation of senior officer corps who seem to have high appreciation of the tenets of civil-military relations in general, and civilian and democratic control of the armed forces, in particular. This has come about as a result of the changing human composition of the armed forces, in general, and increasing exposure acquired by officers through local and international training and educational opportunities and peacekeeping.[33] For instance, the training opportunities provided by the UK under the Defence Diplomacy Programmes since the 1960s have had overall impact on force structures, the evolution of doctrine, combat and staff training and the conduct of operations. It is however difficult to measure the overall impact of these programmes on the development of politically neutral and democratically accountable armed forces.[34] Similarly, other developmental partners like US, India, China provide professional training opportunities to Ghanaian officers. The critical concern is the challenge of transferring learning and experiences to enhance professionalism.[35] It is therefore essential to transfer these experiences to the next generation of senior and mid-career officer corps and the rank and file, to some extent.[36]This can be extended to the rank and file, because, as noted in chapter five, there is the need for a complete cultural change among the rank and file and even some officers, as their behaviour tend to undermine the efforts at the institutional level to enhance civil-military relations and create a positive image for the GAF.

Human development is one the of features that sets the military apart from other professional institutions, as officers enter, develop and eventually exit, they may have a profound impact on the institution as a group due to generational influence in organization and leadership.[37] In this regard, generations must be allowed to teach and learn from each other through formal and informal settings, including mentorship.[38] This could enable the next generation to continue to become more professional and effectively engage civilian authority in the political decision making process in their field of expertise.

6.1.2 Political Decision-Making Process

The GAF gaining a global and local reputation that is marked by core values of professionalism and dedication of its personnel in executing their core mission both at home and abroad (through peacekeeping). However, the military may not necessarily be well served by the decisions made by politicians and military leaders. Poor defence decision-making may result in loss of lives and public funds.[39] It is imperative for key decision makers to get the right information, the right structures, the right processes, and the right people to make decisions to ensure efficiency and effectiveness of the armed forces. The political decision making process is an important determinant of civil-military relations. The military is expected in principle to be apolitical, but the reality is that all armed forces participate in the political process in diverse ways.[40] As an important state institution, it cannot be precluded from the political decision making process given their organizational identity, autonomy and functional expertise. Some have argued that the military is the executive power of politicians in the field of national and international security, safety and public order.[41] They are the agents or servants who work for the political principals.[42] The military can only be effective if the politicians who are the representative of the people allow them to be. The effectiveness can be in diverse forms and primarily depends on the resources allocated to the military as well as the missions and operations set for them by politicians. This line of argument is reinforced in Levy Yagil reconceptualization of civilian control of the military and control of militarization.[43] In his view, control of the military refers to the extent to which the citizenry, through civilian state institutions, is able to set limits on the freedom of action of the military in the areas of activity that have political implications. These areas include military doctrine and policies, operational plans, weapons systems, organization, recruitment, and promotion of officers. The limits set should be in line with political objectives and the resources required to attain those goals that elected civilians authority shape autonomously. The goals should also be reflective of the general societal goals. The military, in turn, must abide by these civilian directives leading to formation of relations of exchange, in which the military subordinates itself to civilian rulers in exchange for the resources (material and symbolic) that the state possesses and provides to the military.[44]

The different cultural norms and conditions that exist between political authority and military officers has been a source of civil-military tension in most democracies.[45]In the case of Ghana, due to the country's civil-military history, the political decision making processes on defence issues, in general and the GAF, in particular, are handled tactfully by political elites and the leadership of the armed forces.[46] There is a conscious choice by political authority in taking decisions that do not incur the displeasure of the military. As discussed under political transformation, the process of defence budgeting has been shrouded in secrecy for diverse reasons including national security. In the period before

1992, the armed forces basically held the upper hand in deciding issues of budgetary allocation, expenditure and even issues of force structure and size.[47] Since the return to democracy, the political decision making process on defence has been outlined in the 1992 constitution. This has contributed to harmonizing the relationship between military and political authority. The military is also increasingly internalizing democratic principles and internalizing the values of civilian control in its professional ethics. In this regard, there have been shifts in the political decision making process, whereby institutions like the defence ministry is asserting its role in defence management process. [48] Notably, introduction of budgetary reform processes in 1999 further enhanced the role of civilian authority.

Decisions on defence issues are often taken through a multi-tiered approach. As shown in the diagram below, decisions or recommendations on routine operational issues often emanate from a bottom-up approach. Most often, proposals made at the service or unit levels are transmitted through formation and service commanders to the General Headquarters and the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) for onward submission to the Ministry of Defence. Most of these proposals are then discussed at the Armed Forces Council (AFC), where recommendations are made and forwarded to the presidency for further actions.[49] However, key policy decisions often emanate from the top, coming for example from the presidency and discussed at the Armed Forces Council to advise the President. As noted in chapter four, The AFC is a constitutional body chaired by the Vice-President, and made up of Ministers for Defence, Foreign Affairs, and Interior, the Chief of Defence Staff, and all Service Chiefs, Forces Sergeant-Major, and another two persons appointed by the president in consultation with the Council of State.[50] All major policy decisions on defence including procurement, promotions of senior officers and appointments are taken at this level. This council meets three times a year (but may hold emergency meetings when necessary) to make recommendations that are forwarded to the commander-in-chief to take final decisions with assistance of his cabinet.[51] While the 1992 constitution charges the CDS with day-to-day administration of the armed forces, the implementation of this function is often problematic with regards to what kinds of administrative matters the CDS could decide upon without recourse to the direction of AFC. Therefore subjection the discretion of the CDS and the composition of the AFC, differences may arise on what constitute routine and major matters in which the Council may have to be consulted. Indeed, some AFC depending on the composition and wisdom of the members may require the CDS to consult it on almost all operational issues of the armed forces.[52]



Figure 6-6: Defence Decision making Process

Source: Author

From the existing constitutional and institutional arrangements, there is concordance between the armed forces and the executive on the decision making process on defence issues. As noted previously, the president chairs the National Security Council where key decisions concerning defence and security may be taken. The vice president chairs the AFC which takes key decision with regards to the policy and running of the military institution. There is often consultation between the executive and the armed forces, primarily through the CDS, on the defence decision-making process.[53] A typical case was in 2010, when the late President John Mills endorsed the ECOWAS decision to contribute troops to an intended ECOWAS intervention in Côte d'Ivoire during the post-elections crises to forcibly remove then President Laurent Gbagbo, who had refused to step down after losing elections. President Mills later back-tracked his earlier commitment to ECOWAS after he was advised by his Service Chiefs on the overstretched Ghanaian troops in peacekeeping operations elsewhere and the possible security implication of any intervention in the neighbouring Côte d'Ivoire.[54]

Despite the existence of concordance, the relationship between the military and civilian political authority is not always cordial as one may want to believe. Indeed disagreements do arise between leadership of the military and political authorities on defence issues such as budgetary requirements and the use of the armed forces. However, such issues do not

often get into the public domain. These differences are often resolved at the AFC and at the level of Ministry of Defence.[55] For example, after the political turnover in 2001, there was tension between the NPP government and the military, [56] partly due to lack of proper understanding of the actual role of the military in the governance process. The military was perceived as sympathetic to the previous NDC administration that emerged from the PNDC.[57] While the military often perceives itself from a position of superiority over civilians, the tendency of the civilian authority to also push the principle of civilian supremacy to an extreme often to the detriment of established structures create frostiness in the relation between the two actors.[58] As recounted by a retired major-general,

> "When the NPP took over power in 2001, there were discussions mostly initiated by the military hierarchy to develop a clear national defence policy as the country did not have one. Following demands of the military for a defence policy, the political leadership felt its authority was being challenged. But, it later saw the merit in the argument of the military hierarchy and tasked the military to develop the policy. However, the military made it known to the political leadership that it was not their duty to develop a policy but could provide professional input into a process initiated by the executive. This position by the military did not go down well with the political leadership. There was no comprehensive national security policy to set out the tone for a defence policy."[59]

Another senior officer observed that,

> "While we try to present a semblance of a cordial relationship, the reality is not always one of a harmonious relationship. There is disconnect between political authority and the military. Political authority may have not the requisite knowledge on defence issues. But, military officials due to various reasons including their career prospects are at times reluctant to stand up to their professional stance in dealing with political authority. Few officers stood on to their professional grounds and challenged political authority did so at the risk of their promotions."[60]

The statements as above point to instances of discordance between political authority and military. However, the fact that these have not presented threats to the survival of the Fourth Republic is indicative of improved civil-military relations in Ghana.

In addition Schiff argues that issues of military size and composition are also central to the political decision-making process. These also have a direct impact on the general society due to the potential involvement of the citizenry with the armed forces and the economic

cost involved.[61] So it is critical that the citizens along with the military and the political leadership agree on the institutional methods for determining the size and composition of the military. Ideally, the citizenry, through elected officials, may voice their agreement or disagreement of the decision- making process that determines military size, budgets and method of recruitment.[62]Even though decisions on these issues may ultimately be taken by political and military officials at the highest domestic decision-making levels, it is important that government institutions and political channels are in place to enable the citizenry to express their participation. As noted in chapter five, the political space has gradually been opened to the extent that traditionally 'non-securocratic' institutions such as parliament, the Auditor-General, the Accountant-General, the Commission for Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ), and civil society are now playing critical roles in the governance of the defence and security sector.[63] However, these bodies are faced with multiple challenges that hamper their effectiveness.

In the case of CHRAJ, it is a quasi-judicial institution established under the 1992 Constitution to help promote transparency and public sector accountability. It is also responsible for promotion of human rights.[64] It is expected to perform certain functions including: "to investigate complaints concerning the functioning of the Public Services Commission, the administrative organs of the state, the officers of the Regional Coordinating Council and the District Assembly, the Armed Forces, the Police Service and the Prisons Service as far as the complaints relate to the failure to achieve a balanced structuring of those services, or equal access by all to the recruitment of those services, or fair administration in relation to those services."[65] In reality, CHRAJ is faced with constitutional, legal, resource and administrative and financial constraints thereby rendering it less effective. For instance, it cannot initiate investigation unless it is petitioned to do so. After investigations, it lack powers to enforce it recommendations and has to rely on the judicial system to enforce its findings. CHRAJ does not have powers to prosecute corruption cases and it is seriously underfunded making it difficult to attract and return competent staff.[66] While CHRAJ has dealt with high profile corruption by public officials, there is no public knowledge of its involvement in investigation of corruption cases in the armed forces. Nonetheless, on issues of human rights violations, there have been few instances where people have petitioned the commission on issues involving the GAF. Nonetheless, the outcomes of such investigations are not made public.[67]

Similarly, capacity of state agencies, such as the Auditor-General to track and monitor government expenditures of any kind, including military spending is limited by constitutional constraints and inadequate technical resources and funding.[68] For example, on yearly basis, the Auditor-General Report on public accounts of Ghana is submitted to parliament for scrutiny. Standing Order 165 of Parliament assigns to the Public Accounts Committee, (PAC), powers to study the audited accounts showing the appropriation of

funds granted by Parliament to the government.[69] PAC may call upon heads of institutions and individuals cited in these reports for financial irregularities to appear at his public hearings to offer explanations. Subsequently, PAC makes recommendations on its findings. The opening up of PAC proceedings to the public has significantly enhanced revived public interest in issues of corruption and abuse of office including misappropriation of public resources. The effort of parliament has been enhanced in promotion of accountability, combating corruption, strengthening budgetary oversight and resource allocation.[70] However, PAC lacks to power to enforce its decisions and thus must liaise with agencies like the Attorney General's Department to enforce its recommendations including refunds of monies into the public coffers and prosecution of public officials deemed to have misappropriated public funds. With regards to the GAF, their financial transactions are in principle subject to audit. For instance, one officer remarked that, "there is so much waste of public resources within the armed forces. Periodically, auditors come to look into our books, but the critical question relates to the depth of the audit and outcome of the report they submit."[71] This is because corruption is prevalent in Ghana's defence sector, yet the public hardly made aware through the auditor-general report. Indeed cases that are deemed too damaging for government are often not publicized through the work of PAC.[72]

Despite the semblance of concordance on the political decision making process, the defence budgetary process and allocation is not immune from the wider economic realities of the country. For example, as noted by a senior civil servant at the Defence Ministry, "civilian authority do not fully understand defence matters…They always look at the financial side, to decide on what the country could afford.[73] Another retired general observes that, "analysis on defence budgetary needs is not always responded to by politicians. Most of the time, allocations are not based on technical needs of the military, but what the politician thinks the country can afford. Politicians must be schooled in defence and security issues to be able to make informed decisions on the sector."[74] These views represent the apparent lack of mutual understanding among the military and their civilian counterparts on critical issues such as defence expenditure. With regards to defence procurement, Ghana like most African or developing countries does not have a defence industry and thus relies on import from advanced or industrialized countries. It is noted that key decisions on defence procurement, such as equipment are often taken at the cabinet level following recommendations from the AFC. In taking such decision on procurement, there is the likelihood of collusion and corruption among politicians and top brass of the military. An often cited case was in 2003 when parliament approved USD 55 million for the Ministry of Defence to acquire helicopters for peacekeeping. It was however revealed that estimated cost for these helicopters, contract provisions for training personnel, and provision of spare parts and tools was USD 19,695,600.[75] Developments such as these, raise questions about the quality and integrity of both civilian authority and military leadership.

6.1.3. Recruitment Method and Military Style

It is argued by Schiff and other writers that the methods of recruitment into the armed forces and military style are important determinants of civil-military relations. The recruitment strategy and the military style reflect the cultural conditions of the society. It is argued that lack of ethnic and social balance of the officer corps and discriminatory recruitment of the rank and file has an effect on the military style and civil-military relations.[76] Nonetheless, unlike most of the other determinants of civil-military relations, recruitment does not have much to do with how political elites and military leaders interact, than the way military personnel and armed forces are generally embedded in the civil and political environment.[77] Edwin Micewski argues that, issues of power relations between military and political elites are the bedrock of civil-military relations, however, with regards to recruitment; it is often societal-military interactions that influence recruitment. This is because recruitment has an immediate impact on the connection between the individual citizen and the defence of the state.[78] Generally recruitment policies and processes are often informed by a broad range of factors including the security environment, geopolitical and geostrategic interests, and economic conditions, and cultural influences, educational and socio-political interests.[79]

As mentioned earlier, two methods of recruitment; conscription and persuasive methods have been well debated in the literature. Conscription involves a universal obligation for all citizens (often male population) to defend the state and undergo training for this purpose. In such systems, the standing army is made up of a professional officer corps, a group of non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and the conscripts. In some jurisdictions, these persons-conscripts, former officers and NCOs are often enrolled into the reserve forces upon termination of their active service. Persuasive methods often involve all-volunteer forces drawn from state-employed professionals for whom soldiering is like any other job. There may also be reserve force options for former professional soldiers.[80] Essentially, armed forces based on recruitment of professional volunteers and those manned by conscripts are different in terms of their professional ethos, each of which may have advantages and disadvantages for effective civilian and democratic control.[81] It is argued that conscription is often disliked by professional militaries because armed forces made of draftees are expensive and require a large amount of resources to produce the required capability.[82] Generally, most democracies are moving away from conscription to all-volunteer forces. Schiff argues that persuasive recruitment indicates agreement among the political leadership, the military and citizenry over the requirements of the armed forces. In this type of recruitment, often voluntary in nature, citizens may put themselves up for military service based on certain beliefs such as security, patriotism or any other cause such as employment and job security.

The method of recruitment into the GAF has been persuasive in nature since the days of the colonial army. The professional military in a democracy should be raised to reflect the social, ethnic, religious and geographical composition of the society. In this regard, democracies are expected to develop sound recruitment policies to make it possible for citizens from diverse background to make a career in the military either on long-term or short service.[83] The recruitment policies of the country since 1992 seem reflective of this imperative. There is general agreement among political and military leadership and citizenry in Ghana on the recruitment method of the armed forces. The citizenry does not have a direct role in the formulation of these policies, but favourably respond to recruitment advertisements. In most modern societies, the often cited benefit of military service as providing some kind of national civic duty is hardly relevant in present day circumstances.[84] Citizens in such voluntary forces may look up to the military service for various reasons such as altruistic service and self-enhancement motives; as well as economic motives like better pay, gaining skills, and future employment.[85]

As mentioned earlier, GAF has become an employer of choice, whom thousands of qualified young Ghanaians look up to for jobs every year. Most of the respondents sampled on civil-military relations in Ghana viewed the armed forces in high esteem and unanimously agreed on the need for armed forces in Ghana and thus consider the military as an important partner in the governance and development processes. Most respondents cited reasons of territorial defence, internal security, emergency response and rescue, and civil construction in remote areas. However, respondents expressed mixed opinions to the question of whether they wish to join the armed forces. Some of the respondents between ages 18-30 wished they could make a career within the military. However, some of these respondents expressed mixed feelings about the lack of openness in the recruitment process of the armed forces. Indeed one respondent remarked that "their recruitment process lacks transparency."[86] This perception is typically associated with recruitment into most public institutions in Ghana. On hindsight, the processes that are generally merit-based. Yet the actual selection processes are often characterized by lack of transparency and equal opportunity for all Ghanaians. There is a high tendency for people to secure public sector employment based on their social networks. As noted under the discussion on regional balance, the issue of protocol recruitment process could be equated to a sort of partnership between political elites and the military on who gets into the armed forces. Generally wards or people associated with former and active military persons and people connected to political elites may have the upper hand over ordinary citizens in a supposedly merit-based recruitment process. Due to desire of most unemployed youth to secure jobs, some even fall prey to scrupulous recruitment middle-men who dupe them of huge sums of money under the pretext of securing enlistment for them.[87] This situation can be partly attributed to lack

of transparency in an otherwise merit-based system of recruitment in most public sector institutions in Ghana including the armed forces and the police.

The military style exemplified by the external manifestations and inner mental constructions associated with the military. These include the appearance, ethos, and public perceptions about the military. The military style of the GAF is essentially British in nature as the military was mirrored along the former colonial masters. For instance, the mess etiquettes and other qualities of the British aristocracy such as gentlemanliness, finesse and professionalism are the cornerstone of the military tradition in Ghana. As noted previously the GAF is widely respected by the Ghanaian public for their unique corporate and national character.

Indeed, the pomp and pageantry associated with military ceremonies have been essential feature most national celebrations such as independence parades and government inaugural ceremonies. Nonetheless, some aspects of military style which are manifested by the organizational culture are essential determinants of the nature of the relationship between the military and the general society. This will be discussed in the subsequent section of the chapter.

6.2 The Military and the Ghanaian Society

The military in most democracies is an important tool of statehood, however, the prestige of the military rests upon the approval of the general society.[88] The armed forces is embedded and at the same time insulated from the society, especially in democratic societies.[89] However, civilian control of the military is often limited to the relations between elected civilians and generals. As discussed above, this relationship is often viewed mostly through the formal institutional mechanisms and informal relations that influence the manner in which policy makers make use of the military.[90] Civil control of the military, including the way civilians and the general public views and monitors the military is an important factor in fostering healthy civil-military relations. The relationship between military and society is perhaps one of the most significant issues in most democracies. This is because it involves a myriad of conditions that affect militaries, the citizenry at large, and their relationships with each other and other countries.[91] Schiff notes that while some nations and their citizenry have agreed on the institutional separation between civilian elites and the armed forces, other societies have not.[92] In this regard, some have argued that, those nations that do not espouse institutional separation are not necessarily in conformity with the normal condition of civil–military relations.[93] Schiff argues that, these viewpoints lack nuanced understanding of the need for cultural and institutional sensitivity especially in developing nations where the dominant Western civil–military separations may or may not be regarded as indigenously appropriate.[94] Concordance theory, however, considers the citizenry as an

important partner, even though, Schiff did not elaborate how the relationship between the military and society plays out in practical terms and its likely effects on maintaining a stable civil-military relationship or otherwise.

In the case of African societies, Naison Ngoma observes that since time immemorial the relationship between the military and civil society has been both problematic and complex often without a clear distinction between soldiers and the rest of the society. However, the contemporary era has seen the military evolving into a professional and full-time establishment that is distinct from civil society.[95] In Ghana, as in other societies with histories of colonial repressive and post-independence coup-prone militaries, the relations between two actors are characterized by mutual suspicion and mistrust. Particularly, the military is generally feared by the civilian population partly due to the inherently violent nature of their profession. The military have been used by both military regimes and authoritarian civilian regimes to unleash a reign of terror and various forms of human rights abuses against civilian population. Moreover, the abysmal records of past military regimes also deflated the military's claim of superior ability to rule. Civilians have a poor perception of the military as legitimate political rulers.[96] Since the beginning of the Fourth Republic, the military has sought to redeem its battered image, re-professionalize and develop a healthy relationship with the civilian population. The literature on civil-military relations in Ghana has focused extensively on the power relations between the military and political elites. The relationship between the citizenry and military is often not considered. The general public is not factored into the decision making process on defence issues in Ghana. The remaining section of this chapter looks at the relationship between the military and the general society, including key societal actors such as the media and civil society organizations.

During the PNDC era that ushered in the Fourth Republic military supremacy in Ghanaian society was the order of the day even though the regime was quasi-military in nature. The era was characterized by military presence in most aspects of public life. The advent of the Fourth Republic came with the natural expectation of demilitarization of politics and society as an important mechanism of nurturing and consolidating democracy. This process included ad hoc processes to re-professionalize the armed forces some of which have been discussed under themes of defence transformation. The critical question is how these developments have contributed to improving civil-military relations within the context of the relationship between the armed forces and general society. Previous surveys on civil-military relations have pointed to a generally high appreciation of the role of the military in protecting the territorial integrity of the state. The Ghanaian public also holds the military in high esteem for their role in both external and internal peacekeeping, emergency rescue and disaster relief, provision of civil support duties like road construction, bridges and healthcare. The military is also admired as an important national symbol.[97] Interestingly, all

respondents sampled for this study attested to these factors and thus considered the military as an important state institution and partner in the development process. Most respondents justified their reasons within the intricate linkage between developments and security.[98]To them, the military provides the peaceful environment for governance and development to thrive.

The GAF is one of the most publicly trusted institutions in Ghana with regards to performance of their core mandate.[99] For example, results of the 2015 Afrobarometer survey on public perceptions on state institutions reveals that "the only public institution that enjoys a substantial level of trust is the military. More than half of Ghanaians (56%) say they trust the military."[100] Despite the appreciable level of trust in the military, public perception towards the military is at best mixed. Initially, the public perception towards the military has been a negative one as the military is often regarded as avenue for school drop-outs and violent persons. This is partly attributed to the nature of the colonial army which was mostly made up of enlisted illiterates used for the purpose of oppressing public discontents against colonialism. The military was basically seen as an oppressive and lawless institution. In the post-independence era the image persisted for a long while. The military over the years have changed in terms of the human composition with educated persons and professionals increasingly making careers in military service. Indeed, opinions of the respondents varied on their general impression or perceptions about the armed forces. For instance some respondents noted the following about the GAF: "they are bunch of highly skilled personnel in various disciplines who are always ready to defend the nation on call. They are very disciplined and respected. But there is a perception that they are scary and should be feared."[101]

The military is respected because it is regarded as more disciplined as compared to other security services like the police. Most of the respondents across the three regions were very appreciative of the corporate image of the military, particularly, the disciplined and strict demeanour of military personnel. Generally, most Ghanaians are more confident of the military as a reliable source of security than the police. However, some respondents noted that, the military behave like secret organization and are not very open with information to outside or external people."[102]Another respondent added that "they are sometimes polite but not friendly most of the times. Others observed that "they have recently moved from bullying people. Now most Ghanaians can relate to them, but there is some element of fear due to their past."[103]

The above comments paint a picture of mixed perceptions among Ghanaian citizenry about the armed forces. The military has over the years embarked on some measures to bridge the gap and improve their image among the citizens. For instance, each year the gates of all garrisons are opened to the general public as part of activities marking the country's

Independence Day celebrations. This event known as the Open Day allows citizens, mostly school pupils to visit military installations and be educated on the activities of the military.[104] For example, people get to enjoy free rides on the air force planes, and naval ships. Moreover, military personnel are increasingly being educated through workshops, academic courses and seminars on the tenets of civil and civilian control of the armed forces.[105] For instance, curricular at institutions like the Ghana Armed Forces Command and Staff College (GAFCSC) include modules on good governance.[106] In this regard, there have been some improvements in the previously tensed relations between public and the military. As observed from the respondents, the average person in Ghana may have visited a military barracks for varied reasons across the three regions studied. For example, one respondent noted that "the military people are just like us civilians but only in uniform."[107] Indeed, almost all respondents indicated that they felt secure in military environments. However, some of them pointed out their initial uneasiness in the environment which were later watered-down following friendly interaction with the military. These views from the ordinary Ghanaians point to improving relations as compared to the pre-1992 era when people would prefer to keep away from the military barracks due to fear of being harassed by the military.

The culture of impunity, which characterized the rule of the PNDC, has largely ended, and the state and its security apparatus are no longer perceived by the general public as agents of insecurity or fear.[108] This notwithstanding there is some room for improvement. As noted in chapter five, the negative culture of the military has not changed completely even though their evolving missions bring them into regular contact with society. Essentially, the image of the brute soldier is still prevalent among some members of GAF. Some of the military officers interviewed acknowledged this fact, and argued the rank and file especially, need reorientation on the appropriate way of dealing with civilians in a democracy. Indeed some members of officer corps need some further reorientation to improve their attitude towards the civilian population. Issues of military brutality continue to surface in the media. These have been detailed in chapter five. It is however noteworthy that in April 2016, a story was reported about a teenager who was tied to tree and tortured by some soldiers on a suspicion of mobile phone theft. This story provoked public sentiment especially when it coincided with the release of an alleged report of a military inquiry into an earlier shooting incident in Accra that claimed one civilian life. The military later discredited the media report of exonerating the 23 soldiers while explaining that the soldiers fired in response to mob action by the residents during a demolition exercise by a private real estate developer.[109] As noted previously, the GAF abhors any act of unprofessionalism by its personnel, the military authorities accordingly responded to the media reports on the tortured teenager and the soldiers involved were arrested and subjected to civil and internal disciplinary procedures.[110] Several acts of indiscipline by

military personnel are subjected to internal disciplinary measures and court martial, and those bothering on criminality are then forwarded to the civil courts.[111]

In spite of the mixed relationship between the military and ordinary people within the society, almost all the respondents interviewed opined that Ghana needs an armed force and this institution is an important partner in the governance process. The prevalent view among the respondents is that the armed forces exist to provide security for development to take place. For example, a respondent noted that "the armed forces and other security agencies in the country maintain peace and security in the country and ensure that there is peace and stability within our borders". Another adds that, "I believe that when peace prevails in a country, its citizen's work effectively and efficiently for tremendous prosperity and growth."[112] The role of the armed forces in projecting Ghana's image abroad through peacekeeping was widely noted by most of the respondents. One respondent noted that, "personnel who go on peacekeeping mission bring foreign exchange into the economy."[113] As such the military is an important partner in the governance and development process. These views find resonance in the linkage between development and security. For instance, a respondent from Accra aptly captured this that "without their role in safeguarding internal security, meaningful development cannot take place."[114] This is precisely so because, the front line institution responsible for internal security, the police is largely perceived as corrupt and ineffective.

Others note that, "the armed forces undertake developmental assignment and therefore contribute to civil infrastructure construction". Some respondents argue for inclusion of the military in developmental projects. To them, "the military should be given more opportunity to contribute to the development as they possess the requisite skills."[115] Nevertheless, some respondents in the informal sector, seem to lack a clear understanding of the role of the armed forces in the democracy. For example, one respondent noted that "they ensure peace in the country and also provide assistance in times of accidents and disasters. But he also adds that since they are part of the executive government they ensure the protection of basic human rights of citizens."[116] Another respondent notes that, "the armed forces consist of the police who help administer peace."[117] A fisherman in Central Region also remarked that, "soldiers, police are all part of the armed forces."[118] These views were very prevalent among respondents from the Central Region. This region is one of the four regions where there is no visible military presence. It appears some ordinary Ghanaians are confused over what constitutes the armed forces and other security services and their respective roles. Ordinarily, people perceive all uniform personnel as security providers. This can be attributed to the use of the armed forces for internal security and the presence and influence of the military in the society in the days of military rule and the early days of the Rawlings-led NDC.[119]

6.2.1 Civil Society and the Military

It is a given that civil society organizations play important role in a democracy. Civil and democratic control of the armed forces involves the participation of a wide range of social actors including civil society and media who can provide oversight and inputs.[120] Schiff's concordance theory did not elucidate the relationship between the military and these core elements of the society. However, it is important for one to delve into how these actors also matter in the civil-military relations discourse in Ghana. There is no universally acceptable definition of the term "civil society." Generally, it refers to the realm of organized social life that is voluntary, self-generating, mostly self-supporting, and autonomous from the state, and bound by a legal order or set of shared rules.[121] This realm of public space often includes networks of institutions through which citizens can voluntarily represent themselves in cultural, ideological, and political senses.[122] This is separate from general "society" in that it involves citizens acting collectively in a public sphere to express their interests, passions, and ideas, exchange information, achieve mutual goals, make demands on the state, and hold state officials accountable.[123] There is also contention on the nature or appropriate relations between civil society and state: whether state-civil society relations are cordial or hostile.[124] Civil society provides a check on the power of the state.[125] This may often strain relationships between civil society actors and government elites. Nonetheless, Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) are essential as they may help promote institutionalized social trust that helps deepen the democratic process.[126] For instance, Helge Rønning argues that the relationship between state and civil society in an African context is one of tension between a weak state and a weak civil society.[127]

The return to democratic rule in Africa also came with some significant changes in the relationship between the state and CSOs. In Ghana, for instance, the relationship has moved from mutual suspicion and exclusion, to one of greater engagement and accommodation of CSOs in development policy dialogue, in particular, and public policymaking in general.[128] Under the platform of the Movement for Freedom and Justice, civil society groups like the Ghana Bar Association, Trades Union Congress, National Union of Ghanaian Students, Christian Council, Catholic Bishops Conference, as well as the media played an instrumental role in communicating the local demands for return to democratic rule in the country. Under the current democratic dispensation, a number of CSOs have played crucial roles in shaping and sustaining the democratic process in the country.[129] Prior to 1992, governments, especially in the days of Structural Adjustment Programme under the PNDC, civil society organizations were seen as obstacles in the process of governance. The government therefore resorted to harsh legal measures to curb their participation in the decision making processes. The current political dispensation has witnessed increasing involvement of civil society actors, despite their challenges, in formulation and

implementation of policy decisions such as poverty reduction strategies, domestic violence law, and political transition laws, among others.[130]

With particular reference to the defence and security sector, civil society actors have an important role to play from political decisions and planning (defining policies or a reform agenda), to the effective provision of security services (supporting and monitoring the delivery of public security services), and finally in the evaluation of security and defence policies.[131] Civil society working outside the formal institutions, mainly through social movements and interest groups, can influence institutional policy making through lobbying, protests, court appeals, and the media.[132] It was observed sometime back that African CSOs were generally disinterested in these areas and also had weak capacity to effectively engage the actors of the sector to influence policy and oversight.[133] While this have changed considerably, other persisting challenges including lack of trust and/or transparency between CSOs and the security and defence sectors, lack of independence of CSOs and fragmented CSOs tend to affect advocacy on issues related to security and defence sector oversight.[134]

Partly due to history of poor civil-military relations, civil society, especially the epistemic communities and the media until recently shied away from venturing on defence and security issues in Ghana. The relationship between the military and civil society organization is one of uneasiness. As noted by chair of the Civic Forum Initiative Ghana, [135]"they (the military) try to accommodate civil society, but do so with suspicions and from a position of perceived superiority. The military by its very nature, composition and ethos is based on a disciplined and process approach to doing business. However, this does not exist in civil society which has a different approach to business."[136] The involvement of civil society in security and defence sector governance, in general, emerged after the late 1990s.[137] For example, Aning and Lartey, note that this was not possible in the past due to two reasons. "First, the political sensitivities of the PNDC regime and its overriding penchant for "securitizing" issues that it did not want publicly scrutinized resulted in an unofficial embargo on closer civil society engagement and supervision. Second, there was a dearth of civilian expertise on matters of security."[138] There has been a resurgence of civil society and media with expanded scope and self-confidence in their determination to preserve freedom and ensure good governance. Despite the relative changes in civil society engagement in the governance process, defence and security remain a highly specialized area in Ghana. As a result, there is a limited circle of experts and non-governmental research organizations in this area.[139]

Moreover, the traditional secrecy surrounding issues of defence and security has not changed significantly. It was observed some time back that the strategies of CSOs towards the security sector often lacked political astuteness. This is because of the tendency of pro-

democracy actors or advocates to generally demonizing the security sector, and the military in particular. [140] The lack of appropriate strategies by CSOs to effectively engage the military contributed to heightening the hostility between the two rather than ameliorating it.[141] The changing nature of the African security and governance landscape in recent years provides opportunities for African states and civil society organizations to engage in comprehensive study and application of civil-military relations beyond the prevailing theoretical approaches.[142] There have been some modest shifts in the engagement of civil society on defence issues. For example, think tanks such as the African Security Research and Dialogue (ASDR), Ghana Centre for Democratic Development, (CDD-Ghana), Imani-Ghana, undertake research and policy dialogue on defence and security issues. Such CSOs have been able to engage and actually provided training and capacity building programmes for both political and military officers. Some others also facilitate dialogue with representatives of the security and defence establishments and to encourage public debate on the sector.

Despite the opening up of the civil society space in the field of defence and security, there remains a vacuum for effective dialogue with both the armed forces and the political authorities on a range of issues including defence policy, defence budgeting, roles and missions of the armed forces, recruitment, training, force deployment and equipment.[143] Through effective partnership, civil society can bring their comparative advantage to bear in the defence management process directly through formal dialogues and indirectly through research and analysis to inform policy. This could help improve transparency in the defence process and engender public trust and support through the work of the media.

6.2.2 Media-Military Relations

Free and interdependent media is a cardinal element of democracy, especially where they can play a vital role in keeping government and people aware of each other. To this end, the media provides a transmission link between the political system and the public sphere. The media thus play a dual role in representing and forming political opinion. Therefore, the media constitute a fundamental linkage between society and the government, communicating information, intentions, concerns, priorities and reactions to policies.[144] The media facilitates the democratic process by upholding accountability, transparency and good governance in the public sector.[145]In most established democracies, the media and civil society and interest groups may help to educate the citizenry on specialized areas of defence and security, in order to enable deeper policy debates and informed discussion on policy options.[146] The media and civil society can play key roles in monitoring defence and security sector institutions to ensure that they are effective and accountable. However, this has been very challenging even in advanced democracies due to several factors including

the lack of transparency and restrictions placed on reporting defence and security activities such as budgeting and expenditures.[147]

The armed forces, like any public institution is a national asset and must therefore account for its actions and identify its relevance and contribution to the public interest.[148] Accountability is required of military operations as well as the conduct of individual service personnel. This can be best done through effective communication and response to media enquiries without necessarily compromising the security of the state. Many militaries often use their public relations outfits as well as the independent media to continually inform the public about the role and relevance of the armed forces in order to engender public support.[149] The interest of the media in the military is necessary and healthy for any democracy.[150] The media plays an important role in shaping perceptions of the society on the military. It also helps to influence the perceptions of the military in the policy process and military professionalism.[151] It is argued that both the military and media seek to serve the public good. The military does this through the defence of national security. While the media ensure that civilians back home are fully informed of the nation's foreign policy and wartime commitments. To this end, tensions can arise between the two due to competing requirements. For instance, successful military operations require the element of surprise and entails secrecy. The media in contrast, generally seeks transparency in their reportage.[152] In essence, the balance between censorship and free press has been has been the source of tension between the military and the media in most democracies especially in times of war or crisis. Most militaries around the world have established media or public relations offices in order to constructively manage their relationships and communications with journalists. However, the interaction between the media and security and defence policy makers and practitioners remains with tensions.[153]

The Ghanaian media landscape before 1992 was very restricted. The national broadcaster, Ghana Broadcasting Corporation (GBC), and only two state-owned newspapers, the *People's Daily Graphi*c and *Ghanaian Times* dominated. Their contents were mostly a collation of government press releases and speeches of state officials.[154] Since independence, GBC which is a public service institution has been used traditionally to carry out a political propagandist and developmental role to the interest of competing political elites.[155] The activities of private media were largely curtailed by the Criminal Libel Law. Indeed, daring practitioners who stood up to the excesses of the PNDC regime were harassed with frequent arrests and detention. This development stifled press freedom. The media in Ghana, especially the private media, have been one of the drivers for democratic change.[156] The return to constitutional rule brought about change in the media landscape. The 1992 Constitution under chapter 12 guarantees a free and independent media. Since the lift of the newspaper licensing law, (PNDCL 211) in July 1992, there had been the re-emergence of private press.[157] Private media expanded quickly with when the NPP

government repealed the Criminal Libel Law with the passage of Criminal Libel and Seditious Libel Laws (Amendment) Act 2001 (Act 602) in July 2001. [158]

As at 2015, there are over 100 newspapers and print media with diverse focus.[159] With regards to the electronic media, about 412 Frequency Modulation (FM) and 63 Television stations have been registered by the National Communication Authority to operate throughout the country.[160] The National Media Commission was established in 1993 under Act 449 to regulate the media landscape. The media as the fourth estate of the realm has since become instrumental in safeguarding the country's democratic principles by performing its watchdog and monitoring functions.[161] The media, in particular, have provided enormous information on public affairs and helped the general population in setting the agenda, disseminate political information, expose corrupt practices in government, and general developments in the country including the activities of the armed forces.[162] The role of the media in identifying key issues and their ability to influence public agenda and opinions cannot be underestimated.[163] Particularly, the emergence of private owned media has added some value to the democratization process. For example, they help probe government policies and behaviour; foster a discursive public where issues of national concern can be openly articulated.[164]

With the return to democratic governance in Ghana, both the media and the military have undergone some changes with regards to their roles in society. The relationship between the media and the military was marked by mutual distrust and suspicion.[165] This is not remarkably different from the relationship between military and the general society. The lack of understanding of each other's role in the society is seen as the principal cause of the tension between the media the military.[166] Typically, the media see itself as neutral and powerful voice of the public and often see the military and the way it operates as an impediment to accessing uncensored information.[167] In the same vein, the military is also wary of the media, partly due to the latter's tendency to misrepresent information without due regard to security imperatives and the future role and effectiveness of the military.[168] For example, Section 16 of the Armed Forces Act (1962) and other institutional regulations puts restrictions on disclosure of military information. Specifically article (b) states that "every person subject to the Code of Service Discipline who without authority discloses in any manner whatsoever any information relating to the numbers, position, material, movements, preparations for operations of any of the Armed Forces or of any forces co-operating therewith."[169] Another article (c) also states that "without authority discloses in any manner whatsoever any information relating to a cryptographic system, aid, process, procedure, publication or document of any of the Armed Forces or of any forces co-operating therewith".

These provisions notwithstanding, the media often perceive of military officials attempting to prevent any coverage with the potential to put the armed forces in a bad light. The military in turn see the media as a group of self-aggrandized journalists driven mainly by market pressures, and job security.[170] Most often, media reports in Ghana on the military tend to focus on violent misconducts of soldiers such as brutalities against civilians. These portray the military as harsh and oppressive institution. There are only a few reports that point to professionalism of the institution and the courage of individual soldiers in peacekeeping and other functions of the military in society. This can be attributed to the reason that the media thrive on sensationalism to capture the attention of their audience.[171] These developments have a remarkable effect on public consciousness often leading to generally accepted stereotypes about the military, some of which may be misleading, simplistic, and sometimes the cause of irritation and distress to the people in the institution. [172] Moreover, the cultural differences between the two institutions also contribute to the seeming conflict. Typically, the military is conservative, corporatist and secretive while the media is liberal, open and public oriented.[173]While the military expect public support in the performance of their legitimate task, the media is not only interested in informing the public about military policy and activities, but also to bring out the political, ethical and legal issues relating to military activities.[174] Furthermore, differences in modes of operations of the two may add to the tension. For example, the military's bureaucratic processes, restrictions, attention to detail and reliance on official sources may delay the access and release of information. On the contrast, the media are often quick to go to press at the earliest possible time with whatever they perceive to be news.[175]

In addition, as mentioned in chapter four, Ghana's current political dispensation has become excessively politicized. Partisanship has become a major component of most public discourse in the country. The media, especially privately owned media, have also been polarized along party lines. Indeed, some politicians own media establishments to pursue business and political interests, at times creating tensions in the country. The media landscape has some shortcomings such as unprofessional practices and ethical breaches like biased reportage, publication of untruth, libellous and sensational stories and political propaganda.[176] For instance, some media personnel often lack deeper understanding of issues, and use their platforms to attack personalities who are perceived as opponents of their agenda.[177] As noted, the military as an institution is not completely immune from politicization of public discourse in Ghana. The noted challenge or danger is the tendency of political elites to use the media and possibly recruit agents in the military to circulate real and imagined sensational information about the military to the public domain. For example, there have been some headlines with potential polarizing effects on the military.[178] As noted in chapter five, several newspaper and online publications often touch on some issues within the armed forces such as ethnicity and politicization of recruitment and promotions.

For example, during the Kuffour-led NPP administration some news headline that emerged included "NPP recruiting supporters into military – JJ." These stories attributed to former President Rawlings allege an orchestrated attempt to fill up vacancies in the military with supporters of the NPP.[179] There have been similar publications under the NDC administrations of Atta-Mills and Mahama respectively. Examples include: "Kokofu Appointments and Promotions in Armed Forces"; "Agbadza and Batakari Promotions."[180] These stories allege politicization of promotions to favour Ewe and Northern officers. While such publications may not be entirely accurate, one cannot discount their effects on the general happenings within the military and public perceptions about the military. This is because the sources of such media publication may be found from the internal audience of the armed forces.[181]

Cordial relationship between the media and the military is essential for smoothing civil-military relations in Ghana. However, this has been a challenge in Ghana. The apparent conflict between the military and media arises out of the lack of understanding of the relevance of each other's roles. In this regard, the military needs to understand the principles of effective communication in both peace and crisis. The media also needs deeper understanding of military operations in order to report accurately on their activities in order to shape public opinion and possibly policy. The military must appreciate that media scrutiny is part and parcel of the governance process. In this light, Kennedy Williams argues that, every time a society permitted its military establishment to insulate itself from effective public scrutiny, that military establishment ended up destroying the very people it was supposed to protect.[182] The link between the military and society is even more important presently than before, and this link is best established through the media.[183]Most especially, the evolving roles of the military are increasingly bringing soldiers into direct contact with the local population. A key feature of the post-modern military has been the increasing interpenetration of civilian and military spheres, in terms of structure and culture.[184] This has also impacted on media-military relations. So it is imperative for the military to be adept in dealing with the media who would always inquire about issues involving the military and report to the general public.[185]

Technological advancement in information and communication has dramatically altered the way media operates and how information could easily get into the public domain. Therefore, it is important for the military to learn how to adapt to the spread and impact of modern communication.[186] It is argued elsewhere that the growth and rapid flow of information has democratized and fragmented media-military relations especially in advanced democracies.[187] For example, in an era of social media, stories can be rapidly disseminated as soon as they break. This often makes it impossible for the high command to conceal certain information they perceive may cause some discomfort within the

institution.[188] For instance, a respondent argued that the internal audience military personnel (including their families or relations) are essential source of information that could contribute to enhancing military-community relations especially where the general public have confidence in the armed forces. At the same, the actions of the internal audience can undermine this relationship because people can use media as a conduit to share inaccurate information.[189]

In sum, there is growing recognition that the media can play a vital role in informing the general public about the military. To this end, some have argued that military–media relations are now oriented to cooperation (rather than censorship) and open information policies.[190] As noted earlier, a major shift in the postmodern military thinking is from a position of hostile censorship to one of public relations.[191]The nature of media-military relations in Ghana is mixed. It has been marked by mutual suspicion and mistrust. There has been some shift in the relation to some level of openness towards the media. In one breadth, the military appears co-operative in terms of the military working with journalists in both peacetimes and times of crises on issues pertaining to the role of the military in Ghanaian society. Now it is very common to hear public relations officers of GAF resorting to local radio and television stations to respond to some pertinent issues relating the military. Press releases are also issued when needed to clarify issues in the public domain. Nonetheless, the flow of information from the military could be improved. The reticence on the part of military is yet to change completely due to the traditional sensitivities that inhibit open discussion on defence and national security issues. This is compounded by the fact that the even though the country has a very vibrant media landscape, and Article 21 of the Constitution guarantees the right to information, Ghana is yet to adopt the Right to Information Law to provide principled ways backed by law for citizens and others to obtain information from government agencies including the military.[192]

6.3 Summary

Civil-military relations are essential measures of democratic consolidation. As argued in this chapter, the nature of civil-military relations in Ghana's Fourth Republic points to a state of concordance among the political and military elites on the social composition of the officer corps, political decision making process, recruitment and military style. While there have been shifts in how these agreements are being reached and implemented in practice, there are notable challenges. The current democratic dispensation of the Fourth Republic has survived 25 years of stability. Essentially, the nature of political turnover in Ghana has been fairly orderly and peaceful, taking place in accordance with democratic rules provided under the Fourth Republican constitution that puts the country on the path of democratic consolidation. There is concordance among the political and military class that their mutual

interests could be best served in a democracy. However, current development in other countries in the West African region, where countries like Mali, which were largely seen to be on the path to democratic consolidation, unexpectedly witnessed a democratic reversal in terms of a coup in 2012, makes it difficult to entirely rule out the phenomenon of military interventions in politics across the region. In this regard, discourse on civil-military relations in Ghana has mainly focused on the relationship between these two actors. The third partner, the citizenry, even though important, is often not directly involved in the process or part of the interaction. Indeed, the armed forces must be seen to be legitimate, efficient and effective in the eyes of the public. The nature of the military and societal relations as argued above has been mixed. It has been characterized by frostiness and mutual suspicion. There have been some changes as revealed from interactions with some selected civilians. Notably, the public perception towards the military is changing, while the military is also making an effort to enhance its professional ethos and open up to the society through institutional engagements and the media. Besides the general society, the relationship between the military and key societal actors such as civil society groupings and the media, remains under studied. As discussed, civil society until the 1990s largely kept away from defence and security issues due to various reasons identified above. The media as the Fourth estate of the realm has seen increasing role in the governance process and public discourse.

However, the relationship between the media and the military could at best be described as problematic. This situation is not peculiar to emerging democracies such as Ghana. Even the most advanced democracies of the West are often confronted with this challenge. Several reasons including lack of understanding of each other's roles, differences in organizational cultures, professional ethos and procedures often compound the situation. As discussed the proliferation of advanced communication channels make it almost impossible for the military to keep to its traditional approach to communication. In the same vein, the media must understand their roles and limit in dissemination of public information to inform public opinion and policy. Essentially, there is limited public discourse on defence issues in the Ghanaian media. The media is often interested in reports of misconduct by individual military personnel. Such stories are obviously sensationalist, agitate public sentiments, and go a long way to inform or reinforce the existing public perception about the military. Going forward, one would wish to see when the media with the help of epistemic civil society grouping could lead the crusade for open and informed discussions on defence issues such as defence policies, budgets, doctrines, deployment, and their expected political and policy implications.

The ad hoc approaches used in the Fourth Republic have brought about some relative changes to Ghana's defence sector. As examined within chapter five, some things have changed in terms of the human composition, political setting, cultural and organizational

transformation. Even though the changes have not been across-the-board or systematic as done in some post-conflict or post-authoritarian settings, they have directly and indirectly impacted on building a healthy-civil military relationship in the country. Currently, the country is witnessing increasing professionalism in the way the military and government deal with each other. This indicates improved relations between civilian political authority and the military. However, it is imperative for the country to pursue a comprehensive and nationally-owned process at transformation and modernization its defence sector to enhance civil and democratic civilian control. The various mechanisms of civilian control have been outlined in the 1992 constitution. However, it appears the element of civil control with regards to allegiance of the armed forces to the larger civil society other than government begs improvement. As noted, Ghanaians generally trust the military institution in terms of their astuteness in execution of the mission at home and abroad. Even though state and its security apparatus are no longer perceived by the general public as agents of insecurity or fear, some Ghanaians still fear the military. Actions or behaviour of elements within the military institution also corroborate this through their high handedness in dealing with civilians. The approach of the military in relating to civilians is largely influenced by the organizational culture and a perceived superiority of the military to both civilian authorities and the general society.[193] There is the need to deal with the prevalent militaristic psyche in addition changing societal mind-set in order to make defence transformation more successful.[194] For country which is in a process of democratic consolidation, civilian control alone is not enough. There is the need to move further to control of militarization which deals with controlling the mechanisms that legitimize the use of military force, in particular, and the military, in general.[195] This can be achieved through political discourse that ensures that the use of the military is based on a thorough, open, and deliberative process of decision making in which the citizenry plays an active and autonomous role in addressing the legitimacy to use the military.[196] This could serve as an entry point to enhance the involvement of citizenry and relevant civil society actors and media in defence discourse and possibly enhance accountability and behaviour of the military towards the society.

Endnotes

[1] See Finer, Samuel, (1962), *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics*. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers: Luckham, Robin, (1994), "The Military, Militarization and Democratization in Africa: A Survey of Literature and Issues', *African Studies Review*, 37(2):13-75; Welch, Claude, (1970), "The Roots and implication of military intervention", In: *Soldier and state in Africa: a comparative analysis of military intervention and political change*, edited by Welch, Claude, 1-61, Evanston: North-western University Press; Decalo, Samuel, (1989), "Modalities of Civil-Military Stability in Africa", *Journal of Modern African studies*, 27(4): 547-578; Decalo, Samuel, (1990), *Coups and Army Rule in Africa*. Second edition, New Haven: Yale University Press; Onwumechili, Chuka, (1998), *African Democratization and Military Coups*, WestPoint, Connecticut, London: Prager.

[2] Huntington, Samuel, (1957), *The Soldier and the State; The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relation.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, Cambridge; Janowitz, Morris, (1960), *The professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait*. London: The Free Press Corporation; Janowitz, Morris (1977*), Military Institutions and Coercion in the Developing Nations*, London and Chicago: The University Of Chicago Press.

[3] Huntington, (1957), op. cit.

[4] Koonings, Kees, and Kruijt, Dirk (2002), "Military politics and the mission of nation building", In: *Political Armies: The Military and Nation building in the Age of Democracy*, edited by Koonings Keesand and Kruijt, Dirk, 9-32, London: Zed Books; Luckham, Robin, and Hutchful, Eboe, (2010), "Democracy and War-to-peace transition and Security sector transformation in Africa", In: *Security Sector Transformation in Africa*, edited by Bryden, Alan and Olonisakin, Funmi,185-204, LIT Verlag: Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces. Verlag; Agbese, Pita, (2004) 'Democratic and Constitutional Control of the Military in Africa', In: *The Military and Politics in Africa: From Engagement to Democratic and Constitutional Control*, edited by Kieh, George and Abese, Pita, 183- 210, London: Ashgate.

[5] Segel, Glen and Vajpeji, Dhirendra, (2014), "Introduction", In: *Civil-Military Relationships in Developing Countries*, Edited by Dhirendra Vajpeji and Glen Segel, 1-19, Maryland:Lexington Books.

[6] Croissant, Aurel, Kuehn David, Chambers, Paul (2013), *Democratization and Civilian Control in Asia*, London: Pelgrave Macmillan; Koonings, and Kruijt, (2002), op. cit; Shaw, Martin, (1991), *Post-Military Society: Militarism, Demilitarization and War at the end of the Twentieth Century*. London: Polity Press; Barany, Zoltan, (2012), *The Soldier and the Changing State: Building Democratic Armies in Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Americas*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

[7] Schiff, Rebecca, (1995), "Civil-Military Relations Reconsidered: A Theory of Concordance. *Armed Forces & Society*, 22 (1):7-24; Schiff, Rebecca, (2009*), The Military and Domestic Politics: A Concordance Theory of Civil-Military Relations*, London: Routledge.

[8] Travis, Donald, (2016), "Saving Samuel Huntington and the Need for Pragmatic Civil-Military Relations", *Armed Forces & Society*, 43(3):395-414.

[9] Williams, Rocky, (1998), "Towards the Creation of an African Civil-Military Relations Tradition", *African Journal of Political Science*, 3(1):20-41; Williams, Rocky (2002), "Mapping a New African Civil-Military Relations Architecture", In: *Ourselves to Know: Civil-Military Relations and Defence Transformation in Southern Africa*, edited by Williams, Rocky, Cawthra, Gavin, and Abrahams, Diane, 265-281, Pretoria: ISS.

[10] Agyemang-Duah, Barfour. (2002), "Civil-Military Relations in Ghana's Fourth Republic", *Critical Perspectives* No.9, Accra: Ghana Center for Democratic Development.

[11] Cleary, Laura, (2012), "Lost in Translation: The Challenge of Exporting Models of Civil-Military Relations", *Prism*, 3(2), p.20.

[12] Hartle, Anthony, (2004), *Moral Issues in Military Decision Making*, Second Edition, Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas.

[13] Ibid. pp. 11-28.

[14] Frimpong, Daniel (2003), Leadership and the Challenges of Command: The Ghana Military Academy Experience, Accra: Afram Publications.

[15] Ibid.

[16] Sutton, Inez, (1983), "Labour in Commercial Agriculture in Ghana in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries", *The Journal of African History*, 24: 461-483.

[17] Maurice, Garnier, (1972), "Changing Recruitment Patterns and Organizational Ideology: The Case of a British Military Academy." *Administrative Science Quarterly* 17, no. 4: 499-507. *Business Source Complete*, EBSCO*host* (accessed May 1, 2016).
[18] Maitland-Jones, J.F, (1974), *Politics in Africa: The Former British* Territories, New York, WW Norton, p 110.
[19] Sagaren Naidoo, (2006), The Role Of The Military In Democratic Governance In Africa: The Need To Institutionalize Civil–Military Relations, In: *From State Security to Human Security in Southern Africa*, edited by Hendricks, Cheryl, 33-47, Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies (ISS).
[20] Luckham, Robin, (1998), "Transition to Democracy and Control over Ghana's Military and Security Establishments" in: *Ghana: Transition to Democracy*, edited by Ninsin, Kwame, Accra: Freedom Publications.
[21] Huntington, (1957), op. cit. pp. 74 and 84.
[22]Ibid.
[23] Finer, (1962) op. cit. 23-60.
[24]Price, Robert, (1971), "Military Officers and Political Leadership: The Ghanaian Case", Comparative *Politics*, 3(3):361-379.
[25] Lucian, Pye, (1962), "Armies in the Process of Political Modernization," in J. J. Johnson, Ed. The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries (Princeton, 1962), pp. 73-80; and Huntington, p. 203
[26]Ibid.
[27] Aning, Kwesi (2004), "A Comparative Analysis of Security Sector Governance in West Africa: The Ghana Case." Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, *Africa-wide Security Governance Project*. Accra.
[28] Interview with Senior Officer of Ghana Armed Forces, August 28, 2015, Accra.
[29] For example officers who attain the rank of colonels and above retire on their salary.
[30] Ghana News Agency, (2007), "Soldiers' Salary to be Reviewed Annually", May 15. Available at https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/ (Accessed on September 20, 2017).
[31] Interview with a military officer at KAIPTC, Accra, October, 8, 2015.
[32] Ofosu-Appiah, SK. (2010), *Allegiance versus Indiscipline*, London: Xlibis; Interviews with Brigadier-General Daniel Frimpong, (Retired) Accra, May 14, 2015.
[33]Interview with Major-General Carl Coleman (Retired), Accra, June 16, 2016.
[34]Cleary, Laura, (2011), "Triggering Critical Mass: Identifying the Factors for a Successful Defence Transformation", *Defence Studies*, 11(1), pp. 43-65.
[35] See, Soeters, Joseph and Van Ouytsel, Audrey, (2013), "The Challenge of Diffusing Military Professionalism in Africa", *Armed Forces & Society*, 40(2):252-268; Robinson, Colin, (2017), "How Might Democratization Affect Military Professionalism in Africa? Reviewing the Literature", *Small Wars & Insurgency*, 28(2): 385-400
[36]Interview with Benjamin Kunbour, Minister of Defence, Accra: July 15, 2015.
[37] Wilson, Isaiah, Cox, Edward, Park, Kent and Sondheimer, Rachel, (2012),"Kids These Days: Growing Military professional across Generation", in: *Civil-Military Relations in Perspective*, cdited by Chimbala, Stephen, 21-30, Ashgate Publication.
[38]Ibid.
[39] United Kingdom House of Commons, (2015), "Decision-making in Defence Policy". Available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa (Accessed on June 21, 2016).
[40] Omelda, Jose (2012), "Escaping from Huntington's Labyrinth: Civil-Military Relations and Comparative Politics", In: *The Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations*, Edited by Bruneau, Thomas and Matei, Cristina, 61-76. London: Routledge.
[41] Soeters, Joseph, Van Fenema, Paul and Beers, Roberts, (2010), "Introducing Military Organizations", In: *Managing Military Organizations: Theory and Practice*, Edited by Soeters, Joseph, Van Fenema, Paul and Beers Roberts, 1-16, London: Routledge.
[42] Feaver, (2003), op. cit.
[43] Levy, Yagil, (2016), "What is Controlled by Civilian Control of the Military? Control of the Military vs. Control of Militarization", *Armed Forces & Society*, 42(1):75-98.
[44] Ibid.

[45] Young, Thomas-Durell, (2006), "Military Professionalism in a Democracy", In: *Who Guards the Guardians and How: Democratic Civil-Military Relations,* edited by Bruneau, Thomas and Tollefson, Scott, 17-35, Texas: University of Texas Press; Kohn, Richard, (2008), "Coming Soon: A Crisis in Civil-Military Relations", *World Affairs Journal.*
[46] Interview with Chief Director, Ministry of Defence, Accra, May 13, 2015.
[47] Hutchful (2007); Aning and Lartey, (2009), op. cit.
[48] Interview with Dr Benjamin Kunbour, June 15, 2016, Accra.
[49]Ibid.
[50]Republic of Ghana, 1992 Constitution Chapter 17.
[51]Interview with Benjamin Kunbour, June 15, 2016, Accra.
[52]Ibid.
[53] Interview with Vice Admiral Mathew Quarshie, former Chief of Defence Staff, July 27, 2015, Accra.
[54] Interview with a senior officer, GAF, October 23, 2014.
[55]Interview with Benjamin Kunbour, June 15, 2016, Accra.
[56]The NPP government is from an anti-military political tradition.
[57]Interview with Benjamin Kunbour, June 16, Accra.
[58]Interview with Major-General Carl Coleman (Retired), June 16, 2016, Accra.
[59]Ibid.
[60] Informal chat with senior officer of GAF, Accra: October 7, 2017.
[61]Schiff, (1995; 2009), op. cit.
[62]Ibid.
[63] Aning and Lartey (2009), op.cit.
[64] Republic of Ghana, (1992), 1992 Constitution, Chapter Eighteen.
[65] Ibid.
[66] Asibuo, Sam, (nd) "The Role Of The Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ) In Promoting Public Service Accountability Under Ghana's Fourth Republic" African Training and Research Centre in Administration for Development. Available at http://unpan1.un.org (Accessed on September 20, 2017).
[67]Obuoba fm (2017), "Brutalised 16-year-old awaits end of CHRAJ investigation" June 14. Available at http://obuobafm.com/ (Accessed on September 20, 2017).
[68] Gyimah-Boadi, Emmanuel and Brobbey, Victor, (2012), *Countries at the Crossroads 2012: Ghana.* Available at https://freedomhouse.org (Accessed on September 20, 2017).
[69] Acquaye, Augustus, (2017), "Work of Public Accounts Committee", February 8. Available at http://www.gbcghana.com/1.5453340 (Accessed on September 20, 2017).
[70] Parliamentary Centre, (2009), *The Public Accounts Committee of the Parliament of Ghana,* Accra: Parliamentary Centre.
[71] Interview with officers of GAF, Accra; see also Transparency International, (2015), "Government Defence Anti-Corruption Index", London: Transparency International
[72] Kan-Dapaah, Albert, (2015), "Parliament's Role in the Fight against Corruption", Accra: Institute for Economic Affairs.
[73]Interview with Chief Director, MOD, Accra, May 13, 2015.
[74] Interview with a retired Brigadier-General, October 29, 2014 Accra.
[75]Ministry of Defence, (2003), "Update on the supply of Helicopters – to the Ghana Armed Forces by Wellfind Ltd" p. 1 quoted in Aning, Kwesi, (2004), "Military Imports and Sustainable Development: Case Study Analysis – Ghana," 10; Chanaa, Jane, (2005), Guns or Growth?: Assessing the Impact of Arms Sales on Sustainable Development, London: Oxfam.
[76]Ali, Zulfiqar, (2014), "Contradiction of Concordance Theory: Failure to Understand Military Intervention in Pakistan", *Armed Forces & Society,* 40(3):544–567
[77]Micewski, Edwin (2006), "Conscription or the All-Volunteer Recruitment in a Democratic Society", In: "In: *Who Guards the Guardians and How: Democratic Civil-Military Relations,* edited by Bruneau, Thomas and Tollefson, Scott, 208-234, Texas: University of Texas Press.
[78]Ibid.

[79]Ibid, p. 209.
[80] Møller, Bjørn, (2003), "Raising Armies in a Rough Neighbourhood The Military and Militarism in Southern Africa", *Working Paper* No. 118, Development Research Series, Research Center On Development And International Relations (DIR).
[81] Young, (2006), op. cit.
[82] Micewski, (2006), op. cit.
[83] Young, (2006), op. cit.
[84]Micewski, (2006), op. cit
[85] Woodruff, Todd, (2017), "Who Should the Military Recruit? The Effects of Institutional, Occupational, and Self Enhancement Enlistment Motives on Soldier Identification and Behavior", Armed Forces and Society, Vol: 1-29
[86] Interviews with a Ghanaian citizens in Accra, December 2015.
[87] Ghana News Agency (2016), "Ghana Armed Forces cautions public against recruitment scam", January 18. Available at www.ghanabusinessnew.com (Accessed on May 1, 2016); Ghana Armed Forces Website (2016),Disclaimer: Ghana Armed Forces Recruitment 2015/2016, January
[88] Young, (2006), op. cit.
[89]Levy, (2016), op. cit.
[90]Ibid.
[91]Schiff, Rebecca, (2012), "Concordance Theory, Targeted Partnership, and Counterinsurgency Strategy", *Armed Forces & Society*, 38(2): 318-339.
[92]Schiff, (2012).
[93]Owens, Mackubin, (2008), ''Scholar and Gentleman, Sam Huntington, R.I.P.,'' *National Review Online*, 1. December 29; Kohn, Richard, (1997), ''An Essay on Civilian Control of the Military,'' *American Diplomacy*
[94]Schiff (1995, 2009, 2012).
[95]Ngoma, Naison, (2006), "Civil–Military Relations in Africa: Navigating Uncharted Waters", *African Security Review*, 15(4):98-111.
[96]Agyemang-Duah, (2002), op. cit.
[97]CDD Survey, 2000 cited in Agyemang-Duah, (2002), op. cit.
[98] Duffield, Mark, (2001), *Global Governance and the New W*ars: *The Merging of Development and Security*, London: Zed Books.
[99] Darkwa, Akosua, Amponsah, Nicholas, and Gyampoh, Evans, (2006) "Civil Society in a Changing Ghana: An Assessment of the Current State of Civil Society in Ghana" CIVICUS: Civil Society Index Report for Ghana, World Bank and GAPVOD.
[100]Afrobarometer and CDD (2014), "Trust and corruption in public institutions: Ghanaian opinions Findings from the Afrobarometer Round 6 survey in Ghana". Available at http://www.afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/mediabriefing/ghana/gha_r6_presentation3_trust_corruption.pdf(Accessed on May 18, 2016).
[101]Interview with Ghanaian, Accra, November 2015.
[102]Interview with a Ghanaian, Kumasi, November 2015.
[103]Interviews with a Ghanaian, Accra, November, 2015.
[104]Interviews with Vice Admiral Matthew Quarshie, CDS, Accra, May 27, 2015.
[105]Agyemang-Duah, (2002), op cit.
[106]Interview with Lt Col Wilson, Accra: October 15, 2015.
[107]Interview with a Ghanaian, Accra, November 2015.
[108] Aning and Lartey (2009), op. cit.
[109]Myjoyonline.com (2016), "Military Denies Clearing 23 Men in Kasoa Shooting", April 22. Available at www.myjoyonline.com (accessed on May 3, 2016).
[110]*The Chronicle*, (2016), "Soldiers Who Tortured 16-year-old Boy Locked up", April 23. Available at www.myjoyonline.com (Accessed on May 4, 2016); Myjoyonline, (2016), "Culture of Impunity Grows Within Police, Army as Brutalities go Unpunished", Available at http:www.myjoyonline.com (Accessed on May 5, 2016); Myjoyonline.com (2013), "Ghana Armed Force Sanctions 22 Soldiers", June 3. Available at htttp://myyoyonline.comnews (accessed on June 03, 2013).

[111] Interview with Col Mbawine Atindade (Retired), Former Directors of Ghana Armed Forces Public Relations Directorate, Accra, May 23, 2016, Accra; See also Myjoyonline.com (2013), "Ghana Armed Force Sanctions 22 Soldiers", June 3. Available at htttp://myyoyonline.comnews (accessed on June 03, 2013).
[112]Interview with a Ghanaian trader, Cape Coast, December 2015.
[113]Interview with a Ghanaian, Accra, November 2015.
[114] Interview with a Ghanaian, Accra, November 2015.
[115]Interviews with a Ghanaian, Accra, Kumasi, Cape Coast. November and December 2015.
[116] Interview with a Ghanaian, Cape Coast, December 2015.
[117]Interview with a Ghanaian plumber, Cape Coast, December, 2015.
[118]Interview with a Ghanaian Fisherman, Cape Coast, December, 2015.
[119] Nugent, Paul, (1995), *Big Men Small Boys and Politics in Ghana*, Accra: Asempa Publishers.
[120]Hutchful, Eboe, (2012), "Security Sector Governance and Peacebuilding", In: *Peacebuilding Power, and Politics in Africa*, Edited by Devon, Curtis and Dzinesa, Gwinyayi, 63-86. Athens: Ohio University Press.
[121] Diamond, Larry, (1994), "Towards Democratic Consolidation", *Journal of Democracy*, 5(3): 4-17.
[122] Miller, Christopher, (2005), *A Glossary of Terms nnd Concepts in Peace and Conflict Studies*, edited by King, Mary, Second Edition, Addis Ababa: University for Peace.
[123]Ibid.
[124] Abdulai, Abdul-Gafaru, and Quantson, Ruby (2009), "The Changing Role of CSOs in Public Policy Making in Ghana", *Ghana Social Science Journal*, 5 & 6, (1 & 2): 114-151.
[125]Williams, David, (2010), "Making a Liberal State: 'Good' Governance in Ghana", Review *of African Political Economy*, 37(126):403-419.
[126]Arthur, Peter, (2010), "Democratic consolidation in Ghana: the role and contribution of the media, civil society and state institutions", *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*, 48(2):203–226.
[127] Rooning, (1995), op. cit.
[128] Abdulai, and Quantson, (2009), op. cit.
[129]Longdon, Jonathan, (2011), "Democracy Re-Examined: Ghanaaian Social Movement Learning and the Re-Articulation of Learning in Struggle", *Studies in the Education of adults*, 43(2), pp. 147-163.
[130] Abdulai and Quantson, (2009), op.cit.
[131] Loada, Augustine, and Moderan, Ornella, (2015), "Civil Society Involvement in Security Sector Reform and Governance" in *Toolkit for Security Sector Reform and Governance in West Africa*, edited by Moderan, Ornella, Geneva: DCAF.
[132]Yagil, (2006), op.cit.
[133] Hutchful, (2003), op. cit.
[134] Loada, and Moderan, (2015), op. cit.
[135]The Civic Forum Initiative is a broad coalition of civil society actors with membership drawn from advocacy NGOs, policy think tanks, faith-based organizations, community based organizations, youth groups, labour organizations, gender groups, and individual citizens. Formed in 2008, the overall objective of the CFI is to ensure peaceful and credible electoral management through active community and citizens' participation, and collaboration with relevant state institutions to foster national cohesion in Ghana.
[136]Interview with Major-General Coleman (Retired), Chair Civic Forum Initiative, Ghana, Accra, June 16, 2016.
[137] Hutchful, Eboe, (2003), "A Civil Society Perspective," In: *Providing Security for People: Security Sector Reform in Africa*, edited by Lala, Anicia and Fitz-Gerald, Ann, Shrivenham: GFN-SSR.
[138]Aning and Lartey, (2009), op. cit. p. 14.
[139] Adedeji Eboe, (2004), "Security Sector Reform as An Instrument of Sub-Regional Transformation in West Africa," *Reform and Reconstruction of the Security Sector*, edited by Bryden, Alan and Hanggi, Heinner, 82. Geneva: DCAF.
[140]Hutchful (2003), op. cit.
[141]Ibid.
[142] Rupiya, Martin, Moyo, Gordon, Laugesen, Henrik, (2015), "International African studies Perspectives: The New African Civil-Military Relations Phase in African States Development", In: *The New African Civil-*

Military Relations, edited by Rupiya, Martin, Moyo, Gorden, 1-14, Pretoria: The African Public Policy and Research Institute.
[143]Loada and Moderan, (2015), op. cit.
[144]Caparini, Marina, (2004), "Media and the Security Sector: Oversight and Accountability", In: *Media in Security and Governance: The Role of the News Media in Security Oversight and Accountability*, edited by Caparini, Marina, 201-212, Nomos Verlagsellcshaft: BICC and DCAF; Ball, Nicole, (2006), "Civil Society, Good Governance and the Security Sector", In: *Civil Society and the Security Sector: Concepts and Practices in New Democracies*, edited by Caparini, Marina, Fluri, Phillip, and Molnar, Ferenc, 59-70, Geneva: DCAF.
[145]Ibid.
[146]Ibid.
[147]Ball, (2006), op. cit.
[148]Ibid.
[149]Johnson, Stephen, (2001), "Military Public Relations in the Americas: Learning to Promote the Flow", Paper Presented at Panel for Military-Media Relations, Center for Hemispheric Studies, Washington DC, 22-25 May, Cited in Caparini, (2004), op. cit.
[150]Hooper, Alan, (1982), *The Military and the Media,* Aldershot, Gower Publishing Company Limited.
[151]Wilson, et al, (2002), op. cit.
[152]Hsia, Tim (2011), "The Uneasy Media-Military Relationship", *New York Times, June 15.* Available at *http://atwar.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/06/15/the-uneasy-media-military-relationship* (Accessed on May 16, 2016); Tuosto, Kylie, (2008), "The 'Grunt Truth' of Embedded Journalism: The New Media/Military Relationship", *Stanford Journal of International Relations,* X (1):20-31.
[153]Caparini, (2004), op. cit.
[154]Nugget, Paul, (2012), *Africa Since Independence.* Second ed. London: Palgrave Macmillan; Haynes, Jeff , (2003), "Democratic Consolidation in Africa: The Problematic Case of Ghana", *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*, 41(1):48-76.
[155] Karikari, Kwame, (1993), "Africa: The press and democracy", *Race and Class* 34(3): 55-66.
[156]Gadzekpo, Audrey, (2008), "Guardians of democracy: the media". In: *Ghana: Governance in the Fourth Republic*, edited by Barfour Agyeman-Duah.195-214Accra: Centre for Democratic Development, 195–214, Voltimer, Katrin, *The Media in Transitional Democracies*, Cambridge, Polity Press;
[157] Tettey, Wisdom, (2003), "The Mass media, Political Expression and Democratic Transition", In Critical Perspectives in Politics and Socio-Economic Development in Ghana, edited by Tettey, Wisdom , Korbla, Puplampu, and Berman, Bruce, 83-106. Leiden: Brill.
[158] Owusu, William, (2011), "The Ghanaian Media Landscape: How unethical practices of journalists Undermine Progress", *Reuters Institute Fellowship Paper,* Oxford University.
[159]National Media Commission, (2016); BBC Media Development Initiative, (n.d), "Ghana Country Report". Available at http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/trust/pdf/AMDI/ghana/amdi_ghana7_newspapers.pdf (Accessed on May 17, 2016).
[160] 313, FM stations are currently in operation, while 30 of the register 63 are currently on air. See National Communication Authority, (2016), Industry Information. Available at http://www.nca.org.gh/51/116/Industry-Information.html (Accessed on May 17, 2016).
[161] Arthur, (2010), op. cit.
[162]Ibid.
[163]McComes, Maxwell, (2014), *Setting the Agenda,* Second Edition, Cambridge: Polity Press.
[164] Hydén Göran, Leslie Michael, and Ogundimu, Folarin, (2003), *Media and democracy in Africa*, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers.
[165]Interview with Col Mbawine Atindade, (Rtd), Former Director, Department of Public Relations, Ghana Armed Forces, May 23, 2016, Accra.
[166]Ibid.
[167] Danso-Ankrah, John, (2011), Military-Media Dichotomy and Its Impact on Military Operations in West Africa. Thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree Master of Military Art and Science.
[168]Ibid.

[169]Republic of Ghana, (1962), Armed Force Act.
[170]Kirke, Charles,(2008), "Seeing Through the Stereotype: British Army Culture – An Insider Anthropology", Armed Forces, Soldiers and Civil-Military Relations: Essays in Honor of Jürgen Kuhlmann, edited by Gerhard Kümmel, Giuseppe, Caforio, Christopher Dandeker , 13-36, VS Verlagfür Sozialwissenschaften.
[171]Interview with Col. Atindade, (Retired), May 23, 2016, Accra.
[172] Kirke, (2008), op. cit.
[173]Hopson, Sharon (2000), "Media Relations", Council for Canadian Security in the 21ST Century. Available at http://www.cc21.org (Accessed on May 18, 2016).
[174]Ibid.
[175]Ibid.
[176] Danso, Sarah, and Edu-Afful, Fifii, (2012), "Fruitcake','Madmen'. 'all-die-be-die': Deconstructing Political Discourse and Rhetoric in Ghana". In: *Managing Election-Related Violence for Democratic Stability in Ghana*, edited by Aning Kwesi, and Danso, Kwaku, 97-139, Accra: FES and KAIPTC; Asah-Asante, R., (2007), The Media in Ghanaian politics. In: *Ghana at 50: Government, Politics and Development*, edited by Ayee, Joseph, 143-159. Accra: FES.
[177]Salihu, Naila, and Aning, Kwesi, (2014), "Do Institutions Matter? Managing Institutional Diversity and Change in Ghana's Fourth Republic", *KAIPTC Policy Brief* 10, Accra: KAIPTC; Arthur, (2010); op. cit.
[178] Danso-Ankrah, (2011), op.cit.
[179]Ghanaweb (2002), "NPP recruiting supporters into military – JJ". June 5. Available at http://www.ghanaweb.com (Accessed on May 30, 2016).
[180]Prah, Prince, (2010), "Kokofu Appointments and Promotions in Armed Forces", July 10, available at http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Kokofu-Appointments-and-Promotions-in- (Accessed on January 19, 2016). The word "Kokofu" is the name of village in the Ashanti Region. The word is also used proverbially in the Akan lauguage, Twi, to refer to nepotism. Agbadza is name of a traditional dance in Ewe, language from the Volta Region. Batakari is name of a traditional clothing from northern Ghana. These words are used in this context to refer to nepotism along ethnic lines.
[181]Interview with Colonel Atintande (Retired), Accra, 23 May 2016.
[182]Williams, 1993, p. iv
[183]Hooper, (1982), op. cit.
[184]Moskos, Charles, (2000), "Armed Forces after the Cold War", In: *The Post Modern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold Wa*r, Edited by Moskos, Charles, Williams, John. Segal, David, 1-13, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.
[185] Dandeker, Christopher (2000), "The United Kingdom: The Overstretched Military", In: *The Post Modern Military: Armed Forces After the Cold War*, Edited by Moskos, Charles, et al, 32-50, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.
[186]Hooper, (1982), op. cit. p.7
[187]Blackwell, Stephen,(2004), "Military-Media Relation and the Defence establishment in Britain:, In: *Media in Security and Governance: The Role of the News Media in Security Oversight and Accountability*, edited by Caparini, Marina, Nomos Verlagsellcshaft: BICC and DCAF; Maltby, Sarah, Thornham, Helen, and Bennett, Daniel, (2015), "Capability in the Digital: Institutional Media Management and its Dis/Contents" *Information, Communication & Society*, 18 (11):1275-1296.
[187]Caparini, (2004), op. cit.
[188]*Daily Guide*, (2016), "Military probes Army Chief over car gift", June 28; *Daily Guide*, (2016), "Compliments to the Military", June 28.
[189]Interview with Col. Atintande (Retired), May 23, 2016, Accra
[190]Maltby, (2012), op. cit.
[191]Dandeker (2000), op. cit.
[192]Kwadwo Appiagyei-Atua, (n.d), "Access To Information And National Security In Ghana: Drawing The Balance" available at www.right2info.org/resources/publications/pretoria...april *(*Accessed on February 29, 2016)

[193] J'Kayode Fayemi, (2002), "Entrenched militarism and the future of democracy in Nigeria", in *Political Armies: The Military and Nation Building in the Age of Democracy*, edited by Koonings, Kees and Kruijt, Dirk, 205-233, London: Zed Books.
[194] Cleary, Laura, (2011), "Triggering Critical Mass: Identifying the Factors for a Successful Defence Transformation", *Defence Studies*, 11(1): 43-65.
[195] Levy, (2016), op. cit.
[196] Ibid.

CHAPTER SEVEN

Summary of Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations

7.0 Introduction

This thesis examines the changes in Ghana's defence sector since the return to constitutional democracy in 1992. It answers the research question- has Ghana's processes of defence transformation contributed to healthier civil-military relations and consolidation of democracy in the Fourth Republic? The supporting research objectives included: 1) to investigate Ghana's process at transforming her defence sector in line with democratic principles; 2) relate the theories and principles of civil-military relations and defence transformation to the Ghanaian case; and 3) identify the lessons other countries in the sub-region and the continent could draw from Ghana. These objectives were achieved based on qualitative analysis of available date. This final chapter therefore puts forward the key findings and conclusions of the thesis. It also offers some recommendations and identifies some areas for future research on defence transformation and civil-military relations in Ghana.

7.1 Summary of Findings

Ghana witnessed what was termed as "musical chairs" between military and civilian political elites for most part of the post-independence period. Ghana's defence sector has an authoritarian past, and thus requires some level of changes to ensure that it conforms to the democratic principles that Ghana has acceded to since 1992. Defence transformation processes have been organically driven by the peculiar external and internal political, economic and social factors of the country since the late 1980s. The resultant changes in the defence sector and therefore provides the basis to examine the transformations that have occurred in the sector thus far using Chuter's conceptual framework in terms of cultural, human, organizational and political transformation.

This thesis narrowed the theoretical debates on civil-military relations to the African context in order to understand the motivations for military interventions in the region and the challenges of disengaging the military from the political realm. This provides the opportunity to move the debate beyond the piecemeal approach of security sector reform to a more holistic approach of security and defence sector transformation. Having noted the theoretical and conceptual gaps in the literature, the third chapter outlined the research methodology employed to address both the theoretical and empirical aspects of the study. In doing so, a single-case study approach was adopted as the research design by relying on primary data extracted from semi-structured and structured interviews as well as secondary data. The multiple data sourced were analysed qualitatively based on the chosen conceptual and theoretical frameworks. The intention was not to generate theory out of the rich data, but rather, to use the data to explain the chosen theoretical and conceptual frameworks

based on a case study of Ghana. To do this, a deeper historical account of the Ghanaian democratic transition process was done in order to clearly contextualize the place of the armed forces in the contemporary democratic process. This panoramic analysis showed how the Ghana Armed Forces (GAF) has evolved and what has been done to situate it in the contemporary discourse on defence transformation and civil-military relations.

Having provided the historical context, chapter five examined the current developments in the Ghana Armed Forces within the framework of David Chuter's Guide to Defence Transformation. The chapter specifically highlighted some of reforms carried out by the two main political administrations under the Fourth Republic. This was followed by in-depth examination of changes in terms of the cultural, human, organization and political environment of the GAF. The study found that there have been some transformational changes in the GAF with respect to the culture, gender and regional composition of personnel, organizational and parliamentary oversight of the defence sector. The changes have occurred organically in response to the changing environment in which the armed forces finds itself. The chapter then identified some of the catalysts for change in the GAF. These have been largely centred on post-Cold War era democratization and socio-economic realities of Ghana. In addition, the use of the armed forces in certain international engagements like peacekeeping also necessitated a departure from a male-dominated institution to include more women. Furthermore, developments at the domestic level such as the impact of the declining Ghanaian economy and its effect on defence expenditure also propelled organizational transformation to bring about effectiveness and efficiency.

In terms of cultural transformation, the thesis argued that, the extent of change is mixed. GAF has both domestic and international reputation for their professionalism especially in the areas of peacekeeping. At the same time, GAF had a negative image among the Ghanaian public stemming from its history of coups d'état and the associated issues of human rights abuses. In this regard, there is an institutional desire for cultural change. The GAF seems to be making efforts to change the negative perception. These have been notable in the pronouncement and actions of the military hierarchy. These have yielded some results and point to changing institutional culture. There is the emergence of a generation of senior officers who have better appreciation of the tenets of democracy and civil-military relations. The critical concern is the sustainability of these values in the GAF and whether all soldiers have imbibed the tenets of civil-military relations. For instance, there are difficulties partly stemming from perceived feeling of superiority by the military.

The attitude of some soldiers towards civilians raises several questions. The use of soldiers for the purpose of internal security often presents some challenges in dealing with violent behaviour of military personnel. Some soldiers in dealing with civilians still exhibit aggression. Several examples of military brutality continue to surface in the media. This

notwithstanding, there is some relative change in the institutional outlook. For instance, the culture of impunity for excesses of soldiers that was prevalent during certain periods in the country's political history is no more. In recent times, the military as an institution or individual soldiers cannot entirely be absorbed of aberrations of norms of civility especially if they do brutalise civilians. Through the work of the media and civil society organizations, cases of abuse by military personnel are often publicized. However, the military often enjoys the leeway to conduct and apply its internal disciplinary procedures against soldiers found to have manhandled civilians. The results of such internal measures are often not released to the general public. This is cause for concern. There have been cases where apologies have been issued at the institutional level. Now, independent state institutions such as the Commission for Human Rights and Administrative Justice are getting involved (albeit minimally) in the conduct independent investigations in cases of purported human rights abuses by the military as they are constitutionally mandated to do so. This development is in the right direction and could be improved. There is need for victims of abuses to be adequately educated about their rights to petition such institutions to enable them initiate investigations into infractions of their human rights by the military.

With respect to human transformation**,** the study specifically dealt with issues of representativeness of the armed forces in terms of regional balance and gender. As discussed in chapters five and six, issues of ethnicity were partly attributable to the chequered history of civil-military relations in Ghana. Therefore, as a way of dealing with regional balance in public sector employment and government appointments in the current political dispensation, the 1992 constitution has provision that seeks to ensure non-discrimination and regional balance in public sector appointments. The GAF as a public institution is ideally expected to be a fair representation of the entire population with respect to certain attributes such as ethnic or regional composition and gender. It was generally noted that, the calibre of persons that get into the armed forces has changed from the colonial and immediate post-independence era when people with little or no educational qualification sought refuge in soldering. Currently, the GAF is an employer of choice, whom, thousands of school graduates turn to for employment.

The issue of regional balance remains a sensitive issue in the GAF. The note of concern is whether perceptions and sensitivities around the issues of regional balance is a time-bomb in the armed forces, to explode if not adequately addressed. While respondents were able to share some views on the subject, securing exact data on the current situation was not possible. So the views expressed remain speculative that the GAF is relatively balanced regionally. Indeed, the recruitment policies and programmes are structured in ways that seem to give equal opportunity to able bodied Ghanaians to join the armed forces. In this regard, people are recruited based on their regions of residence and not regions of origin. Considering, the cosmopolitan nature of most Ghanaian urban cities and issues of inter-

ethnic marriages, it may be challenging to squarely place people within a particular ethnic group. Existing socio-cultural factors also make people from certain parts of the country more inclined to military service than others. Moreover, since recruitment is voluntary in nature, it is seemingly impossible to restrict entry from certain regions or particular ethnic groups who are mostly interested in military service. Nonetheless, recruitment processes over the years have been characterised by certain practices as 'protocol' recruitment and alleged involvement of ethnic and political considerations. Similarly, promotions to some ranks in the GAF are done on merit based on laid down regulations in the Armed Forces Regulations on Administration. The involvement of political authorities, the President, Cabinet and the Armed Forces Council, in promotions especially to senior officer ranks from Colonel and above often give rise to issues of real or imagined political and ethnically based promotions. While the GAF is arguably fairly balanced, perceptions of ethnic based recruitment and promotions in the GAF remain. Therefore, regional balance remains a thorny issue in GAF, even though the human composition has changed to some extent with regard to geographic origins of personnel. This calls for concern and thus requires urgent means to address the situation.

On gender, the military is veritably synonymous with the socio-cultural construction of masculinity, and thus not sensitive to the different genders in the institution. For instance, the institutional language is not gender sensitive. Nonetheless, there have been some modest changes brought about by some international and regional imperatives on equal representation of demographic makeup of the society and new requirements of peacekeeping for integration of females in peacekeeping contingents to enhance mission effectiveness. As shown in chapter five, female representation in the GAF has been low since independence. Despite the existence of an unofficial 10% quota for women in all recruitments, women remain underrepresented. There have been some policy reforms over the years to increase female representation in the GAF. For instance, issues of equal pay for all forces, regulations on marriage, pregnancy and maternity leave regulations have been revised. Nonetheless, the implementation of gender integration measures in GAF appears very cosmetic and not backed by comprehensive policies. For example, the GAF has no gender policy to guide its practice of gender integration. Moreover, certain institutional norms and regulations on promotion have not been modified to take into account specific needs of women. The involvement of women in GAF operation was explored. The study found that there is a high concentration of females in certain units like support services. Even though all units in GAF are technically open to women, they are not allowed in combat roles. This excludes women from serving in positions which come with more prestige, rewards and possibilities of faster advancement in ranks. Multiple challenges have been identified as affecting efforts at enhancing career prospects for women in armed forces. Since 2016, the absence of women at the strategic decision-making levels of the

armed forces changed with the appointment of Ghana's first female brigadier-general. This development presents hope for women progression in GAF.

With regards to organizational transformation, the thesis examined the technocratic processes through which the institution is rightsized and the general management of defence in Ghana to ensure efficiency and effectiveness of the armed forces. Of critical concern is the policy framework to guide the practice of defence sector management in Ghana. The country does not have a comprehensive national security strategy to define its defence policy. Officials interviewed alluded to ongoing process to develop a national security policy. The issue of the existence or otherwise of national security and national defence policies remains contested. While all respondents in the study acknowledge the absence of comprehensive national security strategy, there is a defence policy signed by late President Atta-Mills in 2012. Nonetheless, this document did not emanate from a holistic national process including parliamentary approval. Therefore, it lacks a general acceptance by the actors expected to implement it. Successive governments under the Fourth Republic have been concerned about regime security, but have given low priority to the issues of defence as compared to policies and initiatives that seek to address socio-economic development of the country. Likewise, the Ghanaian public and civil society have not pressed upon government to develop one.

In the absence of comprehensive national security strategy and defence policy, the GAF, over the years have operated based on national laws such as the 1992 constitution of Ghana, Ghana Armed Forces Act 105(1962) and its amendments, Security Services and Intelligence Act 526 (1996), and various Armed Forces Regulations (Administration, Finance, and Discipline), and other institutional documents such as the OptraLog. These documents clearly provide the basis for civilian oversight of the defence sector, but, they do not clearly provide guidelines for transforming the armed forces organization. The Ghanaian economy has been a major determinant of the strength of the armed forces both in terms of force levels and capabilities. Defence spending has been inconsistent because the relative economic growth recorded under the Fourth Republic has not necessarily impacted on defence spending, with that spending hovering around less than 1% of GDP. The defence sector has suffered most as the economic situation of the country declined over the years. In spite of the budgetary constraints, emolument of personnel of the GAF is always catered for in the defence budget. Unlike other public sector employees, military personnel are always paid on time, giving credence to the argument that, this appears as a strategy employed by political authority to keep the armed forces financially happy to confine them to the barracks. Despite the fact that, the general conditions of service of the armed forces beg improvement, mutinies over pay are rare in Ghana.

Budgetary constraints have been the key reason behind restructuring of the overall size and strength of the armed forces. There exists a formula arguably used for the calculation of force strength, based on population density, but the reality is that, like most public sector institutions in Ghana recruitment figures are determined based on what the political authority thinks the economy can support. Indeed, the GAF always requires financial clearance from Ministry Finance and Economic Planning before it can embark on yearly recruitment.[1] The strength of the GAF fluctuated over the years, providing the basis for some respondents to argue that, the armed forces has operated below the expected capacity. The processes involved in arriving at these figures remain largely understudied. Two strands of opinions emerged from this study on the right size of the GAF. One strand, shared by a majority of respondents from GAF, is that, currently the institution is not rightly sized and operating at 40-50% of the required strength. This point of view calls for more personnel while cognizant of the fact that defence budgetary constraints makes it impossible in the short to medium timeframe. Another point of view, shared by the interviewees is that, the current personnel numbers are appropriate considering the population size and the economic imperatives of maintaining effective and efficient armed forces. One can argue that, Ghana is not at war or faced by eminent geostrategic threats, so does not require additional strength. Nonetheless, there is a need for the existing force level to be adequately resourced in terms of training and advanced military capabilities to enhance their effectiveness.

The thesis also sought to examine the role of the ministry of defence in the management of defence. Previously, the MOD basically served as a "clearing house" between the military and political authority. This was attributed to some noted challenges in defence management in Ghana. For instance, as a civil service institution, the ministry is supposed to lead the defence management process. However, the reality with the ministry is that its corps of technocrats and other civilian staff is skeletal. Some reform measures instituted by the NPP government in 2003 have contributed to some modest changes. Notably, the MOD is no longer located in Burma Camp, as it has new office complex and a modest number of civilian experts. The ministry appears to be asserting its role in defence management issues such as the budgeting and procurement processes which before 1999 were dominated by the armed forces. Moreover, modifications brought about by the national budgetary reform processes, specifically, the introduction of the MTEF, (Medium to long term expenditure framework), has contributed to an increased role for the MOD and relative transparency in the process.

With regards to political transformation, the 1992 constitution clearly establishes civilian control of the military. The armed forces now appear to have to terms with the principles of civil-military relations. In this regard Ghana's armed forces have become more professionalized over time and thus it would appear that objective control is being

exercised. However, as illustrated in chapter five, there remains arrears in which political interferences are felt. The study focused on parliamentary oversight of the defence sector under the Fourth Republic. The 1992 constitution explicitly states that an armed force cannot be established in Ghana without parliamentary approval. However, parliamentary oversight is not explicitly provided for in the constitution. Even though the constitution refers to the investigative and inquiry functions of committees, it does not make specific reference to oversight of the security sector. Also, the Armed forces Act of 1962, although amended several times over the years does not make any provision for parliamentary oversight. Other acts of parliament such as the Security Services and Intelligence Act 526 of 1996, was seen as an attempt to prescribe in-depth national security architecture for the state. The act also seeks to address the vacuum on parliamentary oversight and civilian control of the security sector and strips the security actors of their hitherto perceived opacity. For example, Act 526 requires the executive to report to parliament annually through the minister of national security. However, the oversight does not go beyond submission of report by the executive. The reality is that, this requirement is hardly adhered to by the executive as the post of a minister for national security does not often exist especially under NDC administrations. Parliament too does not demand for the report. Even in cases where such position is occupied as in the early years of the first NPP administration (2001-2009), the minister brought little or no change to the status quo.

Generally, the institutionalization of parliamentary oversight in Ghana's democratization process has been severely hampered by the sporadic coups d'états and the dissolution of parliament at every military takeover of political power. The first parliament under the Fourth Republic (1993-1996) was basically seen as a rubber stamp of the executive because it was dominated by the NDC and allied political parties. Successive parliaments since 1996 have made some modest improvements in the performance of core functions such as representation, law making and oversight despite the existence of an overly powerful executive arm of government. It is noteworthy that, the armed forces appears to have accepted civilian control of the military, yet, past experiences in civil-military relations still impact on the present dispensation. To this end, there is still mutual suspicion on the part of civilian leadership and military to the extent that, issues concerning the military are often handled tactfully by civilian authorities. As shown in earlier chapters, democratic control of the armed forces is vested in parliamentary committees like the Public Accounts Committee (PAC), Finance Committee and the Parliamentary Select Committee on Defence and Interior (PSCD&I). These committees perform different oversight functions. Challenges to effective exercise of parliamentary control include the nature of political system, lack of technical knowledge by parliamentarians and the capacity of parliament as an institution (staff strength and resources).

The lack of transparency in Ghana's defence spending makes the sector susceptible to corruption. Formerly, issues of defence were often not discussed on the floor of parliament. There have been some relative changes in parliamentary scrutiny into defence budgetary allocations. Nonetheless, successive parliaments under the Fourth Republic have not yet come to terms with how far they can delve into issues of defence sector including the military budget. Issues of defence budget are often discussed in camera at parliamentary committee levels. In instances, where such issues are presented for parliamentary plenary discussions, they are often characterized by self-censorship and excessive partisanship making it impossible for due diligence to be done before matters are put to vote on the floor of parliament.

Moreover, the relative powers of parliament in relation to the executive on the armed forces are clearly manifested in the area of deployment of Ghanaian military to peacekeeping operations. Ghana's engagements in either regional or UN-mandated peacekeeping operations are not adequately guided by parliamentary oversight. There is the need for the country to allow parliamentary oversight to impact on the totality of executive decisions in relation to military operations both for national defence purposes and peacekeeping missions abroad as such decisions have larger implications for the country. For instance, successive governments and leadership of the armed forces have not been very transparent on issues relating to peacekeeping funds accruing to the country. Giving parliament an effective oversight function could contribute to transparency and enhance public confidence in the operations of the armed forces.

In chapter six, the current state of civil-military relations in the Fourth Republic was examined through the Concordance Theory of civil-military relations. The theory postulates that to prevent military intervention in politics there should be agreement among three partners-the military elite, political authority and citizenry on four parameters namely: social composition of the officer corps, recruitment, political decision making and military style. In applying this proposition to gauge the civil-military relations, the study found out that, there is some level of concordance in the Ghanaian case which has contributed to keeping the military in the barracks since the last coup d'état in 1981. This is also attributable to the changes or developments within the armed forces with regards to the human, cultural, organizational and political environment.

The thesis contends that concordance in Ghana exists between two partners as opposed to the three proposed by Schiff. Here, the military elite and political authority are seen to be in agreement over the four areas proffered by Schiff. There is mutual agreement between these two actors that their interests are best served in a democracy. However, the third partner, the citizenry seem disinterested and not factored into the decision making process. Indeed, interviews among ordinary citizens in three selected regions of Ghana point to a

general appreciation of the role of the military as providers of both homeland security and regional/international security through peacekeeping. The stability provided by the military is needed for democracy and development to thrive. Nonetheless, there is some amount of fear or apprehension towards the military. This became evident in the responses from different sub-groups in the sample size about their general impression about the military. Notably some military officers and the rank and file have not completely moved away from the culture of violence associated with the military. A cause for worry for sustainability of healthy civil-military relations is that, the increasing appreciation of tenets of democracy and principles of civilian and democratic control of the armed forces exist among the current generation of the officer corps as opposed to the rank and rank. The rank and file, though not factored in the concordance theory, is a critical mass that needs to be oriented on the contemporary discourse of civil-military relations.

The chapter also explored the nature of the relationship between the armed forces and other important sub groups such as the media and civil society. For instance, the media play diverse roles in keeping both the military and civilian society aware of each other. Partly due to history of civil-military relations, civil society, especially the epistemic communities and the media have until recently shied away from venturing into defence and security issues. The relationship between the military and civil society organization has been one of uneasiness. There has been a resurgence of civil society and media with expanded scope and self-confidence in their determination to preserve freedom and ensure good governance. To this end, there have been some changes in CSO engagements in the governance process, in general, and the defence sector, in particular. However, defence and security remain a highly specialized area in Ghana. As a result, there is a limited circle of experts and non-governmental research organizations in this area.

With the return to democratic governance in Ghana, both the media and the military have undergone some changes with regards to their roles in society. The relationship between the media and the military is marked by mutual distrust and suspicion. Typically, the media see itself as neutral and powerful voice of the public and often see the military and the way it operates as an impediment to accessing uncensored information. In the same vein, the military is also wary of the media, partly due to the latter's tendency to misrepresent information without due regard to security imperatives and the future role and effectiveness of the military. There have been some shifts in the relations to some level of openness. The military appears co-operative in terms of the military working with journalists in both peace and crises on issues pertaining to the role of the military in the Ghanaian society. However, there is yet to complete change from the traditional sensitivities that hinder open discussion on defence and national security issues.

[1]See, *The Finder*, (2017), "GAF To Recruit 1,200-Accommodation In 2017 Budget", March 14.

Table 11-7: Summary of Transformation in Ghana's Defence Sector and Nature of Civil-Military Relations Since 1992

Political Administration	Cultural transformation	Human transformation	Organizational Transformation	Political Transformation	Nature of Civil-military Relations
NDC 1992-2000	Quiet reforms to ensure professionalism in GAF Current calibres of military officers have better educational qualifications and access to higher educational and professional qualification. GAF personnel exhibit professionalism in peacekeeping environment	Reforms of forces pay policies with introduction of equal pay for equal work. Deployment of women are deployed to peacekeeping missions started in 1994	Reintroduction of defence management structures such as the Armed Forces Council, the Defence Administrative Committee, and the Defence Staff Committee Increase in force levels Introduction of budgetary reform process that gives Ministry of Defence a lead role from 1999 process	Chapter four of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana elaborates on the executive oversight of the security and defence sectors The role of Parliament resides in its function as the source of legitimacy of all security institutions as outlined under Article 210(2), of the 1992 Constitution. Quiet reforms to restore discipline, command, and control and greater political control The passage of the Security and Intelligence Service Act 526 of 1996 provide an avenue to prescribe in-depth national security architecture for the state. Issues of security sector reform gained traction after 1996 Parliamentary oversight of the armed forces is done through	The armed forces was a major support base of government Preponderance of military in society There were no deliberate efforts at warming relations the general society was apprehensive about the military

Political Administration	Cultural transformation	Human transformation	Organizational Transformation	Political Transformation	Nature of Civil-military Relations
				committees like the Public Accounts Committee (PAC), Finance Committee and the Parliamentary Select Committee on Defence and Interior (PSCD&I).	
NPP 2001-2008	Institutional desire to change negative image of GAF. Military officers now have high appreciation of tenets of civil-military relations and constitutional rule	Efforts at addressing the perceived regional imbalances in the GAF begun in 2001 Recruitment is done based on regions of residence rather ethnic origin of applicants. The ethnic Composition of officer corps relatively balanced. It is no longer dominated by Ewes and Northerners. Revised entry requirement for officers enlistment from advanced secondary school certificate to bachelor's degree	Since 2001 There has been significant increase in force strength to meet changing requirements of GAF There has been some modest increase in defence expenditure since 2006. Reforms of Ministry of Defence to enhance civilian oversight started in 2003. The first phase of the PIP commenced in February 2003 with a course in Defence Management for civilian staff of MOD Ministry of Defence engaged in civil-military Dialogues, and participated in events such as the "South-South Dialogue on Defence Transformation"	The armed forces appears to have accepted civilian control of the military Political environment was opened to civil society engagement in defence issues Parliamentary oversight is now enhanced. There is improved transparency in defence budgetary processes	There was minimal reform to depoliticize the military a Warming of relationship between GAF and general society presence of military in Society reduced. Civil society engagement in defence and security Issues increased

Political Administration	Cultural transformation	Human transformation	Organizational Transformation	Political Transformation	Nature of Civil-military Relations
		Prior to 1992, women female representation was less than 0.5%. Currently women constitute about 10% Since 2001 recruitment aims at 10% women GAF maternity leave regulation was revised in line with Ghana Labour Law (2003)	in 2003.		
NDC 2008-2016	The GAF now apologizes for infraction by soldiers following internal investigation into such incidence	In 2014, an online application system to reduce the human factor in the selection processes Ghana Army got one female brigadier-general in 2016 Three women pilots in Ghana Air Force as at 2015	Since 2012, there have been internal processes aimed at restructuring the GAF to effectively respond to internal security threats. Defence policy was adopted in 2012, but not public document Ghana Army now has three command centres: Northern, Central and Southern	Parliamentary oversight has improved. Political environment is accommodating to public scrutiny.	Relations is now improved The fear of the armed Forces by general society is reduced

Source: Author

7.2 Conclusions

The research question was premised on a desire for a deeper enquiry into the processes of transforming Ghana's defence sector. The GAF has since independence been the primary source of political instability in Ghana. The review of literature on defence and security sector has shown that there exist only a few analyses in the area of defence transformation on stable but post-authoritarian countries like Ghana. In line with the research objectives, the novelty of this research is the ability to explore in-depth a relatively understudied topic of defence transformation and civil-military relations by using the dual lens of Chuter's conceptual framework to defence transformation and Schiff's Concordance theory of civil-military relations. The thesis therefore argues on the strength of its findings that some changes have taken place in Ghana's defence sector, in terms of cultural, human, organizational and political transformations. However, unlike other post-conflict setting where defence reforms are prescribed as part of peace settlements, the reforms in Ghana have been organically driven by the peculiar political, social and economic realities of the country. They have therefore happened in a piecemeal fashion and largely undocumented, making it difficult to study. The processes have come with some inherent challenges which could be surmounted to make the changes holistic.

Ghana is now seen to be on the path of democratic consolidation having succeeded in managing three political turnovers since 1992. The country now ranks high in most democratic governance index in Africa. Notably, Ghana ranked seventh in the Ibrahim Index of African Governance 2016 on overall performance in governance in African.[1] The country also scored above regional average across all the categories, such as safety and rule of law, participation and human rights, and human development.[2]Similarly, the Freedom House index for 2016 ranked Ghana among the freest countries in the world with an aggregate score of 83.[3] While there are indications of challenges in the governance process, the Fourth Republic is undoubtedly the longest surviving political dispensation. This thesis argues that the changes in the defence sector have contributed to improving civil-military relations in the country which hitherto was marked by coup d'états. Since the inception of the Fourth Republican constitution in 1992, there have been various constitutional arrangements to bring the armed forces to conform to the characters of the democratic dispensation it finds itself. Using Schiff's concordance theory, the thesis has been able to demonstrate how partnership has been fostered between key actors of the concordance theory, namely political authority and military on some variables such as political decision process on defence, social composition of the officer corps, recruitment and military style. There is mutual respect by political authority and military as both have come to a realization that their collective interests are best served under a democracy.[4] For instance, human transformation in the armed forces, especially at the officer corps have led to the

emergence of a critical mass of officers who have a deeper appreciation of the tenet of civil-military relations and civilian supremacy and oversight of the defence sector. There have been some deliberate efforts to transform the social composition of the officer corps to ensure regional balance. This does not however, fully address the real or imagined perceptions of political meddling in the armed forces along ethnic and regional lines.

Moreover, the study argues that, the partnership essentially exists among two actors, which are the military and political elites. The third partner, the citizenry and by extension, civil society remains a passive actor, due to diverse reasons highlighted in earlier chapters. Typically, peoples' experiences with the military since the colonial era through to the post-independence era of military rules have generated fear and apprehension towards the military. Based on responses from Ghanaians sampled from three regions, the study found mixed perceptions among Ghanaian citizenry about the armed forces. The military has over the years embarked on some measures to bridge the gap and improve their battered image among the citizens. To this end, peoples' perceptions of the military are gradually changing as most Ghanaians appreciate the role of the armed forces in the development process. The GAF is the only public institution that enjoys a substantial level of trust among Ghanaians.[5] Nonetheless, there is yet to be complete behavioural change across the military as soldiers continue to abuse civilians giving credence to peoples' apprehension of the military as a trusted partner in society.

The thesis sought to extend the partnership further to explore the relations between the military and other core actors as civil society and the media. Civil society has found its place in the governance process and making modest contribution in diverse ways to help promote institutionalised social trust which contributes to deepening the democratic process. Yet, civil society groups are yet to fully explore their role in contributing to the public discourse on defence issues. The relationship between the military and civil society organization is one of mutual suspicion due to difference in institutional cultures. The military tries to accommodate civil society, but does so with suspicions and from a position of perceived superiority. There have been some changes in CSO engagement in defence and security issues. Nevertheless, defence and security remain a highly specialized area in Ghana, therefore limiting the circle of experts and non-governmental research organizations in this area. Only a few think thank engages the military on ad hoc basis, in diverse capacity building and dialogue fora.

The relationship between the media and military is no different from the rest of the society. It is marked by mutual distrust and suspicion. The armed forces, like any public institution, is a national asset and must therefore account for its actions and identify its relevance and contribution to the public interest. This is often done through activities of the media in shaping perceptions of the society about the military. The military in Ghana has not been

media friendly. There is lack of free flow of information from the military due to the traditional sensitivities that inhibit open discussion on defence and national security issues. Besides, the lack of understanding of each other's role and differences in operation procedure are the principal cause of tensions between the media and the military. There have been some shifts in terms of openness towards the media. Now, the military appears co-operative in terms of working with journalists on issues pertaining to the role of the military in the Ghanaian society. As media thrives on sensationalism to capture the attention of their audience, news about the military, often focus on violent misconducts of soldiers such as brutalities against civilians. Only a few reports capture, heroic stories and professionalism of the institution and individual soldiers in peacekeeping and other functions of the military in society. So there is the need to smoothen relations between the media and the military to deepen efforts at improving civil-military relations in Ghana.

As noted earlier, an effective, efficient, accountable and affordable defence sector could essentially contribute to consolidation of democracy in West Africa generally. Recent developments in the region especially in countries that have been touted as being on the path to democratic consolidation, point to the fact that, the region is still coup prone, most countries are yet to effectively transform their post-authoritarian defence sectors. The process of defence transformation seeks comprehensive change that can radically alter the status quo of power relations in the provision, management and oversight of defence sector.[6] This multifaceted approach, which seeks to achieve an optimal force design and improved effectiveness and efficiency, and at the same time, developing and maintaining a professional and modern national defence force, that is representative of all groupings within a country in terms of regional distribution and gender.[7] These go a long way to give effect to national defence policies and principles of civil-military relations. In addition, defence transformation could bring about fundamental changes in the armed forces by moving them through their authoritarian past to align them the current defence and security needs.[8] This can help improve both national and international respect and trust in West African military institutions.

As shown in this study, Ghana has seen some changes in the armed forces, although the changes have not been comprehensive. The country's growing democratic credentials can be attributed to the gradual acceptance of the principle of civil-military relations by both the armed forces and civilian authority. The case study of Ghana does not provide enough basis for generalization and wholesale application in other countries in West Africa. Nevertheless as mentioned earlier, the processes and challenges provide useful lessons for other countries in the sub-region could draw from in their efforts at transforming their post-authoritarian defence sector.

7.3 Recommendations

Based on the findings and conclusions of the study, the following recommendations are therefore offered to guide future policy and practice of transforming the defence sector and improving civil-military relations in Ghana.

1. Towards National Security and Defence Policies

Comprehensive defence transformation processes often take place over a long period of time and require multiple resources.[9] There is ongoing process to develop a national security strategy and defence policy for Ghana. There is need for the government of Ghana to expedite the process and initiate a national consultative process that includes relevant stakeholders such as civil society and the citizenry. The policy once developed and adopted should be revised periodically to respond to the security and defence needs of the country. This can be started with a comprehensive review of the country's internal and external security environment. Such a process will help the country to determine the appropriate roles of the GAF and how much the country wants to spend to prepare the armed forces to meet the strategic defence objectives. A detailed elaboration of the mission, doctrine, force design, and human resource needs of the GAF can be made based on consensus among the relevant stakeholders like government, Armed Forces Council, parliament, ministries of defence, finance, interior, military hierarchy and civil society. The national security framework will set the tone for a defence policy that could clearly spell out strategic defence goals of the country and how the armed forces can be transformed and structured to contribute to the realization of policy objective.

2. Fostering Cultural Change

There is a need for complete change in military culture from the traditional aggressive and violent behaviour to a culture of respect for rule of law and human rights. There is the need to address the psychology of militarism at the level of individual soldiers. Soldiers must be carefully selected and professionally trained to acquire nuanced understanding of contemporary norms of civil-military relations. Professionalism can be both technical and normative, including respect for the rule of law and accountability to civil authorities and civil society in general. It is important for recruited soldiers to be trained to appreciate the importance of human rights and understand that violent behavoir is not conterminous with virtues of effective soldiering. For instance, Basic Education Certificate Examination (BECE) as minimum entry requirement to the enlisted ranks should be upgraded to Senior High School Certificate and post-secondary diplomas as higher qualifications could

contribute to the overall professional outlook of the individual soldier, and enhance the general appreciation of the institutional culture and civil-military relations.

Training alone may not bring about attitudinal change, hence, soldiers must be reoriented to avoid violent behaviour in their interaction with the civilian population, especially their involvement in civil law enforcement duties.This can be done through reorientation and change of mind-set from the perceived superiority of the military that often contributes to violent behaviour of soldiers towards civilian population. There is the need for the country to reduce the military's role in domestic law enforcement and internal security.

GAF has a responsiblity to institutionalize ethical and accountable culture in order to build trust of the general society. Measures should be taken to enhance rank and file and officer accountability for their actions by improving the transparency of the military justice system. Civilian justice system must be strengthened to ensure accountability for crimes against civilians by the military. There should be a clear and enforceable code of conduct whose provisions must be made easily accessible to all including the public.

3. Enhancing Regional Balance in GAF

As an institution responsible for defence of the nation, the GAF must be apolitical and national in character. Perceptions of regional or ethnic and political biases in the GAF undermine the credibility of the military in the eyes of the general population it seeks to defend. It also has dire consequences on cohesiveness and effectiveness of the institution in particular and civil-military relations, in general. To overcome this challenge, GAF must learn to manage the diversity of its personnel in terms of their ethnic or regional disposition to create a more dynamic and competitive organizational culture to achieve the general organizational goals.[10]

At the national level, deep-seated social, cultural and political differences that underlie existing tensions on regional balance and gender in the armed forces must be addressed even though this appears daunting. Particularly, civilian political authority must endeavour to depoliticize the military environment by keeping the military truly professional and eschew partisanship in its decision-making in relating to promotions and appointments in the armed forces. The practice merit-based promotion based on the existing point-system must be strengthened.

The GAF must improve the level of transparency about its recruitment and promotion practices to ensure credibility in the eyes of general public regarding representativeness of personnel. For instance, as part of the yearly recruitment exercises, the general public should be informed about the figures of personnel chosen across the regions of Ghana by detailing out the processes involved in arriving at the figures. The issue of protocol

recruitment practices must be critically examined. The practice may have its merits, however the demerits seems to undermine the fairness of recruitment processes. Standards must not be lowered for people coming through channels. They must be subjected to the rigorous screening associated with the enlistment process.

4. Towards a "Re-gendered" Armed Forces

At the national level, there is the need to actively promote gender mainstreaming in Ghana's defence sector. This must backed by a clear national mandate, derived from the highest political level, which is in line with overall strategic defence and security policies of the country. Gender integration in GAF should be approached from a transformative angle that seeks to address the outdated institutional cultures, practices and policies to respond to the needs of all in society. The GAF should develop an inclusive gender policy and equal opportunity policies to enable females to explore their full potentials in military service. This can be done through the provision of relevant educational and professional advancement opportunities. Specific strategies can be devised to recruit and retain women in the GAF. For example, affirmative action policy could be used to allocate 30% recruitment figures for women and set targets for the number to be developed and promoted within a particular timeframe through adequate training.

Gender sensitive policies could contribute to attracting and retaining highly qualified women in the armed forces. The Ministry of Defence should work in tandem with the high command of the GAF, to critically review and revise some outdated institutional regulations to enable females to explore their career potential in the military. Regulations prohibiting women from participating in combat related examinations should be reviewed. The GAF should consider providing alternative support facilities for families and possibly use other criteria for promotion for those who turn down foreign deployment for family reasons. Women in the GAF must be provided with work place friendly policies, gender-sensitive facilities and adequate urinal facilities. Again, providing nursing and day-care facilities, flexible work schedules for parents could boast women's interest in military service.

In addition, there is a need to discourage and end stereotyping of women's roles in the armed forces. Women must be encouraged to explore their full potential and not limit their deployment to support roles. Qualified women should be promoted to increase the number of women at the strategic decision making positions in GAF. They could take on a broad range of tasks, including operational and combat functions which have prospects for advancement to higher level of their careers. Ghana must make policy declaration to open combat roles to women. The few women at the senior officer levels in the GAF, through their networks should take it upon themselves to mentor other women. Such forums can be

used to address peculiar challenges of women, both individual and career-related opportunities.

5. Investing in Defence to bring about Organizational Transformation

The Government of Ghana has a vital role to play in bringing about organizational transformation of the armed forces to ensure effectiveness and efficiency. There is the need for massive investment in the armed forces to enhance training and professionalism of personnel, logistic and materiel. The armed forces contribute significantly to providing a stable environment for development to thrive, and bring in revenue through their participation in international peacekeeping. Defence expenditure must be made to have positive impact on citizens in general, and the armed forces, in particular. With regards to budgetary allocation for national development it is essential for government to maintain a balance between the defence sector and other sectors of the society such as education, health, social infrastructure and human development.

Sound defence budgeting processes and practices could improve accountability and ensure that the defence budget is aligned to the priorities of the armed forces, as determined through a holistic defence policy-making process. To promote efficiency of the sector, there is the need to strengthen the skills and capacities of civilian authorities in order to transform them into effective and credible managers of the defence sector. Specifically, the MOD needs to improve their overall management practices to enhance democratic and civilian control of the armed forces. The country should put in place a coherent national defence planning process to produce a policy that could enable the MOD to attract and retain high calibre professionals for both policy formulation and implementation as well as in technical fields like research and development in security and defence sector. Notably, transparency in the defence budgetary process and procurement could be improved by engaging relevant stakeholders to engender public understanding about defence expenditure.

It essential for the country to consider undertaking a defence review process to determine an appropriate force structure, in line with strategic defence direction of the country and strength of the economy. Further, the processes in arriving at recruitment quotas must be made much clearer to the public and relevant stakeholders to help curb out the perception of favouritism of certain groups of people in recruitment.

6. Strengthening Parliamentary Oversight of the Defence Sector

Parliamentary oversight of the defence sector should be strengthened. This can be done by providing members of parliament and parliamentary staff with practical knowledge, skills, resources and techniques needed for effectve parliamentary oversight of the security and defence sector. Parliament may have to consider an institutionalized approach to building capacity of members in certain technical issues like defence and security as there is low level of expertise in these areas in Ghana. For instance, the country can explore the options of setting up defence and security liaison office permanently attached to PSCD & I that can be consulted by parliamentarians and parliamentary staff to provide research and technical advice to the committee on defence/security issues. In the absence of such a body, the capacity of parliamentary staff must be enhanced through the provision of adequate training and archival resources to provide members of parliament with necessary background research on issues under consideration.

There is the need to demystify defence and security issues in Ghana. This requires a shift from the traditional secrecy surrounding issues of defence and security to improve transparency and accountability in defence budgetary and spending processes. This can contribute to ensuring that outcomes of decisions are consistent with public intentions and policy objectives. The parliament of Ghana is not a perfect instituion, yet, members of parliament must have the political will and do away with excessive partisanship, and use the tools and mechanisms at their disposal to objectively perform their oversight functions on the armed forces. Members of parliaments could effectively use their powers in open and frank manners, without undue censorship, to enhance transparency and provide information to a larger audience, including the media, non-governmental organisation and civil society as a whole on defence issues.

The parliament of Ghana must as a matter of urgency pass the right to information law. This law could empower relevant actors and civil society to demand information in the relatively opaque security and defence environment. Issues of defence and security especially budgeting are often too technical for the average members of parliament to follow and scrutinize effectively. In this regard, parliament can collaborate with civil society to draw the latter's experience in the review and monitoring of the budgetary process.

Moreover, women participation in parliamentary oversight of the defence sector must be reconsidered. Parliamentary committees can use their monitoring and oversight functions to draw the attention of the executive to gender issues in the armed forces.

In order to boost the democratic legitimacy of Ghana participation peacekeeping participations, the country has to consider involving parliamentary approval either a piriori

or posteriori in peacekeeping deployment. Such decisions have both direct and indirect implication on the public purse. Therefore, the country should adopt specific legislation and use existing parliamentary procedures and practices to empower parliament to debate and approve decisions of the president. Parliamentary debates on such deployment go a long way to inform the general public and enhance the legitimacy of the ensuing deployments. There must be an explicit constitutional provision for parliamentary oversight to ensure that defence and security committees are adequately empowered and trained to carry out their functions effectively and avoid partisanship that often characterized the decision-making process.

7. Sustaining Concordance Civil-Military Relations

The current crop of senior officers has deeper appreciation of tenets of civil-military relations and this has contributed to improve civil-military relations. There is the need to encourage inter-generational and peer learning among personnel in order to transfer this core features to the next generation of officers to sustain the status quo. Military officers should be further trained to enhance their professionalism and the accountability and transparency of the armed forces in general. In order to reduce the mutual suspicion that often exists between civil authorities and members of the armed forces, often reinforced by the military's perceived superiority over civilians, efforts should be made to strengthen channels of communication to enhance the confidence of civil authorities in dealing with the military.

Active civil society engagement is necessary through sustained civil-military dialogues. Currently, the political environment is conducive for civil society and media to play active roles. But there is need for civil society to adopt the appropriate approach to engage the armed forces. For instance, they should approach the military with an open mind in order to engage them constructively. Through the work of a professional and objective media and civil soceity organizations, the public could be educated on their rights and the appropriate institutions to channel their grievances in cases of abuse by military personnel. Essentially, the armed forces must not be let alone to deal with their own people who commit violations of peoples rights. Rather, other civil institutions like CHRAJ must be be resourced to function effectively. Similarly, the media should endeavor to objectively publicize the positive contribution of the military to the governance process and at the same exercise their societal watchdog role, by bringing to light excesses of the military.

Moreover, civil society organizations and media must pursue defence issues with keen interest. This could help enhance public knowledge and perception about the armed forces and invariably contribute to improving transparency in the area. The citizenry is affected by the activities of the armed forces, therefore, the passiveness of the citizenry to issues

concerning the armed forces must end. Local CSOs should expand their capacity building and advocacy initiatives to develop a network of experts who can engage publicly to whip up societal interest in defence issues and contribute to the defence policy making and implementation processes to enhance democractic and civilian control and oversight of defence in Ghana.

Last but not the least, in order to overcome the weak or limited expertise among civil society on defence issues, civils ociety groups collaborate with existing epistemic networks such to the Global Facilitation Network on SSR and the African SSR Network. Through experience sharing with other experts, local civil society organizations could enhance their knowledge and build their capacity to effectively engagement in public discourse on defence-related issues.

7.3.1 Proposals for Future Research

This study has sought answers to the research question, and at the same time, it has raised some pertinent questions that are beyond the scope of this work. Further study could therefore be conducted to answer the following questions:

- To what extent has Ghana's effective performance in peacekeeping contributed to changing the traditional military culture?
- How can Ghana make optimum use of the armed forces beyond peacekeeping?
- The issue of corruption in defence remains under researched in Ghana. What practical measures can be adopted to strenghthen roles of oversight institutions to help deal with corruption in the defence sector, partcularly in procurment, selection for peacekeeping operations, and the use of peacekeeping revenues.
- What measures can be adopted by civil society to increase interest of the Ghainaian public in defence sector discourses?
- Explore how the mandates of institutions can be reconfigured to ensure independent investigations in cases of excesses by members of GAF, as cases of military brutality are not likely to go away any time soon because soldiers are yet to be to complete behavioural change across the GAF.

Final Thoughts

The overall aim of the research is an enquiry into the process of defence transformation in Ghana. Securing in-depth data for a research of this nature is challenging because issues pertaining to the armed forces are often treated with confidentiality. The researcher has been able to navigate through these sensitivities to generate rich data through primary interviews and secondary literature. The findings of this research are therefore based on the

researcher's interpretation of the available data. The thesis has established how the transformation has contributed to sustaining democratic stability in Ghana. As noted earlier, the processes in Ghana was not borne out of peace settlement where there are prescriptions to follow religiously. The changes in Ghana defence sector since 1992 have taken place as part of the democratization process and have been driven by the country's political, economic and social peculiarities. To this end, Ghana has made some significant progress in bringing the defence sector in line with the ongoing democratic process. The general impression of the researcher on the progress made so far is satisfactory. Yet, the country needs to do more to holistically transform the colonial and authoritarian defence sector to adequately respond to the need current needs of the country. The thesis has highlighted some of the key developments in cultural, human, organizational and political transformation of the defence sector in general, and GAF in particular. These have contributed to improving civil-military relations which has helped sustain the Fourth Republic as the longest in the country's political history. As it is widely held that democracy is a process not an event, there are challenges that need urgent attention. This provides opportunities for political leadership and policy makers to show more commitment in transforming the defence establishment to respond to the needs of the current democratic establishment. This should be done in a more inclusive and consultative process taking into account the views of all relevant stakeholders. The findings of this research provide some useful point of reference for both policy and future research on transforming the defence sector in Ghana. Lessons learnt in the Ghana process could also serve as guides for other West African countries who share similar histories of civil-military relations to explore avenues for transforming their post-authoritarian defence establishments.

Endnotes

[1] Mo Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) (2016), *A Decade of African Governance 2006-2015,* London: Mo Ibrahim Foundation.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Freedom House (2016), *Freedom in the World, Anxious Dictators, Wavering Democracies: Global Freedom Under Pressure,* London: Freedom House.
[4]Agyeman-Duah, Barfour, (2002), "Civil-military Relations in Ghana's Fourth Republic", *Critical Perspectives* No.9, Accra: Ghana Center for Democratic Development.
[5]CDD-Ghana, (2014), "Ghana Round 5 Afrobarometer Survey: General Findings". Available at http://www.afrobarometer.org/results/compendium-of-results (Accessed on February 14, 2014)
[6] Bryden, Alan and Olonisakin, Funmi, (2010), *Security Sector Transformation in Africa*, edited by Bryden, Alan and Olonisakin, Funmi, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Force.,
[7]de Vries, Roland, (2006), "Defence Transformation in South Africa: Sharing the Experience with the Forces Armeés de la République Démocratique du Congo', *African Security Review,* 15(4):79-97.
[8]Cleary, Laura, (2011), "Triggering Critical Mass: Identifying the Factors for a Successful Defence Transformation", *Defence Studies*, 11(1): 43-65.
[9]United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Department of Field Support, (2011), "Defence Sector Reform Policy.
[10]Uys, Ina, (2003), "Diversity Management: Reasons and Challenges", *Politeia,* 22(3):30- 48.

BIBILIOGRAPHY

Books

Aboagye, Festus, (1999), *The Ghana Army*: *A Concise Contemporary Guide to its Centennial Regimental History 1897-1999*, Accra: Sedco Publishing Limited.

Aboagye, Festus, (2010), *Indigenous African Warfare: Its Concepts and Art in the Gold Coast, Asante and the Northern Territories up to Early 1900s*, Pretoria: Ulinzi Africa Publishing Solutions.

Adamu, Mahdi, (1978), *The Hausa Factor in West African History*, Zaria and Ibadan: Ahmadou Bello University Press and Oxford University Press.

Addae, Stephen, (2005), *A Short History of Ghana Armed Forces*, Accra: Ministry of Defence.

Adu-Amanfo; Francis, (2014), *The Roles of Peace and Security, Political Leadership and Entrepreneurship in the Socio-Economic Development of Emerging Nations*, Bloomington: Author House Limited.

Afrifa, Akwasi, (1966), *The Ghana coup: 24th February 1966*, London: Frank Cass and Company.

Ahiadeke, Clement, (2008), *Research Methodology: Theory and Practice in the Social Science*. Accra: Sundel Services.

Ahwoi, Kwamena, (2010), *Local Government and Decentralization in Ghana*, Accra: Unimax Macmillan.

Alao, Abiodun, (2012), *Mugabe and the Politics of Security in Zimbabwe*, Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press.

Alexander, Templer, (1964), *African Tightrope: My Two Years as Nkrumah's Chief of Staff*, London: Pall Mall Press.

Amenumey, DEK, (2011), *Ghana: A Concise history from Pre-colonial tomes to the 20th century*, Accra: Woeli Publishing Services.

Armah, Kwasi, (2004), *Peace without Power: Ghana's Foreign Policy 1957-1966*, Accra: Ghana Universities Press.

Assensoh, Akwasi and Alex-Assensoh, Yvett, (2003*), African Military History and Policies: Ideological Coups and Incursions 1900-Present*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Austin, Denis, (1970), *Politics in Ghana; 1946-1960*, London: Oxford University Press.

Austin, Dennis and Luckham, Robin (Eds) (1975), *Politicians and Soldiers in Ghana*, London: Frank Cass.

Barany, Zoltan, (2012), *The Soldier and the Changing State: Building Democratic Armies in Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Americas*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Basham, Victoria, (2013), *War, Identity and the Liberal State*: Everyday *Experiences of the Geopolitical in the Armed Force*, London: Routledge.

Bayart, Jean-Francois, (1993), *The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly*, New York: Longman.

Baynham, Simon, (1988), *The Military and Politics in Nkrumah's Ghana*. London, West View Press.

Berg, Bruce, and Lune, Howard, (2012), *Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Science*, Eighth Edition, Boston: Person Education Inc.

Born, Hans, Fluri, Philipp, Johnsson, Anders, (2003), *Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector: Principles, Mechanisms and Practices:* Geneva: DCAF and Inter-parliamentary Union.

Bouman, Garry and Atkinson, Garry, (1995), *A Handbook of Social Science Research: A Comprehensive and Practical Guide for Students*. 2nd Edition. New York: Oxford University Press.

Brannen, Julia, (1992), *Mixing Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Research*. London: Avebury.

Bryman, Alan, (2012), *Social Research Methods*, Fourth Edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Buzan, Barry, Waever, Ole, and de Wilde, Jaap, (1998), *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, Boulder Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Buzan, Bary, (1991), *Peoples, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security in the Post-Cold War Era*, Second Edition, Colchester: European Consortium for Political Research Press.

Chanaa, Jane, (2005), *Guns or Growth? Assessing the Impact of Arms Sales on Sustainable Development*, London: Oxfam.

Chazan, Naomi, Lewis, Peter, Mortimer, Rothschild, Robert, Donald, and Stedman, John, (1999), *Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa*, Third Edition, Boulder, Co: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Chuter, David, (2011), *Governing and Managing the Defence and Security Sector*, Pretoria: ISS.

Creswell, John, (1994), *Research Design: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches*, London: Sage.

Creswell, John, (2009), *Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches*. Second Edition, Los Angeles: Sage Publications.

Croissant, Aurel, Kuehn David, Chambers, Paul, (2013), *Democratization and Civilian Control in Asia*, London: Pelgrave Macmillan.

DAC/OEDC (2005), *Guidelines on Security System Reform and Governance*, Geneva.

Dadzie, Ato and Ahwoi, Kwamina (2010), *Justice Daniel Francis Annan: in the service of democracy*, Accra: Institute for Democratic Governance.

Decalo, Samuel, (1990), *Coups and Army Rule in Africa*, Second edition, New Haven: Yale University Press.

Denscombe, Matyn, (2010), *The Good Research Guide for Small-Scale Social Research Projects*, Fourth Edition, Berkshire, England: Open University and McGraw-Hill.

Duffield, Mark, (2001), *Global Governance and the New W*ars: *The Merging of Development and Security*, London: Zed Books**.**

Dugbazah, Justina, (2012*), Gender, Livelihoods and Migrations in Africa*, Milton Keynes: Xlibris Corporations.

Edgerton, Robert, (2002), *Africa's Armies: From Honour to Infamy*, Bolder Colorado: Westview Press.

Edmonds, Martin, (1988), *Armed Services and Society*. Leicester: Leicester University Press.

Esew, Ntim-Gyakari, (2012), *The Military and Democratization in Africa: A Critical Analysis of Transition to Civil Rule in Nigeria and Ghana (1960-2000*), Verlag: Lambert Academic Publishing.

Feaver, Peter, (2003), *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight and Civil-Military Relations*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press

Finer, Samuel, (1962), *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics*. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.

Fordwor, Donkor, (2010), The *Origins, Mission and Achievements of the New Patriotic Party*, Accra: Unimax Macmillan.

Frimpong, Daniel (2003), *Leadership and the Challenges of Command: The Ghana Military Academy Experience*, Accra: Afram Publications.

Geertz, Clifford, (1973*), The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays*, New York: Basic Books, Inc. Publishers.

Gray, David, (2014), *Doing Research in a Real World*, Third Edition, London: Sage Publishers.

Guba, Ergon, and Lincoln, Yvonna, (1985), *Naturalistic Inquiry*, Newbury Park: Sage.

Guillermo O'Donnell and Phillipe, Schmitter (1986), *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies*, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Hartle, Anthony, (2004), *Moral Issues in Military Decision Making*, Second Edition, Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas.

Howe, Herbert (2001), *Ambiguous Order: Military Forces in Africa:* Boulder Colorado*:* Lynne Reiner Publishers.

Herspring, Dale, (2013), Civil-*Military Relations and Shared Responsibility: A Four-Nation Study*, Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.

Hess-Biber, Sharlene, and Leavy Patricia, (2010), *The Practice of Qualitative Research*, Second Edition, Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.

Hironori Yamamoto (2007), *Tools for Parliamentary Oversight: A Comparative Study of 88 National Parliaments*, Geneva: Inter-Parliamentary Union.

Hooper, Alan, (1982), *The Military and the Media*, Aldershot: Gower Publishing Company Limited.

Hordon, Anita, Hodgon, Catherine, and Fresle, Daphne, (2004), *How to Investigate the Use of Medicines by Consumers.* Geneva: WHO and University of Amsterdam.

Hougnikpo, Mathurin, (2010*), Guarding the Guardians: Civil-Military Relations and Democratic Governance in Africa*, Farnham: Ashgate.

Huntington, Samuel (1991), *The Third Wave. Democratization in the Late Twentieth Centur*y, Norman OK: Oklahoma University Press.

Huntington, Samuel, (1957), *The Soldier and the State; The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relation.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, Cambridge.

Hutchful, Eboe, (2002), *Ghana's Adjustment Experience: The Paradox of Reform, Oxford University Press.*

Hydén Göran, Leslie Michael, and Ogundimu, Folarin (2003), *Media and Democracy in Africa*, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers.

Janowitz, Morris (1977*), Military Institutions and Coercion in the Developing Nations*, London and Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Janowitz, Morris, (1960), *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait.* London: The Free Press Corporation.

Kennedy, William, (1993), *The Military and the Media: Why the Press Cannot be Trusted to Cover a War,* London: Praeger.

Kreuger, Larry and Neuman, Lawrence, (2006), *Social Work Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Publications*, New York: Pearson Education & Allyn and Bacon.

Kugler, Richard (2006), *Policy Analysis in National Security Affairs: New Methods for a New Era*. Washington, DC: National Defence University Press.

Lambert, Alexander, (2009*), Democratic Civilian Control of Armed Forces in Post-Cold War Era*, Verlag: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces.

Linz, Juan, and Stepan, Alfred, (1996), *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation.* Baltimore MD: John Hopkins University Press.

Maltby, Sarah, (2012), *Military Media Management: Negotiating the 'Front' Line in Mediatized War,* London: Routledge.

Matthews, Bobs and Ross, Liz, (2010), *Research Methods: A Practical Guide for the Social Sciences*, First Edition, Philadelphia: Trans-Atlantic Publications, Inc.

Mbembe, Achille, (2001), *On the Post Colony*, Berkeley: University of California Press.

McComes, Maxwell, (2014), *Setting the Agenda,* Second Edition, Cambridge: Polity Press.

McKenzie, Megan, (2015), *Beyond the Band of Brothers: The U.S. Military and the Myth that Women can't fight,* New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Merriam, Sharan, (2009), *Qualitative Research: A Guide to Design and Implementation*. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.

Miller, Christopher, (2005), *A Glossary of Terms and Concepts in Peace And Conflict Studies*, edited by King, Mary, Second Edition, Addis Ababa: University for Peace.

Moskos, Charles, (1981), *Institutions versus Occupation: Contrasting Models of Military Organization*. Northwestern University Evanston.

New Patriotic Party, (1993*), The Stolen Verdict: Ghana, November 1992 Presidential election: Report of the New Patriotic Party*, Accra: New Patriotic Party.

Ninsin, Kwame, (1985*), Political Struggles in Ghana: 1966-1981*, Accra: Tornado Publications

Ninsin, Kwame, (1998*), Ghana Transition to democrac*y, Dakar: CODESRIA.

Nkrumah, Kwame, (1967), *Challenge of the Congo*, London: Panaf.

Nkrumah, Kwame, (1964*), Africa Must Unite*, London: Panaf.

Nugent, Paul (1996), *Big Men Small Boys and Politics in Ghana*, Accra: Asempa Publishers.

Nugget, Paul, (2012), *Africa since Independence*, Second edition, London: Palgrave Macmillan.

O' Leary, Zina, (2010), *The Essential Guide to Doing Your Research Project*, Los Angeles: Sage Publications.

Ocquaye, Mike, (1980), *Politics in Ghana: 1972-1979*, Accra: Tonardo Publications.

Ofosu-Appiah, Seth, (2010), *Allegiance vrs Indiscipline*, London: Xlibis.

Oliver, Roland and Atmore, Anthony, (2005), *Africa Since 1800*, Fifth Edition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Olsthoorn, Peter, (2011), *Military Ethics and Virtues: An Interdisciplinary Approach for the 21ST Century*, London: Routledge.

Onwumechili, Chuka, (1998), *African Democratization and Military Coups*, WestPoint, Connecticut, London: Prager.

Osuala, Esogwa, (2005*), Introduction to Research Methodology*, Third Edition, Onitsha: Africana-First Publishers Limited.

Patton, Michael, (1990), Qualitative *Evaluation and Research Methods*, Second Edition, London: Sage Publications.

Republic of Ghana, (1987), *District Political Authority and Modalities for District Level Elections*, Accra: Ghana Publishing Corporation.

Republic of Ghana, (1993), *1992 Constitution*, Accra: Government Printer.

Rodney, Walter, (1973), *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*, London and Dar-Es-Salaam: bogle-L'Ouverture Publications, and Tanzanian Publishing House.

Rubin, Herbert and Rubin, Irene, (2005), *Qualitative interviewing: the art of hearing data.* Second Edition, Thousand Oaks, London: Sage Publications.

Rumsfeld, Donald, (2003), *Transformation Planning Guidance,* United States of America Department of Defence.

Sarantakos, Sotirios, (2005), *Social Research*. Third Edition. New York: Palgrave Macmillan

Schiff, Rebecca, (2009), *The Military and Domestic Politics: A Concordance Theory of Civil-Military Relations*, London: Routledge.

Scott, Thompson, (1969), *Ghana's Foreign Policy 1957–1966*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Shaw, Martin, (1991), *Post-Military Society: Militarism, Demilitarization and War at the End of the Twentieth Century*, London: Polity Press.

Shillington, Kevin, (1992), *Ghana and the Rawlings Factor*, London: Macmillan Press.

Siddiqa, Ayesha (2007), *Military Inc: Inside Pakistan's Military Economy*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), (2016), *Yearbook: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security*, Stockholm: SIPRI.

Stephan, Alfred, (1988), *Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone*, Princeton University Press.

Strauss, Anselm, and Corbin, Juliet, (1990), *Basics of Qualitative Research. Grounded Theory Procedures and Technique*, Newbury Park: Sage.

Thompson, Alex, (2004), *An Introduction to African Politics*, Second Edition, London: Routledge.

Tsikata, Dzodzi, (2009), *Affirmative Action and the Prospects for Gender Equality in Ghanaian Politics*, Accra: Abantu for Development and Friedrich Egbert Foundation.

Voltimer, Katrin, (2013), *The Media in Transitional Democracies,* Cambridge, Polity Press.

Ware, Vron, (2010), *Military Migrants: Fighting for Your Country*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Yin, Robert, (2003), *Case Study Research: Design and Methods,* Third Edition. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.

Yin, Robert, (2009), *Case Study Research Design and Methods,* Fourth edition. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.

Yin, Robert, (2014), *Case Study Research Design and Methods,* Fifth Edition, Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.

Zack-Williams, Tunde, Frost, Diane, and Thompson, Alex, (2002), *Africa in crisis: New Challenges and Possibilities,* London: Pluto Press.

Book Chapters

Adedeji Ebo, (2004), "Security Sector Reform as An Instrument of Sub-Regional Transformation in West Africa," In: *Reform and Reconstruction of the Security Sector*, edited by Bryden, Alan and Heiner, Hanggi, 1-26,Verlag: DCAF.

Alao, Abiodun, and Olonisakin, Funmi, (1998), "Post-Cold War Africa: Ethnicity, Ethnic Conflicts and Security", In: *Africa After the Cold War: The Changing Perspective on Security*, edited by Oyebade, Adebayo and Alao, Abiodun, 117-142, Trenton, New Jersey: African World Press.

Agbese, Pita (2004), "Democratic and Constitutional Control of the Military in Africa", In: *The Military and Politics in Africa: From Engagement to Democratic and Constitutional Control*, edited by Kieh, George, and Abese, Pita, 183-212, London: Ashgate.

Agyeman-Duah, Barfour, (2008), "Introduction: Fifty Years in Perspective", In: *Ghana, Governance in the 4th Republic*, edited by Agyeman-Duah, Barfour, 1-31, Accra: Centre for Democratic Development.

Aning, Kwesi and Sjober, Anki, (2011), "Ghana", In: *Summary of Finding, The Security Sector and Gender in West Africa: A Survey of Police, Defence, Justice and Penal Services*

in ECOWAS States, edited by Gaanderse, Miranda and Valasek, Kristin, 105-118, Geneva: DCAF.

Aning, Kwesi and Aubyn, Festus, (2013a), "Ghana", In: *Providing Peacekeepers The Politics, Challenges, and Future of United Nations Peacekeeping Contributions*, edited by Bellamy, Alex and Williams, Paul, 269-290, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Aning, Kwesi, (2007), "Unintended Consequences of Peace Support Operations for Troop-Contributing Countries from West Africa: The Case of Ghana", In: *Unintended Consequences of Peacekeeping Operation*, edited by Chiyuki, Aoi, de Coning, Cedric, and Thakur, Ramesh,133-155, Tokyo: UN University Press.

Aning, Kwesi, (2015), "Resurrecting the Police Council in Ghana", In: *Learning from West African Experiences in Security Sector Governance,* edited by Bryden, Alan, and Chappus, Fairlie, 19-35, London: Ubiquity Press.

Aning, Kwesi, (2005), "Security Sector Governance in Ghana", In: *Security Sector Governance in West Africa*, edited by Osita Eze and Hettmann, Jens-U, 68-102, Abuja: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.

Aning, Kwesi, and Lartey, Ernest, (2009a), "Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector: Lessons from Ghana", In: *Parliament oversight of the security sector in West Africa*, edited by Sherman, Jake, New York: Centre on International Cooperation.

Aning, Kwesi, and Lartey, Ernest, (2009b), "Evaluating electoral process and the state of democracy in Ghana", In*: The State of Democracy in West Africa*. 158-185, Gorée Institute: Senegal.

Asah-Asante, Robert, (2007), The Media in Ghanaian politics. In: *Ghana at 50: Government, Politics and Development,* edited by Ayee, Joseph, 143-159, Accra: Friedrich Ebert Foundation.

Asante, Richard and Gyimah-Boadi, Emmanuel, (2006), "Ethnic Structure, Inequality and Governance of the Public Sector in Ghana", *In: Ethnic Inequalities and Public Sector Governance*, edited by Bangura Yusuf, Basingstoke: Palgrave and United Nations Research Institute for Social Development.

Ayee, Joseph, (2007), "A decade of Political Leadership in Ghana 1993-2004", In: *Ghana: One Decade of a Liberal State*, edited by Boafo-Arthur, Kwame, 165-187, London: Zed Books.

Ball, Nicole, (2006), "Civil Society, Good Governance and the Security Sector", In: *Civil Society and the Security Sector: Concepts and Practices in New Democracies*, edited by Caparini, Marina, Fluri, Phillip, and Molnar, Ferenc, 59-70, Geneva: DCAF.

Barret, Frank, (2001), "The Organizational Construction of Hegemonic Masculinity: The Case of the US Navy", In: *The Masculinities Reader*, edited by Stephen, Whitehead and Barret, Frank, 77-99, Cambridge: Polity Press.

Blackwell, Stephen, (2004), "Military-Media Relation and the Defence Establishment in Britain", In: *Media in Security and Governance: The Role of the News Media in Security Oversight and Accountability*, edited by Caparini, Marina, Nomos Verlagsellcshaft: BICC and DCAF.

Bland, Douglas, (1998), "Issues in Defence Management: An Introduction", in: *Issues in Defence Management,* Edited by Douglas Bland, 1-3, Kingston: Queens University.

Bluwey, Gilbert, (1998), "State Organizations in the Transition to Constitutional Democracy", In: *Ghana: Transition to Democracy*, edited by Ninsin, Kwame, Freedom Publications: Accra.

Bruneau, Thomas, (2012), "Impediments to the accurate conceptualization of civil-military relations", In: *Routledge Handbook on Civil-Military Relations*, edited by Bruneau, Thomas and Matei, Cristiana,13-21, London: Routledge.

Bryden, Alan and Boubacar N'Diaye, (2011), "Mapping Security Sector Governance in Francophone West Africa", In, *Security Sector Governance in Francophone West Africa: Realities and Opportunities*, edited by Bryden, Alan and N'Dyiaye, Boubacar,, 1-16, Geneva: DCAF.

Bryden, Alan and Olonisakin, Funmi (2010), "Enabling Security Sector Transformation in Africa", In: *Security Sector Transformation in Africa*, edited by Bryden, Alan and Olonisakin, Funmi, 291-220, Geneva: DCAF.

Bryden, Alan, (2004), "Understanding security sector reform and reconstruction", In*: Reform and reconstruction of the security sector. DCAF Yearly Books*, edited by Hänggi, Heiner and Bryden, Alan, 259-275, Geneva: DCAF.

Bryden, Alan, and Olonisakin, Funmi, (2010), "Conceptualizing security sector transformation in Africa", In: *Security Sector Transformation in Africa*, edited by Bryden, Alan and Olonisakin, Funmi, 3-26, Geneva: DCAF.

Bryden, Alan, N'Diaye, Boubacar and Olonisakin, Funmi, (2008), "Understanding the Challenges of Security Sector Governance in West Africa", In*: Challenges of Security Sector Governance in West Africa*, edited by Bryden, Alan, N'Diaye, Boubacar, and Olonisakin, Funmi, 3-26, Geneva: DCAF, LIT VERLAG;

Cafario, Guiseppe, (2007), "Trends and Evolution in Military Profession", In: *Social Sciences and the Military: an Interdisciplinary Overview*, edited by Cafario, Guissepe, 217-236, London: Routledge.

Caparini, Marina, (2004), "Media and the Security Sector: Oversight and Accountability", In: *Media in Security and Governance: The Role of the News Media in Security Oversight and Accountability*, edited by Caparini, Marina, 15-49, Nomos Verlagsellcshaft: BICC and DCAF

Chuter, David, and Cleary, Laura, (2006), "Civilians in Defence", In: *Managing Defence in a Democracy*, Edited by Cleary, Laura & McConville, Teri, 78-92, London: Routledge.

Clapham, Chrisopher, (1982), "Clientelism and the State", In: *Private patronage and public power: Political Clientelism in the Modern State*, edited by Clapham, Christopher, 1-35, London: Pinter.

Clayton, Antony, (1986), "Foreign Intervention in Africa", In: *Military Power and Politics in Black Africa*, edited by Baynham, Simon, 203-258, New York: St Martin's Press.

Clearly, Laura, (2006), "Political direction: the essence of democratic, civil and civilian control", In: *Managing Defence in a Democracy*, edited by Cleary, Laura and McConville, Teri, 32-45, London: Routledge.

Cleary, Laura and McConville, Teri, (2006), "Commonalities and Constraints in Defence Governance and Management", In: *Managing Defence in a Democracy*, edited by Cleary, Laura and McConville, Teri, 3-16, London: Routledge.

Coleman, Carl, (2007), "Defence policy in Ghana: The Past, Present and the way forward", in: *Ghana in Search of National Security Policy, Proceedings of a Conference on National Security*, edited by Bluwey, Gilbert and Kumado, Kofi, Accra: Legon Centre for International Affairs (LECIA).

Dandeker, Christopher, (2000), "*The United Kingdom: The Overstretched Military*", In: *The Post Modern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War*, edited by Moskos, Charles, John, Williams, and Segal, David, 32-50, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press

Danso, Sarah and Edu-Afful, Fifii, (2012), "Fruitcake", 'Madmen'. 'all-die-be-die': Deconstructing Political Discourse and Rhetoric in Ghana". In: *Managing Election-Related Violence for Democratic Stability in Ghana*, edited by Aning, Kwesi and Danso, Kwaku, 97-139, Accra: FES and KAIPTC.

Darkwa, Linda, (2012), "Gender, Elections and Violence: Prising Women out of Democracy in Ghana", in: *Managing Election-Related Violence for Democratic Stability in*

Ghana, edited by Aning, Kwesi and Danso, Kwaku, 277-305, Accra: Friedrich Ebert Foundation and KAIPTC.

Davidson, Julia, (2006), "Sampling", In: *The Sage Dictionary of Social Research Methods*, edited by Jupp, Victor, 272-3, London: Sage Publications.

Denzin, Norman and Lincoln, Yvonna, (2000), "The discipline and practice of qualitative research", In: *Handbook of Qualitative Research*, 2, 1-28, CA: Sage.

Dowse, Robert, (1975), "Military and Police Rule", In: *Politicians and Soldiers, Ghana, 1966-1972,* edited by Austin, Dennis, and Luckham, Robin, 16-36, London: Frank Cass.

Finer, Samuel, (1975), "State and Nation-Building in Europe: the Role of the Military", *The formation of National States in Western Europe,* edited by Tilly, Charles, 95-6, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.

Gaanderse, Miranda, and Kristin Valasek, (2011), "Summary of Findings", In: *The Security Sector and Gender in West Africa: A Survey of Police, Defence, Justice and Penal Services in ECOWAS States,* edited by Gaanderse, Miranda and Valasek, Kristin, Geneva: DCAF.

Gadzekpo, Audrey, (2008), "Guardians of Democracy: the Media", In: *Ghana: Governance in the Fourth Republic*, edited by Agyeman-Duah, Baffour, 195-214, Accra: Centre for Democratic Development.

Genschel, Dietrich, (2003), "Principles and Prerequisites of the Democratic Control of Armed Forces : Best Practices in Established Democracies", In: *Towards Security Sector Reform in Post-Cold War Europe*, edited by Germann, Wilhelm, and Edmunds, Timothy, 90-106, Geneva: DCAF / BICC.

Gerring, John, (2008), "Case Selection for Case-Study Analysis: Qualitative and Quantitative Techniques", In: *The Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology*, edited by Janet M. Box-steffensmeir, Brady, Henry and Collier, David, 645-685, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Goldsworthy, David, (1986), "Armies and Politics in Civilian Regimes", In: *Military Power and Politics in Black Africa*, edited by Baynham, Simon, 97-128, New York: St Martin's Press.

Guba, Ergon, and Lincoln, Yvonna, (1994), "Competing Paradigms in Qualitative Research", In: *Handbook of Qualitative Research,* edited by Denzim, Norman and Lincoln, Yvonna, 105-117, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Gyimah-Boadi, Emmanuel,(1995), "Ghana: Adjustment, State Rehabilitation and Democratization", In: *Between Liberalization and Oppression: The Politics of Structural Adjustment in Africa*, edited by Mkandawire, Thandika, and Olukoshi, Adebayo, 217-229, Dakar, Senegal: CODESRIA.

Hammersley, Martyn, (2006), "Bias", In: *The Sage Dictionary of Social Research Methods*, edited by Jupp, Victor 18-9. London: Sage Publications.

Handley, Antoinette, (2013), "Ghana: Democratic Transition, Presidential Power, and the World Bank", in: *Transitions to Democracy: A Comparative Perspective,* edited by Stoner, Kathryn and McFaul, Michael, 221-243, Johns Hopkins University Press.

Hänggi, Heiner, (2003), "Making Sense of Security Sector Governance", In*: Challenges of Security Sector Governance. DCAF Yearly Books*, edited by Heiner, Hängg, and Winkler, Theodore, 2-23, Geneva: DCAF.

Hendrickson, Dylan, and Karkoszka, Andrzej, (2002), "The Challenges of Security Sector Reform", *SIPRI Yearbook: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security*, 175-201, Stockholm: SIPRI.

Herspring, Dale, (2012), "Searching for a More Viable Form of Civil-Military Relations: the Canadian and American Experience", In: *Civil-Military Relations in Perspective,* edited by Stephen, Chimbala, 31-61, Farnhman: Ashgate.

Hess-Biber, Sharlene, (2006), "The Craft of Qualitative Research: A Holistic Approach", In: *The Practice of Qualitative Research,* edited by Hesse-Biber, Sharlene and Leavy, Patricia, 3-44, Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.

Hutchful, Eboe, (2003a), "Pulling from the Brink: Ghana's Experience", In: *Governing Insecurity: Democratic Control of Military and Security Establishment in Transitional Democracies,* edited by Cawthra, Gavin and Luckham, Robin,78-101, London: Zed Books.

Hutchful, Eboe, (2003b), "A Civil Society Perspective," In: *Providing Security for People: Security Sector Reform in Africa,* edited by Lala, Anicia, and Fitz-Gerald, Ann, Shrivenham: GFN-SSR.

Hutchful, Eboe, (2006), "Ghana'" In: *Budgeting for the Military Sector in Africa: The Process and Mechanisms of Control*, edited by Omitoogun, Wuyi, and Hutchful, Eboe, 72-80, Oxford: Sipri.

Hutchful, Eboe, (2008), "Ghana", In: *Challenges of Security Sector Governance in West Africa,* edited by Bryden, Alan, N'Dyiaye, Boubacar, and Olonisakin, Funmi, 111-132, Geneva: DCAF.

Hutchful, Eboe, (2012), "Security Sector Governance and Peacebuilding", In: *Peacebuilding Power, and Politics in Africa,* edited by Devon, Curtis and Dzinesa, Gwinyayi, 63-86, Athens: Ohio University Press.

J'Kayode Fayemi, (2002), "Entrenched militarism and the future of democracy in Nigeria", in *Political Armies: The Military and Nation Building in the Age of Democracy*, edited by Koonings, Kees, and Kruijt, Dirk, 205-2333, London: Zed Books.

Jasper, Scott, (2009), "The Capabilities-Based Approach," In: *Transforming Defence Capabilities: New Approaches for International Security,* edited by Jasper, Scott, 1-24, Boulder Colorado: Lynne Reiner Publishers.

Jaye, Thomas, and Ebo, Adedeji, (2008), "Liberia", In: *Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector in West Africa,* edited by Ebo, Adedeji and N'diaye, Boubacar, 139-158, Geneva: DCAF.

Kandeh, Jimmy, (2004), "Civil-Military Relations", *In West Africa's Security Challenges: Building Peace in a Troubled Region,* edited by Adekeye, Adebajo and Ismail Rashid, 145-168, Boulder Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Kirke, Charles, (2008), "Seeing Through the Stereotype: British Army Culture – An Insider Anthropology", In: *Armed Forces, Soldiers and Civil-Military Relations: Essays in Honor of Jürgen Kuhlmann,* edited by Gerhard Kümmel, Giuseppe, Cafario, Dandeker, Christopher, 13-36, Verlagfür Sozialwissenschaften.

Koonings, Kees and Kruijt, Dirk, (2002), "Military Politics and the Mission of Nation Building", In: *Political Armies: the Military and Nation Building in the Age of Democracy*, edited by Koonings, Kees and Kruijt, Dirk, 9-32, London: Zed Books.

Kwadjo, Johnny, (2009), "Changing the Intelligence Dynamics in Africa: the Ghana Experience", In: *Changing t*he *Intelligence Dynamics in Africa*, Edited by Africa, Sandy and Kwadjo, Johnny, 95-235, Birmingham: Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform (GFN-SSR) and African Security Sector Network.

Lamptey, Afua and Salihu, Naila, (2012), "Interrogating the relationship Between the Politics of Patronage and Electoral Violence in Ghana", In: *Managing Election related Violence for Democratic Stability in Ghana,* edited by Aning, Kwesi and Danso, Kwaku. 176-209, Accra: KAIPTC and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.

Le Roux, Len, (2004), "Challenges for defence management in Africa", In: *Guarding the Guardians, Parliamentary Oversight and Civil-Military Relations: Challenges for SADC*, edited by Le Roux, Len, Rupiya, Martin and Ngoma, Naison, 85-97, Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies (ISS).

Lock, Peter, (1999), “Africa, Military Downsizing and the Growth in the Security Industry”, In: *Peace, Profit or Plunder? The Privatization of Security in War-Torn African Societies*, edited by Cilliers, Jakkie, and Mason, Peggy, 11-35, Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies.

Loada, Augustine, and Moderan, Ornella, (2015), “Civil Society Involvement in Security Sector Reform and Governance” in *Toolkit for Security Sector Reform and Governance in West Africa*, edited by Moderan, Ornella, Geneva: DCAF.

Lucian, Pye, (1962), “Armies in the Process of Political Modernization”, In: *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries*, edited by Johnson, John, 73-80. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Luckham Robin (1998), “Transition to Democracy and Control over Ghana’s Military and Security Establishments” in: *Ghana: Transition to Democracy*, edited by Ninsin, Kwame, Accra: Freedom Publications.

Luckham, Robin, (1975), “The Constitutional Commission”, In: *Politicians and Soldiers in Ghana*, Edited by Austin, Dennis, and Luckham, Robin, 64-88. London: Cass University Press.

Luckham, Robin, (2003), “Democratic Strategies for Security in Transition and Conflict”, In: *Governing Insecurity: Democratic control of military and security establishment in transitional democracies*, edited by Cawthra, Gavin and Robin Luckham. 3-28, London: Zed Books.

Luckham, Robin, and Hutchful, Eboe, (2010), "Democracy and War- to-peace transition and Security sector transformation in Africa", In: *Security sector transformation in Africa*, edited by Bryden, Alan and Olonisakin, Funmi, 185-204, Geneva: DCAF.

McConville, Teri, (2006), “The principles of management applied to the defence sector”, In: *Managing Defence in a Democracy*, edited by Cleary, Laura, and McConville, Teri, 109-124, London: Routledge.

Micewski, Edwin, (2006), “Conscription or the All-Volunteer Recruitment in a Democratic Society”, In: *Who Guards the Guardians and How: Democratic Civil-Military Relations*, edited by Bruneau, Thomas and Tollefson, Scott, 208-234, Texas: University of Texas Press

Moskos, Charles, (2000), “Armed Forces after the Cold War”, In: *The Post Modern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War*, Edited by Moskos, Charles, Williams, John and Segal, David, 1-13, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.

Murphy, Elizabeth, and Dingwall, Robert, (2011), "The Ethics of Ethnography", In: *Handbook of Ethnography*, edited by Atkinson, Paul, Amanda Coffey, Sara Delamont, John Lofland & Lyn Lofland, 331-351, London: Sage Publications.

Oliver, Paul, (2006), "Purposive Sampling", In: *The Sage Dictionary of Social Research Methods*, edited by Jupp, Victor, 245-6, London: Sage Publications.

Omelda, Jose (2012), "Escaping from Huntington's Labyrinth: Civil-Military Relations and Comparative Politics", In: *The Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations*, edited by Bruneau, Thomas and Matei, Cristiana, 61-76, London: Routledge.

Onwundiwe, Ebere, (2004), "Military coups in Africa: A framework for Research" In: *The Military and Politics in Africa: From Engagement to Democratic and Constitutional Control*, edited by Klay, George and Pita Abese, 17-35, London: Ashgate.

Ostheimer, John, (1986), "Peacekeeping and Warmaking: Future Military Challenges in Africa", In: *African Armies: Evolution and Capabilities*, edited by Arlinghause, Bruce and Baker, Pauline, 32-51, Colorado: World View Press.

Parth, Anne-Marie and Schneider, Susanne, (2017), "Civilian Control and Military Effectiveness in South African and Ghana", In: *Reforming Civil-Military Relations in New Democracies: Democratic Control and Military Effectiveness in Comparative Perspectives*, edited by Croissant, Aurel, and Kuehn, David, 103-127, Cham: Springer International Publishing.

Rech, Mathew, Jenkings, Neil, Williams, Alison and Woodward, Rachel, (2016), "An Introduction to Military Research Methods", In: *The Routledge Companion to Military Research Methods*, edited by Williams, Alison, Rech, Mathews and Woodward, Rachel, 1-20, London: Routledge.

Rupiya, Martin, (2013), "Sub-Saharan Africa: Decolonization to Multiparty Democracy and the Challenges of Transforming Military Institutions'" In: *Military Engagement: Influencing Armed Forces Worldwide to Support Democratic Transitions*, edited by Blair, Dennis, Vol. 2, 188-214, Washington, D.C.: Brookings institution Press.

Rupiya, Martin, Moyo, Gordon, Laugesen, Henrik, (2015), "International African studies Perspectives: The *New* African Civil-Military Relations Phase in African States Development", In: *The New African Civil-Military Relations*, edited by Rupiya, Martin, Moyo, Gorden, 1-14, Pretoria: The African Public Policy and Research Institute.

Sagaren Naidoo, (2006), "The Role of the Military in Democratic Governance in Africa: The Need to Institutionalize Civil–Military Relations", In: *From State Security to Human*

Security in Southern Africa, edited by Hendricks, Cheryl, 33-47, Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies (ISS).

Sangaré, Nouhoum, (2008), "Mali", In: *Challenges of Security Sector Governance in West Africa*, edited by Bryden, Alan, N'Diaye, Boubacar and Olonisakin, Funmi, 185-204, Munster: LIT.

Schnabel, Albrecht, and Farr, Vanessa, (2011), "Returning to the Development Roots of Security Sector Reform", In: *Back to the Roots: Security Sector Reform and Development*, edited by Schnabel, Albrecht, and Farr, Vanessa, 3-28, Geneva: DCAF

Schwandt, Thomas, (2000), "Three Epistemological Stances for Qualitative Inquiry: Interpretivism, Hermeneutics and Social Construction", In: *Handbook of Qualitative Research*, edited by Schwandt, Thomas, 189-213, Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.

Segel, Glen and Vajpeji, Dhirendra, (2014), "Introduction", In: *Civil-Military Relationships in Developing Countries*, edited by Vajpei, Dhirendra and Segel, Glen,1-19, Maryland: Lexington Books.

Snape, Dawn and Spencer, Liz, (2003), "Foundations of Qualitative Research", In: *Qualitative Research Practice: A Guide for Social Science Students and Researchers*, edited by Ritchie, Jane, and Lewis, Jane, 1-23, London: Sage Publications.

Soeters, Joseph and Manigart, Philippe, (2008), "Introduction", In: *Military Cooperation in Multinational Peace Operations—Managing Cultural Diversity and Crisis Response*, edited by Soeters, Joseph and Manigart, Philippe, 1-10, London: Routledge.

Soeters, Joseph, Poponete, Cristina-Rodica and Page, Joseph, (2006), "Culture's Consequences in the Military", In *Military Life: The Psychology of Serving in Peace and Combat*, edited by Britt, Thomas, Adler, Amy, and Castro, Carl 13-34, Westpoint, Connecticut: Prager Security International.

Soeters, Joseph, Van Fenema, Paul, Beeres, Robert, (2010), "Introducing Military Organization", *Managing Military Organization: Theory and Practice*, edited by Soeters, Joseph, Van Fenema, Paul, Beeres, Robert, 1-14, London: Routledge.

Soeters, Joseph, Winslow, Donna, and Weibull, Alise, (2003), "Military Culture", In: *Handbook of the Sociology of the Military*, edited by Giuseppe, Cafarios, 237-254, New York, Kluwer Academic.

Taylor, Trevor, (2006), "The Function of a defence ministry", In *Managing Defence in a Democracy*, edited by Cleary, Laura and McConville, Teri, 92-106, London Routledge.

Tettey, Wisdom, (2003), "The Mass Media, Political Expression and Democratic Transition", *In Critical Perspectives in Politics and Socio-Economic Development in Ghana,* edited by Tettey, Wisdom Korbla, Puplampu, Berman, Bruce, 83-106, Leiden: Brill.

Thom, William, (1986), "Sub-Saharan Africa's Changing Military Capabilities', In: *African Armies: Evolution and Capabilities,* edited by Arlinghause, Bruce, and Baker, Pauline, 97-112, Colorado: World View Press

Tsikata, Kwaku, (2007), "Challenges of economic growth in a liberal economy", In: *Ghana: One Decade of the Liberal State,* edited by Boafo-Arthur, Kwame, 49-85, London: Zed Books.

Udogu, Ike, (2017), "Africa and the search for political stability in the new century", In: *Africa Beyond the Post-Colonial: Political and Socio-Cultural Identities,* edited by Uduku, Ola and Zack-Williams, Alfred, 76-91, Abingdon: Routledge, (first published in 2004).

Van den Berghe, Pierre, (1970), "The Military and Political Change in Africa, In: *Soldier and State in Africa: A Comparative Analysis of Military Intervention and Political Change*", edited by Welch, Claude, 252-266, Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

Welch, Claude, (1970), "The roots and implication of military intervention", In: *Soldier and State in Africa: A Comparative Analysis of Military Intervention and Political Change*, edited by Welch, Claude, 1-61, Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

Welch, Claude, (1974), "Personalism and Corporatism in African Armies", In: *Political-Military Systems: Comparative Perspective*, edited by Kelleher, Catherine, 125-159. London: Sage Publications.

Welch, Claude, (1986), "From 'Armies of Africans' to 'African Armies': the Evolutions of Military Force in Africa", In: *African Armies: Evolution and Capabilities*, edited By Arlinghause, Bruce, and Baker, Pauline, 11-13. Colorado: World View Press.

Williams, John, (2007), "Political Science Perspectives on the Military and Civil-Military Relations", In: *Social Sciences and the Military an Interdisciplinary Overview*, edited by Guissepe, Cafario, 89-104, London: Routledge.

Williams, Rocky (2002), "Mapping a new African civil-military relations architecture", In: *Ourselves to Know: Civil-Military Relations and Defence Transformation in Southern Africa*, edited by Williams, Rocky, Cawthra, Gavin, and Abrahams, Daine, 265-281, Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies.

Williams, Rocky, (nd), "The transformation of the South African Defence Sector since 1990" 39-60, Geneva: International Institute for Security Studies and DCAF.

Wilson, Isaiah, Cox, Edward, Park, Kent and Sondheimer, Rachel, (2012), "Kids These Days: Growing Military professional across Generation", in: *Civil-Military Relations in Perspective*, edited by Chimbala, Stephen, 21-30, Ashgate Publication

Young, Crawford, (1999), "The Third Wave of Democracy in Africa: Ambiguities and Contradictions", In: *State Conflict and Democracy in Africa*, edited by Richard, Joseph, Boulder, 15-38, Colorado, Lynne Rienner.

Young, Thomas-Durell, (2006), "Military Professionalism in a Democracy", In: *Who Guards the Guardians and How: Democratic Civil-Military Relations,* edited by Bruneau, Thomas and Tollefson, Scott, 17-35, Texas: University of Texas Press.

Journal Articles

Abdulai, Abdul-Gafaru and Quantson, Ruby, (2009), "The Changing Role of CSOs in Public Policy Making in Ghana", *Ghana Social Science Journal*, 5 & 6, (1 & 2): 114-151.

Abdulai, Abdul-Gafaru and Crawford, Gordon, (2010), "Consolidating democracy in Ghana: Progress and prospects", *Democratization*, 17(1):26-27.

Agyeman-Duah, Barfour, (1987), "Ghana, 1982-6: The Politics of the PNDC", *The Journal of Modern African Studies,* 25(4):613-642.

Agyeman-Duah, Barfour, (2002), "Civil-military Relations in Ghana's Fourth Republic", *Critical Perspectives* No.9, Accra: Ghana Center for Democratic Development;

Ahiakpor, James, (1991), "Rawlings, Economic Policy Reform, and the Poor: Consistency or Betrayal?", *The Journal of Modern African Studie*s, Vol. 29(4):583-600.

Ahorsu, Ken, and Gebe, Yao, (2011), "Governance and Security in Ghana: The Dagbon Chieftaincy Crisis", Accra: SIPRI&WACSI.

Ala-Adjettey, Peter, (2006), "Reflections on the Effectiveness of Parliament of the Fourth Republic of Ghana", *Kronti ne Akwamu Series* No. 2, Accra: Ghana Center for Democratic Development.

Alao, Abiodun, (2000), "Security Reform in Democratic Nigeria", *Conflict, Security and Development Group Working Paper* No. 2, Centre for Defence Studies, Kings College, University of London.

Ali, Zulfiqar, (2014), "Contradiction of Concordance Theory: Failure to Understand Military Intervention in Pakistan", *Armed Forces & Society*, 40(3):544–567.

Amparo, Nana, (2012), “Troubled Waters - Ghana Boosts Military Spending to Protect Oil Find,” *Janes Intelligence Review*, 14 March

Amponsah, Nicholas, (2000), “Ghana's Mixed Structural Adjustment Results: Explaining the Poor Private Sector Response”, *Africa Today*, 47(2):9-32.

Anebo, Felix, (2001), “The Ghana 2000 Elections: Voter Choice and Electoral Decisions”, *African Journal of Political Science*, 6(1):69-88.

Aning, Kwesi, (1996), “Ghana, Liberia and ECOWAS: An Analysis of Ghana’s Policies in Liberia”, *Liberian Studies Journal*, 21(2):259-99.

Aning, Kwesi, (2004), “Military Imports and Sustainable Development: Case Study Analysis – Ghana”, *Africa Security Dialogue and Research Paper,* Accra.

Aning, Kwesi, and Abdallah, Mustapha, (2013), “Islamic Radicalization and Violence in Ghana”, *Conflict’, Security & Development*, 13(2):149-167.

Aning, Kwesi, and Bah, Sarjoh, (2009), “ECOWAS and Conflict Prevention in West Africa: Confronting the Triple Threats”, New York: Center on International Cooperation, September.

Aning, Kwesi, Jaye, Thomas and Atuobi, Samuel, (2008), “The Role of Private Military Companies in US–Africa Policy”, *Review of African Political Economy*, 35(118):613–28.

Archer, Emerald, (2013), “The Power of Gendered Stereotypes in the US Marine Corps”, *Armed Forces & Society*, 39(2): 359–381.

Armah-Attoh, Daniel, (2015), “The Quality of Public Services: An Intrinsic Factor in Ghanaian Evaluations of Government Performance", *Afrobarometer Policy Paper*, No. 21, July.

Arthur, Peter, (2010), “Democratic Consolidation in Ghana: The Role and Contribution of the Media, Civil Society and State Institutions”, *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*, 48(2):203–226.

Aubyn, Festus and Abdallah, Mustapha, (2013), “Sustaining Peace and Stability in Ghana: Appraising the Role of the National Election Security Task Force in the 2012 Elections”, *African Journal of Elections*, 12(2): 132-151.

Austin, Denis, (1985), “The Ghana Armed Forces and Ghanaian Society”, *Third World Quarterly* 7(1): 97-11.

Avant, Deborah, (1998), “Conflicting indicators of ‘Crisis’ in American civil-military relations”, *Armed Forces & Society*, 24 (3):375-388.

Ayee, Joseph, (1997), "The Adjustment of Central Bodies to Decentralization: The Case of the Ghanaian Bureaucracy", *African Studies Review*, 40(2): 37-57.

Ayee, Joseph, (2002), "The 2000 General Elections and Presidential Run-Off in Ghana: An Overview", *Democratization*, 9(2):148-174.

Ayee, Joseph, (2011), "Manifestoes and elections in Ghana's Fourth Republic", *South African Journal of International Affairs*, 18(3): 367-384.

Azuimah, Francis, (2011), "Perception as a Social Infrastructure for Sustaining the Escalation of Ethnic Conflicts in Divided Societies in Ghana", *Journal of Alternative Perspectives in the Social Sciences*, 3 (1):260-278.

Bagayoko, Niagale, Hutchful, Eboe and Robin Luckham, Robin, (2016), "Hybrid Security Governance in Africa: Rethinking the Foundations of Security, Justice and Legitimate Public Authority", *Conflict, Security & Development*, 16(1):1-32.

Barany, Zoltan, (2012), "How to Build Democratic Armies", *Prism*, 4(1):2-16.

Barracca, Steven, (2007), "Military Coup in the Post-Cold War era: Pakistan, Ecuador and Venezuala", *Third World Quarterly*, (28) 1:137-154.

Baxter, Pamela and Jack, Susan, (2008), "Qualitative Case Study Methodology: Study Design and Implementation for Novice Researchers", *The Qualitative Report*, 13 (4): 544-559.

Bawa, Sylvia, Sanyare, Francis, (2013) "Women's Participation and Representation in Politics: Perspectives from Ghana", *International Journal of Public Administration*, 36(4):282-291.

Baynam, Simon (1990), "Defence and Security Issues in a Transitional South Africa", *International Affairs Bulletin*, 14 (3):9-10.

Baynham, Simon, (1985), "Divide et Impera: Civilian Control of the Military in Ghana's Second and Third Republics", *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 23(4): 623-642.

Bennett, John, (2017), "Combating Sexual Assault with the Military Ethic: Exploring Culture, Military Institutions, and Norms-Based Preventive Policy", *Armed Forces & Society*, 1-24, November.

Biddle, Stephen, and Long, Stephen, (2004), "Democracy and Military Effectiveness: A Deeper Look", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 48(4)525-546.

Birikorang, Emma, (2007), "Ghana's Regional Security Policy: Costs, Benefits and Consistency", *Occasional Paper* No. 20, Accra: KAIPTC.

Bland, Douglas, (1999), “A Unified Theory of Civil-Military Relations”, *Armed Forces & Society*, 26(7): 17-25.

Boafo-Arthur, Kwame, (1999), “Ghana: Structural Adjustment, Democratization, and the Politics of Continuity”, *African Studies Review*, 42(2): 41-72.

Boafo-Arthur, Kwame, (2008), “Democracy and Stability in West Africa”, *Claude Ake Memorial Papers*, Volume 4, Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute.

Bobrow, Davis, and Boyer, Mark, (1997), “Maintaining System Stability: Contributions to Peacekeeping Operations", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 41(6): 731-784.

Boraz, Stephen and Bruneau, Thomas, (2006), “Democracy and Effectiveness”, *Journal of Democracy*, 17(3):28-48.

Boraz, Stephen, and Bruneau, Thomas, (2006), “Reforming Intelligence: Democracy and Effectiveness”, *Journal of Democracy*, 17(3): 28-42.

Born, Hans, Caparini, Marina and Haltiner, Karl, (2002), “Models of Democratic Control of the Armed Forces: A Multi-Country Study Comparing ‘Good Practices’ Of Democratic Control”, *Working Paper Series*, No. 47, Geneva: DCAF.

Boubacar, N’Diaye, (2005), “Not a miracle after all: Côte d'Ivoire's Downfall: Flawed civil-Military Relations and Missed Opportunities’”, *South African Journal of Military Studies*, 33(1):89-118.

Bratton Michael, and Gyimah-Boadi, Emmanuel, (2015), “Political Risks Facing African Democracies: Evidence from Afrobarometer”, *Afrobarometer Working Paper* No. 15

Bratton, Michael, (2004), “The 'Alternation Effect' in Africa”, *The Journal of Democracy*, 15(4).148-158.

Bratton, Michael, and van de Walle, Nicholas, (1994), “Neo-Patrimonial Regimes and Political Transitions in Africa", *World Politics*, 46: 453-89.

Brennen, Julia, (2005), “Mixing Methods: The Entry of Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches into the Research Process”, *International Journal of Social Research Methodology*, 8(3):173-184.

Briely, Sarah, (2012), “Party Unity and Presidential dominance: parliamentary development in the Fourth Republic of Ghana”, *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 30(3): 419-439.

Brooks, Risa, (2006), “An Autocracy at War: Explaining Egypt's Military Effectiveness, 1967 and 1973", *Security Studies*, 15(3):396-430.

Bruneau, Thomas, and Trinkunas, Harold, (2006), "Democratization as a Global Phenomenon and its Impact on Civil-Military Relations", *Democratization*, 13(5): 776-790.

Bruneau, Thomas, and Mate, Cristiana, (2008), "Towards a New Conceptualization of Democratization and Civil-Military Relations," *Democratization*, 15(5): 909-929.

Burk, James, (2002), "Theories of Democratic Civil-Military Relations", *Armed Forces & Society*, 29(1): 7-29.

Carothers, Thomas, (2002), "The End of the Transition Paradigm", *Journal of Democracy*, 13(1):6-9.

Chazan, Naomi, (1989), "Planning Democracy in Africa: A Comparative Perspective on Nigeria and Ghana", *Policy Sciences*: *Policymaking in Developing Countries*, 22(3/4): 325-357.

Chuter, David and Gaub, Florence, (2016), "Understanding African Armies", *Issue Report No. 27*, April, Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies.

Chuter, David, (2000), *Defence Transformation: A Short Guide to the Issues*, *Monograph* No. 49 Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies.

Chuter, David, (2009), "Civil-military relations: is there really a problem?", *Journal of Security Sector Management*, 7(2):1-17.

Cleary, Laura, (2011), "Triggering Critical Mass: Identifying the Factors for a Successful Defence Transformation", *Defence Studies*, 11(1): 43-65.

Cleary, Laura, (2012), "Lost in Translation: The Challenge of Exporting Models of Civil-Military Relations", *Prism*, 3(2):19-36.

Cottey, Edmonds, and Foster, Anthony, (2002), "The Second Generation Problematic: Rethinking Democracy and Civil-military relations", *Armed Forces & Society*, 29(1):31-56.

Crawford, Gordon, and Gabriell, Lynch, (2011), "Democratization in African 1990-2010: An Assessment", *Democratization*, 18(2):275-310.

Croissant, Aurel, Kuehn, David, Chambers, Paul, and Wolf, Siegfried, (2010), "Beyond the Fallacy of Coup-ism: Conceptualizing Civilian Control of the Military in Emerging Democracies", *Democratization*, 17(5):950-975.

Dandeker, Christopher and Gow, James (1999), "Military Culture and Strategic Peacekeeping", *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, 10(2):58-79.

Davis, Norman, (1996), "An Information-Based Revolution in Military Affairs", *Strategic review*, 24 (1):43–53.

Decalo, Samuel, (1989), “Modalities of Civil-military stability in Africa”, *Journal of Modern African studies*, 27(4): 547-578.

Diamond, Larry, (1994), “Towards Democratic Consolidation", *Journal of Democracy*, 5(3): 4-17.

Doorenspleet, Renske, (2012), “Critical Citizens, Democratic Support and Satisfaction in African Democracies", *International Political Science Review*, 33(3):279-300.

Dunivin, Karen, (1994), “Military Culture: Change and Continuity”, *Armed Forces & Society*, 531-547.

Durotoye, Yomi, and Griffiths, Robert, (1997), “Civilianizing Military Rule: Conditions and Processes of Political Transmutation in Ghana and Nigeria", *African Studies Review*, 40(3): 133-160.

Dyer, Gibb, Wilkins, Alan, Eisenhardt, Kathleen, (1991), “Better Stories, Not Better Constructs, to Generate Better Theory: A Rejoinder...” *The Academy of Management Review;* 16(3); 613-619.

Ebo, Adedeji, (2005), “Towards a code of conduct for Armed Forces and security forces in Africa: opportunities and challenges”, *Policy Paper*, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of the armed forces (DCAF), March.

Ebo, Adedeji, (2007), “The Role of Security Sector Reform in Sustainable Development: Donor Policy Trends and Challenges”, *Conflict, Security and Development*, 7 (1):27-60.

Ejiogu, EC, (2007), “Colonial Army Recruitment Patterns and Post-Colonial Military Coup d’états in Africa: The Case of Nigeria, 1966-1993”, *Scientia Military*, 35(1): 99-132

Erdmann, Gero, and Basedau, Matthias, (2007) “Problems of Categorizing and Explaining Party Systems in Africa”, German Institute for Global Area Studies, *Working Paper* No. 40.

Fasana, Kenton, (2011), “Using capabilities to drive military transformation: an alternative framework”, *Armed Forces & Society*, 37(1):141-162.

Fayemi, Kayode, (1998), “The Future of Demilitarization and civil military relations in West Africa: Challenges and Prospects for Democratic Consolidation”, *African Journal of Political Science*, 3(1): 82-103.

Feaver, Peter, (1996), “The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz and the Question of Civilian Control”, *Armed Forces & Society*, 23(2): 149-178.

Feaver, Peter, (1999), “Civil-military relations”, *Annual Review of Political Science*, 2:211-41.

Feaver, Peter, (2016), “Civil–Military Relations and Policy: A Sampling of a New Wave of Scholarship”, *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 40(1-2):1-18.

Foster, Gregory, (2005), “Civil-Military Relations: The Postmodern Democratic Challenge” *World Affairs*, 167(3):91-100.

Francesco Bertolazzi, (2010), *Women with a Blue Helmet: The Integration of Women and Gender Issues in UN Peacekeeping Missions*, Santo Domingo: United Nations International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women (UN-INSTRAW).

Ganle, John, (2015), “Ethnic Disparities in Utilization of Maternal Health Care Services in Ghana: Evidence from the 2007 Ghana Maternal Health Survey”, *Ethnicity and Health* 21(1):1-17.

Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Force (DCAF) (2000), “Defence Reform”, *Backgrounder* 10.

Gocking, Roger, (1996), “Ghana's Public Tribunals: An Experiment in Revolutionary Justice”, *African Affairs*, 95(379):197-223.

Goldschmidt, Jenny, (1980), “Ghana between the Second and the Third Republic Era: Recent Constitutional Development and their Relation to Traditional Laws and Institutions", *African Law Studies*, 81:43-61.

Goldsworthy, David, (1981), “Civilian Control of the Military in Black Africa”, *African Affairs*, 80(318): 49-74.

Guillem, Piella, (2016), “Transforming the Spanish Military”, *Defence Studies*, 16(1): 1-19.

Gutteridge, William, (1967), “The Political Role of African Armed Forces: The Impact of Foreign Military Assistance”, African *Affairs*, 66(263):93-103.

Gyimah-Boadi, Emmanuel, (1994), “Ghana's Uncertain Political Opening", Journal *of democracy*, 5(2), pp. 75-86.

Gyimah-Boadi, Emmanuel, (2009), “Another Step Forward for Ghana", *Journal of Democracy*, 20(2): 138-152.

Gyimah-Boadi, Emmanuel, (2015), “Africa’s Waning Democratic Commitment”, *Journal of Democracy*, 26(1): 101-113.

Hall, Lynn, (2011), “The Importance of Understanding Military Culture”, *Social Work in Health Care*, 50(1): 4-18.

Haltiner, Karl, (2002), “Democratic Control of Armed Forces: Renaissance of an old Issue? *Working Paper Series*, No. 45, Geneva: DCAF.

Handley, Antoinette and Mills, Greg, (2001), “From Military Coups to Multiparty Elections: The Ghanaian Military-Civil Transition", *Working Paper* 2, November, Hague: Netherlands International Institute of International Relations, Clingendael.

Haynes, Jeffrey, (2003), “Democratic Consolidation in Africa: The Problematic Case of Ghana”, *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*, 41(1):48-76.

Haynes, Jeffrey, (1993), “Sustainable Democracy in Ghana: Problems and Prospects”, *Third World Quarterly*, 14(3):451-67.

Heineken, Lindy (1998), “The Challenges of Transformation: SANDF Officers' Attitudes towards Integration, Affirmative Action, Women in Combat and Language Usage”, *Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies*, 28(2):220-235.

Heinecken, Lindy, (2017), “Conceptualizing the Tensions Evoked by Gender Integration in the Military: the South African Case”, *Armed Forces & Society*, 43(2):202-220.

Hettne, Bjorn, (1980), “Soldiers and Politics: The Case of Ghana”, *Journal of Peace Research*, 17(2):173–93.

Horowitz, Dan, (1987), “Strategic limitations of a ‘nation in arms”, *Armed Forces & Society*, 13 (2): 277–294.

Houngnikpo, Mauthrin, (2012), “Africa's Militaries: A Missing Link in Democratic Transition”, *Africa Security Brief*, January.

Howe, Kenneth, (1988), “Against the quantitative-qualitative incompatibility thesis or dogmas die hard”, *Educational Researcher*, 17(8):10-16.

Huntington, Samuel, (1984), “Will More Countries Become Democratic?” *Political Science Quarterly*, 99(2): 193–218.

Hutchful, Eboe (1985), “IMF Adjustment in Ghana since 1966”, *Africa Development*, 10(1/2): 122-136.

Hutchful, Eboe, (1979), “Organizational Instability in African Military: The Ghanaian Army”, *International Social Science Journal*, 31:606-618.

Hutchful, Eboe, (1995), “Why Regimes Adjust: the World Bank Ponders its “Star Pupil”, *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, 29(2):303:317.

Hutchful, Eboe, (1997a), “Reconstructing Civil-Military Relations and the Collapse of Democracy in Ghana, 1979-81", *African Affairs*, 96:535-560.

Hutchful, Eboe, (1997b), “Demilitarization the political process in Africa: Some Basic Issues”, *Africa Security Review*, 6(2):3-16.

Hutchful, Eboe, (1997c), “Military Policy and Reform in Ghana”, *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 35(2): 251-278.

IMANI Ghana (2011), “The Dangers of Military Commercialization in Ghana”, *IMANI Report*, August, 8.

Jackson, Ronald, Darlene, Drummond and Sakile, Camara, (2007), “What is Qualitative Research?”, *Qualitative Research Reports in Communication*, 8(1):21-28.

Jaye, Thomas, (2008), “Liberia’s Security Sector Legislation”, Geneva: Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF).

Jeffries, Richard, (1992), “Urban Popular Attitudes towards the Economic Recovery Programme and the PNDC Government in Ghana”, *African Affairs*, 91(363):207-226;

Jeffries, Richard, and Thomas, Clare, (1993), "The Ghanaian Elections of 1992", *African Affairs*, 92:331-66.

Jenkins, Craig, and Kposawa, Augustine, (1992), “The Political Origins of African Military Coups: Ethnic Competition, Military Centrality, and the Struggle over the Postcolonial States”, *International Studies Quarterly*, 36(3):271-291.

Jeong, Ho-Won, (1995), “Liberal Economic Reform in Ghana: A Contested Political Agenda”, *Africa Today*, 42(4): 82-104

Jibrin, Ibrahim, (2003), “Democratic Transitions in Anglophone West Africa”, *Monograph Series*, Dakar: CODESRIA.

Jockers, Heinz, Kohnert, Dirk, and Nugent, Paul, (2009), “The Successful Ghana Election of 2008: A Convenient Myth? Ethnicity in Ghana's Elections Revisited”, *SSRN Electronic Journal*, January.

Johnson, Burke, and Onwuegbuzie, Anthony, (2004), “Mixed Methods Research: A Research Paradigm whose Time has Come”, *Educational Researcher*, 33(7): 14-26.

Johnson, Thomas, Slater, Robert, McGowan, Patrick, (1984), “Explaining African Military Coups d’états, 1960-1982”, *The American Political Science Review*, 78(3): 622-640.

Kan-Dapaah, Albert, (2015), “Parliament’s Role in the Fight against Corruption”, Accra: Institute for Economic Affairs.

Karikari, Kwame, (1993), “Africa: The press and democracy”, *Race and Class* 34(3): 55-66.

Killingray, David, (1982), "Military and Labour Recruitment in the Gold Coast during the Second World War", *Journal of African History,* 23(1): 83-95.

Kohn, Richard, (1997), "An Essay on Civilian Control of the Military," *American Diplomacy*

Kohn, Richard, (2008), "Coming Soon: A Crisis in Civil-Military Relations", *World Affairs Journal*, Winter.

Kopecký, Petr, (2011), "Political Competition and Party Patronage: Public Appointments in Ghana and South Africa", *Political Studies,* 59(3):713-730.

Kotia, Emmanuel, (2011), "The Principle and Reality of Legislative Oversight in Defence Matters in Liberal Democracies: An Empirical Case", *Journal of Alternative Perspectives in the Social Sciences,* 3(1):57-71.

Krepinevich, Andrew, (1992), "The Military-Technical Revolution a Preliminary Assessment", Paper Prepared for the Office of Net Assessment. Washington, DC: Centre for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.

Kugler, Richard, (2006*),* "Policy Analysis in National Security Affairs: New Methods for a New Era", Washington, DC: National Defence University Press.

Kusi, Newman, (1991), "Ghana: Can Adjustment Reforms be Sustained?", *Africa Development,* 16(3/4) 181-206.

Le Roux, Len, (2003), "Defence Sector Transformation", *African Security Review*, 12(3): 5-15.

Le Vine, Victor, (1987), "Autopsy on a Regime: Ghana's Civilian Interregnum 1969-72" *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 25(1):169-178.

Levy, Yagil, (2007), "Soldiers as Labourers: A Theoretical Model", *Theory and Society*, 36(2): 187-208.

Levy, Yagil, (2012), "A Revised Model of Civilian Control of the Military: The Interaction Between the Republican Exchange and the Control Exchange", *Armed Forces & Society*, 38(4): 529-556.

Levy, Yagil, (2016a), "Control from within: How Soldiers control the military", *European Journal of International Relations,* 1-25.

Levy, Yagil, (2016b), "What is controlled by Civilian Control of the Military? Control of the Military vs. Control of Militarization", *Armed Forces & Society*, 42(1):75-98.

Lijphart, Arend, (1971), "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method", *The American Political Science Review*, 65(3):691.

Lindberg, Steffan and Clark, John, (2008) "Does Democratization Reduce the Risk of Military Interventions in Politics in Africa?" *Democratization*, 15(1):86 – 105.

Longdon, Jonathan, (2011), "Democracy Re-Examined: Ghanaian Social Movement Learning and the Re-articulation of Learning in Struggle", *Studies in the Education of adults*, 43(2): 147-163.

Luckham, Robin, (1994), "The Military, Militarization and Democratization in Africa: A Survey of Literature and Issues", *African Studies Review*, 37(2):13-75.

Luckham, Robin, (1996), "Crafting Democratic Control Over the Military: A Comparative Analysis of South Korean, Chile and Ghana," *Democratization*, 3(3):215-245.

Lunn, Simon, (2002), "The Democratic Control of Armed Forces in Principle and Practice", *The Quarterly Journal*, No.4, December.

Maltby, Sarah, Thornham, Helen, and Bennett, Daniel, (2015), "Capability in the Digital: Institutional Media Management and its Dis/Contents" *Information, Communication & Society*, 18 (11):1275-1296.

Marshal, Martin, (1996), "Sampling for Qualitative Research", *Family Practice*, 13(16):522-525.

Maurice, Garnier, (1972), "Changing Recruitment Patterns and Organizational Ideology: The Case of a British Military Academy", *Administrative Science Quarterly* 17, no. 4: 499-507.

Mileham, Patrick (1999), "Military Virtues: The Right to be Different?, *Defence Analysis*, 14(2):169-189.

Møller, Bjørn, (2003), "Raising Armies in a Rough Neighbourhood: The Military and Militarism in Southern Africa", *Development Research Series*, Working Paper No. 118, Research Centre on Development and International Relations (RCDIR).

Murphy, Elizabeth, and Dingwall, Robert, (2007), "Informed Consent, Anticipatory Regulation and Ethnographic Practice", *Social Science & Medicine*, 65: 2223-2234.

Ngoma, Naison, (2006a), "Civil-Military Relations in Africa: Navigating Uncharted Waters", *African Security Review*, 15(4): 98-111.

Ngoma, Naison, (2006b), "Myths and Realities of Civil-Military relations in Africa and the Search for Peace and Development", *Journal of Security Sector Management*, 4(1):1-28.

Ninsin, Kwame, (1993), "Some Problems in Ghana's Transition to Democratic Governance", *African Development*, 18(2):5-22.

Ninsin, Kwame, (1987), "Ghanaian Politics after 1981: Revolution or Evolution?", *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, 21(1):17-37.

Norheim-Martinsen, Per, (2016), "New sources of military change –Armed Forces as Normal Organizations", *Defence Studies*, 16 (3), 312–326.

Ocquaye, Mike, (1995), "Human Rights and the Transition to Democracy in the PNDC in Ghana", *Human Rights Quarterly*, 17(3):566-573.

Omitoogun, Wuyi, (2003), "Military Expenditure Data in Africa. A Survey of Cameroon, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and Uganda", *SIPRI Research Report* No. 17, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Onwuegbuzie, Anthony, and Leech, Nancy, (2007), "Sampling Designs in Qualitative Research: Making the Sampling Process More Public", *The Qualitative Report*, 12(2): 238-254.

Onwuegbuzie, Anthony, and Leech, Nancy, (2005), "On becoming a pragmatic researcher: The Importance of Combining Quantitative and Qualitative Research Methodologies", *International Journal of Social Research Methodology*, 8(5): 375-387.

Open Society for West Africa (OSIWA), Institute for Democratic Governance (IDEG) and Afrimap, (2007), "Ghana: Democracy and Political Participation", Dakar: OSIWA.

Opoku, Darko, (2008), "Political Dilemmas of Indigenous Capitalist Development in Africa: Ghana under the Provisional National Defence Council", *Africa Today*, 55(2): 25-50.

Oquaye, Mike, (2013), "Addressing the Imbalance between the Arms of Government: Search for Countervailing Authority", *Institute of Economic Affairs Newsletter*, 19(5), Accra: Institute for Economic Affairs.

Ottaway, Marina, (2003), "Democracy Challenged: The Rise of Semi-Authoritarian Regimes", Washington D.C., Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Ouedraogo, Emile (2014), "Advancing Military Professionalism in Africa", *Research Paper* No.6, Washington, DC: Africa Centre for Strategic Studies.

Owens, Mackubin, (2008), "Scholar and Gentleman, Sam Huntington, R.I.P", *National Review Online*, 1. December 29.

Owusu, Michael, (1997), “Domesticating Democracy: Culture, Civil Society, and Constitutionalism in Africa", *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 39(1):120-152.

Owusu, William, (2011), “The Ghanaian Media Landscape: How Unethical Practices of Journalists Undermine Progress”, *Reuters Institute Fellowship Paper*, Oxford University.

Pershing, Jana, (2003), “Why Women Don’t Report Sexual Harassment: A Case study of an elite Military Institution”, *Gender Issues*, 21(4):3-30.

Pfaffenzeller, Stephen, (2010), “Conscription and Democracy: The Mythology of Civil-Military relations”, Armed Forces & Society, 36(3):481 –504.

Podder, Sunkaya, (2013), “Bridging the ‘Conceptual–Contextual’ Divide: Security Sector Reform in Liberia and UNMIL Transition”, *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding*, 7(3): 353-380.

Prezelj, Iztok, Erik Kopač, AlešŽiberna, Kolak, Anja and Anton, Grizold, (2016), “Quantitative monitoring of military transformation in the period 1992–2010: Do the Protagonists of Transformation Really Change More than Other Countries?”, *Defence Studies*, 16(1): 20-46.

Price, Robert, (1971), “Military Officers and Political Leadership: The Ghanaian Case”, Comparative *Politics*, 3(3):361-379.

Price, Robert, (1984), “Neo-colonialism and Ghana’s Economic Decline: A critical assessment”, *Canadian Journal of African studie*s, 18(1): 163-193.

Rabinowitz, Beth and Paul Jargowsky, Paul, (2017), “Rethinking Coup Risk: Rural Coalitions and Coup-Proofing in Sub-Saharan Africa”, *Armed Forces & Society*, XX(X):1-25.

Radelet, Steven, (2010), “Success Stories from 'Emerging' Africa”, *Journal of Democracy*, 21(4): 87-101.

Rahblek-Clemmensin, Jon, Emerald, Archer, John Barr, Aaron Belkin, Mario Guerrero, Cameron Hall, and Katie , Swain, (2012), “Conceptualizing the Civil-Military Gap: A Research Note”, *Armed Forces & Society*, 38(4):669-678.

Ray, Subhasish, (2013), “The Non-martial Origins of the "Martial Races": Ethnicity and Military Service in Ex-British Colonies”, *Armed Forces & Society*, 39(3): 560-575.

Reeves, Audrey, (2011), “*Gender and Security Sector Reform: Examples from the Ground*”, Geneva: DCAF.

Ronning, Helge, (1995), "Democracy, Civil Society and the Media in Africa in the Nineties", A Discussion of the Emergence and Relevance of Some Analytical Concepts for the Understanding of the Situation in Africa", *Innovation: The European Journal of Social Science Research*, 8 (4):335-352.

Rose, Charlie, (1994), "Democratic Control of the Armed Forces: A Parliamentary Role in Partnership for Peace", *NATO Review*, Web Edition, 5(42):13-19.

Robinson, Colin, (2017), "How Might Democratization Affect Military Professionalism in Africa? Reviewing the Literature", *Small Wars & Insurgency*, 28(2): 385-400.

Ruffa, Chiara, (2014), "What Peacekeepers Think and Do: An Exploratory Study of French, Ghanaian, Italian, and South Korean Armies in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon", *Armed Forces & Society*, 40(2):199-225.

Sale, Joanna, Lohfeld, Lynne, and Brazil, Kevin, (2002), "Revisiting the Quantitative-Qualitative: Implications for Mixed-Methods Research", *Quality and Quantity*, 36(1): 43-53.

Salihu, Naila and Aning, Kwesi, (2013), "Do Institutions Matter? Managing Institutional Diversity and Change in Ghana's Fourth Republic", *Policy Brief* No.10, Accra: KAIPTC.

Sandbrook, Richard, and Oelbaum, Jay, (1997), "Reforming Dysfunctional Institutions through Democratization?: Reflections on Ghana", *The Journal of modern African studies*, 35(4): 603-646.

Schiff, Rebecca, (1995), "Civil-Military relations reconsidered: A theory of concordance", *Armed Forces & Society*, 22 (1):7-24.

Shelton, Garth, and Alden, Chris, (1998), "Brave New World: the Transformation of the South African Military", *Comparative Strategy*, 17(4):345-362.

Sherman, Jake, (2009), "Strengthening Security Sector Governance in West Africa", New York: Centre on International Cooperation.

Smith, John, (1983), "Quantitative versus Qualitative Research: An Attempt to Clarify the Issue", *Educational Researcher*, 12(3):6-13.

Snider, Don, (1999), "The Future of Military Culture: An Uninformed Debate on Military Culture", *Orbis*, 43(1):11-26.

Soeters, Joseph and Van Ouytsel, Audrey, (2013), "The Challenge of Diffusing Military Professionalism in Africa", *Armed Forces & Society*, 40(2):252-268.

Souaré, Issaka, (2010), "Critical assessment of security challenges in West Africa", *Situation Report*, Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, October 18.

Souaré, Issaka, (2014), "The African Union as a Norm Entrepreneur on Military Coups d'état in Africa (1952-2012): An Empirical Assessment', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 52(1):69-94.

Sowers, Thomas, (2005), "Beyond the Soldier and the State: Contemporary Operations and Variance in Principal-Agent Relationship," *Armed Forces & Society*, 31(3): 385-409.

Sutton, Inez, (1983), "Labour in Commercial Agriculture in Ghana in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries", *The Journal of African History*, 24: 461-483;

The Military Balance, (2015), "Chapter Nine: Sub-Saharan Africa", 115 (1): 421- 480.

Travis, Donald, (2016), "Saving Samuel Huntington and the Need for Pragmatic Civil-Military Relations", *Armed Forces & Society*, 43(3):395-414.

Tsekpo, Anthony and Hudson, Alan, (2009), "Parliamentary Strengthening and the Paris Principles Ghana Case Study", London: Overseas Development Institute.

Travis, Donald, (2017), "Saving Samuel Huntington and the Need for Pragmatic Civil–Military Relations", *Armed Forces & Society*, 43(3): 395-414.

Tuosto, Kylie, (2008), "The 'Grunt Truth' of Embedded Journalism: The New Media/Military Relationship", *Stanford Journal of International Relations*, x (1):20-31.

Uzoigwe, Godfrey, (1977), "The warrior and the state in precolonial Africa: comparative perspective". *Journal of Asian and African studies*, X111(1-4): 20-48.

Wells, Richard, (1996), "The Theory of Concordance in Civil-Military Relations: A Commentary", *Armed Forces & Societ*y, 23 (2):269-275.

Whitfield, Lindsay, (2009), "Change for a Better Ghana: Party Competition, Institutionalization and Alternation in Ghana's 2008 Election", *African Affairs*, 108(433):621-641.

Williams, David, (2010), "Making a liberal state: 'good' governance in Ghana", *Review of African Political Economy*, 37(126):403-419.

Williams, Rocky (1998),"Towards the Creation of an African civil-military relations tradition", *African Journal of Political Science*, 3(1):20-41.

Williams, Rocky, (2005), "Human Security and the Transformation of the South African Security Environment from 1990-2004: Challenges and Limitations," *Journal of Security Sector Management*, March.

Woodruff, Todd, (2017), "Who Should the Military Recruit? The Effects of Institutional, Occupational, and Self Enhancement Enlistment Motives on Soldier Identification and Behavior", *Armed Forces & Society*, 43(4): 1-29.

World Health Organization, (2009), "Changing cultural and social norms supportive of violent behaviour" *Series of briefings*, Malta: World Health Organization.

Zeff, Eleanor, (1981), "New Directions in Understanding Military and Civilian Regimes in Ghana", African *Studies Review*, 24(1): 49-72.

Newspapers and Magazines

AFnews, (2015a), "Committee to Review GAF UN Peacekeeping Operation Inaugurated", First Quarter, no. 122.

AFnews, (2015b), "Government releases funds for UN Troops", First Quarter, no. 122.

African Defence Forum, (2016), "Profession of Arms: Building a Military Culture that Moulds Ethical Leaders" Volume 8 Quarter 4: 9-13

Akuaku, Bennet, (2009), "Fire at Burma Camp" *Daily Guide*, February 16.

Awiah, Dominic, (2017), "Operation Vanguard Launched to Wipe out Galamsey", *Daily Graphic*, August 01.

Business World Ghana, (2012), "The Business of Peacekeeping", August 25. Available at http://www.businessworldghana.com/the-business-of-peacekeeping/ (accessed on 28 September, 2015).

Daily Graphic, (2011), "Ghanaian Parliament Approve Loans for Acquisition of Military Transport Planes, Surveillance Aircraft", July 21.

Daily Graphic, (2016), "225 Ex-soldiers sue CDS" 13 January 2016.

Daily Graphic, (2015), "C'ttee to Review GAF's Participation in UN operations", January 28

Daily Guide, (2015), "Military brutality!" March 7.

Daily Guide, (2015), "Soldiers Met out Mob Justice", December 30.

Daily Guide, (2015), "Election Security Taskforce Inaugurated", February 13.

Daily Guide, (2016), "Military Probes Army Chief Over Car Gift", June 28;

Daily Guide, (2016), "Compliments to the Military", June 28.

Daybreak, (2001), “Ghana Armed Forces Must Be Regionally Balanced?,” January 21.

Daybreak, (2010), “Ghana Armed Forces: Policy of Regional Balance Under Threat?” August 27.

Frimpong, Daniel, (2015), “Women of Ghana Armed Forces-Bravo!’…My First Ladies...”*Afnews,* Fourth Quarter, p.5.

Ghana Armed Forces Website (2016), “Disclaimer: Ghana Armed Forces Recruitment 2015/2016”, January. Available at http://view.gafonline.mil.gh/ (Accessed on May 1, 2016).

Ghana News Agency, (2016), “Ghana Armed Forces cautions public against recruitment scam", January 18. Available at www.ghanabusinessnew.com (Accessed on May 1, 2016).

Ghana News Agency, (2011), “Ghana will benefit from DIHOC partnership - Defence Minister,” August 6.

The Chronicle, (2014) "Soldiers’ Peace-Keeping Earnings …" 27 January

Odei, J. (2015), “Protocol Recruitment-Ghana Armed Forces”, *Daily Guide,* January 12.

The Ghanaian Times, (2014), “Defence Ministry Saddled with Debt”, December 17,

The Chronicle, (2016), “Soldiers Go Wild Over Unpaid Peacekeeping Cash”, March 31.

The Chronicle, (2016), “Soldiers who tortured 16-year-old boy locked up”, April 23.

The Finder, (2014), “Protocol Recruitment Breeding Crooks into the Military”, 3 September.

The Chronicle, (2010), “Military Academy Shut doors to SHS Graduates: To Pave Way for Degree and Diploma holders”, March 18.

The Chronicle, (2011), “Dealing with Indemnity Clauses in the Constitution”, Editorial, March 3.

Reports

African Security Dialogue and Research (2009), “Workshop Report on Capacity Building for Members of the Parliamentary Select Committee on Defence and Interior and National Stakeholders” 17-19 April, 2009.

Afrobarometer and Centre for Democratic Development (CDD-Ghana) (2014), “Trust and Corruption in Public Institutions: Ghanaian opinions Findings from the Afrobarometer

Round 6 survey in Ghana". Available at http://www.afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/mediabriefing/ghana/gha_r6_presentation3_trust_corruption.pdf(Accessed on May 18, 2016).

CDD-Ghana, (2014), "Ghana Round 5 Afrobarometer Survey: General Findings", Accra: CDD. Available at http://www.afrobarometer.org/results/compendium-of-results (Accessed on February 14, 2014).

Darkwa, Akosua, Amponsah, Nicholas, and Gyampoh, Evans, (2006) "Civil Society in a Changing Ghana: An Assessment of the Current State of Civil Society in Ghana" CIVICUS: Civil Society Index Report for Ghana, World Bank and GAPVOD.

Freedom House (2016), "Freedom in the world, Anxious Dictators, Wavering Democracies: Global Freedom under Pressure", London: Freedom House.

Fox, Leslie, Hofman, Barak, Anyimadu, Amos, Keshishan, Michael, (2011), "Ghana Democracy and Governance Assessment: Final Report" New York: USAID

Ghana Armed Forces, (1996), "Report of the Review of Roles and Structure of the Ghana Armed Forces", Ministry of Defence, Accra, September.

Ghana Civil Service, (2013), "Annual Performance Report of the Civil Service: Strengthening the Performance Management Culture in the Civil Service". Available at http://www.ohcs.gov.gh/sites/default/files/.pdf (Accessed on March 3, 2016).

Ghana Defence Policy, (2012), July, Unpublished Document.

Ghana Statistical Service, (2012), "2010 Population and Housing Census: Summary Report of Final Results", Accra: Ghana Statistical Service.

Houses of Parliament, (2015**), "**UK -Ghana Programme on Defence and Security Parliamentary Scrutiny", 150917/REPORT/GHANA15.
Available at https://www.uk-cpa.org/downloads/file:br3pnoxk5c (Accessed on October 31, 2017).

ICC International Maritime Bureau, (2016), "Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships: Report for the Period 1 Janaury-31 December 2015", London: ICC International Maritime Bureau.

Ministry of Defence (2010), "Medium-Term Development Plan 2010-2013", Accra.

Ministry of Defence, (2014), "Implementation of Sector Medium-Term Development Plan (2014-2017) Annual Progress Report For 2014". Accra.

Mo Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) (2016), "A Decade of African Governance 2006-2015", London: Mo Ibrahim Foundation.

National Commission for Civic Education (2014), "Assessing the effectiveness of Parliament in Ghana's Democracy", Accra: NCCE;

National Democratic Congress (2008), *Manifesto for A Better Ghana, A Better Ghana: Investing in People, Jobs and the Economy.*

New Patriotic Party, (2000), *Development in Freedom: Agenda for Positive Change,*

Republic of Ghana, (1977), *Union Government Report*, paragraph 112, Accra

Republic of Ghana, (1982), PNDC Law 42: Provisional National Defence Council (Establishment) Proclamation (Supplementary and Consequential Provisions) Law. Accra: Government Printer December.

Republic of Ghana, (2014), "The Budget Statement and Economic Policy of the Government of Ghana for the 2015 Financial Year Presented to Parliament on 19 November 2014;

Republic of Ghana, (2015), "The Budget Statement and Economic policy of the Government of Ghana for the 2016 Financial Year Presented to Parliament Friday 13 November 2015.

Svìrák, Antonin, (1997), "Democratic Control of Armed Forces and the Share of the Civilians in the Management of the Department of Defence, including their Preparation for the Exercising of their Functions in Stabilized Democratic States in Europe (Germany, UK, Norway, Austria) and in the Czech Republic", Final Report, Prague: NATO.

Transparency International, (2015), "Government Defence Anti-Corruption Index 2015", London: Transparency International.

Transparency International, (2013), "Governance Defence Anti-Corruption Index Ghana 2013", London: Transparency International.

Wilhelm, German, (2002), "General Principles of the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security and its Role in Developing Democratic Institutions in the OSCE Participating States", Presentation made at the OSCDE/CPC Workshop: Implementation of the Code of Conduct and the Confidence-Building Measures, Bishkek, 25-26 November.

Internet sources

Adu-Gyamfi, Ameyaw, (2017), “Kumasi Shoe Factory on the Verge of Collapse - Dept Defence Mins Laments”, August 17. Available at http://www.peacefmonline.com/pages/local (Accessed on November 6, 2017).

Aning, Kwesi and Aubyn, Festus, (2013b), “Peacekeeping Contributor Profile Ghana”, *Providing for Peacekeeping*, Available at Available at http://www.providingforpeacekeeping.org/2014/04/03/contributor-profile-ghana/ (accessed on 28 September 2015).

Atlantic Council of Montenegro, (2006), “Round table “Assessment of Corruption Risk in the Defence Sector”. Available at http://www.ascg.me/en/sadrzaj/round-table-%E2%80%9Cassessment-corruption-risk-defence-sector%E2%80%9D (accessed on March 2, 2016).

Bondarenko, Veronika, (2017), “'Gratuitously cruel': United Nations guts more than $600 million in funding to global peacekeeping programs”, *Business Insider, Military and Defence*, June 29. Available at http://www.businessinsider.com (Accessed on October 24, 2017).

Biakoye, Nana (2009), “Thank God Damoah has been Axed!!!” November 14. Available at http://wwww.modern.ghanaweb.com, (Accessed on July 21, 2015).

Birikorang, Emma, (2004), "Human Security in Ghana and West Africa". Available at http://centreforforeignpolicystudies.dal.ca/pdf/fff-birikorang.pdf (Accessed on September 15, 2015).

Citifmonline (2015), “Mahama, First Lady Escape Accident After Helicopter ‘Precautionary’ Landing”, July 11. Available at http://citifmonline.com/2015/07/11/ (Accessed on November 28, 2016).

Citifmonline, (2017), “Mahama Begs Parliament to Approve RTI Bill at the 11th hour”, January 5. Available at http://citifmonline.com/2017/01/05/ (accessed on September 19, 2017).

Classfmonline (2017), “MP Challenges Akufo-Addo’s Gambia Troop Deployment” 19 January 2017. Available at http://www.ghanaweb.com (accessed on January 31, 2017).

Collier, Paul, and Hoeffler, Anke, (2004), “The challenge of Reducing the Global Incidence of Civil War”, *Copenhagen Consensus Challenge Paper*, 26 March. Available at http://www.copenhagensonsensus.com/Files/Filer/CC/Papers/Conflicts_230404.pdf (accessed in December 4 2012).

Coleman, Katrina, (2017), “The Dynamics of Peacekeeping Budget Cuts: The Case of MONUSCO”, *IPI Global Observatory,* Available at https://theglobalobservatory.org/2017/07/monusco-drc-peacekeeping-budget-cuts/ (Accessed on October 24, 2017).

Economist Intelligence Unit, (2015), “Ghana: IMF Deal is not a Panacea”. Available at http://country.eiu.com/article.aspx?article. (Accessed 20 September, 2015).

Ghana Armed Forces, (2012), “Ghana Air Force Inaugurates New Officers’ Rank.” September 13. Available at http://www.gaf.mil.gh/index.php?option=com (Accessed on February 15. 2016).

Ghana Armed Forces, (2013), “C-in-C Commissions Four Helicopters for the Ghana Air Force”, January 5. Available at http://www.gaf.mil.gh/index.php (Accessed on November 29, 2016).

Ghana Armed Forces, (2015), “Recruitment into Ghana Armed Forces”. Available at http://www.gaf.mil.gh.

Ghana National Action Plan for the Implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women Peace and Security (GHANAP 1325), October 2010.

Allafricanews, (2008), “Ghana: After the Public Accounts Committee Hearing - What Next?” Available at http://allafrica.com/stories/200711010706.html, (Accessed on June, 3, 2008).

Ghanaweb, (2002), “NPP Recruiting Supporters into Military – JJ”. June 5. Available at http://www.ghanaweb.com (Accessed on May 30, 2016).

Ghanaweb, (2016), “Ethnic Groups”. Available at http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/tribes/ (accessed on January 28, 2016).

Government of Ghana (2015), “Gov't Approves National Gender Policy” Available at www.ghana.gov.gh/index.../1822-govt-approves-national-gender-policy (accessed on February 18, 2016).

Graphiconline (2016), “Constance Edjeani-Afenu becomes Ghana's first female Brigadier-General", March 4. Available at http://www.graphic.com.gh/news/ (Accessed on March 5, 2016).

Graphiconline, (2014), “Loan deal for Ghana Armed Forces divides Parliament” July 16, http://www.graphic.com.gh/news/politics/27131 (accessed on February 29, 2016).

Hopson, Sharon, (2000), "Media Relations", Council for Canadian Security in the 21ST Century. Available at http://www.cc21.org (Accessed on May 16, 2016).

Hsia, Tim, (2011), "The Uneasy Media-Military Relationship", New York Times, June 15. Available at http://atwar.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/06/15/the-uneasy-media-military-relationship (Accessed on May 16, 2016).

Information Service Department, (2017), "Stakeholders Meet to Review Affirmative Action Bill", Available at http://www.ghana.gov.gh/index.php/media-center/news/ (Accessed on September 19, 2017).

Kwadwo Appiagyei-Atua, (nd), "Access to Information and National Security in Ghana: Drawing The Balance". Available at www.right2info.org/resources/publications/pretoria...april (Accessed on February 29, 2016).

Mayring, Philip, (2000), "Qualitative Content Analysis", *Qualitative Social Research*, 1(2), Art. 20. Available at http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0114-fqs0002204 (Accessed on June 24, 2013).

Modernghananews, (2009), 'Veep commission's new ministry of defence building', December 24. Available at http://www.modernghana.com (Accessed on September 9, 2015).

Myjoynoline.com, (2014), "GAF introduces Humane Reforms for Military Training", February 19. Available at www.myjoyonilne.com (Accessed on February 20, 2014).

Myjoyonline (2013), "Military Command Apologizes to GJA, Journalists", May 9. Available at http://edition.myjoyonline.com/pages (accessed on May 09, 2013).

Myjoyonline, (2016), "Culture of Impunity Grows within Police, Army as Brutalities Go Unpunished", Available at http:www.myjoyonline.com (Accessed on May 5, 2016).

Myjoyonline.com (2013), "Ghana Armed Force Sanctions 22 Soldiers", June 3. Available at htttp://myyoyonline.comnews (Accessed on June 03, 2013).

Myjoyonline.com (2015), "Ghana to Review its Peacekeeping Operations", May 31. Available at http://www.myjoyonline.com/news/2015/may-31st (Accessed on September 28, 2015).

Myjoyonline.com (2016), "Military Denies Clearing 23 Men in Kasoa Shooting", April 22. Available at http:// www.myjoyonline.com (Accessed on May 3, 2016).

Nyabor, Jonas, (2017), "We'll pass RTI Bill this year – Bawumia", February 2. Available at citifmonline.com. (Accessed on October 24, 2017).

National Media Commission and BBC Media Development Initiative, (N.d), "Ghana Country Report". Available at http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/trust/pdf/AMDI/ghana/amdi_ghana7_newspapers.pdf (Accessed on May 2, 2016).

Peacefmonline, (2015), "Ghana Armed Forces confirm dismissal of 500 recruits" December 26. Available at http://www.ghanaweb.com (Accessed on January 18, 2016).

Peacefmonline, (2014), "Soldiers before CHRAJ for making Worlasi Sweep", June 15, available at https://news.peacefmonline.com/pages/social/201406/203661 (Accessed on June 16, 2014).

Myjoyonline (2013), "GJA Fumes over Military's 'one sided' Investigation on Journalist Assaults", April 25, Available at http://edition.myjoyonline.com/tgnews (Accessed on April 26, 2013).

Prah, Prince (2011), "Why Ewe Officers and Men Hate Regional Balance in GAF! " January 28, Available at http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/features/Why-Ewe-Officers-And-Men-Hate-Regional-Balance (Accessed on January 19, 2016).

Prah, Prince, (2010), "Kokofu Appointments and Promotions in Armed Forces", July 10, available at http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Kokofu-Appointments-and-Promotions-in- (Accessed on January 19, 2016).

Prah, Prince, (2014), "Agbadza and Batakari Promotions" available at https://www.modernghana.com/print/581257/1/agbadza-and-batakari-promotions.html (Accessed on January 19, 2016).

Statement made by the press secretary to the president, Mr. Andrews Awuni. Available at http://ghana.gov.gh/ghana/presidency_issues_statement_purchase_presidential_jet.jsp, (accessed, 3 June 2008). Cited in Aning and Lartey (2009).

Supreme Court of Ghana, (2013), "Judgment of the Presidential Election Petition", Writ No. J1/6/2013, 29th August. Available at http://www.africanelections.org, (Accessed on October 12, 2015).

United Kingdom House of Commons, (2015), "Decision-making in Defence Policy". Available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa (Accessed on June 21, 2016).

United Nations (2015), "Ranking of Military and Police Contributions to UN Operations" July. Available at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2015/jul15_2.pdf (accessed on 9 September, 2015).

Yeebo, Zaaya, (2007), “Rawlings: A Threat to Democracy", May, *The Ghanaian Oracle*. Available at https://ghanaianoracle.wordpress.com/category/zaya-yeebo (accessed on August 23, 2015).

Thesis/Dissertations/Unpublished Works

Aholo, Francisca,(2016), “The Implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325: Role Of The Ghana Armed Forces in Ensuring Female Inclusion in Peace Support Operations”, Dissertation Submitted to the University of Ghana, Legon, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Award of Master Of Arts Degree in International Affairs.

Aubyn, Festus and Lartey, Ernest, “Assessing the Electoral Security Architecture of Ghana", *KAIPTC Monograph* (unpublished).

Armah, Auguster, (2013), “Breaking the Glass ceiling in the security sector: a comparative analysis of women’s promotion in GAF and Police Service”, Thesis submitted to KAIPTC in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of Master of Arts in Gender, Peace and Security.

Brewoo, Serwaa, (2013), “Examining the Roles of Ghanaian Female Peacekeepers in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: The Case of The Ghana Armed Forces and the Ghana Police Service”, Thesis submitted to KAIPTC in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of Master of Arts in Gender, Peace and Security.

Nti, Nana Bemma, “The Queen Mother’s Speech: A Feminist Analysis of Yaa Asantewaa’s Legacy and Resolution 1325” (Unpublished).

Danso-Ankrah, John, (2011), “Military-Media Dichotomy and its Impact on Military Operations in West Africa”. Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree in Master of Military Art and Science.

Iskra, Darlene (2007), “Breaking through the glass ceiling: elite military women’s strategies for success,” Thesis submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the University of Maryland, College Park in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Minaudo, Michael, (2009), “The Civil-Military Relations Cube: A Synthesis Framework for Integrating Foundational Theory, Research, and Practice in Civil-Military Relations”, A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the SE 704 Civil-Military Relations, Newport: Naval War College.

Available at http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA499826 (Accessed on April 25, 2013).

Owusu, Ursula, (2015), "Legislative Oversight of the Security Sector: A case study of the Defence and Interior Select Committee of the Parliament of Ghana". Dissertation submitted to KAIPTC in partial fulfilment of the award of Master of Arts in Conflict, Peace and Security.

Pantah, A.M. (2002), "Ghana-Togo Relations under the National Democratic Congress (NDC) Government", Unpublished thesis. Available at http://datad.aau.org/handle (accessed on 10 September 2015).

Official Documents

Standing Orders of Parliament, Order 158 under 'Functions and Powers of Committees, November 2000.

Ghana Armed forces (1970), "Armed Forces Regulations (Administration)", Volume 1. Section 2.21–12.40.

Ghana Armed Forces (1970), Ghana Armed Forces Regulations V1.

Ghana Armed Forces, (2013), *Draft PSO Doctrine by GHQ (IPSO)*, Accra: Armed Forces Printing Press.

Republic of Ghana, (1996), Security Services and Intelligence Act 526

Republic of Ghana, (n.d.), 'The Search for True Democracy in Ghana. Accra: Information Services Department, 10-11

Conference Papers

Johnson, (2001), "Military public relations in the Americas: learning to promote the flow", Paper Presented at Panel for Military-Media Relations, Centre for Hemispheric Studies, Washington DC, 22-25 May, Cited in Caparini

ANNEXES

ANNEX A

Interviewees

1. Air Vice Marshal Edem Dovlo (Retired)
2. Brigadier-General Charles Richter-Addo(Retired)
3. Colonel Charles Adu-Brempong
4. Brigadier-General Francis Adu-Amanfo (Retired)
5. Mr Halidu Fuseine,Chief Director, Ministry of Defence
6. Dr Benjamin Kunbour, Former Minister of Defence
7. Commander Ali Kamal-Deen, Director of Research GAFCSC
8. Stuart Cattermal,
9. John Bowkett
10. Real-Admiral Matthew Quarshie
11. Lt Colonel George Wilson
12. Major Aaron Osei
13. Lt Colonel Clement Dingame
14. Lt Colonel Lawrence Deku,
15. Brigadier-General Emmanuel Kotia
16. Commander Daniel Hedrick, Office Security Cooperation, US Embassy Accra
17. Lt Colonel Ben Richards, UK High Commission, Accra
18. Major-General Arnold Quainoo (Retired)
19. Dr Kwesi Aning
20. Honorable Major Derik Oduro (Retired), MP
21. POI Augustina
22. Brigadier-General Daniel Frimpong (Retired)
23. Corporal Boadu
24. Lt Colonel T Baa-tabana
25. Lt. Colonel S Arhin
26. Colonel Mbawine Atintande (Retired)
27. Major-General Carl Coleman(Retired)
28. Lt Commander Veronica
29. 45 anonymous civilians from Accra, Kumasi and Cape Coast.

ANNEX B

Interview Questions

Retired and Active Military Personnel and Civilians

1. Can you tell me more about role of armed forces in Ghana's contemporary democratic dispensation?
2. What is the strategic defence direction of Ghana?
3. What measures have been taken to bring about cultural transformation in the Ghana Armed Forces?
4. How has the Ghana Armed Forces transformed its human resources with regards to ethnic and regional composition?
5. What measures have been taken to ensure gender balance in the armed forces?
6. What are some of the operational factors that impact on female representation in the armed forces?
7. How does the Ghana Armed Forces ensure that the conducts and character of the institution conforms to the political features of the democracy within which it is located?
8. Can you throw some light on the organizational or technocratic processes taken to transform the Ghana Armed Forces with regard to size and capability?
9. Can shed some light on the recruitment process of the Ghana Armed Forces?
10. Is the armed forces rightly sized, trained and equipped to carry out its internal and external functions effectively?
11. How is the procurement process in the Ghana Armed Forces implemented?
12. How efficient is the operational process of the Ghana Armed Forces?
13. Civil-military relations envisage partnership with between the armed forces, and civilian authority, and the armed forces and the general society. What is the nature of the relationship between the armed forces and civilian authority?
14. To what extent is the direction and administration of the armed forces demilitarized?
15. Should civilian technocrats be given more responsibility with regards to the administration, financial administration, and procurement process and resource development of the armed forces?
16. How is the relationship between the armed force and the general society?
17. How people friendly is the Ghana Armed Forces?
18. How has the growth and diversification of Ghana's economy impacted on the military?

19. To what extent has support by international development partners contribute to enhancing professionalism among the officers and other ranks of the Ghana Armed Forces?
20. To what extent is the transformation process in the Ghana Armed Forces locally driven?

Members of parliamentary committee on defence and interior

1. For how long have you served on this committee?
2. Do you have previous military experience?
3. What is the role of armed forces in the contemporary democratic dispensation?
4. As a member of parliament, what is your understanding of parliamentary oversight of the military?
5. How does parliament perform is oversight role over the military?
6. Are members of parliament adequately prepared and equipped with the technical knowledge on management of defence in Ghana?
7. How transparent is the process of defence budgeting in Ghana?
8. Does parliament scrutinize the defence budget submitted by the ministry of defence?
9. Do you think the Ghana Armed Forces in its current state is rightly sized and equipped carry out its internal and external functions?
10. In your opinion, has anything changed in the Ghana Armed Forces with regards to organizational culture?
11. Does parliament have any oversight role on the appointments and promotions in the armed forces?
12. As a member of parliament have you ever seen the country's defence policy?
13. How has the growth and diversification of Ghana's economy impacted on the military?
14. Is the Ghana armed force efficiently managed?
15. Does parliament have any role in the reform process of the Ghana Armed Forces?

Ministers of Defence

1. Can you please shed some light on your experience as a minister of defence?
2. Does the political culture of the country support civilian oversight of the military?
3. How does the military accept civilian control?

4. What were some initiatives you introduced during your tenure to bring about change in the management and operation of the armed forces?
5. How has the growth and diversification of Ghana's economy impacted on the military?
6. During your tenure did you see any changes in the outlook of the military toward civilian authority?
7. In your opinion, has anything changed in the Ghana Armed Forces with regards to organizational culture?
8. In your opinion how effective are the Ghana armed forces in carry out internal and external security functions?
9. Is the Ghana Armed Forces efficiently managed?

ANNEX C

Questionnaire for Civilians in Accra, Kumasi, Cape Coast

You are kindly being invited to participate in a research project in Defence and Security being conducted by a PhD student of Cranfield University, UK. The overall aim of the research is to undertake an enquiry into the process of defence transformation in Ghana since 1992, and the implications for civil-military relations and democratic consolidation.

Your responses are voluntary and will be confidential. Responses will not be identified by individual. All responses will be compiled together and analysed as a group.

A. **BACKGROUND INFORMATION**

1. Age:
2. City/Town of Residence:
3. Profession:
4. Organization:
5. Gender:
6. Educational Background (Please tick as appropriate)

   a. Basic Education

   b. Secondary Education

   c. Tertiary Education

   d.

Other……

B. Civil-Military Relations

8. What do you know about the Ghana Armed Forces?.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....

9. Have you ever interacted with military personnel? A. Yes B. No.

if yes where and under what
circumstances?.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....

10. Does Ghana need armed forces? A. Yes. B. No.

if yes why
……
……
……
……
…….
……..

if no,
why?.....
.....
.....
.....
.....

11. In your opinion, what is the role of the armed forces in the country's governance process?.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....

12. Do you see the armed forces as a partner in Ghana's development process? A. Yes B. No

if yes why?

……
……
……
……
……
……
……

If no,
why?.....
.....
.....
.....
.....

13. What is your general impression about the Ghana Armed Forces

……
……
……
……
……
……
……

14. Have you ever visited any military barracks? A. Yes B. No

if yes
where?.....
.....

15. If yes, how did you feel being in a military
environment?.....
.....
.....

16. Is the Ghana Armed Forces people-friendly? A. Yes B. No

if yes
why?.....
.....
.....
.....
.....

If no,
why?.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....

17. Would you like to join the military? A. Yes B. No

If yes
why……
……
……
……
……
……
……
…….

If no
why……
……
……
……
……
……
……
…….

18. Would you encourage any member of your family to join the military?

A. Yes B. No

ANNEX D

CONSENT FORM

Naila Salihu
Centre for International Security & Resilience
Cranfield University
Defence Academy of the United Kingdom
Shrivenham, Swindon
SN6 8LA

You are kindly being invited to participate in a research project being conducted by Naila Salihu, a PhD student of Cranfield University. Before you decide to participate in this study, you should read the information provided on this consent form and ask questions about anything that you do not understand.

I agree to participate in this research project entitled ***Defence Transformation in West Africa: Perspectives from Ghana***, which is being conducted by the researcher.

I agree that the following points have been explained to me:

1. **The Purpose of the Research**: The overall aim of the study is to undertake an enquiry into the process of defence transformation in Ghana. Specifically, the study seeks to achieve the following objectives:

a) Investigate and examine Ghana's process at transforming her defence sector in line with the democratic principles;

b) Relate the theories and principles of civil-military relations and defence transformation to the Ghanaian case

c) Examine the contribution of Ghana's defence sector towards consolidation of democracy; and

d) Identify the lessons other countries in the sub-region and the continent could draw from Ghana.

2. **Explanation of Procedures**: In this study, you will be asked a number questions to solicit your responses and perspectives on a number of questions relating to Defence Transformation and Civil-Military Relations in Ghana.

3**. Answering the Questions:** While you are encouraged to answer all the questions to the best of your knowledge, you do not have to answer any question you do not feel inclined to answer.

4. **Time Required**: The expected for answering the questions is estimated at 30-40 minutes.

5. **Risk or Discomfort**: There are no risks or discomforts anticipated in participating in this study. So kindly relax and provide your candid responses to the questions.

6. **Benefits**: There are no financial incentives for participating in this study

7. **Confidentiality**: Any views expressed in this study will be treated as confidential, and no identifying information will be released to others unless required by law or with your consent. Responses from subjects will NOT fed directly back to the 'Gatekeepers' and will not be attributed to individuals but will be analysed as a group.

8. **Inclusion Criteria for Participation**: To participate in this study, you must be 18 years old or more and you must be affiliated to either defence sector in Ghana or citizen of Ghana.

9. Subjects have the right to withdraw their data for one week and after which it will not be possible as the data will be anonymized in the data pool

---

I agree and give my consent to participate in this research project. I understand that participation is voluntary and that I may withdraw my consent at any time without penalty.

Signature of Participant or Legally Authorized Representative, Date

Verbal consent was given by the participant via the email/phone on…….

_____

Signature of Investigator, Date

_____

_____

PLEASE SIGN BOTH COPIES, KEEP ONE AND RETURN THE OTHER TO THE RESEARCHER.

Research at Cranfield University that involves human participants is carried out under the oversight of the Management **Research Ethics Committee (MREC).** Questions or problems regarding these activities should be addressed to **Management Research Ethics Committee (MREC)** of the Cranfield School of Management, **Cranfield University Defence Academy of the United Kingdom Shrivenham, Swindon SN6 8LA**

Naila Salihu
Student
Ph.D. Programme in International Defence and Security
Cranfield University
E-mail: n.salihu@cranfield.ac.uk/ naila.salihu@kaiptc.org
Phone: +233 244 99 3363

Dr. Laura Cleary
Supervisor
Head of the Centre for International Security & Resilience
Cranfield University
Defence Academy of the United Kingdom
Shrivenham, Swindon
SN6 8LA
Email: l.cleary@cranfield.ac.uk

BACK COVER